Sendero Luminoso



An Annotated Bibliography of the Shining Path Guerrilla Movement

1980-1993

Peter A. Stern

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SENDERO LUMINOSO:

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Peter A. Stern

Foreword by Carlos Iván Degregori

Discard

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Dedicated to the memory of Shelley Miller (1954-1994):
bibliotecaria, amiga, compañera excelente

"Throw a party and invite all our friends."
--Bette Davis in *Dark Victory*

"Think where man's glory most begins and ends,
And say my glory was I had such friends."
--William Butler Yeats

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Foreword

Carlos Iván Degregori

"It is yet unclear whether the Spartan fundamentalism inherent in the Shining Path belongs to the continent's past or to its future; it is certainly a determining feature of Peru's present." Jorge Castañeda wrote that sentence in 1993.* In 1995 Sendero Luminoso (SL) is no longer a decisive actor in Peruvian politics. But the first part of the sentence remains true. The possibility that other groups equally efficient, violent, and regressive could surface in Peru or in other countries of Latin America, has not disappeared.

For this reason it is important to try and understand a phenomenon like SL, which from its violent eruption upon the Peruvian scene in 1980 until its decline in 1992-93 has confounded observers. Much was discussed and debated in the first years of the so-called *guerra popular,* about the supposed *senderista* silence. But there can be no debate about the enormous quantity of information and analysis accumulated over fourteen years of internal war.

The present work by Peter Stern puts into order for the first time the materials published on the Shining Path in Peru and the United States. This is the first professional, detailed bibliography, covering a range of years, with pertinent, intelligent, and respectful commentary, which permits any studious person to find his or her path in the labyrinth of *senderología.* All points of view are represented, including that of the Communist Party of Peru--Shining Path, whose principal documents are included in the bibliography.

I believe that one can find in the arduous task undertaken by Stern not only a professional objective fully realized, but also a genuine concern for Peru and a desire to see that such a disastrous war is not repeated in our hemisphere. The book fully meets these objectives, and will be a fundamental tool for political scientists, historians, policy makers and all those interested in understanding the rise and fall of the most extravagant and deadly political group which my country, and perhaps all of Latin America, has ever seen.

Madison, Wisconsin
February, 1995

*Jorge Castañeda. *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War.* New York: Vintage Books, 1993, p.128.

Preface and Acknowledgments

This annotated bibliography consists of monographs and periodical articles; it does not include newspapers, Peruvian or U.S. While a great deal of good reporting on the war has come from such sources, problems with dependable access to complete runs of Peruvian papers made me decide to forgo any newspaper stories. (Every rule has its exceptions, and so there are two citations from*The New York Times* op-ed page, included because they are first-hand accounts, and in order to alert the reader to watch for a forthcoming monograph from the author.) The first items in the bibliography are some obscure pamphlets by a dogmatic splinter faction of the Peruvian Communist Party. It continues with the first mention I found of Shining Path in a small, leftist Peruvian weekly in the fall of 1980; it ends with a series of articles published in the leading Peruvian human rights journal in December, 1993 speculating on the significance of Abimael Guzmán's offer to negotiate with the government of Alberto Fujimori after thirteen years of bloodshed and horror.

The books and magazine articles come from a myriad of sources. Principally, the books are those classified under the subject headings "Sendero Luminoso," or "Terrorism--Peru" in the bibliographic databases RLIN and OCLC. The journal articles come mainly from social science indexes, such as *PAIS, Social Sciences Index, Reader's Guide, Historical Abstracts,* and of course, the *Hispanic American Periodicals Index (HAPI)* and the *Handbook of Latin American Studies,* as well as the University of Miami North-South Center's "Info-South" database. Still more citations came from database utilities such as ProQuest, FirstSearch, Eureka, and the Expanded Academic Index. In addition, a number of senderologists were kind enough to share additional sources with me.

Every item in the bibliography was examined first hand. The emphasis throughout the work is on materials which are available in libraries in the United States; for this reason, a small number of interesting titles which appear in indices, but cannot be located or are inaccessible, are excluded from the bibliography. Because of the enormous mass of information available on the war in Peru, some degree of selectivity was necessary to keep the bibliography to a manageable length. The primary emphasis is on Sendero Luminoso. Many pieces on refugees, human rights abuses, the narcotics trade, APRA, IU, Peruvian politics, MRTA, the military, and Andean culture are included, but they are secondary to a focus upon Shining Path itself.

Virtually every magazine article on Sendero published in the United States is included. Not every Peruvian article is. *Quehacer* and *Debate* are present *in toto,* but only selected pieces from journals such as *Caretas, Oiga,* and *Equis X* are included. Since the emphasis is on scholarly interpretations of, or in-depth pieces on Shining Path, many stories which chronicled the course of the war (especially in *Caretas*), were excluded. For this reason there are also no FBIS or JPRS translations or reports. *Equis X,* whose journalistic zeal and ideological biases sometimes outstripped its accuracy and dependability, is represented substantially in the early years of the bibliography, because it was one of the first magazines to cover Sendero in depth. Its early pieces are included because there was little else published in Lima on the obscure war in remote Ayacucho in the early 1980's. The

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journal's origins and history are worthy of a study in themselves, but the partisan peculiarities of Peruvian journalism made its sensational revelations somewhat suspect. (All of its by-lines are included in the author index, although whether some of them really exist is highly debatable!) *Equis X* 's leftist perspective can be contrasted with the more conservative coverage of Shining Path in *Caretas,* Peru's leading news magazine.

The bibliography is in chronological order. This allows the reader to see how "Senderology" developed, and to note the differences between foreign and domestic reporting on the war. Themes and common assumptions about the guerrillas changed as the struggle progressed; thus an early emphasis on "Andean mysticism" or "millenarianism" largely vanishes by the end of the decade, as Sendero is seen more and more as a cold-blooded political movement. The tendency of work in English to rely upon previous non-Spanish-language scholarship is especially noteworthy. Within chronological ordering, books come first in each year, in alphabetical order. Included in this section are essays and chapters within books, and items without specific dates. Journal articles follow, with specific dates preceding months (January 10 comes before just plain January). Seasons come after months; thus "autumn" or "fall" follows all September annotations.

I have followed standard bibliographical procedure in reproducing text from citations just as it is published. Thus the Asháninka Indians, who were the subject of many articles, often lack an accented "a" in the second syllable; other sources spell their name with the accent. DINCOTE is sometimes in capitals and sometimes not, etc. In addition, some references included, and some omitted, the Spanish matronymic: thus some citations are Gustavo Gorriti and others are Gustavo Gorriti Ellenbogen.

Acknowledgments are owed to a good many people who helped me during the long genesis of this work, with sources, suggestions, and assistance of many different kinds. The staffs of the Hispanic Reading Room, the *Handbook of Latin American Studies,* and Hispanic Acquisitions at the Library of Congress are due a special note of thanks, particularly Dolores Martin, Sue Mundell, Everette Larson, and Terry Peet. Other people who have helped include David Block, Joseph Consoli, Carlos Iván Degregori, Lawrence Hallewell, Joseph Holub, Peter Johnson, Jorge Marcone, Molly Molloy, Pat Noble, César Rodríguez, Stephen Trujillo, Barbara Valk, Roberto Vergaray, and Kinloch C. Walpole. Another special thanks goes to Pablo Martínez for his editorial skills. I would also like to thank some *compañeros peruanos* who would prefer to remain anonymous. The Rutgers University Libraries assisted with a short academic leave, which greatly helped in research and writing.

New Brunswick, New Jersey
April, 1995

Introduction

The Shining Path in the Corner of the Dead

When the citizens of Lima awoke on December 26, 1980, to find dead dogs, adorned with signs reading "Deng Xiao-Ping, son of a bitch" hanging from the lampposts of their ancient city, they could not possibly have known that they were standing on the edge of an abyss which would plunge their country into the most savage, prolonged, and bitter struggle it has ever known. An obscure and dogmatic political faction, "The Communist Party of Peru by the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariátegui," headed by a bespectacled and bookish philosophy professor named Abimael Guzmán from a provincial university, seemed a joke, a footnote in a wonderful new page in Peruvian history, the restoration of democracy after twelve years of military rule.

Yet Peru was facing a challenge unique in Latin America. Sendero Luminoso is a movement *sui generis*. Not a 1960's-style *foco* guerrilla movement, and tied neither to external aid, nor to sponsoring nations like Cuba or the Soviet Union, Sendero is a mass movement combining Maoist revolutionary ideology with Andean messianic tradition, a marriage of Marxism-Leninism with the nativist communism of an early 20th-century Peruvian intellectual, José Carlos Mariátegui. The Communist Party of Peru--Shining Path (PCP-SL) has declared itself and its leader the "fourth sword of Marxism" (after Marx, Lenin, and Mao). There never was a trace of romanticism about Shining Path; Abimael Guzmán and his comrades spent a decade preparing for "people's war" in Ayacucho, one of the most remote, Indian, peasant, and poverty-stricken regions of Peru. Ayacucho (which means "Corner of the dead" in Quechua) was fertile ground for revolution; its university, the Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga (UNSCH), where Guzmán was an instructor, provided an eager population of young aspiring *mestizos* and Indians ready for indoctrination and recruiting. It is significant that the greatest political turmoil in the department of Ayacucho in the 1960's came not over the demand for free land, but for free education. The importance of the link between the university and Sendero cannot be overstated; it was at the UNSCH that Guzmán and his followers created their "Andean Yenan," making the ideological evolution from "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism" to *pensamiento Gonzalo* ("Gonzalo thought," named for Abimael Guzmán's *nom de guerre,* "Gonzalo.") Guzmán and his followers learned Quechua, and spent years working in small native villages, often inter-marrying into these communities; thus they built a broad base of support before launching their revolution. In the spring of 1980 Guzmán convened the first "military school" to prepare his cadres for ILA--*inicio de la lucha armada,* or the beginning of armed struggle.

ILA began on May 17, when a small band of young *senderistas* entered the polling station in Chuschi, seized the ballot boxes, and burned them in the town square. For the next two years, Sendero was almost unopposed in Ayacucho; the guerrillas assassinated policemen and elected officials, seized weapons, ammunition, and dynamite, entered peasant villages to indoctrinate people and recruit for their cause, held "people's trials" and meted out punishment, which was sometimes execution, for the "rich," or "enemies of the people." Early press reports stressed the guerrillas' ferocity and primativeness; the press made fun of the guerrillas' use of traditional Indian slings to hurl dynamite at targets--forgetting that

such weaponry was easy to obtain and use. Lima essentially ignored the phenomenon in the distant department. It was only when the *senderistas* began to destroy electricity pylons, inflicting blackouts on the capital, bomb foreign-owned factories, and ignite fires in the shape of a hammer and sickle on the hillsides above Lima, that the government took the movement seriously. At the end of December, 1982, President Fernando Belaúnde Terry, who had been ousted from power by the military in 1968, conceded that his police were incapable of containing the violence, and signed a decree placing Ayacucho under a state of emergency, sending in the armed forces to deal with Sendero. This was the start of bloodshed and tragedy which would shape the course of the war for years to come.

The Peruvian armed forces were not equal to the task. Their primary mission was to plan for a conventional war with either Chile or Ecuador, and to hold the eastern jungle areas against foreign incursions. They were ill-equipped and poorly-trained for counterinsurgency war; their only modern experience with guerrillas had been a brief campaign in 1965 against a Cuban-style *foquista* movement of middle-class intellectuals, which had been quickly and easily stamped out. Its very success made the army overconfident. The most recent examples of counter-guerrilla warfare--those of Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile--were not auspicious ones. All three militaries had resorted to the most violent repression, waging *guerra sucia,* "dirty war" against their own populations, in order to eradicate urban and rural guerrilla movements. The Peruvian military and security forces, under the command of General Roberto Noel, began a campaign of mass terror against the peasants of the Andes. Particularly brutal were the *sinchis,* special counter-guerrilla units of the *Guardia Civil* (Civil Guard). The sinchis had been trained by U.S. Special Forces in the 1960's; the word "sinchi" is Quechua for "powerful." Their counterinsurgency tactics consisted of terrorizing peasants into cooperating with the government. Rape, torture, indiscriminate murder, and "disappearances," became common in the emergency areas. If the Sendero guerrilla, in the Maoist fashion, was to be the fish which swam in the sea of the people, the solution Noel and his security forces advocated was to drain the pond.

The military, borrowing a tactic from the British and American counterinsurgency experiences in Malaysia and Vietnam, ordered the formation of peasant self-defense patrols,*rondas campesinas,* and the transfer of many villages from their traditional locations to new sites, making them the equivalent of "strategic hamlets." *Rondas* had existed in northern Peru for more than a decade, formed by villagers to stop cattle rustling, but the southern *rondas* were anything but voluntary. To refuse to join a *ronda* was to imply sympathy with or support for the guerrillas, and so villages were forced to form patrols, which were given nothing with which to defend themselves, or at best, a few old rifles or shotguns. Soon another facet of the revolution became apparent: at times villages used their *rondas* not against Sendero, but to fight against other communities in order to settle old scores or rivalries which had existed for years. Thus a true civil war began to rage in the mountains.

Within the year reports of indiscriminate and widespread human rights abuses began to surface from the emergency zones. Still white, cosmopolitan Lima paid little attention to what was happening in the "other Peru"--the Peru of poor, Indian peasants. Then in January 1983, an incident took place which shocked the nation, and threw into stark relief the kind of struggle which was taking place in the mountains. Seven journalists from Lima newspapers and magazines, accompanied by a native driver, traveled high into the Andes to investigate a report that villagers from the tiny hamlet of Uchuraccay had killed a band of *senderistas.* The band of reporters climbed to Uchuraccay and disappeared. Their bodies were unearthed days later, stripped of clothing, buried face down, with their ankles broken. All had been bludgeoned to death. The national outcry was so great that the government was forced to convene a committee to investigate the killings, headed by the novelist Mario Vargas Llosa.

The commission's findings were highly controversial, and remained the subject of harsh criticism for years. Vargas Llosa and his fellow investigators, after interviewing villagers, police, anthropologists, sociologists, and other experts, blamed the killings on a series of misunderstandings: the Iquichanos of Uchuraccay, who had killed several guerrillas a few nights before, feared reprisals, and, with what they felt was the tacit encouragement of the sinchis to kill any strangers who appeared, murdered the journalists in the mistaken belief they were guerrillas seeking revenge. That evidence contradicting this conclusion quickly surfaced only added to the appearance of a cover-up. In a wider sense, however, the commission placed the blame on a cultural gulf between the two Perus--the European, Western Peru of Lima and the coast, and the Indian, peasant, traditional Peru of the highlands. No one was ever punished for the murders. A few months later *senderistas* massacred 66 people, including old women and children, in the small village of Lucanamarca; Peru had learned that a violent and savage war was raging in the most remote provinces of the country.

By 1984 it was apparent that the security force's campaign of *guerra sucia* had had some success against Shining Path. Guerrillas were forced out of their original zones of operation into other provinces and departments. This had the effect of both diluting and expanding the war. While many peasants resented Sendero's pulling out and leaving them exposed to the wrath of the army and sinchis, the moves had the effect of spreading the revolution to new areas. Sendero also began to contemplate a fundamental shift in strategy. In Maoist doctrine, people's war is fundamentally ta rural war, whose objective is to surround the cities, which will fall as a result of victory. But by 1984 Sendero was shifting to a new urban strategy, in which the cities would also be the target of revolution. In part this was due to pressure on Sendero in the countryside, but critics also maintained that Guzmán may have become impatient with the slow progress in the *campo* and decided to speed up final victory. A meeting of the PCP declared Lima and other cities to be part of next year's objective in the strategy elaborated by Presidente Gonzalo. The construction of support bases*(bases de apoyo)*, which signified the establishment of "liberated communities," was a crucial part of people's war. Popular schools had already been established inside Lima to recruit new party militants, as well as clandestine cells in factories, universities, barrios, and *pueblos jóvenes*, the shanty-towns springing up around Lima and other cities. The Maoist blueprint for the overthrow of the bourgeois, reactionary state, included plans that were designated DDC--*desarrollar, defender y construir bases de apoyo*--to develop, defend, and construct bases of support for people's war.

Another reason for the change in emphasis was that Sendero's welcome in the countryside was weakening. While there was still plenty of misery and poverty on which to draw support, the new society which Sendero was building in its liberated zones was too restrictive for some people. While communities applauded rough justice for thieves, town merchants who had gouged them, and other miscreants, they found Sendero's puritanical morality--prohibiting traditional fiestas, banning drink and narcotics, disbanding neighborhood, church, and fraternal associations--difficult to accept. Sendero also imposed autarky, or economic self-sufficiency, on communities, banning inter-village trade, prohibiting peasants from taking their produce to local markets, and destroying bridges to enforce total isolation. This was done partly to cut food supplies to the cities, and partly to reinforce Sendero's strict rule. Such actions proved highly unpopular, and cost Sendero a great deal of support in the highlands.

By 1985 the Belaúnde regime was weary and prepared to leave office. The economic picture was gloomy, and the government could neither crush the revolution nor formulate a coherent strategy against it. To add to its difficulties, a new guerrilla group emerged from the Peruvian left to launch its struggle for liberation. This was MRTA, the Movimiento

Revolucionario Túpac Amaru. MRTA was an "old fashioned" Cuban-style guerrilla group, as nationalistic as Sendero was internationalist. Although Belaúnde had fulminated against unspecified "foreign elements" he claimed were supporting and bankrolling Sendero, it was quite clear from its virulent rhetoric that Shining Path was an entirely indigenous phenomenon, rejecting and vilifying every other Marxist country and movement in the world. But there was another source, a deadly and ominous one, from which Sendero Luminoso could obtain funds. By mid-decade it was clear that Sendero had made major inroads in an economically crucial area of the country: the jungle regions where coca was grown.

The Upper Huallaga Valley had been colonized enthusiastically by the Belaúnde government in the 1960's, and then left to stagnate without resources or support. Peasants raised coca in the fertile valley, and soon a flourishing traffic in basic coca paste had arisen. The coca paste was flown to Columbia for processing into cocaine, and millions of coca dollars flowed back to the region. Anti-narcotics operations by the police, focusing on eradication were insufficient to stem the flood, even with help from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Crop substitution schemes were so poorly funded that they had no chance of success. The police, in attacking the peasants' livelihood, managed to antagonize practically the entire population. Sendero intervened to defend the peasants, and to act as intermediaries between coca cultivators and the Columbian *narcotraficantes*. While said not to be engaging in the trade itself, they taxed coca flights out of the area; this lucrative trade was soon netting them tens of millions of dollars a year--more money, one observer pointed out, than any legitimate political movement in Peru had at its disposal. The money was used to buy weapons, bankroll the movement, and increasingly, to support the families of imprisoned *senderistas*.

In 1985 Alán García, the young, vigorous, leftist leader of APRA was elected president on a near-universal wave of hope and enthusiasm. García promised a new approach to the war, addressing its root causes: poverty and underdevelopment. He also promised to punish soldiers and policemen who abused human rights. His resolution was quickly put to the test. By 1986 several hundred captured *senderistas,* men and women, were warehoused in three Lima prisons. They quickly converted their wings into "revolutionary territory," clean and orderly, the walls painted with slogans and festooned with banners. The ferociously disciplined prisoners held education classes in Marxist theory, taught the illiterate among them to read, marched in formation and chanted slogans. In June, 1986, the prisoners staged a simultaneous uprising, coinciding with a meeting of the Socialist International in Lima, in a deliberate effort to embarrass García. He quickly capitulated to pressure from the military, and turned over responsibility for suppressing the rebellion to the army and marines. Using helicopters, rockets, and machine guns, the military crushed the revolts, practically destroying the *senderista* block in one jail. Almost 300 prisoners died; at least one hundred were executed, shot in the head at point-blank range as they lay on the ground after surrendering. This was the armed forces' solution to terrorism. Although García swore to punish those responsible, no officer was ever brought to justice. Sendero seemed to exult in the terrible price it had paid, drawing strength from the martyrdom and celebrating the revolt as *el día de la heroicidad*-- the day of heroism. The three prisons, it triumphantly declared, had been transformed into *luminosas trincheras de combate*-- shining trenches of combat.

Afterward the will to fight Sendero seemed to drain out of García. Thanks to his highly nationalistic and confrontational approach to international monetary agencies like the IMF and World Bank, foreign credit to Peru evaporated, and the economy went into severe decline, registering the world's highest rate of hyperinflation. Thousands of Peruvians emigrated, tens of thousands more fled the fighting in the highlands and packed into huge shantytowns *(pueblos jóvenes)* surrounding Lima and other cities, where they constituted a

volatile and inflammatory population, and the target of Sendero's urban infiltration campaign. But their presence was also the spur to a growing movement for mutual aid and support, a phenomenon which grew as the Peruvian state became more feeble, corrupt, and unable to help its own citizens.

Shining Path had not been universally successful in the highlands; it was noticeable that wherever there already existed strong popular groups--peasant federations, unions, neighborhood associations, church groups--Sendero made little headway in recruiting people to its cause. In Puno, where a strong peasant federation had been organized years before by another Marxist party (PUM), Sendero failed to gain a foothold. The deepening economic and social crisis in Peru under the APRA government caused similar urban bodies to spring up--soup kitchens, neighborhood cooperatives, the*vaso de leche* (glass of milk) program which distributed milk to children. These "popular organizations" were a bulwark against Sendero's urban strategy, and consequently, its principal target.

By 1988-90, the situation had reached "strategic equilibrium." Sendero could not take power; the military could not destroy the movement. But time was on Abimael Guzmán's side: the worse the situation grew in the country, the more profound the state of crisis, the greater the breakdown of public services, the stronger Shining Path grew. In 1988 a horrible new phenomenon appeared: a right-wing "death squad," the Comando Rodrigo Franco, named for a murdered APRA official, began to kill suspected leftists. Suspected of ties to APRA and the Interior Ministry, the mysterious body operated for approximately a year and a half before quietly disappearing; Peru was thus spared part of the agony which its Southern Cone neighbors had experienced. In 1988 Abimael Guzmán broke his silence, and that of the Party. Sendero had always been highly secretive; in contrast to most guerrilla movements, it shunned publicity, never explaining its attacks or releasing communiqués to the press. By the late '80's the newspaper *El Diario,* under its editor, Luis Arce Borja, had virtually become Sendero's mouthpiece. Now it published what it called "the interview of the century":*¡Presidente Gonzalo rompe el silencio!* (President Gonzalo breaks his silence!), it announced jubilantly. The interview, some 40 pages of turgid Marxist rhetoric, nevertheless gave valuable insight into the personality of Guzmán, and a rare glimpse into his plans for the future of Peru.

1989 was a watershed year. No time could be more propitious for Sendero to gain the support of, or at least sympathy of, the masses. They virtually controlled the Upper Huallaga Valley, collecting millions in taxes on the cocaine traffic; an assault on the police station at Uchiza, which wiped it out, had the tacit support of the town's entire population. "Armed strikes," which people broke at the risk of their lives, demonstrated Sendero's growing strength in the cities. And yet Sendero did not sweep to victory in 1989; on the contrary, it suffered major blows, in Lima and in other parts of the country. *El Diario* was finally suppressed, its editor escaping to Europe to publish a pro-Sendero newspaper there. The movement's isolation increased after the cold-blooded murder of two French agricultural experts. Finally, its call for a boycott of municipal elections was only partially successful. In many emergency zones people were afraid to go to the polls or turned in spoiled or blank ballots. But in general the turn-out throughout the nation demonstrated that the majority of citizens still preferred peaceful solutions to their problems, and rejected violence as an answer to the country's multiple crises.

By 1990 García sat isolated in the presidential palace, his dreams for Peru shattered. People held their breath, waiting for a military coup, but the armed forces were not eager to repeat the experiences of *el docenio,* the twelve years of military rule from 1968 to 1980. APRA was discredited, the economy was in ruins, and violence was epidemic throughout the entire country. The 1990 presidential election pitted the leftist mayor of Lima, Alfredo Barrantes, the candidate from Izquierda Unida (United Left), against a right-wing author

who espoused free-market solutions to Peru's problems (Mario Vargas Llosa), and a maverick, Alberto Fujimori, the son of Japanese immigrants. Enduring racist attacks on his heritage (he was derisively called *el chinito,* the little Chinaman), Fujimori represented himself as the candidate of reform. He had no tangible program, but was backed by some sectors of what had become a desperate business community. To the surprise of many, Fujimori won.

Fujimori promised to force the military to respect human rights, but in fact granted them virtual immunity from prosecution. In any case, by 1990 the judiciary in Peru was too intimidated to indict any soldier, or, in fact, any terrorist; many known *senderistas* walked out of court free men and women for lack of evidence to convict them. Fujimori's rhetoric, like García's, backed development as the way to undermine the revolution, but his public policies indicated otherwise. Immediately after taking office in 1990 he removed subsidies for basic commodities, whose prices soared at first. "Fujishock," as his critics dubbed it, may have eventually brought down inflation and impressed foreign financial experts, but it only compounded the problems of most of the population. To add to Peru's misery, an outbreak of cholera in 1991 seemed to confirm the nation's descent into the Fourth World.

In 1990 the situation in the Upper Huallaga took an interesting series of turns. The DEA, which had operated semi-clandestinely for some years, became more visible as U.S. President George Bush declared an international war on drugs. Congress appropriated millions of dollars in anti-narcotics aid for Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. The DEA and Peruvian police built a drug interdiction base at Santa Lucia in the Huallaga, complete with Vietnam-era Huey helicopters, barbed wire, and watch towers. The base was manned by DEA agents, ex-Special Forces veterans, and Peruvian police. (Sendero could not resist launching a Viet Cong-style attack against the base, which was repulsed.) Relations between the DEA and the Peruvian army were abysmal; the U.S. accused the army of taking drug money from the traffickers. Peruvian General Arciniega had in fact decided that his fight was against Shining Path, not poor *campesinos* who raised coca because they couldn't make a living growing any other crop. MRTA, whose activities and base of support lagged far behind Sendero's, did manage to gain support in certain areas of the Huallaga. Contrary to the accusations of some rightist commentators, MRTA and Sendero had never been allies; in Lima and the Huallaga, they actually fought one other.

The situation from 1990 to 1992 seemed to be one of stalemate. Fujimori showed his authoritarian colors when he announced an *autogolpe,* or "self-coup" on April 5, 1992. Denouncing Congress and the judiciary as hopelessly corrupt and inefficient (accusations which contained a large measure of truth), he suspended both and ruled by presidential decree. The government quickly established special courts with emergency powers to try terrorists. The military was divided, but Fujimori had the support of enough generals to ratify his assumption of dictatorial power. The U.S. and the international community condemned the *autogolpe,* but relations with the U.S. were strained over differences in the anti-drug war, and the American military never had the same relationship with or influnce over the Peruvian military as it had with the Salvadorans or Guatemalans. Sendero responded to Fujimori with a new tactic: in July it detonated a series of extremely powerful car-bombs in the Lima neighborhoods of Miraflores and San Isidiro, among others, causing horrific casualties, extensive damage, and widespread panic. Never, it appeared, had the situation been as dire as it was in the summer of 1992. Shining Path prepared itself for a new, lethal urban offensive, as the capital waited in fear and dread.

Then on September 12, 1992, came the thunderbolt. The police announced the capture of Abimael Guzmán! Not seen in public (except in a captured video) for over a decade, the legendary *Presidente Gonzalo,* at one time even rumored to be dead, the deity of the revolution, was in the hands of the state. Although rumors abounded in Lima of exotic

CIA spy devices, Guzmán appears to have been captured through old-fashioned police work, and because he grew careless about security. Only the fact that the police general who commanded the operation took the precaution of announcing Guzmán's capture to the press immediately afterward saved his life. When the police raided the upper-class home in which Guzmán was hiding, the portly, bearded intellectual told Dincote's General Antonio Vidal "It's my turn to lose." Pointing a finger at his head, Guzmán said "You can take anything away from a man, except what he has here. And even if he is killed, his followers will remain." By the time the military came to claim Guzmán, it was too late to dispose of him secretly, as they no doubt would have otherwise ruthlessly done. Displayed in a cage before the world, dressed in a ludicrous black-and-white striped convict's outfit, Guzmán shouted his defiance, calling upon his comrades to launch the next phase of people's war.

But Shining Path seemed stunned. Much of the movement's top leadership was captured with Guzmán, and computer disks were seized, with, rumor held, the entire membership of the movement, as well as extensive financial information. In succeeding months, the police were able to capture more cadres and leaders. Abimael Guzmán was tried *in camera* by a military court. Because the Peruvian constitution provides for capital punishment only in cases of treason during wartime, he was sentenced to life in prison. Most experts were convinced that Guzmán was too dangerous ever to leave custody, and that the government would find some way to kill him. Fujimori urged an amendment to the constitution which would enable him to dispose of Guzmán forever.

Abimael Guzmán spent the next year in solitary confinement, without visitors or even books to read. Sendero Luminoso and its overseas supporters in the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), a tiny coalition of Maoist parties, had never been overly concerned with human or civil rights before. Now they became fanatically devoted to those of Guzmán, and "International Committee[s] to Preserve the Life of Abimael Guzmán" sprang up in Europe and the U.S. Attacks by Shining Path declined, as the movement's energies were redirected to saving their god-head. The flaws inherent in a cult of personality became apparent after Guzmán's capture. He had personified the revolution; now the movement was decapitated.

A little over a year after Guzmán's capture came a second thunderbolt. In October 1993 Fujimori announced at the United Nations that he had received a letter from Guzmán, asking for negotiations between the government and Sendero! Shining Path, which had rejected and denounced compromise for a decade, now sought it. When party supporters howled that it was a trick, Fujimori showed a video on national television, in which a trim and mustachioed Guzmán, looking fitter than he had since going underground, calmly read the text of his letter to "President Fujimori," a title he would not have even acknowledged "before the fall." He announced the end of the phase of armed struggle, to be replaced by a struggle for an historic peace accord.

But Fujimori, believing Sendero Luminoso now effectively neutralized, had no reason to negotiate with its captured leader. Shining Path now appears to have lost in its bid to topple the Peruvian state. In the two years since Guzman's arrest, some 7,000 members of Sendero have been detained, while thousands more have surrendered to security forces, accepting the amnesty offered in the Law of Repentance. It is reported that Oscar Ramírez Durand *(Compañero Feliciano)*, one of the few top leaders not captured by the security forces, has reorganized the powerful Lima metropolitan committee under his leadership. In the place of Sendero Luminoso is said to be *el Sendero Rojo,* or the Red Path, determined to continue people's war, no matter how long it takes to achieve victory. *Senderista* cadres often spoke of "carrying their lives on the tips of their fingers," ready at any moment to die for the revolution. The faithful believe that its triumph is inevitable, if it takes fifty or even a

hundred years. On walls in the countryside, the slogan *¡Viva el Presidente Feliciano!* has already appeared.

Guzmán has apparently retained the loyalty of the several hundred *senderistas* incarcerated in Lima prisons, as well as that of the imprisoned party leadership. Together they form what the dissidents perjoratively call *el Sendero Negro*, the Black Path, the half of the movement which is open to a peace accord with the government. The situation is extremely unclear; bogus press reports, deliberate (and false) leaks from military intelligence, propaganda from Fujimori's supporters, and government pronouncements have created at atmosphere in which nothing is certain. Many asked whether the split between Guzmán and Durand was real or contrived. Was Comrade Feliciano directing a wholly separate movement, or was his task to continue the armed struggle to keep pressure on the government, and give Guzmán a greater bargaining chip? By the end of 1994, it seemed certain that the division between the two factions of Shining Path was genuine.

Meanwhile, sporadic bombings and shootings of policemen have continued. What Peru may now face is a process of "Colombianization," where endemic, low-level guerrilla warfare continues for years, even decades, but the movement has no ability to take power or threaten the nation's existence. Sendero still controls parts of the Upper Huallaga Valley, and therefore has access to unlimited funds. The war may be carried out in the jungle, in parts of the highlands, and in the cities in the foreseeable future. But the decapitation of the movement appears to have effectively ended its once very real threat to establish the Maoist New Democracy in Peru. A summer 1993 poll showed that only 18% of those questioned worried about terrorism; most were concerned about unemployment. Alberto Fujimori, having decided to restore "democracy" and run again, won easily in presidential elections in April, 1995. As the deadline for an amnesty decree for guerrillas approached in early November, 1994, authorities reported that 5,416 Peruvians had sought amnesty under the law.

By Way of Conclusion

The war has resulted in some 27,000 deaths since May, 1980, and caused perhaps $22 billion dollars in damage; "the social cost in terms of suffering, hatred, and disunity is immeasurable."* Having read, skimmed, or otherwise absorbed more than a thousand sources on Shining Path, I feel reasonably justified in formulating a few conclusions about the experience of Sendero Luminoso in Peru. First, it is obvious that the struggle came about because of a conjunction of two factors: the index of misery and frustration in rural Peru was high, and a remarkable movement stood ready to take advantage of that anger. In some ways Peru does conform to the classic theory of the "j-curve" of rising expectations: the 1968 revolution whetted the nation's appetite for reform. Because that reform was aborted, botched, and unfinished, (especially in regard to agrarian reform in the highlands), frustration with unfulfilled hopes was intensified. But there is no escaping the conclusion that the war happened because Sendero *made* it happen: because a disciplined, committed, militant, and ideologically-motivated movement was determined to launch a revolution. Sendero prepared for that war carefully, chose the most propitious moment in which to inaugurate it, and once it began, was prepared to make any sacrifice *(la cuota)* to ensure its success, no matter how long it took. Without Abimael Guzmán, without Gonzalo thought, without the two-line struggle, there would have been no Shining Path.

Second, Sendero was remarkably successful in waging guerrilla war, but it was not perfect, and it made many mistakes. It was helped enormously in its struggle by successive Peruvian governments, which first ignored it, gave it time to grow and establish itself, and then mishandled the situation in the very worst way. Over and over again the state's

response only helped Shining Path. A *leitmotif* running through the literature on Sendero as early as 1981, and the conclusion of virtually every social scientist who studied it, is that Sendero's war was a political one, and could only be resolved through political solutions, not by military means. The Peruvian military ignored the example of the successful British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaysia, and consistently chose a harsher, more punitive, more repressive policy. The *guerra sucia* carried out in the highlands made thousands hate and fear their own government. For a decade the military and the civilians could not decide upon a realistic strategy to fight Sendero's threat, or commit the resources to make any strategy effective.

For people to commit themselves to such a bloody and terrible movement as Sendero Luminoso was a serious decision. Had the government shown some willingness to improve people's lives, Sendero could not have gathered as much support as it did in the countryside. People probably did not have unrealistic expectations; they did not expect the government to work miracles, to magically lift them out of poverty. But they expected it to do *something*. An electrical transmission line, a source of clean water, a medical clinic, a rural school, a sewer line: these things might have averted the revolution in some villages and *barrios*. But the state did nothing, or worse, it sent in policemen and soldiers who didn't speak Quechua, and who didn't care what they did to people they didn't regard as fellow countrymen. It is notable that by 1990, support for the guerrillas dropped dramatically in places where even small efforts at civic action had been made.

Third, Peru has been profoundly changed by a decade of people's war. Thousands of Peruvians have learned the hard way that the government of their country cannot, or will not, do anything for them. It cannot protect them, keep order, or provide them with food, shelter, education, or health care. If they want these things, they will have to obtain them by their own efforts. The real victory of the people is not an Andean Kampuchea, but the explosive growth of popular organizations throughout rural and urban Peru: the neighborhood associations, clinics, schools, soup kitchens and self-defense patrols which emerged in the 1980's and 1990's. In many different ways, people have empowered themselves, and the government cannot take that away from them. One report on the *rondas campesinas* mentioned that the government had announced that the arms supplied to the patrols were only a loan, and that it wanted them back after the war. Whether the government can realistically expect to get its weapons back is an interesting question. The *rondas* have the obvious potential to become more than merely self-defense patrols, and in some places they have already made that transition.

And last, in some perverse way Sendero has won a victory, although it is not the victory it sought. No one in Peru can claim any longer to be ignorant of the way the "other half" of the country lives. The highlands have been brought to Lima, literally and figuratively. Literally, because thousands of Indians have fled their villages and settled in squalid shantytowns around the capital and other cities; figuratively, because the plight of the peasantry, *la mancha india* or Indian stain, as the highlands have been called, has been made starkly clear to the nation's middle and upper classes. Whether they chose to do anything about it is another matter, but the "two Perus" have been forced to acknowledge their mutual existence. Nothing can alter that fact. What is unbearably tragic is that Guzmán's "river of blood," and untold human suffering, were apparently necessary to achieve that recognition.

*"The Cell at the End of the Path." *The Economist,* September 19 1992, p. 50.

Acronyms/Terms

AAD=Asociación de Abogados Democráticos--Association of Democratic Lawyers (SL)
AED=Asociación de Estudiantes Democráticos--Association of Democratic Students (SL)
ajusticiamiento="settling of accounts"; i.e., "popular justice" meted out by Sendero
alcalde=mayor
AP=Acción Popular, Fernando Belaúnde Terry's political party
APRA=Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, Alán García's political party, founded in the 1930's by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre

CAEM= Centro de Altos Estudios Militares; Peruvian war college
CAP=Cooperativa Agraria de Producción
CFPPGD=Comité de las Familias de Presos Políticos de Guerra (SL)
CORAH =Control y Reducción de Cultivos de Coca en el Alto Huallaga
CSRP= Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru (U.S.)
CTIM=Centro de Trabajo Intelectual Mariátegui (SL)

DEA=(United States) Drug Enforcement Administration
DESCO= Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo
DIE=Destacamento de Inteligencia del Ejército (Army intelligence)
DIEE= Dirección de Investigaciones Especiales (part of DIRCOTE)
DINCOTE= Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo (National Counterterrorism Directorate)
DIRCOTE= Dirección Contra Terrorismo (older acronym for DINCOTE)
DIRIN=Dirección de Inteligencia de la Policía Nacional
DOES=Dirección de Operaciones Especiales; police special operations unit

ERPS=Empresas Rurales de Propriedad Social

FBIS= (United States) Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FDPA= Frente de Defensa del Pueblo de Ayacucho
FER= Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario, Student Revolutionary Front, at the University in Huamanga in the 1960's
FIR=Frente Izquierdista Revolucionario, 1960's "foco"-style movement led by Hugo Blanco
foco=Cuban-style "focus" of revolutionary activity

GEIN= Grupos Especiales de Inteligencia, working inside DINCOTE and PNP
GC=Guardia Civil
GR=Guardia Republicana

IEP= Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
ILA=Inicio de lucha armada, the inauguration of armed struggle by Shining Path: May 17, 1980
IU =Izquierda Unida, United Left

Llapan Atiq (Quechua)= GR special units

MAP=Movimiento de Artistas Populares (SL)
MBP=Movimiento de Bases Populares (SL)
MCB=Movimiento Clasista Barrial (SL)
MCP= Movimiento de Campesinos Popular (SL)
MFP= Movimiento Feminino Popular--Popular Women's Movement (SL)
MIP=Movimiento de Intelectuales Populares (SL)
MJP= Movimiento Juvenil Popular (SL)
MOTAG=Movimiento de Obreros y Trabajadores Agrícolas (SL)
MOTC= Movimiento de Trabajadores Clasistas (campo obrero)-- a *senderista* labor front
MPJ=Movimiento de Pueblos Jóvenes (SL)--shantytown dwellers
MPP=Movimiento de Profesionales Progresistas (SL)
MRPJ=Movimiento Revolucionario de Pueblos Jóvenes (SL)
MRDP= Movimiento Revolucionario de Defensa del Pueblo, a Sendero popular "mass base" for urban organizing
MRTA=Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru

NGO's=Non-governmental organizations

pachacuti=a Quechua term for cataclysmic upheaval which will change the world
paro armado=armed strike (SL tactic)
PCP=Partido Comunista del Perú (Peruvian Communist Party)--"Sendero Luminoso"
PCR=Partido Communista Revolucionario (Maoist)
PEAH-- Proyecto Especial--Alto Huallaga
PIP= Policía de Investigaciones del Perú (equivalent to FBI) The PIP runs DIRCOTE
PNP=Policía Nacional del Perú
Policía Técnica= Technical Police; i.e., fingerprint, forensic experts
POMR=Partido Obrero Marxista Revolucionario (Trotskyist)
PSR=Partido Socialista Revolucionario (Velazquista)
PST=Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Trotskyist)
pueblos jóvenes= "young towns," i.e., shantytowns around Lima
PUM=Partido Unificado Mariateguista (led by former guerrilla Héctor Béjar)
Puka Llacta= Patria Roja (Red homeland or fatherland) in Quechua

rondas campesinas=peasant self-defense patrols

SAIS= Sociedad Agrícola de Interés Social
SIN= Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (National Intelligence Service). Created under the Velázquez government, this military intelligence unit was distrusted by Belaúnde and almost dismantled. It regained status and influence again under García and Fujimori.
sinchis= Special police counterinsurgency units; trained by the Green Berets in the mid-1960's. "Sinchi" is a Quechua term for powerful; often translated as "those who can do anything."
SL= Sendero Luminoso
Socorro Popular= People's Aid; Sendero support organization
soplones="squealers," informers

UHV=Upper Huallaga Valley, coca-growing territory (Alto Huallaga in Spanish)
UNSCH=Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga, in Ayacucho, birthplace of Sendero Luminoso

Shining Path Chronology

June 14, 1895 José Carlos Mariátegui born in Lima

1926 Mariátegui founds and edits *Amauta,* a Marxist literary and cultural journal

1928 Mariátegui publishes *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality;* founds Socialist Party of Peru

1930 Mariátegui dies in Lima

1934 Abimael Guzmán born in Mollendo, near Arequipa

1953 Guzmán attends university in Arequipa

1962 Guzmán begins teaching at the university in Ayacucho

1964 Peruvian Communist Party fractures into pro-Moscow and pro-Chinese (PCP-Bandera Roja) factions

1965-67? Guzmán travels to China to study Marxism, politics, and military tactics and strategy

1970 Guzmán breaks with PCP-BR to form the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path

1973 Sendero cadres establish party-affiliated front groups

1975 PCP establishes "peoples' schools" for political education

March-April,1980 First Sendero military school

May 17, 1980 *Inicio de lucha armada*--beginning of armed struggle

December, 1980 State of emergency declared in Ayacucho

January, 1981 Sinchis ordered into Ayacucho

March, 1981 Government issues Legislative Decree 046, declaring terrorism a special crime

October, 1981 Sendero attacks police post in Tambo

March, 1982 Sendero frees 247 from Ayacucho prison; dynamites Lima power lines

September, 1982 Public funeral procession in Ayacucho for Edith Lagos

December, 1982 First Emergency Zone placed under army control

January, 1983 Murder at Uchuraccay of eight journalists

April, 1983 Sendero massacre of peasants in Lucanamarca

May, 1983 Sendero bombs Lima businesses and factories

July, 1983 Sendero attacks *Acción Popular* headquarters, killing two

1983-84 *Rondas campesinas* established in the sierra

June, 1984 MRTA (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) begins guerrilla war

July, 1985 Belaúnde leaves office; APRA's Alán García becomes president

June, 1986 Sendero destroys associated agricultural enterprises in Puno

June 18, 1986 *Senderista* inmates in Lima prisons riot; 287 killed by the military

February, 1988 Inflation reaches 1,800 percent

May, 1988 Sendero Labor Day parade in Lima

June, 1988 Sendero's "number two," Osmán Morote, captured

July, 1988 *El Diario* publishes "Interview of the century" with "President Gonzalo"; Comando Rodrigo Franco death squad assassinates Morote's defense lawyer

November-December, 1988 SAIS Cahuide farms sacked and destroyed

January, 1989 Sendero "generated organisms" call armed strikes in Lima industrial zones

March, 1989 Sendero wipes out Uchiza police post in Upper Huallaga Valley

November, 1989 Sendero calls for boycott of regional, municipal elections; murders mayors, leaders, and popular candidates

December, 1989 MRTA murders Asháninka Indian leader; Asháninkas declare war on MRTA

March, 1990 "Armed strike" called by Sendero in Lima

April, 1990 Assault launched on Santa Lucía anti-narcotics base in the Upper Huallaga Valley

April-June, 1990 General elections; Alberto Fujimori elected president

July, 1990 45 MRTA guerrillas escape from prison

August, 1990 Economic austerity measures ("Fujishock") announced

February, 1991 Raid on Lima safe house yields video tape of a tipsy Guzmán dancing

May-June, 1991 "Red Month": Sendero launches wave of urban bombings and black-outs

June, 1991 Sendero declares "strategic equilibrium"

February 15, 1992 Sendero murders community activist María Elena Moyano

April 5, 1992 Fujimori suspends Peruvian constitution; assumes dictatorial rule

May, 1992 *Senderistas* battle police in Canto Grande; 50 prisoners die

July, 1992 Car bomb devastates Miraflores, wealthy Lima suburb

September, 12, 1992 Abimael Guzmán arrested in Lima

October, 1992 Guzmán sentenced to life imprisonment

October, 1993 Guzmán offers to negotiate with government

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Sendero Luminoso

Prior to 1980

Five years before the *inicio de lucha armada* on May 17, 1980, the Communist Party of Peru "by the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariátegui" released several documents on the future of the party and of the revolution. Two writings which survive from this underground period are a discourse on Mariátegui and women (presumably written by Abimael Guzmán himself), and a document describing the need to "reconstitute" the Party.

1. [Guzmán, Abimael]. *El marxismo, Mariátegui y el movimiento feminino.* Lima: Editorial Pedagógica "Asencios," April 1975.

This short (76pp.) work evaluates the role of women and their liberation from a Marxist perspective in general, and in the light of José Carlos Mariátegui's writings in particular. Mariátegui wrote that one cannot study the life of a society without determining and analyzing its base, the organization of the family and the situation of women: "The feminine question is part of the human question." He decried the proletarianization of Peruvian women as a result of the development of bureaucratic capitalism. Woman, declares the pamphlet's anonymous author, is not passive, nor domestic adornment, nor apolitical instrument; the women with class consciousness is indefatigable fighter and militant. She suffers from Peru's semi-feudalism and semi-capitalist condition, but the *Movimiento Feminino Popular* of Ayacucho is launching the struggle for class mobilization of Peruvian women, at the service of the democratic-national revolution. Women, he writes, should participate in all forms of proletarian organizing, but they can only organize correctly if they follow class principles and the invincible light of Mariátegui's philosophy *(pensamiento de Mariátegui).* They must fought for the formation of the National Federation of Peruvian Women, as part of the Frente Unico del Pueblo, which will mobilize women to unite with the popular masses and link them to the struggle of the people.

2. Communist Party of Peru, Central Committee. *¡Retomemos a Mariátegui) y reconstituyamos su partido!* S.n., s.l. [Lima], October 1975.

On the 80th anniversary of Mariátegui's birth, and 47 years after the founding of the Communist Party, the PCP pays homage to its founder and guide under the slogan " let us return to Mariátegui and reconstitute his party!" The anonymous pamphlet reviews the class struggle in Mariátegui's thought, his conception of Marxism-Leninism, and the general line of the Peruvian revolution (Peru is a semi-feudal and semi-capitalist country whose revolution will be led by workers and peasants). To retake the road of Mariátegui and reconstitute his party is to serve the working class, the people, and the revolution. Of particular interest is as description of various party conferences. The fourth party conference in January, 1964 confirmed the importance of Mao's guiding thought. The fifth in November, 1965 clarified the party's understanding of Peruvian society, drawing closer to their founder. The sixth in January, 1969 fought "rightism" and "opportunism." The struggle, however, does not end; it is constant...

1980

3."Guerrillas en Ayacucho." *Equis X*, no.204 (August 12-19 1980): 11.

Equis X reminds its readers that nearly a year ago it identified a group of terrorists in central and southern Peru as members of the Communist Party of Peru, "by the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariátegui." Ultra-Maoist, self-identified with the Chinese "Gang of Four," they are led by ex-professor Abimael Guzmán of the University of Huamanga. The military government of Morales Bermúdez deliberately suppressed reports of guerrillas until the transfer of power to civilians was complete. After chronicling the dynamite attacks in Ayacucho, *Equis X* states its total opposition to guerrilla action in Peru today. The authorities, within the limits of the Constitution and laws, have the responsibility to repress severely, efficiently, and rapidly, outbreaks of this type. Furthermore, the press and democratic institutions have a duty to support the government's efforts to end terrorism, albeit with strict respect for the law and human rights. The government is wrong to try to minimize or hide these attacks; democracy is based on the free

participating in parliament, will openly condemn guerrillas and terrorism. The socialist left must opt for representative democracy, and reject the path of violence, which will, without doubt, claim it as its first victim.

4. "Senderito ominoso." *Caretas*, no.614 (September 8 1980): 30, 32.

First mention of Sendero in *Caretas*. Shining Path is characterized as the revolution of the delirious, isolated from any popular movement, accompanied only by its fantasies, a part of the ultra-left which has launched its people's war. *Caretas* reviews Sendero's six months of dynamite attacks and threats, calling the bombers crazy. Sendero is described as a dissident faction of the *Partido Communista Bandera Roja* , and Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, Luis Kawata Makabe, and Osmán Morote Barrionuevo are identified as its leaders. Although the *Movimiento de Obreros y Trabajadores Clasistas* functions as a Sendero front, it has almost no union or peasant influence. Its base has been the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga. It is a group of probably no more than 200 persons, mixing Maoism and Mariátegui with an "unequivocally provincial flavor." The left, *Caretas* notes, has a special responsibility to restrain these attacks. Various leftist parties have condemned the bombings, but why not, *Caretas* asks, a multiparty declaration rejecting this violence? If the parliamentary left will not do this, is it not playing a double game?

5. Ercilla, Tito. "Cada día estalla una bomba." *Equis X*, no.215 (October 29-November 4 1980): 18-21.

Reveals a secret police report from Ayacucho documenting more than 100 acts of terror in three months. These are attributed to three groups: Sendero Luminoso, with perhaps another very small group (there are reports of a "popular army"), *narcotraficantes* , and "gorillas," elements of various military intelligence services intent on destabilizing democracy. Also mentioned are agents in the service of Chile or Argentina (both at this time under military rule). Sendero's attacks have been widespread, in the sierra, the jungle, and the coast. They have focused on infrastructure, local government, or political parties (usually *Acción Popular*), and have almost always used dynamite. A detailed description of many the incidents follows; contrary to the impression that Sendero's actions went unnoticed in its first years of operation, the *Equis X* article shows that the facts on terrorist incidents, if not always a correct interpretation of them, were available from a very early date.

6. Rey de Castro, Patricio Ricketts. "Bim Bam Bum en Ayacucho: en la mata del terrorismo." *Caretas*, no. 629 (December 22 1980): 28-32.

Caretas' s first extended report from Ayacucho. Sinchis patrol empty streets as Sendero Luminoso sets off dynamite bombs which announce the beginning of a prolonged armed struggle. Sendero affirms that its movement is the axis of a world revolution and the best example of modern Marxist-Leninist and Maoist thought. The walls of Ayacucho are painted with slogans praising Mao, the Gang of Four, armed revolution, and denouncing the fascist regime and its successor, Belaúnde. The author distinguishes a number of organizations (MOTC, FDPA, MFP, MCP, MJ), which he identifies as organs of Shining Path. Sendero is not acting alone, but in concert with the armed Maoist faction *Puka Llacta* of the MIR. Apparently the PCP also receives aid from Colombia and has contacts with Chile and Brazil. Manuel Rubén Abimael Guzmán is Sendero's founder; he is deified and his pronouncements are almost pathetically eulogized. *Caretas* reports that in six months 232 acts of terrorism have been committed over a wide area. The sinchis have orders to enter a "liberated zone" consisting of a quadrangle of mountainous peasant communities in Cangallo and Víctor Fajardo provinces.

1981

7. Granados Aponte, Manuel Jesús. "La conducta política: un caso particular." BA thesis, Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga, 1981.

One of the most fascinating, yet elusive documents of *senderología*. Granados attended the UNSCH and knew many who would later fight with Shining Path; his bachelor's thesis in the faculty of anthropology is probably the earliest scholarly study of Sendero. He begins with an analysis of Ayacucho and its history, and recounts the crucial role of the university in ideological struggle. The "particular case" he reviews is of course, Sendero Luminoso. Granados describes its origins, social composition, organization, and existing levels, as well as its political theses: the

character of Peruvian society, the character of the revolution, the tasks and instruments of the revolution, and the *linea de masas*-- the line of the masses. Granados describes how the PCP split up in 1964; its membership at the time was mainly small bourgeoisie, especially university students, with few links to either the peasantry or workers. The Party's role was to direct the people, organize popular movements to lead the masses, and engage in external and internal struggles against "liquidationism" and revisionism. To the PCP, Peru is still the same society it was when Mariátegui studied it in the 1920's; i.e., semifeudal and semicolonial. The two weapons of the revolution will be the Frente Unico and the Popular Army. The former is a fundamental arm of the democratic-national revolution; it will be an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal front under the direction of the working class, with the participation of workers, peasants, and the small and national bourgeoisie in certain circumstances. The Party itself is the vanguard which will direct the revolution, and must be extremely clandestine, small in size, selective and efficient. Granados studies Sendero's political battles at the University in the 1960's against other student groups, carried out largely through its front organization, the FER--Frente Estudiantíl Revolucionario, "By the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariátegui." He concludes by asking what can be expected from Sendero? Absorbed with the "recomposition" of the Party in 1978-79, the PCP decided to set into motion what had previously only been theoretical--armed struggle. [Granados, according to Raymond Bonner (see no.541) could only afford to type three copies of his thesis. One was seized by *senderistas*, who warned him that it would be used "for the day of adjusting accounts." Another was "borrowed" from the University's library by the Uchuraccay commission, and never returned. Granados told Bonner that it is now in the possession of the military commander of Ayacucho.]

8. Pareja Pflucker, Piedad. *Terrorismo y sindicalismo en Ayacucho (1980).* Lima: s.n. [Empresa Editora Ital Perú S.A.], 1981.

Third in a series of works tracing the history of worker organization in Peru (previous volumes covered anarchism and *aprismo* in relation to labor unions in the country). Pareja Pflucker's contribution to senderology is to place Shining Path within the context of a long, convoluted, and highly politicized process of legal and extralegal struggle among parties of the left. The early "mysterious" nature of Sendero is largely a myth: documents show that the long evolution of Sendero through a decade of education and preparation made them not unknown to authorities in Ayacucho. As early as three months after the initiation of armed struggle (ILA), the Guardia Civil in Ayacucho knew that it was Sendero carrying out attacks, and that they had originated at the University. Most of the work deals with GC repression of unions, and how the terrorism of Sendero affected the rest of the progressive movement in the department. A detailed and knowledgeable source on *sindicalismo* and the leftist environment out of which Shining Path emerged.

9. Villavicencio Terreros, Felipe. *Delitos contra la seguridad pública; Delito de terrorismo.* Lima: Epasa, 1981.

An exhaustive work by the chair of criminal law at the Universidad Particular de San Martín de Porres on the portions of the Peruvian penal code that deal with terrorism and public security. Extremely detailed, if dry and analytical, the work covers the legal aspects of the crimes of arson, illegal transportation and employment of explosives, definitions of terrorism, and the ramifications of belonging to or supporting terrorist acts. Important as a legal framework for the expanding war against Sendero in the decade to come.

10. Bendezu, Carlos. "Contra todo y contra todos: el luminoso sendero de Edith Lagos, una chica de armas tomar." *Caretas,* no.630 (January 5 1981): 12-13.

On Christmas Eve Edith Lagos, a presumed leader of Sendero, was arrested in Ayacucho. The following day Lima was horrified by a "cruel, absurd, demented" massacre of dogs, found hanging from lamp-posts with signs denouncing Teng Siao Ping around their necks. Lagos, 18 years old, has proclaimed her complete innocence. *Caretas* describes Lagos as physically attractive, relates her desire to transfer to a university in Lima, and interviews her father. However, the police have information that she is the author of a number of dynamite attacks in Lima, which are described. The Ministry of the Interior complains of a lack of legal means to battle persons intent upon destabilizing democracy. An accompanying photo shows a policeman removing one of the notorious dogs from a lamp-post.

11. Rey de Castro, Patricio Ricketts. "Zonas liberadas." *Caretas,* no.631 (January 12 1981): 22-23.

Report on a Peru which is described as six months into an open Maoist guerrilla war. The dynamite explosions which Peru has been suffering are merely diversions, propaganda actions, attacks designed to polarize the country and attract enthusiasts. Establishing "liberated zones" in the countryside and recruiting among the peasantry has been the real aim of Sendero. The consolidation and expansion of these zones will permit the movement to build guerrilla bases and to establish "red zones." From there the cities can be surrounded and power seized. When? In 50 or 100 years? It matters little: "Asian messianism is not in a hurry." The movement born in the University of Huamanga has taken advantage of the region where geographic, social, economic, and political conditions are favorable. Rey de Castro describes Sendero's antecedents in Ayacucho in the 1970's, and the beginning of the imagined War of One Hundred Years. An interview with the Minister of Justice follows (pp.26-30), in which he affirms that terrorism must be fought with the Constitution, and gives his views on the nature of the recent wave of attacks.

12. "Los sinchis en Vischongo." *Caretas*, no.632 (January 19 1981): 28-31.

In one week the sinchis have rounded up 250 suspected terrorists in Vischongo province of Ayacucho. *Caretas* describes how the Guardia Civil's antiterrorist troops are cleaning up a liberated zone. With Vietnam and China in mind, the sinchis have succeeded in striking at the first steps of guerrilla war. A sidebar traces Sendero's origins from the 1963 Sino-Soviet split.

13. Salcedo, José María. "El papel del terrorismo y el terrorismo de papel." *Quehacer*, no.9 (January-February 1981): 38-45.

Examines the role of the Peruvian press in covering Sendero and the mounting crisis in Peru. Certain newspapers and magazines make little or no distinction between Sendero and many sectors of the left, smearing legitimate progressive factions by insinuating support for or tolerance of *senderista* acts of terror. Salcedo cites articles and editorials which assert a sort of "moral responsibility" and "ideological culpability" on the part of Peruvian leftist parties. Rather than view *senderista* attacks as isolated incidents of Maoist terror, these press organs see them as part of a larger evolving strategy for taking power by the left, particularly Izquierda Unida (IU). Denunciations of terrorism by leftist politicians are dismissed; criticisms of the "sinchis" for alleged human rights abuses or the government's antisubversive campaign are tantamount to complicity with the terrorists' aims. Even the Church is not exempt: one frankly sensationalist report linked certain Dutch priests with a "well-known politician" who "could be the brain of Sendero Luminoso." However, no proof of this conspiracy was forthcoming. In general, these press campaigns not only link the left or progressive sectors of Peru with violence, but by positing the existence of an "internal front," they identify as an enemy of democracy anyone who questions the economic order or the decisions of the government. It is these forces, Salcedo asserts, not the progressive left, who truly threaten democracy.

14. *Nueva democracia,* año 1, no.2 (February 1981).

The second issue of an extremely rare, crudely-mimeographed party newsletter proclaims "People's War is a peasant war or it is nothing!" The "periodical of information and ideas" contains a review of the armed struggle, with extensive quotes from *Oiga, El Diario,* and *La Prensa.* The Peruvian armed forces, as the spine of the state, are defending the established order at the service of Yankee imperialism; they act as an occupying army. The struggle is not a question of terrorism or democracy, but of the democratic road of the people or the road of reaction. In Peru, says *New Democracy,* a child dies from malnutrition every five minutes; each day the life expectancy of a miner sinks lower from tuberculosis or silicosis. To use violence against reactionaries is not only our duty, but our right. The newsletter explains Sendero's armed actions, concluding with the slogans "Down with the repression of the peasantry of the central sierra!"; "Down with repression against the combatant sons of the people!"; "Long live the road to surround the cities from the countryside!" Other articles analyze the Belaúnde government's economic policies, and a national strike.

15. "El debate anti-terrorista." *Caretas,* no.640 (March 16 1981): 20-21.

Legislative Decree number 46, a severe law against terrorism, was published last week by the government. *Caretas* is concerned that articles 6 and 7 of this law could muzzle the press, since they establish penalties for reporting which is deemed to "excuse" terrorist acts.

16. López, Sinesio. "Democracia y terrorismo." *Debate*, no.7 [March 1981]: 67-70.

Terrorism has polarized Peruvian politics in the seven months since democracy was restored. The spectrum of opinion on terrorism is very wide: some hold it a serious danger to democracy; others believe that its threat is exaggerated. The left declares Peru to be in an open state of war, while the right scoffs that terrorism is to be found more in the pages of newspapers than in reality. Some politicians are advocating draconian solutions, including the death penalty, to halt its spread. López concedes that Sendero Luminoso, which he characterizes as a small political sect, is responsible for spreading terror from Ayacucho to other areas, including Lima, Huaráz, and Cajamarca. Still, other terrorist acts have different, perhaps more sinister origins. Ultraright forces are also committing acts of terror, and López strongly suggests that all terror, whether committed by left or right, is aimed at the progressive sectors of Peru. Terrorist acts give the government a pretext to repress the entire left and popular movements. López condemns the economic policies of Ulloa as regressive and a factor in exacerbating poverty and misery in Peru. It is these policies, he says, more than terrorism, that undermine democratic stability: "In this connection, terrorist acts serve the right politically and help the implementation of the Ulloa Plan."

17. "El terror llega a Lima." *Caretas,* no.647 (May 11 1981): 16-17, 70.

Lima is beginning to experience even more attacks from Sendero (81 so far) than Ayacucho. The replacement of electricity pylons (60 million *soles* each) is costing money that could be better spent on other projects. Leftist politician Diez Canseco has demanded the repeal of the Antiterrorist Law, but *Caretas* profiles the expertise of the GC, the División Contra el Terrorismo (DICOTE), and the PIP in fighting terrorism. *Caretas* details the latest terrorist attacks, giving details on a Molotov cocktail assault as an example.

18. Benavente, José. "La mano tras el terror." *Equis X,* no.242 (May 20-26 1981): 18-20.

A "special report" on "who the terrorists of Sendero are and what they want." Benavente relates the story of a typical sinchi raid on a *pueblito* in Andahuaylas, during which the police show such cruelty that one old man says that they didn't appear to be Christians (signifying human beings). They destroyed crops, killed animals, raped the women and beat the men, all the time demanding "Where are the terrorists?" Four young men from the university had been in the village, trying to teach the peasants such incomprehensible words as armed struggle, feudalism, and revolution. Efforts against the guerrillas have been hindered by incompetence and internecine feuds between the Civil Guard, the Republican Guard, and the national police. Meanwhile Sendero continues to evade publicity; when two reporters from Lima went to Ayacucho to interview *senderistas*, they could only make contact with people "on the periphery of the periphery" of the group. But Benavente has learned that Sendero is still in its preparatory phase, "forming cadres and perfecting its organization." He identifies its members as ex-teachers and students from Huamanga, and reports that it formerly received aid from China and Albania. The origins of its present funding is a mystery. It has a "Robin-Hood" like attraction for the most pauperized and marginalized sectors of the population, a phenomenon he challenges social scientists to study.

19. "Guerrillas: primeros choques." *Caretas,* no.651 (June 8 1981): 30-31.

Report on clashes between Sendero and Guardia Republicana antiterrorist battalions in Andahuaylas department. "Operation Sierra" was launched to divert a planned *senderista* June offensive; it continues "Operation Surprise" which the GC and DICOTE launched in January to detain guerrillas. *Caretas* differentiates between Sendero and the 1965 guerrilla movement: Sendero is intent upon staying in the countryside and building a mass movement among the *campesinos.* However, no one has been able to actually substantiate the existence of the so-called "red zones." A possible connection between the guerrillas and drug runners is suggested.

20. Pareja Pflucker, Piedad. "Los orígenes de Sendero Luminoso." *Equis X,* no.249 (July 15 1981): 38-40.

Chapter reprinted from the author's *Terrorismo y sindicalismo en Ayacucho.* Pareja Pflucker traces the PCP from its origins in 1928, when it represented the only leftist alternative to APRA, to the 1960 factional fights and ideological struggles among Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban-style communism. She delineates no less than 20 factions that emerged from this period. Sendero traces its lineage back to the PCP-BR *(Bandera Roja),* a product of the definitive Chinese-Russian split of 1964. After taking his faction away from Saturnino Paredes in 1970, Guzmán formed his own Communist Party "by the shining path of Mariátegui." Pareja Pflucker briefly summarizes the development of the party up to its preparation for prolonged armed struggle, including the formulation of its crucial philosophical bases in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

21. *Nueva democracia,* año 1, no.3-4 (July 1981).

The lead article of *New democracy* examines the new government's economic policies in relation to the general class struggle, finding that these policies represent continuing fascism and the structuring of the corporate state. Wages are sinking, and strikes are breaking out against the government. Another article asks whether democracy or pure class struggle will prevail; to this end shall armed struggle or parliamentary cretinism be the people's choice? Still another piece proclaims the unity of the International Communist Movement and the thirteen Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations that comprise it. A final section examines Chinese texts on people's war; e.g., "Notes for a study of 'One sole spark can set a prairie on fire.'"

22. "Freddy' colaborá." *Caretas,* no.661 (August 24 1981): 30-33, 67.

Caretas speaks with a captured *senderista* who has decided to collaborate with the police. The masked youth, about 20 years old, is described as a district commander of Sendero, and confesses to at least 10 assaults, including an attack against the police station at Quinuapata in July. The police believe that Sendero is about to graduate from dynamite attacks to open guerrilla warfare. The Ministry of the Interior is asking for 59 billion *soles* for the purchase of helicopters, trucks, and radios for the Guardia Civil. Traditionally, the military has opposed the GC getting any sophisticated equipment, especially helicopters. The GC continues to operate without adequate resources to fight the guerrillas. *Caretas* correspondents accompanied a GC/PIP patrol, and can testify to the difficulties of fighting a guerrilla war on foot.

23. Benavente, José. "Terrorismo y antiterrorismo: la verdad sobre 'Sendero Luminoso.'" *Equis X,* no.257 (September 15 1981): 30-31.

Illustrating the vagaries and absurdities of Peruvian law, more than a dozen *senderista* leaders, including Guzmán and his wife, are at liberty, their names and tendencies perfectly known to the authorities for years. The police have in custody some 400 persons who have confessed or been unable to disprove association with the terrorists. Once in the hands of the judiciary, many are set free, thanks to the stupidity of police officials. There is perhaps no crime more difficult to prove than terrorism. DICOTE, the Directorate Against Terrorism, has built up a picture of the Sendero leadership, but those named have quickly gone underground. Meanwhile, the group's bombings have become more sophisticated, graduating from simple dynamite to the use of plastic explosives (used in the recent bombing of the US embassy in Lima). However, these more advanced explosives can still be manufactured inside Peru, and their employment does not signal foreign involvement with Sendero. Benavente criticizes the national police, calling them unprepared to deal with the terrorists, and too focused on finding the top leaders, which will have little or no effect on the current bombing campaign. For this he blames the Interior Ministry, which after a year has still not developed an effective anti-terrorist strategy.

24. "Hablan los terroristas." *Equis X,* no.260 (October 6 1981): 22-23.

Publication of the names and photos of the first captured "Sendero terrorists". Mostly young, unemployed *limeños*, they were recruited by *"escuelas populares,"* which are semi-legal groups for initial schooling and indoctrination, from which members graduate to more clandestine bodies. Their confessions to DICOTE reveal details about how Sendero is organized and how it operates.

25. Goldenberg, Sonia and Oscar Medrano. "Tambo: el puesto acribillado; Hubo que hacerlo; El fenómeno de Ayacucho." *Caretas,* no.669 (October 19 1981): 10-17, 70.

Trio of stories on Sendero's attack on a GC post 60 kilometers northwest of Ayacucho, the steps President Belaúnde is taking to fight this terrorism, and recent counterinsurgency operations by the GC. Sendero's attack on the Guardia post in Tambo, which left three dead and four wounded, has forced the government to declare a state of emergency in five provinces of Ayacucho. Goldenberg and Medrano reconstruct the assault on Tambo: while some 20 masked terrorists fired on the post, 30 others (none of whom appeared to be peasants) took control of the town, shouting slogans in support of the armed struggle, and raised a red flag. In accordance with provisions of the Peruvian constitution, President Belaúnde has declared a state of emergency in Huanta, La Mar, Huamanga, Cangallo, and Víctor Fajardo provinces, suspending constitutional guarantees, declaring a curfew, and giving the police and military broad powers. *Caretas* discusses the internal political and international ramifications of taking this step. The GC and PIP have

launched Operation Yunque y Martillo, directed against the University in Ayacucho, considered the principal center for terrorism. Six hundred men arrived under the command of a GC general, and arrested 50 students in a night raid. Also detained were several professors, including the mathematician Maximiliano Durand Araujo. While there have been protests at these actions, the police told reporters that their intention in Ayacucho was to prevent violence. The University's rector has denied that his school is a bastion of terrorists, but the authorities believe that the UNSCH is a principal recruiting center for Sendero. A number of detainees are named by *Caretas*.

26. "El Comité Central de 'Sendero.'" *Equis X*, no.262 (October 20 1981): 22-23.

Equis X interviews professor of mathematics Maximiliano Durand Araujo, an alleged member of the Central Committee of Sendero, in the offices of DICOTE. Although he declines to specifically condemn Sendero (to which he denies any link), he does declare that terrorism is damaging the country. He further professes complete ignorance of the Sino-Soviet split or the leftist dichotomy between parliamentary change and armed struggle. The police, reports the journal, have managed to piece together from captured documents and interrogations of prisoners, a list of Sendero leaders. *Equis X* prints the names of more than a dozen persons, identifying the leaders of the Political Bureau, the Departmental Committee in Ayacucho, and the Central Committee of the party (including Durand). This is the first detailed description of the people who are alleged to lead Shining Path.

27. "Terror en Ayacucho." *Equis X*, no.262 (October 20 1981): 10-12.

The recent deaths of two civilians and a policeman in Ayacucho have moved the government to suspend the Constitution and give itself emergency powers in five provinces of the department. The Interior Minister and heads of the GC and PIP are clearly to blame for their inertia and lack of progress against the terrorists. *Equis X* is in full agreement with the government's decision to declare a state of emergency, opposing equally state terrorism and torture, and political crime committed by the left. Still, neither the police nor even the counterproductive sinchis are suited for operations in the rural terrain of the mountains. It is only the armed forces that are adequately trained and equipped to deal with situations like that of Ayacucho, and unfortunately, they are inclined to view themselves as compromised in actions of this sort--a fault directly attributable to the government's weakness.

28. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "Ayacucho: la búsqueda del Sendero." *Caretas*, no.670 (October 26 1981): 23-25, 80.

The first of many reports on Shining Path by Gorriti, one of the most prominent chroniclers of the war. Gorriti reports from Ayacucho, where the police are concentrating on destroying possible links between the peasants and the terrorists. *Caretas* managed to speak with captured alleged *senderista* leader Durand, who denies any link with the group. In the emergency zone, the GC, GR, and PIP are mounting a series of operations against the guerrillas. Many people have been arrested; while most have been released, the authorities are under pressure to produce results quickly, and almost certainly some innocent people have been detained. The terrorists are operating in both urban and rural cells. Gorriti reports that the delicate balance between maintaining civic protections and fighting terrorists has sometimes been breached by the sinchis. Gorriti and Oscar Medrano also go along on a helicopter patrol, and describe how the sinchis operate in the countryside. Appended is an interview with Civil Guard General Carlos Barreto, on how his men are fighting the subversives. He claims that the GC has infiltrated Sendero. Their leadership is very intelligent, and they are well armed, trained, and active. But they have not yet attracted a mass following, according to Barreto. Preceding these pieces is a report (pp.18-21) on the detainees of Ayacucho. A French tourist was arrested and mistreated in jail; in addition, one of the arrested students describes her torture at the hands of the police to Gorriti.

29. Goldenberg, Sonia. "Sendero y la universidad." *Caretas*, no. 671 (November 2 1981): 49-50.

Is the Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga the cradle and bastion of *senderismo* ? Goldenberg talks with the university's rector, a sociologist, and an anthropologist in a search for Sendero's roots. The UNSCH was (re)established in 1959, on the American model, in a small town with absolutely no industry, of some 18,000 peasants and a few feudal *señores*. By 1967, when Abimael Guzmán became director of personnel, the University had been converted into a bastion of the PCP Bandera Roja. Today Ayacucho is an occupied city, and "the Alma Mater continues atoning for the original sin." But while many graduates have been arrested as terrorists,

the Frente Unico de Estudiantes expelled Sendero in 1974 in a bitter fight for control of the student body. The "popular schools" proselytize for terrorism, but not the University, declares a PIP colonel. Today the University's administrators are determined to show that Sendero is only a memory; there aren't even any slogans painted on the white walls of the cloisters. The rector describes for *Caretas* the school's many non-political accomplishments, its faculty and student body, and the central role it plays in the economy of Ayacucho. Still, students walk the streets of the city fearfully, and some burn books by the river, works such as the essays of José Carlos Mariátegui, lest they be found by the sinchis to be in possession of "subversive materials."

30. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "Si la mano dura da tranquilidad..." *Caretas*, no. 671 (November 2 1981): 34-36.

Brief interview with José Gagliardi Schiaffino, retired army general and the new Interior Minister. Gagliardi is evasive on a number of points, including whether terrorism is on the increase or is under control, and who is backing Sendero. He does believe that the terrorists are receiving outside aid, although he declines to say from where. He concedes that the security forces could be better equipped (they especially lack helicopters), and declares that if legal and constitutional means allow a "harder hand" in the fight against terrorism, he will apply those measures.

31. Alarcón, Hugo Ned. "Gagliardi se fue a la guerra." *Caretas*, no.672 (November 9 1981): 16-17, 70.

The new Interior Minister visits the war zone. He has given orders to repel by arms any attack of the terrorists, and if possible, to exterminate them. The ramifications of the term "exterminate" are ominous in their implications. While the Minister is well-intentioned and not to blame for abuses in the emergency zone, some police officials are interpreting his message as a go-ahead for repressive measures. *Caretas* examines the problems of intelligence and coordination which the GC and PIP are having in their fight against the terrorists. Sendero, according to a report quoted from Desco's *Resumen semenal,* has its own weaknesses and internal factional struggles. "Purifying" its cadre has thinned out its ranks. Still, the authorities have to put their house in order. The SIN, or National Intelligence Service, has been reactivated by President Belaúnde (its budget had been cut drastically). Police operations against Sendero will henceforth be coordinated by military intelligence.

32. "Balance del terror." *Caretas*, no.678 (December 21 1981): 24-25.

Sendero has launched a series of bombing attacks in Lima. *Caretas* analyzes its latest actions, and discerns a pattern related to the intensity of police counter-actions against the terrorists. So far there have been 700 actions since January 1 of this year. Where these actions have taken place and against what targets is described. The Interior Ministry is looking at a plan to protect high tension electricity lines. *Caretas* has learned that Sendero's Central Committee met in early September, and decided to make the transition from acts of sabotage and terror to guerrilla warfare. The PCP is also reaching out to recruit from other leftist organizations, such as Unir, the PCP-U, VR-Proletario, and MIR. Now Sendero seems to be carrying out simultaneous campaigns of agitation, demonstration, sabotage, and terror. The article estimates that their chances of success at these levels are minimal. "Although one never knows..."

1982

33. Mercado, Rogger. *El PC "Sendero Luminoso."* Lima: Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1982.

The first full-length study to appear on Sendero. While most histories of the PCP go back no further than the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960's, Mercado traces its origins back to Mariátegui, following the many evolutions of the Party through eras of *caudillismo* and national alliance with bourgeois parties during the antifascist period preceding and during the Second World War. Pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese forces irrevocably split the Party in 1964 over differences of personality as well as ideology. Several further factional fights in 1967 and 1970 led to the formation of *El Partido Comunista del Perú "Sendero Luminoso,"* Guzmán's faction. Mercado describes briefly its Maoist line and development, through "reclaiming Mariátegui" to "reconstructing and reconstituting" the Party. In order to explore more thoroughly Sendero's aims and reasoning, Mercado reprints an interview conducted by Manuel Góngora Prado in *La República* with a member of Sendero's central committee in March 1982. He also includes as counterpoint an interview with the leader of *Patria Roja,* who attacks Sendero's "infantile and dogmatic" conception of revolution and presents IU as a democratic alternative. Mercado, while not endorsing Sendero, cannot bring himself to condemn it: "It is preferable to march to the summit in error than to descend into the abyss with certainty." Mercado in any case considers the Belaúnde-*aprista* government to be little better than a "civil dictatorship with a democratic face." And he rejects any suggestion that Sendero is either a foreign campaign or a "mere anarchic orchestration," since its ideology and actions reflect its uniquely parallel urban and rural blend of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. Significantly, there is no mention whatsoever of Andean messianism in relation to Sendero; Mercado's book is strictly political.

34. Comité Central, Partido Comunista del Perú. *¡Desarrollemos la guerra de guerrillas!* S.n, s.l., 1981.

A valuable primary document of the movement, and its first lengthy ideological statement. The PCP recounts fifteen years of struggle to reconstitute itself as the organized vanguard of the proletariat founded by José Carlos Mariátegui, and congratulates itself upon 21 months of armed struggle, with almost 2,000 "actions" in virtually all of the country's departments. Sendero has carried out peasant mobilizations, sabotage, blackouts, bombings, bank robberies, etc. The counterrevolutionary government's response has been persecution, repression, torture, jail, and death. Whether that government is civilian or military, declares Sendero, the real ruler of Peru is monopoly capitalism, especially international banking institutions operating at the behest of North American imperialism. The PCP divides Peru into *campesino,* proletarian, petit bourgeois, and middle-bourgeois sectors; it is the workers and peasants, along with the middle bourgeoisie, which united under the direction of the proletariat, will form the core of the revolutionary forces and lead the armed struggle. The manifesto ends: "People of Peru! Labor, peasants, workers, young people, intellectuals, support the armed struggle! Support the spread of guerrilla warfare! *¡Viva el Partido Comunista del Perú! ¡Gloria al Marxismo-Leninismo-Maoismo!"*

35. "Los jinetes del Sendero." *Caretas,* no.680 (January 1 1982): 66-67.

A few minutes after 9 o'clock on the evening of January 6, a troop of *senderista* horsemen entered San José de Cecce. Raiding the GC post, the guerrillas stole pistols, rifles, machine guns and ammunition. They dynamited the post before withdrawing. The surprise was total. *Caretas* reports on recent actions in the emergency zones, including the murder of a GR policeman, and a police raid on the University. The synchronous and varied nature of these assaults point to a vigorous, not weakened, terrorist organization. Sendero's tactics differ from those of classical Latin American guerrilla movements. They seem to originate inside or close to the places where they strike, which points to dependence on intense political work to build localized, clandestine organizations. Sendero strikes where vigilance has been relaxed. Counterinsurgency experience shows that the eradication of such movements which have deeply penetrated populations is a long and arduous task, principally political, and only secondarily military. The fight against Sendero will need a much greater effort.

36. "S.L. Durand absuelto." *Caretas,* no.682 (January 25 1982): 20.

Very brief item notes that 38-year-old professor Maximiliano Durand Araujo, accused of being one of Sendero's top leaders, has been found innocent of all charges. This is the second time that Durand has been acquitted for lack of proof. He was arrested in Lima (allegedly on a mission

to establish clandestine cells in the capital), and transferred to Ayacucho. He was freed, but several other persons were convicted of crimes against public security, the Constitution and the state. The same column reports that Edith Lagos, 19 years old, is awaiting sentencing. Lagos is also thought to be a top *senderista* leader, and responsible for the bombings of election offices.

37. Salcedo, José María. "Pablo Macera: Tim, Velasco, el Papa, Abimael Guzmán..." *Quehacer*, no.15 (February 1982): 48-65.

Interview with Pablo Macera on a wide spectrum of topics: General and President Velasco, the Pope, Ulloa, Haya de la Torre, terrorism, eroticism, etc. On the subject of terrorism in Peru, Macera is convinced that the men and women of Sendero are people connected with a "messianic, millenarian, Andean movement" which has come again and again, and failed, from the 16th century forward, and, he suspects, before then as well.

38. "Guerrillas 'toman' Ayacucho." *Equis X*, no.281 (March 8 1982): 9-10.

On March 4 some 150 *senderistas* virtually "took" the city of Ayacucho, attacking simultaneously the barracks and headquarters of the Civil and Republican Guards, the PIP, the jail, and the hospital. A new phase in the "prolonged war from the countryside to the city" has seemingly been opened. *Equis X* is alarmed by the widespread and coordinated nature of the assaults, which demonstrate an alarming level of audacity, skill, and organization. *Equis X* also disparages the government's ineffectual response to the threat, and condemns the cold-blooded killing of two wounded *senderistas*, who were dragged from their hospital beds and murdered by police. A commentary by Ismael Frías follows the article, warning that an overreaction to Sendero threatens Peru with "pinochet" authoritarianism.

39. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo."Morir en Huamanga." *Caretas*, no.688 (March 8 1982): 10-17.

Detailed report on the *senderista* attack on Ayacucho. Gorriti reconstructs how the guerrillas assaulted the CRAS jail, freed all the prisoners, including Edith Lagos, and retired without any effective response from the police. They do not seem to have employed any sophisticated arms, nor is there any indication of outside (foreign) help. The following story ("En el hospital") details the cold-blooded murder by members of the Republican Guard of wounded *senderistas* in the Ayacucho hospital.

40. Frías, Ismael. "¿Terrorismo antiterroristas?" *Equis X*, no.282 (March 15 1982): 11.

Op-ed piece unequivocally condemning the guerrillas. For the leftists of *Equis X*, Sendero is not "a belligerent in an undeclared civil war, social fighters with mistaken methods, nor revolutionaries with a strategy and tactics different from ours." They are delinquent, subversive, criminal terrorists, totalitarian activists who intend to destroy not only the institutions of capitalism, but also those of political pluralism, democratic freedom, and the human rights of all who do not think like them. But Frías also warns that fighting Sendero with inhuman and barbarous conduct will bring the population to the side of the terrorists.

41. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "¿Qué hacer en Ayacucho?" *Caretas*, no.689 (March 15 1982): 11-17.

How to pacify Ayacucho? asks Gorriti; how do you pacify a zone where, in spite of the terrible damage caused by the war and the sick economy, in spite of a state of emergency, two guerrilla leaders have been buried, their coffins covered by the red banner with the hammer and sickle, attended by a large crowd? The assault on the jail in Huamanga, bombings of electrical towers, a dynamite attack on the Justice Ministry--all show that the situation is far graver than the government has admitted. Gorriti poses a number of questions about Sendero. Are the police forces sufficient to fight them? What kind of terrorism are we confronting? Is Fidel Castro involved, as some who want to break relations with Cuba claim? Is nacroterrorism, "an alliance between vice and violence" responsible, as President Belaúnde has declared? Should we call for intervention by the armed forces? In the course of answering some of these questions, Gorriti absolves Sendero of a true alliance with the drug traffickers; they merely impose "taxes" on the flow of coca. Nor is "cryptodogmatic" Abimael Guzmán allied with Castro, whom he sees as a servant of social imperialist revisionism. Follow-ups on the CRAS and GC post assault and the hospital massacre point to official negligence (there was warning of a possible attack on the jail) and culpability.

42. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo."Sendero en Canarias."*Caretas,* no.690 (March 22 1982): 12-14.

After describing the latest *senderista* attack (on the Canary Mines), Gorriti asks, "What is Sendero's own vision for its armed struggle?" *Caretas* has had access to authentic documents from the fourth plenary session of the party's Central Committee, which detail the need to widen bases of support in Cusco, Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Huancavelica, to establish Popular Schools, to clandestinely build the future People's Army, and to hew fiercely to the "correct" line of Mao as interpreted by Comrade Gonzalo. Gorriti analyzes Sendero's military strategy, tactics, armaments, strengths, and potential weaknesses.

43. Echevarría, Neftalí." ¿Qué quiere Sendero?" *Equis X,* no.284 (March 29 1982): 4-6, 15.

An investigation into Sendero's aims. To understand Abimael Guzmán is to comprehend Sendero, which is becoming a cult around "Alvaro" (Guzmán's first pseudonym) or "Gonzalo." Echevarría traces Guzmán's arrival at the University of Huamanga, the development of his political philosophy, and the steps leading up to armed struggle. What does Sendero want? Echevarría believes that its aims are simple: to nationalize totally the economy, so that Sendero is servant and master of all and everyone. To this end the party is ready to empty the cities, driving the population into the countryside as Pol Pot did in his "democratic Kampuchea." Still, to the landless or hungry peasant, the unemployed student, the embittered professional, the ruined artisan and small merchant, etc., Sendero offers a rifle, and with this weapon, an activity, food, power, prestige, and the chance to be part of the new rulers of the nation.

44. Ercilla, Tito. "Ayacucho: 'Zona liberada.'" *Equis X,* no.286 (April 12 1982): 22-23.

Report from Ayacucho, a "liberated zone" in the hands of the guerrillas, with an invisible and underground governing structure similar to that of the Vietcong. Ercilla outlines the guerrilla techniques, borrowed from Vietnam, which Sendero is employing, including a clandestine fighting organization, rural support bases, "war taxes," and a secret vigilance and control apparatus, which uses assassination to ensure compliance. The sinchis, GR, and PIP are outmatched by the guerrillas. To regain control, he writes, will require the political and military intervention of the army, not only in Ayacucho, but in all the *mancha india* (the "Indian stain"), the most peasant, Quechua-speaking, and deprived region of the country.

45. Bonilla, Alberto. "Blanco tiende puentes, pero Sendero los dinamita." *Caretas,* no.695 (April 26 1982): 26-30.

Interview with Hugo Blanco, leader of the PUM and participant in the abortive rural guerrilla movement of 1965. Although Blanco considers Sendero's revolutionary violence a justifiable response against the reactionary violence of the Belaúnde government, he still has many ideological and practical differences with Shining Path. In particular, he regards Sendero as too much of a "vanguardist" and not enough of a "mass" movement. Still, he tells *Caretas* that the left can most effectively help Sendero by blocking the government's repressive offensive, not only in support of Sendero, but also in solidarity with the victims of that repression. Bonilla closely presses Blanco on his party's position with regard to Sendero, on his solidarity with a movement which he considers mistaken in its tactics, and on his views of IU and other leftists who have condemned the guerrillas.

46. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "Habla Sendero." *Caretas,* no.695 (April 26 1982): 31-33.

Interview with Catarina Arianzén and Victor León Huamán, both presumed *senderista* leaders. They were detained after the burning of a tractor on a Cusco cooperative farm, and taken to Lima for interrogation by DICOTE. Arianzén appears to have suffered abuse while in custody. Their statements shed some light upon the ideological background of Sendero, its analysis of Peruvian society, its distance from the rest of the country's left, and its path to power. Their belief in revolutionary violence, disdain towards all other Marxist countries, blithe acceptance of cruelty in the name of the revolution, and faith in the masses, are a good example of the mind-set of typical captured members of Sendero.

47. Salcedo, José María. "Sendero, conciencia de la izquierda?" *Quehacer,* no.16 (April 1982): 14-20.

Blackouts and molotov cocktails thrown in Miraflores have awoken Lima to the reality of Sendero. No longer a distant, exotic phenomenon in far-off Ayacucho, the left must come to terms with this phenomenon. For some, the guerrilla still holds a certain fascination. But Salcedo argues deftly for the left to recognize that Sendero is not the product of its own failures, "nor is it the light which illuminates the errors and failings of the left." The left has to recognize that to Sendero, it is part of that society which they intend to eliminate. The left needs the current democratic *aperatura,* but Sendero does not; for it, democracy is irrelevant. The left must recognize Sendero as its principal enemy. If Shining Path succeeds in provoking a military coup, it is the left that will suffer and disappear as a political option.

48. Grimberg, Pablo. "Donde termina el Sendero." *Caretas,* no.697 (May 10 1982): 26-30.

Exclusive report from El Frontón, the grim island fortress prison in the harbor of Callao, where *senderistas* are imprisoned for maximum security. *Caretas* interviews several suspected guerrillas, including a 16-year-old boy. Common to all the prisoners is the seeming arbitrariness of their detention, at various places and times, and for different reasons. There are 127 presumed terrorists in El Frontón, and probably more than half are totally innocent. However, *Caretas* was permitted a few minutes with a knowledgeable and politically aware prisoner, who calmly discusses the opportunism of Hugo Blanco, the abuses they have suffered at the hands of the Republican Guard, and the justifiable role of armed struggle. A follow-up interview (pp.30-31,72) with Minister Enrique Elías illuminates the government's decision to imprison suspected terrorists in El Frontón.

49. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "El tambo del Sendero." *Caretas,* no.699 (May 24 1982): 18-19.

Less than a year after the destructive attack on Tambo's Civil Guard post, Sendero has returned to kill again. The cruelty of their assault (in which a child was killed and a woman wounded) illustrates the violent nature of the *senderista* sedition. Gorriti reconstructs the attack by 50 terrorists on Tambo, whose GC post now stands empty. Sendero has gained not only a moral, but a material victory as well, in terms of clothing, medicines, and shoes seized. The police have gained only sporadic and limited success in their counterinsurgency efforts. Gorriti judges the political and tactical balance between the two opposing forces. The police are caught in a dilemma they cannot resolve: a tactical retreat will give the terrorists the initiative and leave the population open to retribution.

50. Salcedo, José María. "¿Qué hacer con 'Sendero'?" *Equis X,* no.292 (May 24 1982): 28.

Salcedo, an experienced senderologist, reflects on the threat of the movement to Peru's democracy. The left needs democratic "spaces;" Sendero does not. For the PCP, democracy is absolutely irrelevant. Sendero welcomes repression, believing it necessary for the success of the revolution. This is a hypothesis which Salcedo says has been discredited many times in history. A *golpe militar,* according to the guerrillas, will eliminate once and for all their bitterest rivals, the rest of the Peruvian left, leaving only the option of Sendero. The left must not only oppose terrorism, but also demand accountability from the security forces; militarized repression cannot co-exist with "democratic spaces."

51. Grimberg, Pablo. "La escuela del valor." *Caretas,* no.700 (May 31 1982): 40-45.

Interesting story on the training of Peruvian Marines. Undoubtedly influenced by the current Malvinas/Falklands war between Argentina and Great Britain, *Caretas* depicts the extremely rigorous and demanding training which Marine recruits undergo, designed to produce ferocious physical and psychological toughness. [After the government gave the military responsibility for eradicating Sendero, the Marines were accused of some of the war's worst human rights abuses.]

52. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "El camino del Abimael." *Caretas,* no.701 (June 7 1982): 40-44.

Examination of who Abimael Guzmán Reynoso is: his background, schooling, intellectual development, and beliefs. Gorriti traces the evolution of Guzmán into "Comrade Gonzalo" through interviews with his teachers and students. Although his leadership has been crucial to the definition of Shining Path, Guzmán himself has remained in the shadows. A portrait of an overwhelmingly serious, studious, and brilliant, if somber, individual emerges. "He was a priest's

dream, a mother's dream," remembers one fellow student of a man who never got drunk or played a prank. Although illegitimate, Guzmán's father treated him on an equal basis with his other children. From the first he showed zeal in school and earnestness in his conduct. His mentor, Dr. Miguel Angel Rodríguez Rivas, describes him as having neither English humor nor Russian tenderness, but a "solid Germanic braininess." His doctoral thesis in 1961 was on "A Kantian Theory of Space." He soon complemented it with a law thesis, "The Democratic Bourgeois State." By this time he was a disciplined militant of the Communist Party. His "Andean trajectory" began when Efraín Morote Best, rector at the UNSCH in Ayacucho, convinced him to come to that impoverished department. Rodríguez Rivas remembers a few human traits of Guzmán, including his fondness for classical music and modern literature, especially Joyce and Hemingway. His mentor believes that his former student may not take "Gonzalo thought" seriously, but has conceived it as a guide for more limited minds. He also thinks that Guzmán has adopted a messianism through which he believes that he can solve the country's problems.

53. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "La ofensiva del terrorismo." *Caretas,* no.706 (July 12 1982): 22.

While Sendero's counterattack against the police offensive in Ayacucho seems to have ended for the moment, one general's optimism that terrorism has been "controlled" seems somewhat misplaced. Still, what measures, asks Gorriti, should the nation take to stifle a terrorist outbreak? Is the state of emergency justified? Should the death penalty be expanded to cover terrorist crimes? Civil Guard officials and the relatives of police killed in Sendero attacks believe it should be. But despite this emotional reaction to these outrages, there are serious questions concerning the laxness and inefficiency of the judicial system in its handling of terrorist suspects. What is certain, anyway, is that bringing the "eastern deliriums" of Abimael and his works into the dock is far from reality. Accompanying articles (pp.24-25) describe the Sendero attack on the Naña GC post, and examine the quality of police training for members of the Civil Guard. Their instruction lasts only six months, they lack equipment and infrastructure, and their pay is low. Ammunition is so scarce that they scarcely fire a dozen shots during training. Nevertheless, their valiant reaction to the Naña attack shows that spirit is not lacking; to remedy these deficiencies is a clear and urgent task.

54. "Naña: el terrorismo llega a Lima." *Equis X,* no.299 (July 12 1982): 8-10.

Sendero, after a period of inactivity, has renewed its offensive with a series of attacks. The guerrillas continue to show a high degree of organization, discipline, and preparation; the government continues to fumble for an effective response to both terrorism and the country's economic crisis. *Equis X* analyzes briefly the nature of Shining Path's popular war, showing how it differs from other popular struggles throughout the world.

55. Retamozo, Roberto."'Sendero' segun 'Sendero.'" *Equis X,* no.300 (July 19 1982): 17, 23-24.

Describes and analyzes in some detail the clandestine pamphlet of some 30 pages, entitled "Develop guerrilla warfare!" ("*¡Desarrollemos la guerra de guerrillas!* ") The release of the first detailed explanation of Sendero's political philosophy marks a significant step in understanding the theoretical underpinnings of its people's war.

56. Cabrera, Julio. "¿Cuba arma a Sendero?" *Equis X,* no.303 (August 9 1982): 7.

President Belaúnde has repeatedly placed the blame for terrorism on exterior forces, on nations "which export revolution." While not mentioning Cuba, he has clearly accused that country of backing Shining Path. Cabrera declares that neither Cuba, Russia, nor China are supporting Sendero financially or logistically. This can be logically proven: Sendero is ideologically opposed and antagonistic to Cuban, Soviet, and Chinese communism. Castro, Brezhnev, and Deng-Xiaoping have equally drawn its scorn. Why then does the president continue to make this false accusation? His inability to resolve Peru's economic crisis and his subservience to the United States are explanations for this falsehood. Belaúnde stood by England and the United States and against Argentina during the Malvinas War; now he stands by the Reagan administration against Cuba.

57. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Sendero a la locura." *Caretas,* no.709 (August 9 1982): 22-24.

Shining Path guerrillas have wreaked havoc on an experimental farm, the Fundo Allpachaca, run by the UNSCH and supported by the Swiss and Dutch governments. *Senderistas* dynamited the buildings, and then did their greatest damage: 25 Brown Swiss cows slaughtered,

25 head of cattle stolen, and the throats of four Holsteins cut. Germ plasm and wine depositories, animal medicines, and priceless documentation were all destroyed in an effort to polarize the countryside. The Fundo was the center of a developmental effort to improve the lives of Ayacucho's peasants. "A peasant revolution which demolishes *sembríos*, dynamites tractors, destroys bridges and canals,and kills *comuneros?*" asks a member of Izquierda Unida. "This is Andean nihilism and nothing more." The Peruvian Peasant Confederation (CCP) has voted to condemn the attack; the peasant patrols started by the CCP must fight not only thieves and cattle rustlers, but also the "Andean emulators of Pol Pot."

58. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Jueves negro." *Caretas*, no.712 [711] (August 23 1982): 10-19.

Series of stories on violent Sendero actions, in particular a wave of bombings which have left many dead and wounded in Lima. *Caretas* measures the government's response, as well as that of Parliament, to the escalation of terror in the capital. Other pieces include a profile of one man's odyssey from student to terrorist, a short interview of the Interior Minister, and an examination of Sendero's recent operations in Ayacucho. Sendero differs from other terrorist groups in its fanaticism, its total freedom from dependence upon external help, and in its deliberate adoption of the simplest methods of operation in the city and the countryside (for example, its extensive use of dynamite, readily available in a mining economy). It has compensated for its lack of arms and equipment with careful organization and meticulous planning. Gorriti shows how Sendero has organized itself, how it recruits and trains its cadres, and how it operates, stressing the organization's elevation of politics above all other considerations, and the importance of women in its ranks as leaders.

59. Sanders, S.V. "Peru's Ancient Incas Are Reborn in a Terrorist Movement." *Business Week*, no.1754 (August 30 1982): 45.

One of the first reports on Sendero in the U.S. press. Peru, chosen by the Reagan administration to receive special aid in the wake of the Cancún economic summit, is menaced by a terrorist group that combines Maoist revolutionary violence with a legend that the Incas rulers of ancient Peru will one day return. *Sendero Luminoso* or Shining Trail is baffling, as it has sought no publicity for its cause. Its leaders are thought to have urban and university backgrounds. Sendero was allied until 1987 with Patria Roja, which has sent 80-90 trainees to North Korea, Vietnam, Algeria, and China. But Sendero broke with PR and its members spent time in Indian villages learning Quechua. A suspected leader is Abimael Guzmán. Pablo Macera is quoted as saying Sendero is part of a "messianic, millennialist, Andean movement" which has existed since the 16th century, with little success. Although small and isolated from the left, it is nevertheless the tip of an iceberg of discontent and frustration of Peru's twelve million Indians, aided by an economic downturn and a fall in metal prices (Sendero has recently spread to mining regions outside of Ayacucho). Peru, Sanders writes, has always experienced revolutionary activity. The US has been more concerned lately about the large number of Soviet military advisors in Peru, linked to the 2.5 billion dollars in Soviet weaponry which Peru bought in the 1970's. One analyst said of Sendero, "These guys are so different and mysterious that it is possible that at some point the army is liable to say it is time to do something about them." This, Sanders believes, might endanger Peru's latest experiment in democratic government.

60. "El gran apagón de los 'luminosos.'" *Equis X*, no.305 (August 23 1982): 8-10.

Sendero has brought the revolution to Lima by dynamiting electrical transmission towers and blacking out the capital. *Equis X* reviews the attacks in detail, and their impact upon and significance for the country as a whole. The impotence of the government in the antiterrorist, economic, and political spheres, calls for radical change. National strikes by wide segments of the working and professional classes point to severe problems that will not be solved by the government's suspension of constitutional guarantees and declaration of emergency rule.

61. Ercilla, Tito. "Sendero se confiesa." *Equis X*, no.306 (August 31 1982): 4-6.

Interview with a supposed *senderista.* In a series of probing, even antagonistic exchanges, the *senderista* explains the reasoning behind the blackout of Lima on August 19, denies that Sendero's actions constitute terrorism, and declares stories of guerrilla atrocities to be filthy lies of the bourgeois government and its lackeys. Ercilla asks his subject to elaborate upon the origins and aims of Shining Path, its organization, and aims. The guerrilla sheds light upon the various

phases of the armed struggle, and rejects absolutely any alliance with IU: "The masses will follow us. The leaders [of IU] are traitors and we will treat them as such."

62. Medina, Manuel Miguel. "Derechos humanos no son terrorismo." *Equis X*, no.308 (September 13 1982): 19-21.

Interview with Javier Diez Canseco, who has been viciously attacked by both ultra-left and ultra-right for his opinions. Diez Canseco vigorously champions human rights and those who defend them. In Peru today the defender of human rights is branded a terrorist; this, he declares, is the thesis of Pinochet, Videla, and D'Aubuisson. *Equis X* presses him closely on why some sectors of the left have been so reluctant to condemn Sendero, on how the UDP would fight the terrorists if it came to power, on the reaction in Peru to his denunciations of human rights abuses, and for his own views on Shining Path.

63. "La muerte de Edith Lagos." *Caretas*, no.714 (September 13 1982): 10-13, 70.

Report on Edith Lagos, a martyr at age 19, and on the aftermath of her death: a huge funeral procession in Ayacucho, wild accusations of murder by irresponsible journalists, and the birth of a new legend. *Caretas* reports the circumstances of Lagos' death, and on her legacy: even before her death, a reporter found a small statue of a female guerrilla with a machine gun at a fair in Huancayo; Edith Lagos' name was inscribed on its base.

64. Gaitán, Julio César. "Visita a zona senderista." *Equis X*, no.309 (September 20 1982): 4-6, 30.

Extraordinary visit to a "liberated zone" in Ayacucho. Ordered not to bring any identification or luggage, Gaitán waits at a certain corner in Ayacucho for contact with the guerrillas. He is impressed by their efficient urban communication and support infrastructure, and paints a picture of a movement far more widespread than publicly acknowledged. In interviews with *senderistas* and their supporters, Gaitán puts a human face on a mysterious and enigmatic enemy. The guerrillas claim to have hundreds of liberated villages, where the power of the state has been eliminated and Sendero has been established as the authority, distributing arms, controlling economic activity, collecting taxes, dispensing justice, and educating the young.

65. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "Sendero en El Frontón." *Caretas*, no.715 (September 20 1982): 20-23, 64-65.

Long report from the Blue Pavilion at El Frontón, where 252 imprisoned *senderistas* openly sing hymns to the armed struggle. Gorriti describes a disciplined cadre of political prisoners who lecture him on their "beacon of the world revolution," and describe Comrade Gonzalo as the fourth sword of Marxism. No other group but them is Marxist, they declare; all others are merely reactionaries. The prisoners justify violence against mayors, small merchants, and functionaries, because they betray the cause of the people and serve the enemy. "This is a revolution; everyone who opposes the revolution, will simply be crushed like an insect; that's the way it is." They summarize for Gorriti *pensamiento Gonzalo:* his philosophy, his economic thought (Peru is a capitalist bureaucracy over a feudal base), and his scientific socialism (the five phases of the armed struggle). They reject Russia (revisionist), China (the present leadership is characterized as "rats"), and Albania (Hoxha is a miserable revisionist). Gorriti says that one thing about the *senderistas* is that they speak clearly; one is with them or against them. He compares their look to that of the Khmer Rouge or the revolutionary guards of the Ayatollah Khomeni. They are secular ayatollahs in their implacable and fanatical community.

66. Gaitán, Julio César. "Nueva arma de Sendero: terror selectivo." *Equis X*, no.310 (September 27 1982): 16-17.

The assassination of policemen of the PIP represents a "new weapon" within the "second armed struggle" phase that Sendero is waging, namely the "punishment of torturers and informers." The murdered PIP agents were supposedly part of an interrogation unit in Ayacucho; the press has alleged that the killings are acts of vengeance on the part of Sendero for the torture and murder of guerrilla leader Edith Lagos. Interrogation is a specialty of the PIP, with psychological tricks of a cruel nature a common technique. Sendero is executing police agents, along with those they call *soplones* (squealers), civilians who pass information to the police.

67. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "Sendero en El Frontón II: Gonzalismo y fanatismo." *Caretas*, no.716 (September 27 1982): 32-35.

Second part of Gorriti's report from El Frontón. He summarizes the five phases of the armed struggle, according to the *senderistas:* Mobilization, agitation, and armed propaganda; sabotage and guerrilla actions; generalized spread of violence and the development of guerrilla war; development and expansion of support bases *(bases de apoyo);* encirclement of the cities and the collapse of the state. The guerrillas claim to have succeeded to the third step, and are preparing for phase four. Gorriti talks to prisoners who have asked to be separated from the others in the Blue Pavilion in another area of the prison. Even these men shout the customary *senderista* slogans and sing a hymn in praise of Presidente Gonzalo.

68. Gaitán, Julio César. "Sendero prepara toma de Ayacucho." *Equis X*, no.311 (October 4 1982): 4-6, 28.

According to informed sources in Ayacucho, Sendero is preparing for a spectacular action: to take control of the city. Skeptics should remember that Sendero was effectively master of Ayacucho for almost five hours when its guerrillas liberated prisoners from the city's jail. Taking control of the city's nerve centers, using its radio and television facilities, would be the culmination of the "third armed struggle" phase and the preparation for intensified war of its "red army." *Equis X* lists more than a dozen provinces where Sendero already has effective control. It considers the situation irreversible, because the guerrillas have penetrated every institution in Ayacucho and have growing support throughout the zone. The reasons for this support, or acquiescence, are fear, conviction, and hatred of the government and Acción Popular. The counterproductive tactics of the sinchis have merely intensified this rejection of the state.

69. Béjar, Hector. "Guerrilla, terrorismo: de 1965 a 1982." *Debate*, no.16 [October 1982]: 54-57.

Béjar, who led an abortive attempt at Cuban-style "foco" guerrilla warfare in 1965, distinguishes between his own movement and Sendero. Both are opposed to economic, social, and political aggression and a democracy empty of social content. But here the similarities end. His movement, Béjar contends, was a guerrilla campaign; that of Sendero is terror. The guerrilla has to conduct himself in a just manner, as did the guerrillas of Vietnam and Cuba. There can be no acts against the people; no torture or abuse of prisoners, no stealing or appropriating goods from the peasants (Mao's famous dictums). Of Sendero he says: "It is easier to be a terrorist than a guerrilla." Lacking a program and model, it has instead substituted an almost fanatical and dogmatic faith. The guerrillas of 1965 were a deliberate and heroic act, Béjar writes, whose leaders were middle- and upper-class youth desirous of joining the historical struggle of the peasantry for land. Sendero emerges from the "medium" poor of the cities and the pauperized of the countryside, from sectors with no hope and no future. His guerrillas did not use indiscriminate violence; "they would have been incapable of planting a bomb in a cinema, assaulting the president of a *campesino* community, dynamiting a tractor, threatening or intimidating peasants or rural teachers." Sendero's actions are a mixture of war, sabotage, and terrorism, propaganda and intimidation, "clean" combat and "dirty" war, revolution and vengeance for social resentment. But even as he differentiates between his own noble movement and the less principled actions of Sendero, Béjar assigns a large share of the blame to the oligarchy's "structural violence."

70. González, Raúl. "Ayacucho: Por los caminos de Sendero." *Quehacer*, no. 19 (October 1982): 39-77.

The first of many articles by González, who became *Quehacer's* resident expert on Shining Path. González traveled to Ayacucho to gather firsthand background information on Sendero. He asks a number of questions: How did Sendero arise? What does it propose for Peru? Why did it chose Ayacucho to launch its revolution? González presents Sendero's ideological positions in the form of eight "theses": that Peru is a dependent, semi-feudal and semi-colonial country, where democracy can be no more than a caricature and the government's aim is to foster "bureaucratic capitalism." To support either the electoral process or to utilize the legal system is to help develop the bureaucratic road, the road of the exploiters. The left can either support the people (i.e., the armed struggle), or continue participating in "parliamentary cretinism." The Peruvian revolution will be democratic, national, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal; its social base will be a worker-peasant alliance. Armed struggle will establish the New Democratic State. The party (PCP) will forge a truly popular army in the course of this armed struggle.

González spoke with military commanders, who admit that many *ayacuchanos* support Sendero, in spite of President Belaúnde's belief that the guerrillas' direction and aid comes from outside the country. He analyzes Sendero's military strategy and that of its opponent, the military

and police. Sendero has established not "liberated," but "controlled" zones, where up to this moment, it has not yet challenged existing communal authority. But González also reports on smaller towns where Sendero has tentatively discussed cutting all ties to the outside state. His analysis of Ayacucho province shows that its inhabitants live on the margins of existence: its productive farmland is limited to 2% of its territory; its illiteracy rate is high, its schools and infrastructure are totally inadequate, water and electricity are nonexistent for most of its communities, and even its caloric intake is lower that most of Peru's. A professor declares that the reopening of the university brought realization to many new students that their homeland had been abandoned by the state. A 19-year-old confesses that his trip to Lima to enroll in school resulted in humiliation and a return to Ayacucho, where he now supports the revolution. Through factual analysis and probing interviews, González establishes a basis for revolt, and chronicles the development of a movement astute enough to channel resentment of injustice, neglect and discrimination into armed struggle: "Sendero, in the hard work of a decade, has given the average *ayacuchano*, especially the *campesino,* not a program--which he could not understand--but a faith and a hope."

71. Lamberg, Robert F. "Dynamite and Democracy in Peru." *Swiss Review of World Affairs,* v.32, no.7 (October 1982): 14-15.

Brief summary of the guerrilla movement Lamberg calls "The Illuminated Way." Sendero Luminoso consists mainly of members of the middle class; its ideology is said to be "vaguely Maoist." Lamberg concentrates almost entirely upon Sendero's military actions, which he characterizes as somewhat amateurish in their initial phase. But their later large-scale attacks (mostly aimed at freeing prisoners) and the excellence of their military training and equipment have surprised authorities. Lamberg details these later operations. President Belaúnde is said to be reluctant to authorize large-scale counterinsurgency operations, "for these would be bound to affect the general civilian population as well." In the meantime, suspicion has been growing that Sendero is receiving aid from foreign countries and from drug smugglers; "the Interior and Justice Ministry have revealed that the terrorists are receiving training abroad and are equipped with Soviet and Czechoslovak infantry weapons...Lima suspects the long arm of Cuba..." Lamberg reports that the authorities are preparing a program of special economic and social action to aid the threatened Andean areas. According to reports, they have captured the bulk of the active terrorists and transported them to the island of El Frontón. "Nonetheless, it would be over-optimistic to regard this as a final solution to Peru's endemic problems, or to even believe that Pol Pot's disciples have been neutralized for ever."

72. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "Mi colega Abimael." *Caretas,* no.721 (November 2 1982): 68-71.

Gorriti talks to David Scott Palmer, who taught at the University in Ayacucho from 1962-63 while serving in the Peace Corps, and returned to Ayacucho in the late 1960's and 1970's. Palmer taught introduction to social sciences and English and coached the basketball team. Palmer gives his recollections of Abimael Guzmán (very intelligent and quite reserved). Guzmán was respected by his students, but didn't mix much with the other faculty members. He was reserved and serious, not given to casual conversation, but only to serious discussion. No one knew anything about his private life. Palmer remembers Guzmán as a *fidelista* (admirer of Fidel Castro) in those days, and very radical. It was obvious he preferred not to communicate very much with the *gringos,* but he was always polite and respectful. Still, it was Guzmán who organized most of the demonstrations against the Peace Corps teachers. Palmer also recalls other students: Luis Kawata Makabe ("one of my best students"), and Maximiliano Durand Araujo ("Nobody knew that he was associated with radical sectors"); he describes the radicalized atmosphere of Ayacucho in the 1970's, and gives his opinion on Sendero's future prospects. It is, he believes, along with the Guatemalan guerrillas, the only movement that has appealed to the Indian masses. Still, it is fighting a government that is more or less reformist, so its prospects for growth are not the same as for those in Central America. He reminds readers that Sendero is a product of the university years of the 1960's and 1970's.

73. Gaitán, Julio César. "Ofensiva de fin de año de Sendero." *Equis X,* no.318 (November 22 1982): 22-23.

Guerrillas are preparing for a massive assault against the police post at Vilcashuamán. Such an attack would have the unanimous support of the zone's *campesinos*, according to *Equis X's* information. The post was actually taken and destroyed once before, but has been re-established by the sinchis. Gaitán describes how the sinchis use these posts for observation and control of the surrounding countryside. One commentator has likened them to "western forts" in "redskin

country." However, their mere presence emphasizes the hypocrisy of the Belaúnde government: the airport and electrical service in Vilcashuamán, which were built with much fanfare by the government in order to promote tourism and regional development, in reality service only the sinchi outpost.

74. Gaitán, Julio César. "Escuadrón de la muerte en Ayacucho." *Equis X*, no.319 (November 29 1982): 4-4-6, 30.

The Civil and Republic Guard and PIP are resorting to "Argentine" methods to fight Sendero: death squads are making their appearance in Ayacucho. It was the GC which first suggested the idea, but officials wanted to spread responsibility throughout the police forces for this dirty work. Gaitán traces the development of the murder squad, based on the fanatic "Triple A" of Argentina, outlines the official tolerance for such illegal activities at the highest levels of government, and describes in detail the case of one of their first victims in Ayacucho, a young student named Yori Luz Sáenz Román.

75. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "Sendero de muertos." *Caretas,* no.725 (November 29 1982): 16-17.

Report on a systematic campaign of assassinations by Sendero. The objective, reports Gorriti, is to totally dominate local municipalities and enforce discipline among Sendero's own cadres. Forty people have been murdered for the crime of treason to or defection from the movement. The names and circumstances of the victims are described. The *aprista* deputy from Ayacucho dramatically declared "Ayacucho doesn't belong any more to the government of Belaúnde." He states that the government has totally lost control in the provinces of La Mar, Víctor Fajardo, and Cangallo. Sendero has a semi-clandestine government administering these areas.

76. "Ayaucho: violencia sin fin?" *Caretas,* no.728 (December 20 1982): 18-21.

Story on a year's endless violence in Ayacucho. In 1982 715 attacks were launched, resulting in the deaths of 81 civilians, 36 policemen, and 32 terrorists; 176 people, including 15 guerrillas, were injured. The military has a growing involvement in the region, primarily in the form of logistical and intelligence support. An aggressive political, as well as police response is needed, says *Caretas.*

77. Ercilla, Tito. "Ejército y represión antiguerrillera." *Equis X*, no.322 (December 20 1982): 16-17, 22.

Bickering continues to hamper anti-guerrilla efforts. The armed forces cannot act as auxiliaries to either the police or paramilitary support bodies. Because the police lack helicopters and other essential equipment, the armed forces have been supporting the security forces, but in essence if they enter the fight against Sendero, they wish to do so in total control of the counterinsurgency forces. Ercilla summarizes the legal and political problems surrounding militarization of the war.

78. Gaitán, Julio César. "Abimael Guzmán: el hombre del año." *Equis X*, no.322 (December 20 1982): 4-6, 30.

Summary of the year's gains by Sendero. The guerrillas have growing support among the peasantry of the central and southern sierras. Electrical blackouts of cities do not affect peasants who have never enjoyed the benefits of electrical light; nor are *campesinos* concerned with Pol Pot or totalitarianism. They do know that Comrade Gonzalo is against the *mistis* who have always abused them, and that the guerrillas are strong. That is enough. Gaitán reviews the life of Abimael Guzmán, and the development of Shining Path's "third step" of guerrilla war. Sendero is calling peasant conventions in some of the liberated zones, attended by delegates from the *campesino* militias. They are to restructure society in their villages in order to advance the course of the war. The inhabitants of these areas must isolate themselves from urban markets, and cultivate self-sufficiency; they are told that they need only sugar, salt, and matches from the outside world. "Necessities" like oil, rice, pasta, kerosene must be sacrificed while the guerrilla struggle lasts. The *campesinos* must also prepare themselves for fierce repression by the sinchis. *Equis X* names Abimael Guzmán as Peru's man of the year in 1982; not because they agree with *senderista* violence, but because they want everyone to recognize the challenge Sendero poses to Peruvian society: civil war or democratic peace with social justice.

79. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "Entró el ejército/Trágicos augurios." *Caretas,* no.729 (December 27 1982): 20-23, 66.

At 7:30 p.m. on December 21, President Belaúnde and several ministers, in accordance with Article 231 of the Constitution, gave the armed forces the responsibility for internal order in Ayacucho and Andahuaylas. Two days later the "Cabitos" battalion marched through the *plaza de armas* of Ayacucho. Gorriti reports on the assassination of Walter Wong, anthropologist and director of the Ayacucho branch of the National Institute of Culture. His tragic murder reinforces the image of a police overcome by the guerrillas and terrorists of Sendero Luminoso. Gorriti recounts the political decision to order the army into the emergency zones and the ramifications for the nation.

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80. Amnesty International. *Peru, Torture, and Extrajudicial Executions: Letter of Amnesty International to President Fernando Belaúnde Terry, August 1983.* New York: Amnesty International USA, 1983.

The first in a yearly series of similar reports on violations of human rights. Since December 1982, when the departments of Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Huancavelica were placed under military jurisdiction, reports of torture and extrajudicial executions have repeatedly come to Amnesty's attention. While recognizing the responsibility of the Peruvian government to uphold the rule of law and punish crimes of violence, political, or otherwise, Amnesty International is convinced that the security services in the emergency zones are frequently violating the law through irregular detentions, "disappearances" of suspects, routine use of torture, and extrajudicial murders. A long list of cases with extensive details is appended.

81. Comisión Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay. *Informe de Comisión Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay.* Lima: La Comisión, 1983.

A primary document of deep significance--the report of the commission appointed by the Belaúnde government to investigate the murders of eight journalists in the highlands. The commission (consisting of the distinguished lawyer Abraham Guzmán Figueroa, Mario Castro Arenas, dean of the College of Journalists of Peru, and Mario Vargas Llosa, Peru's greatest living novelist), sought to establish the "how" of the massacre, reconstructing in exact detail the journey of the reporters from Ayacucho to Uchuraccay, and to answer the "why"--to fix the motive and establish the social, political, psychological, and historical contexts of the killings. The trio decided upon three categories of fact--absolute, relative, and doubtful, in relation to many of the affair's unanswered questions. For example, they held with "relative" conviction that the authorities in Ayacucho knew nothing of the reporter's journey, but with "absolute" conviction that the eight were mistaken for *senderistas* by the nervous peasants of Uchuraccay, and murdered in a massive, improvised and frenzied assault, which took place without dialogue or mediation. Furthermore, the commission declared absolutely that the sinchis have not instigated systematic killing as a means of repression, but allowed, relatively, that isolated actions of this sort have taken place in the sierra (a conclusion for which they were viciously attacked by the Peruvian left). As for the "why" of the case, blame is laid on the guerrillas, on "structural violence" and on Iquichana tradition. The commissioners were especially struck by the ritualistic nature of the eight men's mutilation and interment by the peasants. Appended to the report are five annexes by Peruvian social scientists, on the anthropology and history of the Iquichanas, Sendero Luminoso, and the linguistic traditions of the highlands.

82. Diez Canseco, Javier. *La situación ayacuchana y el Comando Político-Militar.* S.n., s.l., June 1983.

An urgent plea to the nation to see what is happening in Ayacucho. The province is being converted into an arena of political violence and repression without precedence; Diez Canseco asks whether what is taking place in Ayacucho will be extended to the rest of Peru. All constitutional norms have been abandoned. The authority of both judicial and public ministries have been nullified by the "political-military command," as Diez Canseco terms the security forces currently ruling the province. The state of emergency is exacerbating the division between urban and rural areas. In the *campo* the police and military are in complete control. Since the Uchuraccay massacre the press has abandoned attempts to cover the war in the countryside, and the security forces refuse to help the judiciary by providing either transport or escorts. Most of the organisms of civil

society (labor unions, popular organizations, *campesino* groups) have been deactivated, creating what Diez Canseco calls "a concentration and reduction of the space of legality," in which the army and police are the only functioning arms of the state. A discussion of disappearances (particularly among secondary and university teachers) and the impact of repression upon traditional peasant society follows.

83. Lynch, Edward A. *Is Peru Next?* Backgrounder, no.314. Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1983.

Lynch asks, "Is Peru's young democracy the next victim of Cuban and Soviet-backed subversion?" Sendero's terrorist attacks, he writes, parallel other attempts to undermine democracy in Latin America. One of the most persistent myths about Shining Path is that it is an exclusively home-grown insurgency. There is, however, convincing evidence linking it to other guerrilla movements in the hemisphere and the international drug market. Fidel Castro and his Soviet backers can be expected to exploit every opportunity to present the U.S. with another regional challenge. Lynch's analysis of Sendero, based upon English-language sources and FBIS translations, projects Shining Path as part of a broad-based assault upon democratic regimes like Belaúnde's in Latin America. But, "as in El Salvador, the people of Peru have thus far turned their backs on those who would violently topple democracy." Lynch recommends counterinsurgency, counterintelligence, and economic assistance to preserve "a democratically-elected government headed by a popular ruler who is also strongly pro-U.S."

84. Mercado, Rogger. *Algo más sobre Sendero Luminoso: teoría y táctica, violencia, represión y desaparecidos: documentos.* Lima: Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1983.

A continuation of the author's 1981 work on Shining Path. Mercado has assembled primary documents, reporting from the Peruvian press, and his own commentary on the challenge Sendero presents to Peru. Included are Guzmán's address to Sendero fighters at the conclusion of the first party military school, the text of "Develop Guerrilla Warfare!", pronouncements on human rights from the Ayacucho College of Lawyers and Amnesty International, the Peruvian attorney general's offer of dialogue with Sendero, and analysis from Peruvian and foreign social scientists. Mercado's own attitude towards Sendero remains critical, but only in terms of the PCP's choice of tactics. Its reliance solely on its own political-military apparatus has cut it off from other sectors of the Peruvian left, and left them open to repression which makes the victory of the Peruvian Revolution more remote. Mercado's sympathies lie with the millions who have been exploited during the 70 years of the bourgeois state; he seeks a new type of society: the Revolutionary State.

85. Palmer, David Scott. "Peru." *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record.* Edited by Jack W. Hopkins. V.1, 1981-82. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983, pp.342-353.

Brief overview of recent political and economic developments in individual Latin America nations, as well as trends common to the region. Palmer spends the bulk of his essay reviewing Peru's recent economic performance, and politics since the return of civilian rule. He describes a campaign of bombings and disruption of public facilities provoked, most believe, by elements of the extreme or "irresponsible" left. Specially-trained civil guard forces have made sweeps and discovered training camps in Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Lima. Five of Ayacucho's seven provinces have been declared to be in a state of emergency. The most spectacular act to date has been a jail break in Ayacucho city, in which some 50 convicted terrorists got away. Palmer lays responsibility with a Maoist faction of the Communist Party, by the name of Shining Path. After the escalation of violence in 1982, they "were taken seriously indeed."

86. Taylor, Lewis. *Sendero Luminoso and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru.* Centre for Latin American Studies, Working paper no.2. Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1983.

The first extensive analysis of Shining Path to appear in English. Taylor's brief (40 pages) but succinct report covers Sendero's background, methods, political orientation, and guerrilla campaign through 1982. He stresses that the army's experience at easily eradicating the 1965 *foco* guerrilla movement led it to overestimate its own abilities and underestimate Sendero. Taylor traces the evolution of Shining Path from the PCP's 1964 split to the emergence of Sendero, noting that the Party swept up members from many small factions who were dissatisfied with sectarian leftist politics. He reconstructs Sendero's structure, estimating that it has about 200 functioning cells, with up to 10 persons in each cell. Each revolutionary cell has an explosives expert, an ideologue, and a physical fitness and unarmed combat teacher. One person is charged with hiding cell weapons; another has some degree of advanced medical skills. Recruitment is a slow and very careful process; a fighter must spend two to three years in propaganda and sabotage tasks before

training and acceptance as a full member. Sendero is very hard to infiltrate, as most cadres (at this stage) are from small sierra towns and rural areas. Sendero envisions a "five stage" revolution: propaganda and agitation, sabotage against the socio-economic situation, generalization of violence and development of guerrilla war, conquest and expansion of bases of support, and the siege of the cities leading to total collapse of the state. Many of Sendero's acts of economic sabotage are unpopular and do not hurt multinational corporations, but workers and the public at large. Taylor also gives a trenchant and withering analysis of Sendero's political ideology: it is plainly wrong. The Peru that Sendero sees as agrarian and semifeudal is not. In 1980 the agricultural contribution to GNP was 10% and 70% of the population lived in urban areas. Ayacucho itself was never even an area of "feudal landlords," but a desperately poor and backward region that the agrarian reforms of the 1970's left with only a small number of rural cooperatives. Taylor explains: "A majority of Sendero's members originate from the highlands, especially the Central Sierra, and are little traveled. Their image of Peru, therefore, is very much that of an *Ayacucho grande*, i.e., predominantly rural, mainly peasant, and possessing little industry." Taylor links Sendero's simplistic Maoist analysis of Peru to Andean messianism and an exaggerated rejection of outside influences as foreign, an attitude which sees the destruction of everything not indigenous as necessary: "This blending of Maoism with Andean millenarianism has also produced an ideology that is *campesinista* in the extreme, and as often happens in pre-industrial settings like Ayacucho, this has taken on aspects of religious fanaticism." Sendero may grow in strength and achieve its five-stage guerrilla strategy for taking power; this is unlikely. The military may crush Sendero, an outcome equally unlikely (Belaúnde originally gave his army commanders 60 days to eradicate Sendero). The most likely occurrence is that Sendero will suffer reverses, but parts will survive to carry on at some future date. Taylor believes that this will probably be the last attempt at rural guerrilla warfare in Peru; "next time around the most important scene of guerrilla activity will switch to the cities."

87. Gaitán, Julio César. "Ayacucho en guerra: informe especial." *Equis X*, no.323 (January 10 1983): 4-6, 16.

Report from Ayacucho, where Sendero and the army are locked in combat. Shining Path is applying Chinese, Vietnamese, and Algerian guerrilla experiences to an Ayacuchan reality. Comrade Gonzalo has also minutely studied Atahualpa's uprising and other peasant rebellions. Sendero has had almost three years to prepare itself for the inevitable confrontation with the army. Its strategy of assassinating officials is calculated to hasten military intervention. Sendero has also been instructing the leaders of its peasant militias on their role in the stepped-up confrontation. These militias are for self-defense of rebel villages. Guzmán himself is said to have addressed a meeting in the *pueblo* of Carapo in Víctor Fajardo province. Gaitán describes the appeal of Sendero to the peasantry of Ayacucho, and how the guerrillas recruit and operate within the small villages of the sierra. Misery, official neglect, and exploitation have made them fertile recruiting ground for the Maoists. The extensive work of Sendero prior to 1980 has given them literal ties of blood to many among the peasantry of the province.

88. Cabrera, Julio. "Ejército y guerrillas." *Equis X*, no.325 (January 24 1983): 7.

Editorial in which Cabrera applauds General Noel's establishment of a military tribunal to investigate accusations of abuses committed by the security forces. Nothing, he writes, which the guerrillas say during their visits of indoctrination to *pueblos* could be more eloquent than the actions of the sinchis which prove that the government is essentially the enemy of the peasantry and of the Ayacuchan people. The tribunal should drastically punish the indiscipline and brutality of the sinchis, which have now been placed under military command. However, *Equis X* is disturbed by certain proclamations attributed by other dailies to General Noel to the effect that "This is not a battle; therefore there are no prisoners." Because the Peruvian army's prestige is the patrimony of the nation, *Equis X* resists accepting these quotations as genuine.

89. Centurián, Milcíades. "Quienes dirigen Sendero Luminoso." *Equis X*, no.326 (January 31 1983): 22-23.

A rare meeting of Sendero's Political Committee recently took place near the Río Pampas to plan a response to the army's entrance into the war in Ayacucho. *Equis X* publishes the names of the current *senderista* leadership, including Guzmán, his wife Augusta La Torre, Victor Quintanilla Huamán, Antonio Díaz Martínez, Julio César Mezzich, Osmán Morote, Hildebrando Pérez, Dante Casanova, and the brothers Ricardo and Luis Kawata Makabe. [This article casts some doubt on *Equis X's* sources, as Luis Kawata Makabe had been expelled years before from the PCP after a personal falling-out with Guzmán. See no.925.]

90. Gorriti, Gustavo. "¿Cómo se encendió la mecha?" *Caretas,* no.733 (January 31 1983): 26-31.

Gorriti interviews Dr. Efraín Morote Best, rector of the University of Huamanga, said to be a sort of spiritual father to Sendero Luminoso. Morote recounts the early years of the University after its re-establishment in 1959, and its crucial role in the development of the community. He concedes the equally important role the university had in the formation of Sendero. He also has personal respect for Abimael Guzmán as a man, an intellectual, and teacher. He discusses at length the phenomenon of violence as a response to social ills, making it unmistakably clear that his political beliefs are uncompromisingly radical. But he denies being a member of Sendero.

91. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Trágicas linchamientos." *Caretas,* no.733 (January 31 1983): 20-24.

First *Caretas* report on Uchuraccay. It is possible, reports Gorriti, that the journalists and their guide had been mistaken for *senderistas,* and attacked by a mob in an almost frantic state of terror. At press time, none of the missing men have been found. Gorriti gives their names, the papers they worked for, and their last known movements. What is confirmed is that on January 22 a group of villagers reported to the Guardia Civil post in Huanta that they had killed seven *senderistas* in Huaychau. The incursions of Sendero into the zone, the response of the peasants, and the counter-attack by guerrillas is related. The chain of circumstances leads one to conclude that the journalists were mistaken for a band of guerrillas out for revenge.

92. González, Raúl. "Ayacucho: La espera del gaucho." *Quehacer,* no.20 (January 1983): 46-57.

González interviews General Luis Cisneros Vizquerra, Minister of War, who finds *Quehacer's* in-depth coverage of Sendero "very interesting." The general does not believe that Sendero can succeed in Peru. He characterizes it as a rural subversive movement that cannot gain popular support through terror, especially when it uses terror against those same *campesinos* upon whose support it depends. Cisneros believes that the peasantry will act blind, deaf, and dumb to co-exist between the guerrillas and the security forces, and this he does not characterize as "support." Throughout, Cisneros denigrates Sendero and the idea that it has established liberated zones, gained broad support, or done anything but randomly attack, bomb, and terrorize. However, Cisneros does admit that police tactics are counterproductive. ("They kill 60 people and at best there are 3 *senderistas* ...and surely the police will claim that 60 were *senderistas.*") For this reason, he will eventually have to send in the army, albeit reluctantly. Sendero's successes are due to poor training and material limitations on the part of the police. Cisneros does concede that Ayacucho is a deprived area, but asserts that the solutions to alleviate its misery and that of similar areas are complex and will need time and resources to implement. In political terms, Cisneros is wary of the Peruvian legal left and believes that certain sectors of the press are presenting Sendero as a solution to the country's problems. He concludes the interview by asserting that if he has to order the army into Ayacucho, he will do so without hesitation.

93. González, Raúl. "Una encuesta sobre Sendero." *Quehacer,* no.20 (January 1983): 58-69.

As counterbalance to the interview of General Cisneros, González interviews or solicits the opinions of a number of prominent Peruvians, including the bishop of Cajamarca, Monsignor José Dammert Bellido, Alfonso Barrantes, president of Izquierda Unida, César Hildebrandt, a distinguished journalist, sociologist Julio Cotler, and politician Ricardo Letts. González asks each one, "Is Sendero a terrorist or a guerrilla organization? How can its peasant support be explained?" And finally, "Are you satisfied with how the government and the other political forces of the nation are responding to the problem?" The answers he receives are varied, but have several themes in common: all the respondents condemn Sendero's violence, all criticize the government for its handling of the situation, and all hold the poverty and inequalities of Ayacucho as partly responsible for the rebellion.

94. Cabrera, Julio. "Uchuraccay." *Equis X,* no.327 (February 7 1983): 7.

Sorrowful editorial upon the death of eight "journalists, colleagues and brothers." Cabrera writes not of criminal responsibility, but of a wider and more generalized guilt, the result of a psychosis of blood brought about by both Sendero and the sinchis. Unless the government takes steps to address the social problems that confront Peru, Uchuraccay will not be an exceptional case.

95. "Temor y muerte en las alturas." *Caretas,* no.734 (February 7 1983): 10-17.

Long report on the massacre at Uchuraccay. What were the journalists doing there? Were they trying to find Sendero leaders to interview? Were they really carrying a red hammer-and-sickle banner, as the army insists? (Photos of the banner are displayed.) Does some blame attach to the journalists for a foolishly misconceived trip? Multiple stories ask, What really happened in Uchuraccay? Were they killed on orders from the sinchis? A follow-up story, "Prontuario histórico," (pp.18-19, 23) looks at the region's tradition of violence. Yet another piece (pp.20-22) covers the funerals of the slain journalists, and demonstrations against the government.

96. Came, Berry. "Terror on the Shining Path." *Newsweek* v.101, no.6 (February 7 1983): 34.

Report on a raid by police and soldiers on Pomacocha, a tiny hamlet in the Andes. Thirty-nine men were ordered into the town square and ruthlessly interrogated about Sendero. When three men taunted the security forces, they were summarily shot. Came sketches the background of Sendero, a strange Communist splinter group whose favorite weapon is the ancient Inca sling, the *hurraca*. It is the misery of the Indian peasants that has furnished recruits for the guerrillas. As in other contemporary reports, Sendero is characterized as a mixture of Maoist theory and a messianic call for a return to the Inca past. Its models are China's "Gang of Four," the Khmer Rouge and Albania. Although Belaúnde denies any real threat from Sendero ("There are problems in only 2.5% of Peru's territory"), he has sent in 2,000 soldiers, marines, and paratroopers to back up 2,000 paramilitary police in the highlands. Reports of slain and captured guerrillas lead Belaúnde to hope that order will be restored in the emergency zones before the municipal elections, scheduled for November. But the military's tactics may frustrate this hope: peasants fear the sinchis more than the *compañeros* of Sendero. While the rebels only kill selected people, the military kills anybody who gets in their way. The villagers say they're afraid of everybody: Sendero, the army, the police. While this is not much of an endorsement of Shining Path, "determined guerrillas can thrive on such political disarray. A democratic government cannot."

97. Centurián, Milcíades. "Belaúnde: responsable de la masacre de Uchuraccay." *Equis X*, no.327 (February 7 1983): 4-6, 15.

The killing of the eight journalists, as well as that of the *senderistas* whose deaths precipitated the massacre, is the direct result of a psychological conditioning of the peasantry by the sinchis, under North American advisement. A high intelligence official told *Equis X* of a plan perfected by the CIA to drive the native population psychotic in certain ways. President Belaúnde knows of this plan and supports it enthusiastically. In effect, the peasants have been told by order of President Belaúnde to kill all strangers who enter their land. Centurián retraces the journey of the journalists and elaborates upon the role of the police and army in the killings.

98. Medina, Manuel Miguel. "'Equis X en una 'zona liberada.'" *Equis X*, no. 327 (February 7 1983): 18-21.

Equis X interviews a man who lived for several weeks in a "liberated zone" in Carhuanca, department of Ayacucho. The anonymous interviewee describes government by Popular Committee and the organization of the populace into popular organizations, including the militia that polices the community. The "popular army" carries out the execution of traitors and informers. No one dares to appear more prosperous than his neighbors, or to privately farm even a small plot of land. Asked whether the people truly identify with Sendero, the man relates how a campaign of intimidation by the militias stifled dissent from the moment the *senderistas* entered the community. The people were obliged to raise the red banner and sing the "Internationale." Public arguments and drunkenness are prohibited. The priest has been forced to leave the village, and mass is no longer celebrated. The *cofradías* (church brotherhoods) have been dissolved or linked with Sendero. The sinchis came and terrorized innocent people, but left because they were afraid of the guerrillas. Also described is the system of revolutionary education, Sendero's propaganda, and the makeup of the *senderistas* (people as young as 12 and rarely over the age of 25). Particularly important is the relation of murders of peasants who belonged to other leftist factions, such as "PCP *Bandera Roja*." A revealing account of life in what will come to be called the "New Democracy."

99. "A Curious Affair." *The Nation* v.236, no.6 (February 12 1983): 164.

Skeptical report on the Uchuraccay massacre. The government first said that angry peasants had mistaken the eight journalists for guerrillas; later, peasants amended their story, claiming that they had been following police orders to kill all strangers. *The Nation* believes that "everything about both versions is wrong." The eight represented left-wing Lima papers; they were killed not by long-range gunfire, but by machetes, clubs, and stones. "If this was a case of mistaken

identity, the mistake was of Andean proportions." While *The New York Times* put the killings on the front page, it did not think it necessary to go into great detail or explore the background of the case. "If it had, we might have learned about the growing insurrection against... Belaúnde, who is in his third year of what was once billed as democratic rule." Belaúnde has repealed the popular land reform laws of the left-wing military government of the early 1970's. His administration is marked by human rights violations, brutal police tactics, attacks on leftists, and an inability to alleviate grinding peasant poverty. A brief history of Sendero is given, and it is claimed that there are about 1,000 guerrillas, with growing peasant support. "It appeals to the Indian pride in their Incan ancestry and their belief that one day an Incan god will return to liberate them." *The Nation* concludes by asking, "If the Senderistas are as isolated and hated as the government claims, then why is their guerrilla war so widespread and the government's response so drastic? And if the Senderistas have as much support among the peasants as students of the situation say they do, then why did the peasants kill eight 'strangers' with such eager ferocity? The story of what is really happening in the mountains of Peru is not being told."

100. Ercilla, Tito. "Crímines de los sinchis en Cangallo (Ayacucho)." *Equis X*, no.329 (February 21 1983): 4-6.

Detailed description, with names and dates, of abuses committed by the special police against people in Ayacucho. Calling the sinchis the equivalent of Somoza's National Guard in Nicaragua or the Tonton Macoute in Haiti, *Equis X* decries the danger of "salvadorization" of the country. One is either for the sinchis or against them; simple neutrality is not permitted. Almost a dozen cases of murder, break-in, torture, beatings, detention, kidnapping, and other violence are documented. The indiscriminate repression of the sinchis, declares Ercilla, make them the best propagandists for Sendero, and contrasts unfavorably with the guerrilla's very discriminate and selective terror.

101. Centurión, Milcíades. "¿Cambio del jefe de la zona de emergencia?" *Equis X*, no.329 (February 21 1983): 20-21.

General Noel will be replaced as military commander in the Emergency Zone in the coming weeks. His behavior has alienated the majority of army officers; apparently his only defender is his cousin, the Minister of War. The conduct of the war is beginning to tarnish the prestige of the armed forces. A discussion of the political implications of the decision to remove Noel and names of possible successors follows.

102. Gaitán, Julio César. "Mensaje de Abimael a los guerrilleros." *Equis X*, no.329 (February 21 1983): 4-6.

Equis X has obtained a message from Comrade Gonzalo to his revolutionaries. Like most of Sendero's communications, it was memorized and transmitted verbally, in this case by a "*compañera* María Luz." Comrade Gonzalo declares that "we have defeated the enemy strategically and tactically." Gaitán reprints the stock phrases of the communiqué: "The future is ours and our field of battle is the entire national territory"; "The Popular Army strengthens its cadres and tempers its spirit in the invincible fire of guerrilla war," etc. According to information, the message originated somewhere in the central sierra where the general headquarters of the guerrillas (called *la jefatura*) is located. [Guzmán, because of his medical condition, was almost certainly living in Lima at this time.] Guzmán dealt with the murder of *soplones;* he apparently approves of the execution of informers and the intimidation of governmental officials only in extreme cases, and after exhaustive verification and repeated warnings. The article gives a wealth of (alleged) detail on the inside workings of Sendero in this phase of its war.

103. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "Cuando Abimael reía..." *Caretas,* no.736 (February 21 1983): 10-13.

A rare photograph of a smiling Guzmán, caught at a social function in 1973 with academicians who would later be linked to Sendero, shows another side of *Presidente Gonzalo.* "It was rare for Guzmán to smile; his character was essentially reserved; he maintained himself permanently distanced," recalls the uncle of Guzmán's wife, Augusta La Torre. *Caretas* also publishes an even rarer photo of La Torre, whom everyone remembers as a woman of great energy and tenacity, and whom no one doubts played an important role in the destiny of her spouse and his organization. Gorriti talks with Luis La Torre and his wife about their memories of their niece and her extraordinary husband. They remember Guzmán as a disciplined, studious specialist in Marxism-Leninism; also that he read a lot, perhaps too much, and had a good memory. His health was not very good. When La Torre, a moderate social democrat, tried to discuss alternatives to Marxism with Guzmán, he was met with silence. An ex-teacher of Augusta La Torre recalls her

passionate convictions and final decisions, and that at one time Guzmán was contemplating an exclusively academic life abroad. "Augusta did not permit it."

104. González, Raúl. "Las batallas de Ayacucho." *Quehacer*, no.21 (February 1983): 14-27.

Report form the war zone. Subtitled, "an inconclusive story," González sadly recounts the cruelties and terrors of what is becoming a civil war. Coming just a few days after the murder of eight journalists outside Uchuraccay, the tension in Ayacucho is palpable. People are daily hauled into jail, found dead, presumably at the hands of the sinchis or the guerrillas, or have "taxes" extorted from them by Sendero. When the army first entered Ayacucho, many expected they would quickly and skillfully initiate a bloodbath. Instead, they have slowly moved out to start pacification, visiting small communities to carry out "civic action" by bringing medicine, vaccines, and doctors, and raising the Peruvian flag. Into undisputed *senderista* zones went the "sinchis," who lacked this "good" model of operating and began their "dirty work" of occupying and capturing whole communities. The sinchis broke down doors, put everyone up against walls, and beat whoever protested, breaking family possessions and abusing people. González spoke to many who corroborated these stories, plus a surprising number of people who related that the army's behavior was much more considerate. Many of the soldiers spoke Quechua. But by September of 1982 the government was on the defensive, and Sendero regained the political and military initiative. The militarization of the province was a victory for Sendero, and abuses by the sinchis drove many people to the guerrillas' side. They demonstrated their strength by greeting the army's entrance into Ayacucho with a department-wide strike. Still Sendero has committed many strategic errors: closing down local fairs (to cut off commercial relations with the outside world and instigate autarky) has alienated many, but protests can be met with death. Also, people in communities are willing to consider armed struggle, but Sendero can neither furnish them with arms nor remain to defend them, leaving them open to retaliation by the army or police. González paints a dismal picture of a population walking a road between two fires, leaving them with the unpalatable option of, in the words of the former Minister of War, "choosing where they wish to die: on the side of the security forces or on the side of *senderismo* ?"

105. Manrique, Nelson. "Violencia y autoritarismo en la comunidad andina." *Quehacer*, no.21 (February 1983): 28-29.

A mixture of editorial and doleful essay. How culpable, Manrique asks in the wake of the massacre at Uchuraccay, are the Indian killers? How proper is it to mourn for the slain journalists and applaud the murder of *senderistas* by those same peasants a few days before? Is not the violence of February 27 a manifestation of a mechanism characteristic of colonial power: to channel the violence of the oppressed--here generated as a response to the violence of the oppressors--against themselves? Perhaps what happened at Uchuraccay, and what Sendero is doing to small merchants and local functionaries, is a clue to the terrible rage accumulated among the Andean communities of the highlands. The *campesino* community can be progressive as well as retrograde, democratic as well as authoritarian. It can be put as easily at the service of a liberating project as to the perpetuation of oppression, for the conquest of democracy as well as for the crudest forms of authoritarianism, whether left or right. And this the oppressors have always known: "Another lesson learned in the geography of horror, Uchuraccay, Ayacucho, Peru."

106. Benavente, José. "Ayacucho: informe desde el frente." *Equis X*, no.330 (March 1 1983): 420-21.

A message from a "Comrade Joel," said to be Comandante III, *jefe* of a section of "Company I" of the Popular Army. The *senderista* declares that contrary to police pronouncements, hundreds of guerrillas have not been killed, nor is the movement at the point of being eliminated. He laughed at newspaper reports of great guerrilla-police clashes, a hundred dead *senderistas*, and the imminent fall of the general headquarters of Abimael Guzmán. This, he stated, is part of a campaign of psychological warfare designed to demoralize Sendero. Journalists are repeating sinchi information "like parrots." He goes on to describe battles in various areas of the sierra, and to dismiss the idea that any general headquarters of Sendero even exists.

107. Benavente, José. "Informe de la comisión de Uchuraccay." *Equis X*, no.331 (March 7 1983): 21-22.

The Uchuraccay commission establishes implicitly that the responsibility for the deaths of the eight journalists rests with the authorities, and especially with General Noel. *Equis X* finds the report of the Commission to be an enlightening and meticulous work, even more meritorious considering the difficulties under which the commissioners worked, not least of which was the lack of cooperation by the government. The report does not explicitly assign blame for the killings, but

reveals cover-ups, unravels alibis, and sheds light on suspicious obscurities. The eight carried no red flag, nor did they approach the village yelling slogans against President Belaúnde, as some authorities have claimed. Orchestrated pressure applied against the villagers caused them to uniformly alter their stories. The disappearance and re-appearance of the journalists' cameras and film is a damning indictment of the authorities. The Commission also lamented the strange disappearance of the governor of Uchuraccay, Fortunato Gavilán, in whose whereabouts the police and army show no interest. Although *Equis X* applauds the work of the Commission, it is disappointed that no blame is directly assigned. The Uchuraccay Commission should have followed the example of the Israeli commission that investigated the massacre of Palestinians at Sabra and Chatila refugee camps. That report fixed responsibility on the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Israel as well as on its field commander in Lebanon.

108. Gaitán, Julio César. "La batalla de Huancasancos: versión de un testigo." *Equis X*, no.331 (March 7 1983): 4-6, 15.

A correspondent of *Equis X* was in Sacsamarca and Huancasancos during heavy fighting between Sendero and the army, and gives an eyewitness account of the situation. The military has claimed to have killed dozens, even hundreds of guerrillas, including Comrade Gonzalo, Guzmán himself. The reporter declares the stories of extensive combat to be a myth, and compares the "body counts" of this war to those of Vietnam; both are equally illusory. He describes in detail how after both *pueblos* were "liberated" by Sendero the sinchis assaulted the communities by helicopter and drove the guerrillas out, with relatively few casualties on either side. More significant is the relation of the beginnings of inter-community strife: in Sacsamarca, some one hundred peasants surprised a party of *senderistas* while they slept, and made them prisoners. A few escaped, and roused the population of Huancasancos, who to prove their loyalty to the revolution marched *en masse* to Sacsamarca and liberated the *senderista* prisoners. The rebellious peasants they managed to round up were taken back to Huancasancos to be judged and punished.

109. Ecilla, Tito. "Ayacucho: los reveses de Sendero." *Equis X*, no.332 (July [*sic* --March] 14 1983): 21-22.

A 14-year-old guerrilla named "Avelino" describes fighting with sinchis on the banks of the Río Pampas near Concepción, including details of combat and subsequent hiding from police patrols. Recently Sendero has suffered defeat at the hands of mixed groups of sinchis, Republican Guards, soldiers, and marines. However, it would be premature to sing of victory, writes Ercilla. The theater of combat is widening to other areas, and the guerrillas' mobility offers few opportunities for surprise attacks such as "Avelino's" group suffered. Only some 1,300 security force personnel are in the emergency zone, confronting about 70 platoons of guerrillas, according to *senderista* sources. A general admitted to *Equis X* that the military situation was a stalemate until some peasant communities began to turn against Sendero's harsh edicts. Guzmán and the *senderista* leadership are said to be examining the situation; Ercilla believes that if Sendero moderates some of its extreme ideological positions, it will be more acceptable to the peasantry, and even more dangerous than it is now.

110. Smith, Michael. "A Shadow Crosses the Shining Path." *Maclean's* v.96, no.11 (March 14 1983): 23-24.

Smith reports from a blacked-out Ayacucho, where the outline of a hammer and sickle is burning in the hills above the city and guerrillas and soldiers battle in the streets. Sendero, he writes, consists of 200 to 500 guerrillas, and combines elements of traditional Inca mysticism with the collectivism of the Chinese revolution. Their 20-year gestation at the University of Huamanga, their use of the quiet organization of the *campesinos*, and their uncanny knowledge of highland terrain give them the edge over the government, whose long neglect of the highlands won Sendero sympathy. Recently, the guerrillas' move into areas where they have done little political groundwork and their execution of peasants who object to Sendero's forced recruitment of the young has soured support. But one controversial government action has created disorder: bounties of food and supplies for every *senderista* brought in, alive or dead, has created a situation of vigilantism, and some dead "guerrillas" may have been killed over old quarrels, especially over land rights. Despite evidence the program is getting out of control, Belaúnde has praised such "civic cooperation" as patriotic, and the government is continuing it.

111. Cabrera, Julio. "¿Impunidad en Ayacucho?" *Equis X*, no.333 (March 21 1983): 7.

One of the affects of Sendero's war has been the virtual abandonment and dismantling of the apparatus of justice in the highlands. Where the Civil Guard has fled communities, judges have also left their jurisdictions. Justice has been undermined not only by Sendero's threats, but by government apathy. No less than the President of the Supreme Court has admitted this. Cabrera bemoans military and police indifference, if not hostility to the judicial branch of the government, which, among other things, will ensure that no guilty parties will ever be punished for the killings in Uchuraccay.

112. Ercilla, Tito. "Los secretos de Sendero." *Equis X*, no.333 (March 21 1983): 21-22.

No other guerrilla group in Latin America, with the exception of El Salvador's FMLN, has had the impact of Shining Path. In only a year of war it has managed to isolate a vast area of national territory, and to attract international attention. Ultraleft European terrorist groups admire Sendero, not least for its extreme secrecy and air of mystery. What are Sendero's secrets, asks Ercilla? Is Abimael Guzmán actually "Gonzalo," or is "Gonzalo" really a name for a collective leadership? Ercilla explores the mysteries of Sendero's leadership, the question of its independence from external sources of support, its estimated military strength, and the prognosis of General Noel for at least another year of war.

113. "¿Mezzich remplaza a Guzmán?" *Caretas,* no.740 (March 21 1983): 16.

Lima police have begun distributing "wanted" flyers for two men, Manuel Rubén Abimael Guzmán Reynoso and Julio César Mezzich Izaguirre. Guzmán, 48, is believed to be suffering from psoriasis, and cannot live in the Sierra Central. The police think he is either in Lima, abroad, or dead. Mezzich, 35 years old, was born in Miraflores (a posh Lima suburb), studied first at a Jesuit college and later medicine at another university, and joined Vanguardia Revolucionaria. In 1969, under the influence of Cuba and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, he decided to "go to the countryside," where he married a *campesina* from Andahuaylas. He later was elected a sub-secretary in the Peasant Confederation of Peru and led land invasions in the 1970's. By April 1982 he was leading a guerrilla column in Andahuaylas. He may be considered a possible "field marshal" of Sendero.

114. "Ayacucho: ¿Fin de la guerra o guerra sin fin?" *Equis X*, no.334 (March 28 1983): 8-10.

Recent government statements have pronounced that Sendero is breaking up and in full retreat. Is this true, asks *Equis X* ? The majority of dead and captured *"senderistas"* are certainly not guerrillas, but innocent peasants, some of whom may have collaborated with Sendero but were not part of its military structure. In fact, those actively hostile to Sendero are still few in number. The actual guerrilla army's casualties are quite low, and it is considering expanding its operations to other areas of the country, perhaps to Lima. *Equis X* describes the military situation in specific areas of the emergency zone, as well as recent *desaparecidos* for which the sinchis are responsible. *Equis X* declares that the subversive war is being turned into a war without end, especially as General Noel seems to be more of a police than an army general, preferring the repressive methods of the sinchis to civic action.

115. Ercilla, Tito. "Hildebrando Pérez, jefe guerrillero." *Equis X*, no.335 (April 4 1983): 22.

Pérez, an Ayacuchan writer, is one of the movement's top seven leaders, and has so far eluded capture. He and "Comrade Carla" are still leading fighters in the field, while the rest of Sendero's columns have withdrawn temporarily from the battle. Ercilla describes the guerrillas' area of operations, their current tactics, and recent clashes with the security forces. The reactions of a majority of villagers in one community to an encounter between police and guerrillas, (rapid flight from both sides), is illustrative.

116. Gaitán, Julio César. "Lucanamarca: 'Sendero' contrataca." *Equis X*, no.336 (April 11 1983): 4-6.

On April 3 some 50 *senderista* fighters, accompanied by about 130 "militia," attacked the pueblo of Lucanamarca while its inhabitants were celebrating Easter. Gaitán describes in detail the assault on and murder of the people of Lucanamarca. Apparently not only *soplones*, but also common criminals were called forward for "judgment"; the guerrillas, led by Hildebrando Pérez, came prepared with a list of 70 to be subjected to a "popular trial." Some were publicly whipped; others had their heads shaved. In contrast to the foreign press's portrayal of a seemingly irrational and insane act of savagery, *Equis X* shows that the guerrillas had valid reasons for their ruthless behavior: some of the villagers were paramilitary fighters who had helped the sinchis in

antiguerrilla operations. One of the first targets of the *senderistas* were the documents in the municipal hall that listed suspected Sendero members or sympathizers, and probably also government partisans.

117. Gorriti, Gustavo. "La matanza de Lucanamarca." *Caretas,* no.743 (April 11 1983): 10-17.

Sixty-seven people have been killed by a punitive expedition led by Sendero against the people of Lucanamarca. Strangely, condemnation of the bloody assault and solidarity with its victims have been scarce. "A progressive community which rebelled against *senderista* tyranny" is the opinion of *Caretas.* Lucanamarca elected an Acción Popular mayor, and became the target of Sendero in 1981. Sendero prohibited commerce with neighboring towns; for a relatively prosperous herding town, such an action was economic strangulation. Military blows against the guerrillas in February were followed by open repudiation in March, and now the massacre. Gorriti collects and publishes testimony from survivors of the attacks.

118. "Bloody Sunday." *Time* v.121, no.16 (April 18 1983): 46.

As the tiny pueblo of Santiago de Lucanamarca was celebrating Easter Sunday, 30 masked men brandishing axes and hatchets invaded, setting fire to the municipal hall, pillaging local shops, and rounding up villagers, including wizened old women and barefoot children. After stoning, shooting, and hacking to death 66 people, the masked men vanished back into the hills. Thus *Time* magazine characterizes the war in Peru: "The massacre was a direct affront to the liberal government of Peru's President." Sendero is a "shadowy group of self-styled Maoist guerrillas," that has "tyrannized the area around the picturesque Andean town of Ayacucho." Their "eccentric ideology is mingled with a curious form of messianic tribalism," (including the use of Indian slings to hurl dynamite). The murder of journalists at Uchuraccay is presented as an atavistic and ritual killing: "Such hoary superstitions do not seem to interest Belaúnde," who wrote off the Easter massacre as "an insanity perpetrated by people who are psychologically unhinged." *Time* concludes that the Peruvian government will need a more detailed and determined policy if it is to save Andean villagers from their ruthless oppressors.

119. Gaitán, Julio César. "Congreso de Sendero: Abimael reaparece." *Equis X* , no. 337 (April 18 1983): 4-6.

The PCP held its eighth party congress in Lima at the end of March, presided over by Abimael Guzmán. The presence of more than a hundred delegates mocked the vigilance of the intelligence services. Despite his psoriasis, Guzmán appeared in good health. Gaitán describes the activities of the conference, which consisted largely of reports by field commanders and a healthy dose of "self-criticism." These sessions helped the *senderistas* to properly analyze some recent setbacks in the sierra and to improve their planning and indoctrination efforts in the liberated zones. Gaitán summarizes the conference's conclusion (that it is time to move to the "fourth stage" of guerrilla war), and the plans Sendero has for implementing this escalation.

120. Ercilla, Tito. "Ayacucho: hacia la 'salvadorización' del Perú." *Equis X,* no.338 (April 25 1983): 20-21.

Ercilla views in perspective the latest round of fighting between the security forces and the guerrillas, in which a number of sinchis have been killed and captured. The portrayal of a "massacre" perpetrated by Sendero at Lucanamarca is a oversimplification of a series of complex confrontations between some peasants from the village and peasants from another area, with sinchi and guerrilla participation, which culminated in the notorious "massacre." The battle at Lucanamarca substantiates the dire prediction which *Equis X* has been making for months: that General Noel's "Yankee" counterinsurgency strategy is turning village against village, producing the "Salvadorization" of the entire country.

121. Reynoso, Ulises. "¿Diálogo con Sendero?" *Equis X,* no.340 (May 9 1983): 23-24.

Ricardo Letts, prominent in the legal Marxist left, secretly proposed to the wife of President Belaúnde after the Uchuraccay massacre that a Peace Commission be established to search for a political, non-military solution to the struggle in Ayacucho. The approach proved fruitless, and Letts wrote an article in his journal *El caballo rojo* "naming" a number of prominent Peruvians in public life to a "National Citizens Commission of Peace, Concordance, and Dialogue." *Equis X* contacted some of those nominated for their reaction to the idea of a dialogue with Sendero. All agreed that a peaceful, not violent, solution needs to be sought. Reynoso points out that for a dialogue to be successful, both sides must agree to talk.

122. Gaitán, Julio César. "Sendero por dentro: una reunión secreta." *Equis X*, no.341 (May 16 1983): 4-6.

Equis X is invited to a secret meeting of Sendero in one of the *pueblos jóvenes* (shanty-towns) surrounding Huamanga. The purpose of permitting a journalist to report on a Popular School meeting is to demonstrate that despite government repression, Sendero can move freely about the city and carry on with its recruiting and education. The reporter was permitted to listen to, but not view, the meeting. The meeting catechizes the aspirant *senderistas* in the dogma of *pensamiento Gonzalo.* Gaitán captures the almost religious fervor of the movement.

123. Pease García, Henry. "Uchuraccay, Lucanamarca y muchos más." *Quehacer*, no.22 (May 1983): 48-57.

A somber assessment of the work of the Uchuraccay Commission. Neither the massacre of eight journalists at Uchuraccay nor the report of the commission delegated by the government to investigate it are simple, clear, uncomplicated matters. The massacre itself has opened up to public scrutiny an abyss of hatred and killing in the sierras, between pro- and anti-Sendero villages, between opponents and supporters of the guerrillas within the same village, between "rich" and poor peasants, between communities acting out of fear of Sendero and towns acting out of fear of the sinchis, and between neighboring rival communities which have had old rancors stretching back decades, if not centuries. "It would be irresponsible, if not criminal," writes Pease, "to obscure or underestimate the effect of an antisubversive campaign which uses the peasants to confront Sendero (with a total disregard for the political and social consequences) at the same time it deprives them of protection, all this at the least possible cost to the forces of order." Pease accuses the commission of being incapable of getting to the heart of the matter, because of their ideological perspective which equates defense of democracy with defense of the current government. He does credits it with an honest effort to describe the murders, and to understand the peasants' motives. But the commission's timid criticism of some aspects of government policy is overlain with a deeper, more profound reluctance to examine the whole policy of counterguerrilla warfare as currently practiced by the army and sinchis in the sierras. The commission is in no doubt that the journalists were in fact murdered by the peasants, but it completely exonerates the sinchis from accusations that they systematically instigate murder as a means of repression or defense. Mario Vargas Llosa is especially singled out as failing to follow where the evidence and his common sense should lead him, and of moral culpability in contributing to an equivocating conclusion. Sidebars from newspapers lay a large portion of the blame with the sinchis, who exhorted peasants to kill and mutilate *senderistas* with savagery, accuse the commission of being lobotomized, and of whitewashing the government's ultimate responsibility for the massacre. Pease believes that the massacres at Uchuraccay and Lucanamarca confirm that the only solution to the challenge of Sendero is political; to find that solution is the responsibility of the government, all political parties, and the wide array of civil institutions in Peru.

124. Barton, Carol. "Peru: 'Dirty War' in Ayacucho." *NACLA Report on the Americas* v.17, no.3 (May/June 1983): 36-39.

Critical report on human rights abuses by soldiers and sinchis. The massacre at Uchuraccay epitomizes the situation in the highlands, where journalists attempting to verify reports of peasant-Sendero clashes were brutally murdered, some say, at the instigation of the sinchis, who told peasants to kill any strangers they saw. The special commission investigating the massacre condescendingly placed the blame on all Peruvians, for their failure to integrate Indians into modern society. While the army is waging a more subtle psychological campaign of counterinsurgency, the sinchis rely mainly on brutality. They have also recruited whole villages in upper Huanta to hunt *senderistas*, promising immunity and rewards for results, with no questions asked. Many peasants have taken the opportunity to settle old scores with rival villages. Those from Uchuraccay acknowledged their participation in the killings, and were astonished when instead of being rewarded, they were besieged by the press and government investigators.

125. Meyer, Michael R. and Michael Smith. "The Shining Path to Terror." *Newsweek,* v.101, no.24 (June 13 1983): 33.

Sendero attacks, formerly confined to remote Ayacucho, have reached Lima. The firebombing of the giant Bayer chemical plant, blackouts, and dozens of random bombings have shaken the city's inhabitants, and President Belaúnde has declared a 60-day state of emergency. These attacks, combined with the economic crisis, a poor harvest, and a Lima police strike have produced a powerful psychological fear of Sendero. Belaúnde is under pressure to use the army

against the guerrillas. Sendero knows this and uses it against the police: painted on city walls is the taunt "Police, how long can you be cannon fodder?" Sendero now boasts that it will take power by 1990.

126. "Risky Path." *Time,* v.121, no.24 (June 13 1983): 38.

Similar report on Lima bombings and fear of Sendero. An Interior Ministry official now admits that the government underestimated the guerrillas. *Time* acknowledges that Sendero appeals mainly to rural, impoverished Indians and mixed bloods. The threat of ethnic conflict is so real that even the left agrees with Belaúnde's emergency measures. But everyone knows that the real threat comes from the right: Sendero's attacks merely strengthen the hand of military hard-liners who want a crackdown on the country at large.

127. Moreno, Elías. "'Ahora matan a los testigos.'" *Equis X,* no.345 (June 13 1983): 17-19.

Equis X interviews Martha Alvarez, widow of murdered journalist Eduardo de la Piniella, about the government's systematic obstruction of justice in the Uchuraccay massacre. The mysterious murder of María Gálvez de Gavilán, wife of the lieutenant governor of Uchuraccay, as well as other inhabitants of the village, has only deepened skepticism that those responsible for the deaths will ever be brought to justice.

128. "El sendero de Mezzich." *Caretas,* no.752 (June 13 1983): 22-23, 64.

Report on the ideological journey of Julio César Mezzich, top *senderista* leader, from "Castroist" and Trotskyist tendencies to Sendero Luminoso. Mezzich, ex-student of La Inmaculada, once belonged to the entirely heterodox Vanguardia Revolucionaria. During vacations he worked as a member of community development brigades in Ayacucho. This article describes in detail how Mezzich became embroiled in the *Bandera Roja* split between Saturnino Paredes and Abimael Guzmán, and his involvement in the agrarian reform movements of the 1970's. By the end of the decade he had drifted so far left that Sendero was his natural home. *Caretas* asks, does this convert aspire to the leadership position now held by Guzmán? His participation in armed actions is confirmed by eye-witnesses. Furthermore, he is the only Sendero leader who has led peasant mobilizations; in his case, in Andahuaylas, which is his power base.

129. Gaitán, Julio César. "Diálogo o sangre: la idea del fiscal." *Equis X,* no.347 (June 27 1983): 4-6.

According to *Equis X,* sources close to Sendero confirm that the guerrillas are considering entering into a dialogue with representatives of the government. Even though Abimael Guzmán is said to be uncomfortable with calls for dialogue, he does not completely reject the possibility. *Equis X* solicits the views of prominent Peruvians on the possibility of negotiations with the guerrillas.

130. Barrantes, Alfredo. "Sendero Luminoso: un movimiento dogmático y autoritario." *Cuadernos del tercer mundo,* v.6, no.62 (June-July 1983): 32-34.

Alfonso Barrantes Lingán, president of Izquierda Unida (IU), analyzes the differences between the left and Sendero's strategy and methods. While Sendero emerged from the Peruvian left, its dogmatism and authoritarianism have put it on a different course from that of IU. The most striking difference between the two is in their respective approaches to the revolutionary process: IU believes that a substantial transformation of society will be achieved through the patient work of mass organizations; Sendero would impose change from above through violence and terrorism.

131. Bissio, Beatriz. "El desafío de Sendero Luminoso." *Cuadernos del tercer mundo,* v.6, no.62 (June-July 1983): 18-31.

A sharply observant article on Sendero's background, its appeal to *campesinos* , and the conduct of the war. Bissio concentrates on the crucial period prior to the beginning of the armed struggle, and on the effect of land reform measures on the peasantry of the sierra. These reforms ensured a radical modification of the structure of the mountain valleys and of the coastal haciendas, and resulted in a sharp rise in living standards for communities that participated in cooperative agricultural enterprises. But not all peasant sectors shared equally in the reforms, and today the land reform program is at best stalled, if not in reverse. Bissio believes that the response of peasants to Sendero has a direct relationship to their property situation. Those who received titles or have participated in cooperatives have little interest in Sendero; in areas where the reforms were

forestalled, receptivity is greater. Bissio also concentrates on the futile and counterproductive sinchi campaign of terror in the sierra. Masked men who frighten peasants by singing "Shitty terrorists, we will come into your houses at night, we will eat your guts, drink your blood, cut off your heads, gouge out your eyes..." are hardly winning hearts and minds. Bissio does not mince words (Guzmán is called a *cholo* who defends native culture but was molded by elite western educational institutions), and her detail and insight place her report a cut above the usual analysis of Sendero.

132. Moreno, Julio Cabrera. "Sendero nos da interviu." *Equis X*, no.348 (July 4 1983): 4-6.

Somewhere in the central sierra *Equis X* talks with a *senderista* fighter. Although no questions can be asked about the PCP's ideology or organization, the masked guerrilla talks about the progress of the armed struggle, the relationship between splinter groups like VR (Revolutionary Vanguard) and Puka Llacta (Red Homeland) and Sendero, and the crimes of the sinchis ("lackeys and dogs of Belaúnde") against the people.

133. Moreno, Elías. "Un militar dice sí al diálogo con Sendero." *Equis X*, no.349 (July 11 1983): 18-19.

Equis X talks with General Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, ex-Chancellor of the Republic and former Comandante-General of the army under the revolutionary Velasco regime. At a time of supreme crisis in Peru, with violence sweeping the country, economic turmoil, and increased foreign debt, Mercado agrees with those calling for dialogue with Sendero. He disagrees with the general attitude of the government, i.e., to accept the proposition of dialogue with the guerrillas is to deal with "delinquents." He fears that marginalized areas of Peru like the *pueblos jóvenes* are beginning to respond to Sendero's violence, which will spread and strengthen their revolution. He offers some suggestions to avert Peru from this path.

134. Algañaraz, Juan Carlos. "Guerra civil en el Perú." *Equis X*, no.350 (July 25 1983): 4-6, 27-28.

Reproduces a special report originally published in Spain in the journal *Cambio 16*. Algañaraz characterizes Sendero as a movement that styles itself as the center of a world revolution, inspired ideologically with a religious devotion by the Chinese Gang of Four, and displaying an implacable and cruel violence similar to that of the genocidal Pol Pot of Cambodia. A return to democracy after twelve years of military rule left a country on the edge of ruin with a volcanic social situation. Natural catastrophes and a worldwide economic crisis merely add to the misery of Peru's civil war. Algañaraz interviews prominent Peruvians to build a picture of a society on the brink of coming apart.

135. Gaitán, Julio César. "Sendero a la ofensiva." *Equis X*, no.351 (July 27 1983): 4-6.

Equis X concurs with a number of distinguished Peruvians that Sendero is winning the war. Its abortive plan to take over a television studio and broadcast nationally a message from "Comrade Gonzalo" is proof of the audacity of its leaders. Contrary to the opinions of some government officials, Sendero's actions do not reflect a blind cruelty, but rather a calculated strategic plan to take power. *Equis X* quotes General Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, *Visión* columnist Manuel D'Ornellas, and the journal *Perú económico* to buttress its pessimistic forecast.

136. "El caso de Jaime Urrutia." *Quehacer*, no.23 (July 1983): 15.

On May 6, 1983, Jaime Urrutia was kidnapped by ten hooded men and thrown into jail in Ayacucho. The charge was financing Sendero Luminoso through his Instituto de Estudios Regionales "José María Arguedas." Although he was released after 15 days of interrogation, *Quehacer* asks whether all Peruvian social scientists will now have to watch over their shoulders for the government? The question of the origin of a large sum of money lies at the heart of the matter. *Quehacer* explains that the Institute was founded by professionals in 1978 to explore regional solutions to rural problems, and was funded by two Dutch and Swiss development organizations. The Institute was able to improve crops, inoculate cattle, improve local infrastructures, and aid communities in regaining legal status as productive units. *Quehacer* strongly implies that the state, having failed to improve the lives of its own citizens, should not impede the work or suspect the motives of those institutions which can.

137. Vargas Llosa, Mario. "Inquest in the Andes." *The New York Times Magazine* (July 31 1983): 18-23, 33, 26-27, 42, 48-51, 56.

Detailed, gripping account of the deaths of eight journalists in Uchuraccay. With a novelist's skill, Vargas Llosa recreates the events leading up to and the aftermath of the massacre. The thesis of Vargas Llosa's story (and that of the government report he helped to prepare) is that the reporters, all but one *limeños*, had crossed into an archaic, ancient, mysterious Peru in the highlands, and paid with their lives for the gap between Indian and mestizo Peru. The Iquichanos of Uchuraccay were separate even from their Quechua-speaking neighbors, and had a long history of violence and isolation from the nation-state. Caught between the sinchis and the guerrillas, fearful of *senderista* retaliation for their killing of five guerrillas, the peasants murdered and mutilated the strangers with ritual brutality, in spite of their being unarmed and obviously not *senderistas*. Throughout Vargas Llosa lays stress on the tragic and inevitable nature of the events, on the gap between his bourgeois democratic society and the Indians' traditional, hidden, remote, and incomprehensible world in the Andes. [For this viewpoint ("no one was really to blame"), he was viciously attacked by the Peruvian left, which wanted responsibility placed squarely on the government.] A powerful and engaging article by a persuasive and opinionated writer.

138. "La 'Emergencia Malaya.'" *Caretas,* no.759 (August 1 1983): 16-17, 68.

Caretas examines the tactics of a counterinsurgency war that the British won against Marxist rebels in Malaysia. Although the article points out the many obvious differences between the situation in Malaya and the present crisis in Peru, lessons can be learned which might be applied to Peru. The Malaysian guerrillas were much stronger in numbers, and had fought as an anti-Japanese guerrilla force in the Second World War. They could count upon the support of the Chinese Communists, and upon sanctuary in Thailand. Their leader, Chin Peng, a young intellectual, was very different from the theological and mythical professor Abimael Guzmán. The parallels between the two situations include a penchant for the use of terror to guarantee loyalty or cooperation, rugged terrain (jungle in Malaysia, mountains in Peru) which favors the guerrillas, and a targeting of the poorest population as eventual beneficiaries of the promised revolution. *Caretas* draws particular attention to the conduct of the Malaysian campaign as a political war with military overtones, a war of political ideologies. The war was waged under civilian control. The psychological aspects of the war were stressed, and a department of psychological warfare was established to organize a massive propaganda campaign against the guerrillas. The British stressed a policy of surrender for the guerrillas to induce them to defect, cause splits within their ranks, and create an image of a firm but just government. The guerrillas were portrayed not as terrorists, but as dedicated, if misguided people. The death penalty was decreed for anyone caught carrying arms, but such a sentence could be commuted to penal servitude. A legion of self-defense patrols was created of some 350,000 persons; at no time were there more than 40,000 troops and 67,000 policemen deployed. An important philosophy of the war was that cooperation from the populace could not be expected if protection were not provided. A system of reward for capture of terrorists was established, strict guidelines to prevent mistreatment of suspects were followed, and inhabitants of guerrilla zones were relocated and given title to new land. The authorities also stressed political reeducation for captured terrorists.

139. Algañaraz, Juan Carlos. "El desafío de Sendero." *Cambio 16,* no.610 (August 8 1983), pp.72-75.

Algañaraz visited El Frontón with other journalists; he relates meeting with dozens of *senderistas*, who consider themselves prisoners of war. Algañaraz describes the cleanliness of the *senderista* pavilion, the political classes on Marx, Lenin, and Mao, the familiar murals and slogans painted on the walls. The prisoners have transformed a prison into a "shining trench of combat," in which they learn Mao's three rules and eight warnings (obey all orders; take not even a needle or thread from the masses, and return everything captured; speak courteously; pay for what you buy; return things borrowed; replace things damaged; do not hurt or strike the people; don't damage crops; don't take liberties with women; don't maltreat prisoners). The prisoners describe their radical education and their conception of people's revolution in a worldwide context, defend Sendero against charges of brutality, and sing a hymn to the revolution, "Except for power all is illusion." Algañaraz is struck by the faith of the imprisoned *senderistas;* there is never a shadow of doubt, nor a moment of reflection.

140. Ríos, Lucio de los. "Nuevos planes de Sendero." *Equis X,* no.355 (August 29 1983): 22-23.

Equis X has learned of a recent meeting of *comuneros* in Cangallo in which a plan of immediate action against recent security force abuses was conceived. The sentiment for the "general mobilization of peasant communities" was not in conformity to the Maoist line, but drew inspiration from the region's peasant uprisings of the early 19th century. Peasant anger is widespread; an example of recent repression is an attack by sinchis on a peasant gathering during

the *Fiestas patrias*. The atmosphere of the highlands is such that a religious brotherhood's meeting to plan the repair of a local church is interpreted by the police as a subversive "popular assembly."

141. Montoya, Rodrigo. "Izquierda Unida y Sendero: potencialidad y límites." *Sociedad y política,* v.13 (August 1983): 27-36.

Between 1980 and 1982 three facts dominated the Peruvian political scene: the return of constitutional government after 12 years of military dictatorship, the significant presence of a popular workers movement, and the start of armed struggle by Shining Path. Each of these movements marked the end of a process which began in the late 1970's. Montoya explores in detail the development and growth of a strong legal left in Peru, the culmination of which is the United Left, Izquierda Unida (IU). IU's leaders, according to Montoya, suppose that there is a road to reform in Peru. This, he writes, is their fundamental error: they declare themselves heirs of Mariátegui, but their political philosophy has little or nothing to do with the anticapitalist socialist revolution proposed by Mariátegui in *Amauta.* He declares: "...I believe that Sendero Luminoso embodies the Andean fury against the ancient and secular oppression. What attachment can the democratic system have for those who do not benefit from it; on the contrary, [people who are] victims of this social system?" Still, Montoya criticizes Sendero for its reliance upon the peasantry, its neglect of urban and workers' needs, and its isolation. If it can resolve these contradictions and break its isolation, it can channel the "Andean fury" into the fury of the whole nation. He also critiques IU for its timid reformism and lack of a program, supporting "neither the reformism of IU nor the indiscriminate violence of Sendero." The most difficult road, he writes, is the affirmation of a different socialist option, anticapitalist and antitotalitarian. The struggle of the masses must be free and open, not the result of compulsion or imposed obligation; all types of dictatorship must be fought, not reformed.

142. Gaitán, Julio César. "Sendero acepta diálogo." *Equis X,* no.356 (September 5 1983): 4-6.

There are "certain indications" that the PCP is disposed to accept a form of dialogue. According to *Equis X* 's sources, emissaries of Sendero will approach national personalities who have publicly pronounced themselves in favor of talks with the guerrillas. The article discusses the intricate maneuverings of certain Peruvians and political tendencies in this matter, as well as the implications of such negotiations for Peruvian democracy and society. [A hopeful report, not to be borne out by subsequent events.]

143. Gonzáles Manrique, José. "Sendero en Huamachuco." *Caretas,* no.766 (September 19 1983): 34-38.

Report from a war zone. The mayor and lieutenant governor of Curgos, a district of Huamachuco, were murdered in the community plaza by *senderistas;* since then a third of the population has fled to the larger town. Gonzáles describes how Sendero guerrillas entered the SAIS "October 3rd" cooperative, seized any personnel they found there, condemned them to death, and shot them (miraculously, they survived). The SAIS "3 de Octubre" is comprised of five cooperatives, with some 800 members, and 13,000 hectares of farmland, forest, and grazing pastures. Sendero's attacks have caused 100 million *soles* in damage. The barbarism of Sendero has totally disorganized this tranquil and progressive community. It has one primary school with a single teacher, no clinic, and no decent paved road. The isolated community feels abandoned by the central government, but in spite of this has begun organizing itself to be vigilant against the terrorists. A sidebar chronicles a year of terror in Huamachuco.

144. "La carta de Amnistía Internacional a Belaúnde." *Equis X,* no.359 (September 26 1983): 13-15.

The complete text of a letter from Amnesty International to President Belaúnde, pointing out that human rights abuses have been and continue to be committed in the emergency zones, and that a grave situation of political violence exists in the departments of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurímac. More than a year after the massacre at Uchuraccay, not one person has been detained or arrested for the crime; officials have closed their eyes to the detained and disappeared of Ayacucho. Amnesty calls for drastic measures to investigate such abuses, and to put an end to torture, extrajudicial executions, and disappearances. [The publication of such a letter is an act of courage by *Equis X,* particularly as support for Amnesty International is viewed by many in Peru as an unpatriotic and anti-national act.]

145. "Sendero y sus juicios." *Caretas,* no.767 (September 26 1983): 16.

Brief piece on the "chaotic" situation of legal proceedings against presumed *senderistas.* Some 370 prisoners are in El Frontón, 250 in Lurigancho, 50 women in Callao, 10 in Chorrillos, and a dozen in provincial jails. But the courts differ widely in practice: in one district court, for example, ten people were sentenced to terms of no more than 10 years, and 3 were absolved in 1982; now the court is trying 19 suspects accused of 20 attacks in Arequipa. All deny the charges. The process is very slow and tedious, and glaring weaknesses in the system have been exposed. All minors brought to court in Ayacucho have been freed, without regard to the magnitude of their alleged crimes. Fighting a counterinsurgency war within a constitutional legal system will be impossible if the system invalidates the power to bring such people to justice.

146. González, Raúl. "El sendero de Sendero Luminoso." *Debate*, no.22 [September 1983]: 24-37.

Largely a synthesis of his previous work for *Quehacer.* González repeats his thesis that Sendero has found support in Ayacucho because it offers "a faith and a hope." The audacity, ferocity, and daring exhibited by *los muchachos guerrilleros* have won a kind of respect among the *ayacuchanos*, showing that things in the highlands can change. But he repeats his assertions that Sendero has little appeal for people less desperate than those in Ayacucho, lacking as it does a program and operating on the margins not only of the democratic system, but also of progressive social forces. The reality that Sendero confronts, he writes, is that Peru is not Ayacucho. Of equal interest are the numerous sidebars accompanying the article, reports on Sendero attacks on police posts, the assault on the jail in Ayacucho, the firebombing of an *Acción Popular* office, blackouts of Lima, the background and tactics of the dreaded sinchis, and several extracts from primary Sendero documents entitled, "What does Abimael Guzmán think?" The first is an address from the First Military School (April 19, 1980); the second from "New Democracy" (July, 1980); the third a short extract from "Develop guerrilla warfare" (March, 1982). A final section cites official information on leaders and ideologues of Sendero, suspected front organizations which assist it, and the casualties of the war to date, according to the government.

147. "Los partidos ante Sendero Luminoso." *Debate*, no.22 [September 1983]: 39-46.

Debate asks a wide spectrum of Peruvian political leaders for their positions on Sendero. The representatives of parties from left to right all condemn unequivocally terrorism and Shining Path. The leftist groups (PCP, PCR, PSR, POMR-PST) call Sendero anti-socialist, but tend to place a large share of the blame for the phenomenon of *senderismo* on the nation's socio-economic makeup, its ruling classes, and "structural violence."

148. Smith, Michael L. "'No News is Good News:' Sendero y la prensa extranjera." *Debate*, no.22 [September 1983]: 48-50.

Smith, a correspondent for *Newsweek*, shows that the wider world largely ignores events in Latin America unless they involve violence, and then the outside press tends to get the details wrong. Mistakes and ignorance aggravate a situation in which the government already mistrusts the press, especially the foreign press. Objective reporting on the guerrillas brings accusations of sympathy and support for terrorism. Belaúnde prefers positive stories about Popular Cooperation and the electrification of the Andes. The ABC network, Smith writes, spent ten million dollars in Buenos Aires alone to cover the Falklands/Malvinas war; the "front" in Ayacucho simply doesn't warrant a "spot" costing $50,000 a minute. Smith discusses how the various news services cover Latin America: there are few knowledgeable and experienced correspondents fluent in Spanish, and in any case most concentrate on the war in Central America. The few permanent newsmen in South America are based in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Unless Sendero bombs an embassy or a foreign-owned factory, correspondents only come to Peru during peaceful periods between their big stories. The government, taking its cue from the American experience in Vietnam, has restricted access to the emergency zones; the "official" version differs from what anyone may gather simply walking the streets of Ayacucho after 7:00 p.m.

149. "Lo que ata a los campesinos." *Quehacer*, no.24 (September 1983): 23-27.

Peasants who live in communities adjacent to Ayacucho department are caught between two opposing forces: an "implacable and uncommunicative Sendero," which desires to widen its base of support, and the military and police repression, which increasingly intimidates and asphyxiates them. A peasant leader relates how the community gathered together and decided collectively not to support Sendero. Their leaders were then accused by Sendero of being an obstacle to the advance of the revolution. But conversely the same community is accused of being terrorist; the authorities resent local election of leaders who fight abuses of power; merchants

resent communal stores and attempts to strictly control prices; old landowners want to recover their properties and initiate lawsuit after lawsuit; *narcotraficantes* naturally do not like opposition to their business; corrupt state employees do not like being denounced as abusers of power. "All of these accuse us and call us terrorists." The article reproduces testimony from peasants in communities outside of Ayacucho, where strong independent peasant associations already existed prior to the rise of Sendero. But it is these very sources of local power, which exist to strengthen communities and raise standards of living, that challenge both the guerrillas and the security forces of the state. Each side demands absolute fidelity, and neither wishes to see strong sources of power independent of itself.

150. "Los jóvenes dicen: 'somos sospechosos de ser terroristas.'" *Quehacer*, no.24 (September 1983): 28-31.

Added to the normal burdens of youth which are universal, in Peru teenagers and students have an extra cross to carry: because Sendero has recruited widely among the young, the country's youth are now collectively suspected of being terrorists. An engineering student relates that all university students, especially those in state schools, are under suspicion. To be connected with politics is to be regarded by the police as a *senderista*. Recognition of the differences between Sendero and the other leftist organizations is minimal. A sociologist confirms that society at large is beginning to adopt these attitudes. In the *micros*, in the barrios, people joke with students, "How goes it with your *senderista* friends?" This is a pressure that can create reservations and paranoia, aided by constant police stop-and-search sweeps which disrupt school life. Scarcity of money, lack of jobs, sexual frustrations, and the temptations of drugs already exist; now added to them is the constant fear of arrest and detention for carrying the wrong book, or for simply for being enrolled in school. The article carries a tone of frustration and sadness: "In other places they are the hope of tomorrow, the people of the future, the divine treasure of *la patria*. In Peru, however, youth are, in their totality, simply suspected of being terrorists..."

151. McClintock, Cynthia. "Sendero Luminoso: Peru's Maoist Guerrillas" *Problems of Communism*, v.32 (September-October 1983): 19-34.

The first of a number of influential articles on Shining Path by McClintock, one of the most prominent senderologists in the United States. McClintock spent time in Ayacucho during the 1970's observing the impact of the agrarian reform on the department and its peasant communities. She calls Sendero an example of the violence that can result from a combination of widespread poverty, ethnic and regional tensions, and radical leftist ideology, "even when that combination lacks the catalyst of significant foreign intervention." McClintock contrasts Sendero with other, more conventional Latin American Marxist movements in its exclusivity, secrecy, shunning of publicity, and lack of available ideological texts. She brands Sendero as blind to nuance: "The Senderistas see no difference, for example, between the Peru of the 1930's and the Peru of the 1980's; the country remains, in their view, semifeudal and semicolonial. Peru thus supposedly continues to resemble prerevolutionary China." Since it is composed mainly of the sons and daughters of peasants from highland communities, McClintock does not rule out the possibility that Sendero desires race as well as class war. Sendero may be trying to cut off Ayacucho from the coast in order to return to prehispanic Inca days: "In a symbolic practice, Senderistas use the traditional Inca slingshot--to fling dynamite." They may also shun alliances with Lima-based Marxists because those parties are white and middle-class. McClintock thinks it possible that Shining Path is not one, but several allied organizations; while the Sendero based in Ayacucho is considered cruel and doctrinaire, a second "Sendero" organizing in the Lima barrios is less rigid and more criminal. McClintock believes that Sendero's isolationism, rejection of broad-based alliances, and lack of external support will ultimately doom it to failure. Its recent (1982) shift towards Lima, in disregard of Maoist prescriptions, is unlikely to be successful in the relatively modernized and urbanized contemporary Latin American context. McClintock's analysis of local conditions in Sendero's birthplace reveals that Ayacucho's population density was 50% higher in 1980 than it had been in 1940, while soil erosion had increased and caloric intake was found to be only 70% of recommended FAO requirements.

152. "Sendero rompe el silencio." *Equis X*, no.361 (October 10 1983): 4-6.

Despite the climate of violence reigning in Ayacucho, municipal elections are proceeding in the department. Sendero has indicated that it will disrupt the electoral process, terming it a farce, and calling on the people of Ayacucho not to vote, but to fight and to resist. *Equis X* prints the full text of the PCP manifesto, *"La rebelión se justifica."*

153. Benavente, José. "Escalada de Sendero." *Equis X*, no.366 (November 15 1983): 4-6.

Chronicle of daily events in Ayacucho and other departments. *Equis X* places the attacks, strikes, ambushes, and bombings of Sendero into a context of guerrilla strategy, comparing their tactics to those of the Viet Cong. Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and adjacent areas are under the virtual control of Sendero. Many candidates for municipal office have withdrawn from the elections in fear, and a former army officer revealed that at least one hundred soldiers are being tried *in absentia* in the military justice zone for deserting from the army, "carrying their weapons..."

154. Ercilla, Tito. "Genocidio en Ayacucho." *Equis X*, no.368 (November 28 1983): 4-6.

More than two thousand people have died in the Emergency Zones, and hundreds have disappeared or been tortured. Recently *El Diario* and *Visión* brought to light a massacre near Soccos in Huamanga. The authorities tried to blame *senderistas*, but the victims' families assert that sinchis were the killers. The Comando Político Militar has promised an investigation to establish responsibility, but it is far more likely that this promise has been made to forestall national and international scandal than in the interests of justice. *Equis X* discusses the facts of the latest outrage, calling the state of affairs in Ayacucho "genocide" against defenseless communities.

155. Torres, Pedro. "Alcaldesa de Humanga: 'Dialogaré con Sendero.'" *Equis X*, no.368 (November 28 1983): 24-26.

Torres interviews Leonora Zamora Concha, mayor of Huamanga, who won with more than 50% of the vote after being jailed by General Noel for her repeated denunciations of human rights abuses. Zamora, professor at the Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga, discusses the war in Ayacucho and the possibilities of talks with Sendero, as well as her own fears of both the guerrillas and the security forces. A sidebar (*"habla un senderista"*) presents the supposed reaction of Sendero to her election. The *senderistas* had threatened anyone who intended to vote, but changed their minds and permitted the election to proceed in order to embarrass Belaúnde and Noel.

156. "Nueva política frente a 'Sendero.'" *Equis X*, no.369 (December 5 1983): 12-14.

In spite of evidence to the contrary, it appears that the old-fashioned military is not impervious to suggestions that there may be better solutions to the terrorist threat to Peru than purely military ones. The designation of General Adrián Huamán Centeno as the new commander of the emergency zone is a hopeful sign that a political solution, rather than the physical extermination of the guerrillas, may be considered. *Equis X* discusses the possibilities of a new antisubversive policy, and briefly profiles General Huamán. One important change would be tighter control over the Civil Guard and the sinchis. A sidebar reports on negotiations between the authorities and *senderistas* imprisoned in El Frontón in Lima and in Callao, which suggests that Sendero is indeed open to dialogue.

157. Ríos, Lucio de los. "El drama de los desaparecidos: Caín ¿Dónde está tu hermano?" *Equis X*, no.370 (December 12 1983): 4-6.

A doleful report at year's end on the tragedy in Ayacucho, with thousands of dead, kidnapped, tortured, raped, and abused. The author supports the proposal of the mayor of Ayacucho and its *Colegio de Abogados* for the "pacification" of the Emergency Zone, the withdrawal of the security forces, and the presence of the International Red Cross and Amnesty International to secure the peace and determine the facts about human rights abuses. *Equis X* considers these proposals more viable than the continuation of what it calls a bloodbath in Ayacucho. The recent disappearance of two journalists only underlines this urgency. Once again *Equis X* provides coverage, with names and dates, of the atrocities of the war.

158. Harding, Colin. "Reporting the War in Ayacucho." *Index on Censorship* (Writers and Scholars International, London) v.12, no.6 (December 1983): 15-17.

Harding focuses on the dangers of attempting to report honestly and accurately on the struggle between the government and Sendero, and the pressures that both sides bring to bear upon journalists. The government asked the editors of newspapers not to give undue prominence to what it terms terrorism, and the commander of the emergency zone in the early 1980's, Noel y Moral, practically accused the press of supporting the rebels: "Sendero Luminoso is a political organization that has opened a current account, and the left in its entirety has been making deposits

in it..." . When a newspaper reported on the murder of a journalist by policemen in the main square of a town in Ayacucho, its editors were hauled before a "tribunal of honor" by the Peruvian College of Journalists. Harding also reviews the events in Uchuraccay and the subsequent lack of progress in the government's investigation of the journalists' murder. Claims of spreading disaffection with Sendero on the part of peasant communities are impossible to verify, as the government prevents journalists from traveling to many areas within the emergency zones. The authorities equate any opposition with support for and complicity with Sendero. The foreign press has not been immune to these attacks and vilification. Foreign foundations which operate too independently are suspect, as are Peruvian institutions which receive aid from abroad. Harding closes his report with a depressing conclusion: "To speak out against social injustice and human rights violations in Peru is increasingly to be regarded as an actual or potential ally of the Maoist guerrillas. The press and intellectuals are caught up in this manichean polarization, in which it is considered dangerous, even subversive, to report on, and research into, what is going on."

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159. Americas Watch. *Abdicating Democratic Authority: Human Rights in Peru.* New York: Americas Watch, 1984.

Peru faces the most brutal and vicious guerrilla organization in the Americas. Despite its dogmatic ideology and repugnant character, Shining Path is able to exploit centuries of misery and neglect. Peru is handicapped in its battle by a severe economic crisis, and by corrupt and demoralized institutions of law and order. Under such circumstances, Peru would need extraordinary leadership to fight Sendero without resorting to counterterror. Unfortunately, Belaúnde's administration has abdicated authority to the police and army; 4,000 people have died in the war so far, with hundreds "disappeared." Americas Watch has compiled a thorough report, covering the background to revolution, the judicial system, prisons, police, anti-terrorist laws, state of emergency, trade union and peasant organizations, and the press. Sendero's origins and rise, its actions and government counter-actions, paramilitary patrols, the Uchuraccay massacre are documented, as are instances of detained and disappeared persons, extrajudicial executions, illegal detention centers, and cases of torture. The United States is criticized for its policy towards Peru, which has been to support Belaúnde, refrain from criticizing human rights violations, and to try to sell Peru arms to counter-act Soviet influence. The U.S. has also trained the armed forces in counterinsurgency tactics and provided anti-drug assistance. Although it is not to blame for human rights violations, the U.S. has done nothing to reduce abuses; its public silence and disinclination to criticize the Peruvian government has the effect of tactic acceptance of human rights violations. Quiet diplomacy, if such efforts are being made, must be consistent with public policy.

160. Ansión, Juan. "¿Es luminoso el camino de Sendero?" In *El cristiano ante el Perú de 1985: crisis económica, violencia...* [Lima]: Centro de Proyección Cristiano, [1984], pp. 63-68.

Fascinating article that explores the "mysterious" Andean facets of Sendero. *Lo andino*, a sort of indigenous mystical world, is present to some degree in a majority of Peruvians, declares Ansión. This world measures five ages of time: four until now, and one to come in the future. Each period can last from 500 to 1,500 years, but each ends with *pachacuti*, the moment of upheaval, when everything is inverted: top becomes bottom, and vice versa, day becomes night and night day, men are turned into stones, and from the stones comes a new generation. *Pachacuti* manifests itself in a great cataclysm: earthquakes, floods, a rain of fire. The old generation disappears, because it was evil; the rich did not share with the poor; the traditional norms of reciprocity were broken and the gods were not respected. Ansión believes that Sendero consciously perpetuates these links to the indigenous past. When Sendero kills a merchant or *hacendado* in Ayacucho, are they not unconsciously liquidating a *nakaq*, a being paid by city people to cut the throats of *campesinos* and extract their grease? Is not dynamiting power lines and plunging Lima into darkness (the city has light, the sierra none) announcing the *pachacuti* ? For Sendero these actions are not mere symbols, but acts designed to destroy the Western world. Lima is the mouth of Peru, where those who dominate make their pronouncements. To sabotage microwave towers is to cut off the speech of Lima, equivalent to cutting out the tongue of a traitor; Ansión reminds us that lying was one of three capital Inca crimes. Sendero's sabotage of tractors is indicative of its rejection of Western technology; its military actions have been relatively unsophisticated. Sendero is regarded as the instrument of *pachacuti*. It draws strength from three

tendencies: an alienated acculturation in which one's own language and customs are disparaged; a rejection of the West and a longing for a return to a pre-industrial past, linked to millenarianism; and a recovery of *lo andino*, with a projection towards a future in which it will be fundamental to the formation of a new Peruvian nation. Sendero is futurist in theory, but repressively retrogressive in action. This vision appears to appeal mostly to a young, rural population which is not necessarily *campesino*. Ansión puts Sendero on a road to an obscurant precapitalist society--a reactionary road taken by Pol Pot in Cambodia. An illuminating article rooted in the early anthropological school of *senderismo* .

161. Asociación Peruana de Estudios e Investigaciones Para la Paz (APEP). *Violencia y paz en el Perú hoy*. Edited by F. MacGregor and L. Madalengoitia. Lima: APEP and Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 1984.

A volume of 16 essays on violence in Peruvian society, including "structural violence," personal and political violence, and violence in international relations. The essays range from psychological to sociological, and from the highly theoretical to the literal. Particularly noteworthy are Gustavo Gorriti's "Formas de violencia," and Federico Velarde's "La violencia en el Perú hoy." Gorriti asks whether Sendero's violence is a response to socioeconomic conditions in Peru, and observes that the guerrilla violence of other Latin American nations occurred despite democracy, industrialization, and good indices of social gains. Gorriti analyzes terrorism in European, Latin, and other societies, and declares that Sendero is not a spontaneous regional reaction to Ayacuchan marginalization, but a doctrinally dogmatic movement wedded to a rigid dialectic of violence. Velarde compares Sendero and the security forces; both kill not just within combat, but outside it as well, dispensing arbitrary "justice" to those judged guilty by their self-contained value systems. Velarde quotes a *senderista* front organization as declaring that those who oppose them "will be buried ten meters underground"; the "forces of order" are equally guilty of extrajudicial killings. From these maximalist positions come the justification for violence.

162. Collin-Delavaud, Claude. "Le nécessaire consolidation de la démocratie péruvienne." *Problemmes d'Amérique Latine,* no.73 (3e trimestre 1984): 3-29.

Analysis of the Peruvian situation, with particular emphasis on social, economic, and political developments since the election of Belaúnde. Much of the article deals with the economic (and concomitant social) crisis brought about by Belaúnde's neoliberal economic policies. These, the author asserts, are contributing to a "disintegration of the social fabric" even as democracy is being consolidated after a decade of military rule. He defends Belaúnde, whom he says wished to avoid using the army (which was seeking political reintegration) against Sendero, as well as the excesses that such employment would bring. This, he asserts, ran counter to Belaúnde's "profoundly democratic" personality. Sendero's tactic of linking "provocation-repression-revolution" may not be successful everywhere in Peru, but is credible in a society where ecosystems and cultural differences favor conflictive situations and where socioeconomic evolution is so rapid. All these factors have brought about a renaissance of APRA. Collin-Delavaud provides a detailed examination of the economic policies of Manuel Ulloa.

163. Fernández Salvatecci, José Antonio. *Guerrillas y contraguerrillas en el Perú*. S.l., s.n. [1984-1985].

The author, an ex-guerrilla fighter in Nicaragua, analyzes Sendero's battle with the state from a political-military viewpoint. Fernández Salvatecci describes the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warriors like Sun Tzu, Lawrence of Arabia, Mao, Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh and Giap. He then examines Sendero's organization, three-stage plan for victory, leadership, and tactics, as well as those of its opponent, the Peruvian security forces. Throughout, he takes a comparative approach, utilizing such disparate examples of guerrilla and counterinsurgency war as the Jewish resistance in Palestine, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and France in Algeria. As a dedicated revolutionary, Fernández Salvatecci understands the political nature of people's war; with regard to Abimael Guzmán, he astutely points out that most military guerrilla fighters are dead. Those who triumph are the *políticos*, non-military men like Mao, a schoolteacher; Fidel, a lawyer; Che, a doctor, etc. Throughout, Fernández Salvatecci's sympathies are clear: Sendero Luminoso is acting as the vanguard of the Ayacuchan people in their natural struggle for liberation. Sendero has rejected the "war" of declarations and communiqués of the "left" in Peru for armed struggle. This work is complex and detailed in its treatment of insurgency and counterinsurgency; its crude typed manuscript serves to underline the clandestine nature of its revolutionary origins.

164. González, Raúl. "El sendero de Sendero Luminoso." In *El cristiano ante el Perú de 1985: crisis económica, violencia...* [Lima]: Centro de Proyección Cristiano, [1984], pp. 51-62.

González first reviews the progress of the rebellion from its first attacks in 1980 through 1984. He opens with a quotation from Abimael Guzmán's address at the close of Sendero's first military school: "This first military school of the party is a seal and a doorway. Seal and open; seal the time of peace and open the door to the time of war." Sendero, González believes, is still much misunderstood in 1984. Its war began neither with the end of the military school nor the 9th Congress of the Central Committee, but as far back as the early 1970's, when Guzmán joined the most orthodox Maoist catechism to Mariátegui's philosophy. He decided that he had to reconstruct the party anew for an insurgent strategy. The war would be long, and would begin in the countryside, to eventually surround the cities and take power. Success would depend on the response of the state to the party's own military and political gains. González summarizes Sendero's three-stage strategy, and believes that Sendero is leaving the first stage for the second in 1984. He repeats his view that Shining Path has gained popular backing, because it has given to the people not a program, (which they would not understand), but a faith and a hope. The forgotten *ayacuchanos* need to believe in something, to have faith. They need what the state and the political parties have not given them; the political parties cannot say truthfully to the *campesino* "the alternative which we give to you is better than that of Sendero."

165. Lora, Guillermo. *Sobre Sendero Luminoso*. La Paz: Inca, 1984.

A critical evaluation of Sendero from a leftist viewpoint. Lora declares his "unconditional" solidarity with Shining Path, but asks whether its tactics will lead to the establishment of a revolutionary, popular, and anti-imperialist government. In fact, Lora believes that a *senderista* victory would be the triumph of counterrevolutionary Stalinism, not the revolution he prefers. Much of the work is a discussion of whether Sendero's strategy resembles *foquismo* (the old "foco" theory of guerrilla war proposed by Che Guevara and Regis Debray), and why Sendero's revolution has not spread to other impoverished nations (Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, etc.). Lora ultimately believes that Sendero's policies will not be successful, because its Maoist tactics have led it to concentrate on building its revolutionary base among the peasantry, neglecting to formulate the worker-peasant proletarian alliance which Lora says is necessary to achieve victory.

166. *Mundo andino y región*. Lima: Servicios Populares, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 1984.

A collection of essays, the product of a series of seminars focusing on the Andean environment by some of Peru's most prominent social scientists, including Degregori, Diez Canseco, Flores Galindo, Ossio, and Manrique, all of whom have written extensively on Sendero. Among the topics covered are popular movements, the Andean world, human rights, ideology and violence, national and regional culture, regional elites and traditional authorities, peasant organizations, and economic and social conditions in the sierra. Diego García Sayán and Javier Diez Canseco's essays on "Derechos humanos y estado de emergencia en la sierra central y sur" discuss the massive disruption of life in highland communities. Carlos Iván Degregori traces the acceleration of popular organization and increasing radicalization following the re-opening of the University de Huamanga in Ayacucho in 1959 in "Movimiento popular y estado de emergencia." Alberto Flores Galindo follows the thread of violence in Andean society that began before the European conquest and continued through native resistance to the Spaniards under Túpac Amaru ("Ideología, democracia y violencia en la región central y sur andina"). Nelson Manrique examines "Elites regionales y autoridades tradicionales," and Juan Ossio the "Mundo andino y cultura nacional." A penetrating examination of the roots of the present crisis and its impact on the people of the sierra.

167. Palmer, David Scott. "Peru." *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record.* Edited by Jack W. Hopkins. V.2, 1982-83. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983, pp. 393-411.

Annual review of developments in Peru. Efforts by Belaúnde to restore civilian democracy, social peace, and economic growth have been undermined in a variety of ways in the past year, not least by Sendero Luminoso's determined campaign of political violence. Palmer analyzes Sendero principally in the context of its impact upon the rest of the political spectrum, and the chances that the elected government will be able to finish its term without intervention by the Peruvian military. It is too early to tell whether Sendero's blackout of Lima is the group's last desperate gasp or a reflection of its capacity to continue the revolutionary struggle. They have little support in Peru except in Ayacucho, Palmer writes. Appended is part of the report of the commission investigating the murder of eight journalists at Uchuraccay.

168. Salcedo, José María. *Las tumbas de Uchuraccay.* Lima: Editora Humboldt, 1984.

Examines the mysterious murders of eight journalists near the sierra community of Uchuraccay, and the government's subsequent investigation into the massacre. Written in a journalistic style, Salcedo uses interviews and documents to reconstruct events from January to August, 1983. Much of the book reviews the government's anti-guerrilla campaign and strategy, which stresses "units of territorial control" to destroy the guerrilla's infrastructure. Armed local self-defense forces are important in this strategy. Throughout the affair the government implied that the journalists were partially to blame for their own deaths; their decision to visit the town without informing the authorities or soliciting police protection was deemed "imprudent recklessness." They also stressed the presumed leftist politics of the journalists, although their political views were mixed. The Uchuraccay commission spent only 4-5 hours in the community questioning the inhabitants. Although between them the eight had carried at least ten cameras, none were found; rolls of film "recovered" by the Civil Guard were either blank or contained only photos of the sierra. How the film was separated from the cameras was never explained.

The commission itself determined that the journalists were murdered in a case of mistaken identity. But Salcedo points out that several of the party spoke Quechua; furthermore, their injuries indicated not a struggle with an angry and disorganized mob, but blows against immobilized victims. The "smoking gun" of the case was another roll of film "discovered" in a cave by the military. The photos showed the eight en route to Uchuraccay, and holding a white cloth and talking with *campesinos*, one of whom was identified as the wife of a village leader. The thesis of "confusion" was discredited, as clearly a dialogue of some sort took place before the murders. Salcedo believes that the forces of order had encouraged the killing of any suspicious outsiders in the disputed area, and that the villagers made up a story about the men carrying a red flag in order to cover up the murders. He concludes the book with a passage of fantasy in which General Noel, circling the plaza of Ayacucho in a helicopter, yells that it's not worth the price to be a journalist in Peru; Salcedo's furious reply is that it is.

169. Sanders, Thomas Griffith. *Peru Between Democracy and the Sendero Luminoso.* (No. 21) Hanover, N.H.: Universities Field Staff International, 1984.

In July 1985 Belaúnde will turn over the reins of government peacefully, most likely to Alán García of APRA. García faces two formidable challenges: an economy in crisis and Sendero Luminoso. Sanders reviews in detail the political and economic record of the first civilian regime to take office after 12 years of military rule. AP (Acción Popular), once perceived as reformist and left of center, is now seen as conservative, largely due to economic policies adopted at the behest of the International Monetary Fund. Its failure to form a coalition has given APRA and IU the opportunity to win power. Sanders gives a remarkably concise summary of Sendero's origins and plans for revolution. While few believe that it will eventually win, repressing it will be difficult, and it seems likely that it will continue destroying urban and rural infrastructure and posing a threat to state security for years to come. The war further weakens an already distressed economy, and a lengthy conflict may inevitably "sap the vitality of the democratic system." In theory, "economic and social development could be an antidote to SL, but resources are lacking and serious change would take a long time." An extremely detailed and clear evaluation of the situation in mid-1984.

170. Thorndike, Guillermo. *Uchuraccay: testimonio de una masacre.* Lima: the author, 1984.

A striking book of photographs made in Ayacucho province in the early years of the 1980's. After an assault on the jail in Ayacucho in which policemen were killed and many *senderistas* freed, security forces sought vengeance throughout the department. Black and white photos record extrajudicial killings, security forces' sweeps through communities, grieving relatives of slain policemen and villagers, and the faces of tense *ayacuchanos* caught in the middle of political violence. The book's second half deals with the killing of seven journalists in Uchuraccay. The grisly photos of the aftermath of the massacre and the various investigations into it chronicle the savagery and tragedy of the civil war. The accompanying text questions whether the government truly desired to know who was responsible for the deaths of the men killed in Uchuraccay.

171. McClintock, Cynthia. "CIA analiza Sendero." *Equis X*, no.372 (January 9 1984): 4-6.

Equis X reprints McClintock's essay on Sendero from *Problems of Communism*, identifying the journal as "published by the government of the United States and linked to the CIA." *Equis X* wishes to alert its readers to the fact that a journal which influences U.S. policy is

taking an interest in Shining Path. It is not accidental, *Equis X* states, that after the publication of similar studies in *Problems of Communism* the U.S. intervened in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Will we have the Marines here? asks *Equis X*. "The North American threat exists..."

172. "La nueva estrategia." *Caretas,* no.783 (January 1984): 14-19.

Report on the new political-military commander of the emergency zone, General Adrián Huamán Centeno, whose approach to fighting Sendero will be very different from that of his predecessor. Public works, support for agriculture, and technical education are some of the urgent needs a delegation of *ayacuhcanos* has presented to President Belaúnde, and General Huamán has indicated that these are in accordance with his plan of action. The political-military commander must address economic and social needs of the region as an indispensable part of pacification. This new approach will not have any effect on the fanaticism of Sendero; on the contrary, Sendero's recent intensification of attacks in Ayacucho and Lima shows that the guerrillas are alarmed by this new strategy.

173. Gaupp, Peter. "Peru: a 'shining path' to darkness." *Neue Zurcher Zeitung. Swiss Review of World Affairs,* v.33, no.10 (January 1984): 28-31.

Four years into the rebellion, Gaupp reports from the contested provinces that the government seems to have made some headway against the guerrillas. General Clemente Noel, one of the army's most controversial officers, hears mass celebrated in the cathedral in Ayacucho as armed men patrol the church's aisles; the sermon concludes with the declaration "Viva Peru, viva the merciful Virgin, viva the Peruvian army." General Noel is careful to paint a picture of the area under his jurisdiction as "back to normal": quiet in the city, isolated actions by the subversives in the countryside, and broad popular support for the armed forces, which have brought peace and protection to the peoples. Indeed, Gaupp notes that the absence of once-numerous tourists is more notable than the presence of soldiers in the city. However, after a short but coherent review of Sendero's strategy and actions in its initial years of struggle, Gaupp describes both human rights violations and discrepancies between government claims of terrorists killed and captured and estimates of Sendero's membership. Each and every *senderista* , he writes, must have been captured and killed several times over, and the army's "body counts" must be exaggerated. His conclusions, that the guerrillas are alienated from the highland natives by their rigid dogma and that the Peruvian government feels confident of winning the war, reflect the optimism of the early 1980's.

174. Harding, Colin. "Notes on Sendero Luminoso." *Communist Affairs* v.3 (January 1984): 45-55.

Succinct and precise summary of Sendero's ideological background and armed struggle. Harding stresses that Sendero is different from most Latin American guerrillas; despite its dogmatism and stridency, its leaders are patient and pragmatic, setting modest targets for each phase of their prolonged struggle. Compared to the FMLN in El Salvador, Sendero has undertaken no large-scale actions or established permanent bases--yet. Harding is deeply skeptical, both of government claims of guerrilla losses, and of reports that peasant support for Sendero is fading due to its counterproductive tactics. Allegedly, the closing of local markets and the adoption of autarky, and forced recruitment of young people, have turned villages against the guerrillas. Sendero shows a high capacity for learning from its mistakes, Harding says, doubting these stories; local areas may have fallen on hard times because of the operations of military intelligence agents. A desperate note is creeping into government and military pronouncements: blame for Sendero has been pinned successively on foreign countries, drug traffickers, and criminal gangs; their ideology is said to come from foreign foundations. A witch hunt against intellectuals seems to be one measure of state frustration. Appended to Harding's analysis are English translations of primary Sendero documents: excerpts from "Let us develop guerrilla war!" and a complete "Three theses more than those of Mao."

175. Regatero, Felipe. "'Sendero Luminoso': ¿Nuevo mesianismo andino?" *Indigenismo: Boletín del Seminario Español de Estudios Indigenistas* (Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana), no.3, 3rd series (January 1984): 12-15.

The "civilizing hero" was a common myth of prehispanic America: Quetzalcoatl of Mesoamerica, and Viracocha of the Andean world laid the foundations for society, teaching men how to hunt, fish, and grow food. Their mission accomplished, both disappeared, destined to return when the world ended. Regatero discusses pre- and post-Spanish Inca myths, heroes, and resistance movements, from Huayna Cápac to Túpac Amaru II, and asks how Abimael Guzmán and Sendero

Luminoso fit into this tradition of indigenous rebellion. Comparing Sendero with previous native movements, Regatero does not believe that the PCP wishes to restore the Inca empire, nor secure independence from the metropolis, but to establish a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist revolution. Why then a Maoist, rural revolt? Why not a movement based among the industrial proletariat in Lima? Guzmán, he believes, decided consciously and deliberately to utilize the messianic hopes of the Andean people. The fanaticism of its members, the mystic air surrounding "Comrade Gonzalo," the belief that Sendero is the center of a worldwide revolution, all derive from a marriage of Maoism and native tradition. But, Regatero asks, although the indigenous community has been abandoned and exploited by metropolitan Peru, is this the most suitable way to remedy the situation?

176. Wise, Carol. "Peru: Amnesty Speaks Out." *NACLA Reports on the Americas* v.18, no.1 (January-February 1984): 40-42.

Analysis of the 66-page report by Amnesty International, "Peru: Torture and Extra-judicial Executions." President Belaúnde has virulently condemned Amnesty, accusing it of having communist ties and being part of a subversive foreign network responsible for Sendero. The AI report refutes the findings of the government commission on Uchuraccay, concluding that torture and illegal killings are becoming government policy.

177. Garmendia, Pablo. "Planes de Sendero: documento secreto." *Equis X*, no.377 (February 13 1984): 4-7.

Equis X summarizes, but does not reproduce in full, a Sendero document that it has obtained, outlining the classic steps of guerrilla warfare. Sendero boasts of the large number of weapons it has captured and the attacks it has carried out, which include an assault on the Honduran embassy in Lima in support of the people of Nicaragua to protest the staging of American imperialist forces from Honduran territory. Sendero is consolidating new bases of support and plans to enforce a boycott of municipal elections in 1985. IU is attacked as "revisionist, opportunist, and truly reactionary" for participating in elections; in doing so it has placed itself in the camp of the enemies of the people.

178. González, Raúl. "Ayacucho en el año de Noel." *Quehacer*, no.27 (February 1984): 16-31.

Another report from the war zone, under the iron heel of General Clement Noel y Moral. The security forces have scored two recent victories: a raid on a *senderista* intelligence meeting captured 5 people, including Mercedes Malpica, a top leader in urban Ayacucho. A few days later, Antonio Díaz Martínez, considered number three in the Sendero hierarchy, was also captured near the city of Huaral, north of Lima. But González's interviews reveal inconsistencies; somewhere between three- and five-thousand people have died in Ayacucho, but how many were really killed by Sendero? Two, three hundred? One observer believes that Sendero began in Ayacucho with only four hundred well disciplined and trained fighters. If 3-5,000 have died, how many were innocent civilians? As *senderista* operations have spread the government has responded by declaring areas adjacent to Ayacucho emergency zones. One year after General Noel came confidently to Ayacucho, the war has not been contained, but widened. González also discusses Sendero's strategy, its ideological problems, and the atmosphere of tension in the department, however calm it may appear on the surface. He scorns the "play" which now extends over many departments, with its incursions, "people's trials," sinchis--and the arrival of the merchants of disaster, who will prepare tours for foreign journalists, with *"senderistas"* clandestinely "interviewed" for dollars.

179. Neier, Aryeh. "Peru's Dirty War." *The Nation* v.238, no.5 (February 11 1984): 148-149.

Neier, vice-chairman of Americas Watch and Helsinki Watch, reports on the worsening human rights situation. Notorious massacres of peasants by the sinchis at Soccos and of prison escapees (and one hostage) by the police at Lurigancho have resulted in whitewashes by the government, especially by President Belaúnde. Narcotics money has corrupted the police and the courts; many in the army and police no longer have faith in the judicial system, which seems to let traffickers and terrorists off easily. The leading human rights crusader in Peru is suspect as too left; the Bishop's Social Action Commission functions well and is non-political, but is too small to be effective. Peru has no broad-based human rights movement; unless more citizens are willing to challenge Belaúnde's stonewalling on abuses, Peru's "dirty war" will escalate to resemble Argentina's.

180. Werlich, David. "Peru: Shadow of the Shining Path." *Current History* v.83, no.490 (February 1984): 78-90.

Synthesis of the political, economic, and military situation in Peru. Fernando Belaúnde Terry was inaugurated in July, 1980, in an atmosphere of guarded optimism. For the first time, Peru's illiterate (25% of the population) was allowed to vote. A dozen Marxist parties participated in the election and won seats in the legislature. The economy showed signs of recovery, and democracy was restored after 12 years of military rule. Today the economy is nearly prostrate, democratic rule is stained by accusations of widespread human rights abuses and political high-handedness, rumors of coups abound, and the army is locked into an ugly war with Shining Path. Werlich reviews in detail the economic policies of the present administration, and gives a standard summary of Sendero's origins and history. He ends with the municipal elections of November, 1983, in which APRA won 38% of the vote, IU captured the mayor's office in Lima, and Belaúnde's Popular Action Party finished a dismal last with 10%. Peru's fragile democracy, and Belaúnde's tenure, he concludes, have become very insecure.

181. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Este violento país." *Caretas,* no.791 (March 19 1984): 50-53.

Report on a national seminar on violence and peace, held March 12-16, in which some 17 participants explored the ramifications of Peru's increasing violence. Is Sendero a reaction to the marginality and misery of Ayacucho? If so, how should the state respond to this challenge? *Caretas* publishes Gustavo Gorriti's presentation to the seminar. Sendero, in his opinion, is not a spontaneous and regional response to the marginalization of Ayacucho; it is a movement in whose dogmatic structure armed struggle--under a precise doctrinaire methodology--is a necessary part of a determined dialectical process. Gorriti does not believe that Sendero should be understood as an effect of a given social situation, but essentially as the cause of a specific process of violence.

182. López J., Sinesio. "Democracia y terrorismo." *Debate*, no.7 [March 1984]: 67-70.

Terrorism works to polarize politics, exacerbating existing tensions between left and right. Who, López asks, are the terrorists? Are they only those who commit violent crimes, or perhaps also those forces (the government and the right) which use the excuse of terrorism to suffocate political debate and advance a reactionary agenda? López believes that the provocative character of Sendero's actions suggests a strong police infiltration of the guerrillas' ranks. He asserts that all terrorist actions, ultraleft and ultraright, work against legitimate progressive forces. *Senderista* violence, in this context, serves the interests of the right and the regressive economic policies of Finance Minister Ulloa. It is his policies, not *senderista* attacks, that are undermining democratic stability.

183. Basagoytía, Arnulfo."General Huamán se rebela." *Equis X*, no.383 (March 26 1984): 16-17.

In marked contrast to the policies and philosophy of his predecessor in Ayacucho, General Huamán believes in attacking the real roots of the war: social injustice. The government's priorities, says the commander of the security zone, should be to give employment, work, technical assistance, seeds, animals, and foster projects that will draw city and countryside closer together. General Huamán understands that armed force in the region will be almost useless if the causes of the violence are not also addressed. Social and economic development is the best way for society to defend itself. The general's words and deeds have surprised many in certain political circles.

184. Ercilla, Tito. "Ayacucho: gobierno regional autónomo." *Equis X*, no.384 (April 2 1984): 23-24.

Recognition of the problems of Ayacucho, given urgency by the declarations and attitudes of General Huamán, have resulted in new thinking about the region. The best way for the province to defend itself is to promote emergency action for social and economic development. An "integral regional development plan" for Ayacucho is being formulated, which will address agricultural production, agrarian technical assistance, "microregional" projects, infrastructure improvements, basic industry and artisanry, and ultimately tourism. *Equis X* reiterates the familiar indices of misery in Ayacucho (general mortality, health care, infant mortality, etc.). General Huamán has called for substantial budget increases for Ayacucho from the national government.

185. Gaitán, Julio César. "Fuerzas armadas: ultimátum militar al gobierno." *Equis X*, no.384 (April 2 1984): 16-17.

The commanding general of the Peruvian army recently made a visit to Ayacucho to discuss strategy with General Huamán. Consequently, the leadership of the armed forces has given an ultimatum to the government for a free hand in formulating counterinsurgency policy. As a

result, the idea of attacking subversion politically, by addressing the region's problems, as well as by military means, seems to be gaining acceptance.

186. Benavente, José. "¿Maniobras contra Huamán?" *Equis X*, no.386 (April 16 1984): 18-20.

Despite General Huamán's declared intentions to rein in security forces and replace the "dirty war" with a balanced counterinsurgency strategy and "iron discipline," a recent wave of killings by uniformed paramilitaries indicates that certain parties in the government may be encouraging the Guardia Civil and Guardia Republicana to obstruct General Huamán and undermine his authority.

187. Tupia Castro, Roberto. "Tito Valle: 'No juzgan a senderistas.'" *Equis X*, no.387 (April 23 1984): 26-29.

Equis X interviews Tito Valle, president of the Association of Democratic Lawyers. Valle is concerned that the state of emergency has eroded civil rights and normal judicial procedure in Peru. Political prisoners are waiting two to three years before being tried. Special laws have been passed to fight terrorism, judicial norms are being violated, torture is frequent, and El Frontón prison in Lima has been turned into what Valle calls a concentration camp. Of the more than 400 political prisoners detained there, 70-90% have not yet been tried. Valle also comments on pressure to restore the death penalty in Peru. A brief note in *Equis X* 's "De Buena Fuente" section reports that "Comrade Gonzalo," proclaimed president of Peru by the PCP, has established himself in the city of Ayacucho, guarded by militiamen, and is issuing his decrees from a clandestine radio station. Sendero intends to establish a parallel and underground "government."

188. Gaitán, Julio César. "Ayacucho: no más sangre." *Equis X*, no.388 (April 30 1984): 6-8.

Report from Ayacucho on Sendero's gains. In "liberated" communities, there are no government-appointed mayors, teachers, or officials. Military patrols occasionally pass through, but this does little to alter *senderista* control. *Equis X* asks, "Why Ayacucho?" and reviews the province's history of rebellion and desperate levels of underdevelopment. The department is not without natural resources, however: Gaitán points out that hydroelectricity could be generated and local artisanry encouraged to spur development. A sidebar reports on the growing use of radios captured from the GC by *senderista* columns. In the week's "De buenas fuentes" section is a reproduction of the text of an alleged typewritten Sendero flyer, rejecting overtures of dialogue with and amnesty from the government.

189. Radu, Michael. "Terror, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Latin America." *Orbis,* v.28, no.1 (Spring 1984): 27-41.

Part of a multipart forum on various aspects of worldwide terrorism, Radu's concise summary places Latin American terrorism within an international sociological context. Radu minces no words in describing extremely violent movements largely led by middle- or upper-middle class, university-educated men and women who are rebelling against their own class backgrounds and interests. Most revolutionary leaders are completely ignorant of the lives of the poor, which does not stop them from an elitist indifference to the suffering which their violence inflicts on innocent and guilty alike. Shining Path is not immune from this pathology. Radu summarizes the movement: "Combining Mao's personality myth, the God-Sun adoration for the pre-Columbian Inca emperors, and a visionary's belief in the superiority of the eternal value of ideas to the temporary and largely irrelevant value of human life, Guzman *[sic]* succeeded in building a tightly knit, quasi-cult-like organization revolving around adoration of himself, hatred of all aspects of modern life, and the promise of a utopia modeled after the Peruvian Inca state of the past, one that would eliminate the squalid realities of the intervening centuries. Philosophy students and other middle-class scions like Guzman's second in command, Mezzich, proclaimed it their right and duty to speak for and act in the name of their non-Spanish-speaking Indians of the Peruvian highlands. If the Indians understood and accepted Sendero's aims, well and good; if they did not, which appears to have been uniformly the case, so much the worse--for the Indians."

190. Bennett, Philip. "Peru: Corner of the Dead." *Atlantic Monthly* v.253 (May 1984): 28-30, 32-33.

Well-written and informative account of the rise of Sendero to 1984. Bennett, a former reporter and editor at *The Lima Times*, notes that 1980 was a time of tremendous optimism for Peru. The election of Belaúnde after twelve years of military rule, his ambitious plans for economic development, the revival of a free press and a political opposition--all were cathartic for Peru. Dead

dogs hanging from lamp posts on the Avenida Nicolas de Pierola seemed bizarre and irrelevant gestures from a deservingly obscure Maoist sect. Bennett reviews the emergence of Sendero in Ayacucho, its freedom of action during its first two years thanks to the government's failure to take it seriously, its early armed actions, and the sinchi's and army's brutal, if ineffective counterinsurgency measures. Only one of the six men and five women who the government believe are the movement's leaders are among the 3,000 suspects who have been killed or captured so far in the war. Concerning Sendero's philosophy, Bennett quotes Jaime Urrutia, an anthropology professor at Huamanga: "One gets the feeling that their attitude goes deeper than a revulsion towards capitalism. It's the tractor they can't stand." While Sendero does not appear to have the arms, membership, or popular appeal to threaten the government directly, the expansion of their struggle into Lima is ominous. "Every guerrilla action in Lima is more dangerous than a thousand deaths in the Sierra," says a former colleague of Guzmán. Bennett concludes that a coup by the army seems unlikely, but that a stalemate with Sendero could lead to an "Argentinization" of the war (brutal and widespread repression), even under a civilian regime. Crack-downs on moderate leftists are becoming routine; while Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and even Chile are facing the possibility of freer societies, Peru may slip back from its newly-won liberties. This may be Sendero's aim. Urrutia finds it ironic that "If the government becomes more oppressive, or if the coup comes, there's only one clandestine organization in Peru prepared to oppose it."

191. "¿Por donde atacará Sendero?" *Equis X*, no. 389 (May 7 1984): 11.

On the fourth anniversary of ILA, *Equis X* reminds its readers of some basic fundamental tenets of *pensamiento Gonzalo*. In the Maoist style, each and every action of Sendero is carefully planned, part of an intricate strategy for advancing the revolution. There are indications that preparations are being made for what Sendero calls "a great leap," which will have political as well as military ramifications. Sendero's war is at the stage of "breaking and dismembering the bourgeois and reactionary apparatus" of the state. *Equis X* explains what this means. A short but useful piece which underlines that Sendero's war is not haphazardly or randomly waged.

192. Gaitán, Julio C. "Sendero cerca Lima." *Equis X*, (May 28 1984): 8-13.

The 3rd National Conference of the PCP declared Lima and other cities to be part of next year's objective in the New Plan elaborated by Presidente Gonzalo. The construction of support bases*(bases de apoyo)*, which signifies the establishment of "liberated communities," is also part of the general plan of people's war. Popular schools *(escuelas populares)* have already been set up inside Lima to recruit new party militants, as well as clandestine cells *(centros de resistencia)* in factories, universities, barrios, and *pueblos jóvenes*. The urban guerrilla's task at this time is to "prepare the ground;" i.e., to destroy important centers of power so that the guerrillas from the countryside can eventually launch their assault. *Equis X* discusses in detail the Maoist blueprint for the overthrow of the bourgeois, reactionary state. Sendero's watchword is *desarrollar, defender y construir bases de apoyo*--develop, defend, and construct support bases for people's war.

193. González, Raúl. "¿Qué pasa con Sendero Luminoso?" *Quehacer*, no.29 (June 1984): 34-38.

Seventeen months after initiating guerrilla warfare in Ayacucho, Sendero appears to be in retreat under army and sinchi pressure. But González believes that it is preparing for a major change in direction. Sendero's strategy until now has been in three projected steps: agitation and propaganda, the establishment of "liberated zones," the formation of a people's army, and finally, total war and the encirclement of the cities. Sendero has easily accomplished the first, making the whole country aware of its existence and conditions in the sierra. It has created, at least in Ayacucho, conditions necessary for the formation of the liberated zones. But new *focos* of guerrillas which will allow for a widening war have not arisen. Military intervention has squelched actions in Ayacucho, and Sendero has been forced to move its operations elsewhere. Villages in Ayacucho have begun to say "no" to forced recruiting, the closure of fairs, and judgments of so-called traitors and informants; in other words, to Sendero control over their lives. The capture of Díaz Martínez and Zorrilla, orthodox Maoists, may have permitted other viewpoints to gain ground inside Sendero. González believes that Sendero is moving its operations into more northern provinces. Most of its leadership is still free, despite the detention of numerous persons by security forces; this leadership is hiding out in Lima, Arequipa, and Cuzco. *Senderista* actions are shifting outside Ayacucho, focusing especially on Lima. In other words, the security forces have forced Sendero to abandon the countryside, and a major shift to urban terrorism may be beginning. Its objective will be to block elections in 1985. General Noel's antisubversion strategy, far from crushing Sendero, has caused it to widen and transfer its war.

194. Gaitán, Julio César. "Ofensiva guerrillera: Sendero va ganando." *Equis X*, no.397 (July 2 1984): 4-6.

In May the Central Committee of the PCP declared the first stage of its war over, and approved plans to move on to stage two. This new offensive began with bloody attacks on June 22. The first objective will be to establish support bases in various communities, the second objective to isolate the cities. *Equis X* describes how towns like Huamanga, Huancavelica, and Huancayo are almost cut off by *senderista* forces.

195. Gorriti, Gustavo. "La perspectiva de Sendero." *Caretas,* no.806 (July 2 1984): 13.

Brief but important sidebar summarizing Sendero's evaluative and planning conferences. The first took place in November, 1979 under the title "Towards the New Flag." Having already decided upon armed struggle, Guzmán urged the militarization of the party, the development of the military line, and the adoption of the party's goals and methods. The goal was communism, the methods modest: to invoke unrest and encourage incursions. The second national conference was held between March and May of 1982, and was attended by more than 40 party leaders. After two years of struggle, caught off balance by the entrance of the army into the emergency zones, Sendero met to evaluate the situation and plan a response. The conference's password was "Strike to advance support bases." "Gonzalo," allegedly confronted by some "rightist" opponents within the party, cemented his absolute authority; documents refer to his "guiding thought" and "sole leadership." The party concerned itself with preparations to establish support areas, operating simultaneously in the countryside and the cities. The third national conference approved Gonzalo's "grand plan," in which the building of the EGP (Guerrilla Army of the People) through principal, local, and support forces was given priority. Each phase of the plan was divided into multiple parts. The last conference (no specific date is cited) is notable for the development of the cult of personality around Guzmán, and the complexity of the party's scheme for organizing guerrilla war. Gorriti concludes that despite recent blows dealt Sendero, the movement gives the impression of moving ahead in accordance with a previously delineated plan.

196. "Cosecha roja." *Caretas,* no.807 (July 9 1984): 6-11.

The National Defense Council has met with General Huamán to discuss how to increase the role of the army in counterinsurgency in the wake of the killings of 26 policemen and soldiers in just two weeks. There appears to be nearly universal criticism of President Belaúnde for his seeming disinterest in fighting Sendero's subversive threat. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of dissension within the ranks of the security forces over responsibility and police abuses. One sidebar reports on government fatalities, noting that between 1962 and 1981 only 59 Guardia Civil members had been killed in the line of duty; since 1980, 92 Civil Guardsmen, 6 members of the PIP, 27 Republican Guardsmen, and 24 soldiers have been slain. Another sidebar ("Callejón oscuro") reports on prohibitions promulgated by a *senderista* Popular Committee. According to a document seized by the police during an anti-guerrilla operation, gambling, palm-reading, excessive drinking, mistreatment of women, and collaborating with the police are forbidden. Punishments range from jail to haircuts to fines to execution.

197. "Frente a Sendero: ¿Por qué medidas secretas?" *Equis X*, no.398 (July 9 1984): 16-18.

In the last 2 weeks, 35 policemen and 5 soldiers have been killed by Sendero. The government has announced harsher measures to fight subversion, but will not be specific about what exactly those measures will be. In fact, *Equis X* reports that there is a great "malaise" in the armed forces over the government's lack of a coherent counterinsurgency strategy, which must include economic and social measures as well as military and intelligence tactical improvements. General Huamán, with the backing of General Sinesio Jarama, severely criticized the Interior Ministry for inefficiency. A note in the week's "De buena fuente" section predicts that Presidente Gonzalo will shortly be issuing an historic document, and that the Maoist group *Puka Llacta* ("Red Homeland") will be integrated into the PCP, with its leaders given positions within Sendero's Central Committee.

198. Gaitán, Julio César. "Cinco mil casos: ¿Dónde están los desaparecidos?" *Equis X*, no.399 (July 16 1984): 5-7.

Equis X runs photos of just a few of the more than 5,000 "disappeared" in the emergency zones: children as young as 12, peasants, students, teachers, and artisans. While the greater number of cases occurred under the command of General Noel, 100 people have disappeared in the first six

months of General Huamán's command. The report describes some of the individual cases in what it calls the "Argentinization" of Peru.

199. "Guerra sin plazos: la repuesta de Juliá." *Equis X*, no.399 (July 16 1984): 12-15.

General Julián Juliá, commanding general of the army, delivers a frank assessment of the war with Sendero, free of the usual exaggerated optimism of government pronouncements. Juliá characterizes Sendero as a faceless enemy, without a uniform, which appears and disappears. *Equis X* has learned that officials believe the war may last 4-5 years, and will not be won by purely military means. Victory will require socio-economic changes, instigated by Sendero's influence on the peasantry. Interior Ministry officials also outline future changes in counterinsurgency strategy. In a sidebar, *Equis X* investigates recent *senderista* attacks which were said to have briefly "taken" Andahuaylas.

200. "FFAA asumen control." *Equis X*, no.400 (July 23-30 1984): 16-18.

The Joint Command of the armed forces has assumed complete responsibility for planning and execution of counterinsurgency strategy for the entire country. This is an admission that the police forces of Peru, corroded by internal conflict, corruption, and demoralization, are incapable of confronting, let alone defeating the guerrillas. As in 1965, the Belaúnde government has resorted to military solutions when faced with the a phenomenon whose rapid growth is partly due to its unpopular and mistaken economic policies.

201. Ku King, Alberto. "Siguiendo la pista de Sendero en Europa." *Oiga* (July 30 1984): 26-28, 66.

The International Political Committee of Sendero Luminoso is operating from Paris, denigrating the government of President Belaúnde and distributing Shining Path pamphlets, magazines, and books clandestinely printed in France, Spain, and Holland. Its supporters claim Sendero is the only Peruvian political "space" representing the oppressed classes and responding to the forces of repression in Peru today. It has attracted the attention of many European intellectuals and students; the RIM, based clandestinely in Paris, has attracted the attention of INTERPOL. Thousands of Peruvians live in Paris, mostly students and artists, and many do not hide their sympathy for Sendero. They believe that it is the only political force that can radically change the Peruvian social and economic system. Among the groups which Ku King names as Sendero supporters are the Movimiento Proletario del Perú, the Agrupación Intelectual Amauta, the Movimiento por la Liberación del Perú, and the Frente Artístico e Intelectual José Carlos Mariátegui. To a lesser degree this situation is repeated in Rome, but the most open networks are in Madrid and Barcelona. European intellectuals have long been deeply concerned with Third World problems, and many are naturally sympathetic to Shining Path. They see it as a provisional clandestine government, with Abimael Guzmán as president of the republic and *líder máximo* of the proletarian revolution in Peru. Some name "Comrade Gonzalo" as the only legitimate candidate of the people, who will assume political and military power in 1985.

202. St. John, Ronald Bruce. "Peru: Democracy Under Siege." *World Today*, v.40, no.7 (July 1984): 299-306.

Writing for the journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, St. John briefly reviews the Belaúnde regime's four years in office, giving prominence to its economic policies and relations with the United States. After the *docenio* (12 years) of the previous military regimes, the chances for a coup appear to be minimal. Sendero is described as relatively sophisticated in its organization, and although very violent, not a serious military threat to the government. It is a "radical fringe movement with minimal support among the polyglot groups making up the Peruvian left." Belaúnde has complained that terrorist actions receive too much attention from the world press. Sendero has, however, raised the tricky question of how to fight an insurgency without compromising democratic principles. The government's Decree Law 46 (passed without the support of Congress) is viewed as the draconian response of a "governing party with an embattled mentality."

203. Benavente, José."Barrantes: amenaza de muerte." *Equis X*, no.401 (August 6-12 1984): 4-6.

Alfonso Barrantes Lingán, president of Izquierda Unida and mayor of Lima, is said to head Sendero's hit list in its new phase of people's war. The recent assassination of the mayor of Huancayo, Saúl Muñoz, and the assault on a local headquarters of the UDP seem to confirm this. Sendero "second wave" strategy is to kill mayors and leaders of IU. Barantes and Guzmán knew

one another fraternally when both were imprisoned by the military government. *Equis X* recounts the days of the 1970's, before implacable ideological divisions drove the PCP and IU irrevocably apart.

204. "'Equis X' en 'Zona liberada' bajo dominio de Sendero." *Equis X*, no.402 (August 13-19 1984): 14-15.

Equis X visits a number of small villages in the provinces of Ambo (Huánuco) and Daniel Alcides Carrión (Pasco), to investigate reports that Sendero has taken control without alienating or terrorizing the inhabitants. Sendero appears to be avoiding the "excesses and abuses" that have characterized its control of Ayacucho department. *Equis X* saw few walls with slogans or red flags in villages, nor has Sendero instituted the feared Popular Committees. Young men are attempting to teach the peasants about class struggle and exploitation, winning them over to the cause without force. *Equis X* provides details about Sendero's new "soft" techniques to win hearts and minds.

205. Velarde, Federico. "Estar en Ayacucho." *Quehacer*, no.39 (August 1984): 4-5.

An emotional "editorial," in which Velarde writes of bodies disinterred daily around Ayacucho, bodies of citizens detained by the "forces of order," bodies disfigured by dogs and other vermin. To seek information from the state and to be met with silence provokes not only indignation, but also impotence and discouragement. Without forgetting who threw the first stone, those who profess humanism, who defend human rights, cannot permit the state to respond to subversion with the policy of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" of biblical vendettas. When the state, responsible for the well-being and lives of its citizens, trespasses those limits, it itself introduces into the body of society the virus of chaos. The responsibility of the state is primary, with respect to the social and economic conditions that gave rise to subversion, as well as to the means it chooses to fight them. But that does not absolve political parties, unions, all the social institutions of civil society, from responsibility for confronting the unleashing of violence which is taking place in the country today, almost to the point of no return.

206. González, Raúl. "¿...Y ahora qué?: Especial sobre Sendero."*Quehacer*, no.30 (August 1984): 7-29.

On July 20, 1984, President Belaúnde gave the armed forces direct control of the fight against subversion, although the order was never published in the official government gazette. But even four years into the war, apparently no one understands that the insurrection cannot be fought exclusively in a military manner. Sendero pursues its goals: destabilize the political system, create social polarization for the establishment of "bases of support" in rural areas, and win control in the countryside. The ultimate end is to take power, a political objective. The Peruvian government's only objective is a military one: to make Sendero disappear. The state makes no effort to alleviate rural misery, nor to offer the peasantry an alternative to the guerrillas. Many sectors have solicited from the government a strategic plan to confront Sendero militarily, politically, socially, and psychologically, but there has been no response.

Sendero knows its course, and pursues it; the wave of terrorist actions from March 23 to August 7, 1984 are clearly designed to instigate a *golpe* against civilian government by the armed forces. Even forcing the military to enter the fight in Ayacucho was a victory for Sendero, psychologically and tactically. The government has erred again and again, especially in its failure or inability to show democracy superior to the alternatives which Sendero espouses. Four in-depth pieces follow this political analysis: "The Terror in Ayacucho," "The *senderista* Terror," and "The *senderista* Conferences," and "Sendero: Maoism and a Revolution for Export." The third includes documents that detail the PCP's internal discussions and plans for accelerating the war, hammered out in conferences that took place between March and May of 1982. They give the latest "correct" political analysis of conditions in the country and a blueprint for launching the next phase. The last piece is a fascinating exploration of Sendero's links with international Maoist movements abroad (the RIM, or International Revolutionary Movement), and its visions for worldwide revolution.

207. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "Opera de sangre." *Caretas*, no.814 (August 27 1984): 18-19, 72.

Recently some exceptional documents came into *Caretas* ' possession: the acts of the Central Committee II Plenary session, held March 17, 1980. It was there that Sendero, after debates and internal purges, decided to launch the armed struggle. Gorriti recounts what took place during that crucial session. The "correct line" was not immediately approved; i.e., Guzmán had to confront both rightist and leftist "opportunism" in his own party. "Develop the militarization of the Party through actions, in accordance with the Plan of Action for *inicio de lucha armada* was the

watchword of the meeting. The rightist opposition to Comrade Gonzalo asked whether the masses would support armed attacks. To answer his critics Guzmán read three poems of Chairman Mao about optimism and daring to scale high peaks, and another Maoist dictum: "One spark can set the prairie on fire." He challenged his dissenters: "Are you for armed struggle or not?" Between the 23rd and 26th of March, Guzmán dominated his critics, reading from Lenin's and Stalin's military writings and analyzing Hugo Blanco's 1963 peasant movement. When another mutiny threatened to break out, Guzmán demanded that all members of the Central Committee define their position. On April 2 Sendero inaugurated its first military school, which lasted until April 19. The school consisted mostly of political indoctrination designed to ensure that the "correct line" was followed without deviation. To struggle against heretics was a matter of life and death. "Self-criticism" sessions were instituted to eliminate "opportunism" and promote orthodoxy, all under the banner of "rectification." The central theme of the military school was "How to initiate armed struggle starting from nothing." Again, the texts were military writings from Mao and Lenin. A strategy for revolution, taken principally from Mao, was carefully enumerated. All present affirmed their loyalty with the slogan "By the path of Comrade Gonzalo we begin the armed struggle." After one more fight within the Central Committee, Guzmán achieved his goal of unanimity; weeks later the war began when *senderistas* burned the ballot boxes in Chuschi.

208. Saurre, Ulises. "Guerra sucia: ¡No a la impunidad!" *Equis X*, no.404 (August 27-September 2 1984): 8-10.

Total impunity of action is being granted to the killers of Uchuraccay, Soccos, and Ayacucho city. Proponents of the "hard line" are contributing to the "Argentinization" of Peru. The Supreme Court is ordered not to interfere with antisubversion efforts, even in "lamentable" cases. *Equis X* talks with eminent jurists about the dirty war being waged in Peru, and criticizes the journals *Caretas* and *Oiga* for accepting the government's denial of disappearances until recently. It also carries an item about the discovery of 89 bodies in a common grave in Pukayacu, near Huanta, which is under the control of the Marines.

209. "Un segundo Ayacucho." *Equis X*, no.404 (August 27-September 2 1984): 24-25.

Story based on information from *The Andean Report* of August, 1984. A "second Ayacucho" is being opened by *senderistas* in the Upper Huallaga, near Tingo María. Belaúnde has been obliged to extend military control to the Huallaga Valley to combat subversion. The report describes the activities of Sendero, its strength, and the extent of its control in this sensitive area. Raúl Weiner, in a column entitled "Ayacucho" (p.25), comments on several recent notorious cases of kidnapping and murder, presumably by security forces, in the city. General Huamán has not resolved even one of the thousands of cases of disappearances. The growth of "dirty war" does not signify victory over the guerrillas. Wiener calls for a new government and a new concept for fighting the war.

210. Gorriti Elenbogen, Gustavo. "Insurgencia y contrainsurgencia." *Caretas*, no.815 (September 3 1984): 20-23.

"Know your enemy," said Sun Tzu 2,300 years ago, and Mao Tse-Tung followed that advice. "Study the insurgent," recommends French strategist David Galula; in Peru, writes Gorriti, President Belaúnde appears to have ignored this counsel. In two parallel stories ("Mao según Sendero" and "La contrainsurgencia según el enemigo"), Gorriti examines how the Maoist doctrine of people's war has influenced Shining Path and Peru. Galula, in his analysis, stressed that insurgent war is political. The most essential goal for either side is to win the support of the population; the government must show that its cause is better than that of the insurgents. Victory, in this sense, is not the annihilation of the insurgents, but their isolation from the populace. Counterinsurgency war should be 80% political and 20% military, and the campaign should be directed by a civilian. Police operations must be conducted by specially-trained personnel to avoid abuses. Above all, the population must be enlisted in the struggle on the side of the military and police. Gorriti also examines how Sendero's strategy follows the Maoist line, pointing out that Mao himself incorporated the theories of Sun Tzu ("The Art of War"), whose writings were "rediscovered" by Western scholars after the First World War. He faults Chiang Kai-shek for conducting his war against the Chinese Communists on incorrect, Western lines, fighting a war of positions with annihilation of the enemy as the supreme objective. Mao's strategy has influenced struggles in Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Malaya, and the Philippines. Mao himself, Gorriti reminds readers, was a heretic, contradicting the theories of Stalin's Comintern. Gorriti concludes with a quotation of Sun Tzu which Mao particularly liked: "Know your enemy like yourself, and you will be able to win a hundred battles without knowing defeat."

211. Cabrera Moreno, Julio. "Un triunfo de Sendero." *Equis X*, no.405 (September 3-9 1984): 7.

General Adrián Huamán Centeno, who as commander of the emergency zone, advocated civic action as well as military operations to fight Sendero, has been relieved of command by President Belaúnde. The Quechua-speaking general, of Indian descent, was open and frank about Peru's problems, profoundly nationalistic, and identified with the nation's poor. He often declared that the solution to Sendero's challenge would not be military, but political. His relief is not a victory for Belaúnde, but on the contrary, a triumph for Shining Path.

212. Gaitán, Julio César. "Nueva gran ofensiva." *Equis X*, no.406 (September 10-16 1984): 8-10.

Sendero is about to launch a new offensive as part of its "second wave." *Equis X* describes the stages of the new offensive, which has as its objective the formation of "popular power." Popular power means the movement's own government, which includes installing "President Gonzalo" somewhere in the country, along with a powerful radio transmitter, transforming the guerrilla army into a regular army, finding countries that will accept "ambassadors" from the new power, etc. The "De buenas fuentes" page reports on an urban *senderista* squad that is reportedly threatening journalists and media sources with kidnapping or ambush. Reports which Sendero considers false are part of a psychological campaign directed against them.

213. Barnechea, Alvaro and Luis Cisneros H. "El gaucho insiste." *Caretas*, no.817 (September 17 1984): 26-34.

Interview with ex-Minister of the Interior and War Luis Cisneros Vizquerra, following on a *Quehacer* interview of January, 1983. In a series of almost antagonistic exchanges, *Caretas* asks the ex-Minister about the conduct of the war and his views on the political situation (with respect particularly to APRA). Why, the reporters ask, didn't the military government act against Sendero? Were its leaders known to the government? What happened to the archives of military intelligence? Why did the Belaúnde government minimize the terrorist threat? Why was General Huamán removed from command? Will the military continue fighting the war as it has up to now? Cisneros is unrepentant. We must recognize that we are in a state of war, he tells the reporters. Asked whether the armed forces are obstructing the law, he answers: on the contrary, the law is obstructing the military in Ayacucho. In war, he says, there are no human rights. In war one either wins or one loses; if it takes mass graves discovered daily to win, so be it. Society doesn't want to defend itself and places the burden on the armed forces; today we have responsibility for the entire country. He won't condemn his Argentine colleagues; they saved their country from subversion. He is reminded that the cost was high; yes, he replies, but they saved it.

214. "'Hoy' de Santiago: ¿Qué hacer con Sendero?"*Equis X*, no.407 (September 17-23 1984): 5-6.

Reprint of an article from the Chilean journal *Hoy*. The replacement of General Huamán with Wilfredo Mori Orzo indicates an intense debate about the future conduct of the war at the highest levels of government. Huamán had declared the rebellion to be the "harvest" of 160 years of neglect, and spoke of poor government, the centralization of power in Lima, the few resources directed to the sierra. APRA and IU have echoed the same criticisms: without a vast development plan for the emergency zones, it will be impossible to defeat Sendero. Sources in Acción Popular--Belaúnde's party--say the General's firing is due to his criticism of the administration and his insistence on de-emphasizing a military solution to terrorism. *Hoy* also describes the aftermath of the massacre at Pukayacu, which suggests a government cover-up.

215. Goldenberg, Sonia. "Los montoneros de Huanta: una jornada en las alturas navalizadas." *Debate*, no.28 [September 1984]: 40-45.

Thousands of peasants have fled their homes and land to escape the violence of the sierra, establishing tent cities in the highlands. Goldenberg, accompanied by Peruvian and foreign correspondents, spoke with *campesinos* from many communities; they tell of killings by both Sendero and the security forces, especially the Marines. Many in their communities are accused of being *senderistas*, and forced to prove their loyalty by informing on suspected guerrillas. This process is called *navalización* (for the Marines); in the logic of counterinsurgency, "the innocents are *navalizados*, and the rest are guerrillas." Goldenberg provides a wealth of detail on the struggle of those caught between two ruthless forces to survive. She makes some recommendations based upon her observations: that participation in the *rondas* be completely voluntary, and that their nature be strictly defensive.

216. González, Raúl. "Ayacucho: Todo cambió." *Debate*, no. 28 [September 1984]: 33-36.

A doleful mixture of analysis and observation. Tables and graphs on *ayacuchano* population, economic activity, and land use are interspersed with sad ruminations over deserted streets, begging street urchins, closed cinemas and empty bars, and walls covered with pro- and anti-Sendero graffiti. A resident reminisces about the way things "used to be," when the city had a bustling market, daily religious processions, and lounging crowds of people in the plazas: "Ayacucho was a city." After Huamanga reopened in 1959, more and more of the city's life began to revolve around the University; alumni opened restaurants, bookstores, and clothing stores. First the graduates (who were more numerous each year), and then the whole population began to wake up to injustice, to their poor way of life, to what they lacked. Still, they had their religious activities and fiestas, their country fairs and serenades, their dances and bands, their pride at living in the place where the independence of Peru and all of America had been won. There was happiness in the midst of neglect until Sendero took up arms, which made the city a magnet for police and later soldiers who arrived to fight an enemy who hid among the populace. Then everything began to change in Ayacucho. González gives tongue to voices that mourn for a vanished and peaceful, if poor, way of life.

217. Urrutia, Jaime and Enrique González Carré. "Una conversación sobre la Universidad de Huamanga: 'Estamos solos.'" *Debate*, no.28 [September 1984]: 37-38.

Two professors discuss the changes that war has brought to the University in Ayacucho. Virtually all the students and instructors are local; no one wants to come any longer to Ayacucho to teach. The rector was recently summoned to the office of DICOTE in Lima to "bail out" some students, people whose papers had been in order and whose only offense had been to be from Ayacucho. Some of their anecdotes have a tragicomic air: the army seized a book from the library entitled *Resistencia de materiales*, in the belief that a study on materials' strength in construction was subversive! Urrutia and González Carré ruminate on melancholy days in an institution still vital to the future of Ayacucho.

218. Small, Gretchen. "Peru's 'Shining Path' Exposed: How to Fight Narco-Terrorism." *Executive Intelligence Review* v.11, no.38 (October 1 1984): 22-29.

The *Executive Intelligence Review*, published by Lyndon LaRouche's extreme reactionary organization, paints a vast and bizarre conspiracy, "an interlocking network of cults, financial interests, and citizens 'above suspicion'--in East and West--who protect, sponsor, and direct [an] expanding, murderous, 'business.'" Sendero, Small writes, is not a defender of the indigenous Quechua people of the sierra. Its leaders are French-speaking graduates of the Sorbonne: "Shining Path was created deliberately, in a decades-long project by anthropologists, sociologists, and erstwhile missionaries." *EIR* spins a convoluted tale in which a Nazi International drug and weapons trade linked to the International Monetary Fund creates terrorism to destabilize the world, in alliance with the Soviet Union. Abimael Guzmán is a stooge, "a thug whose idea of politics has always been that of a mafioso"; the real groundwork for Sendero was carried out by foreigners at the University of Huamanga in the 1960's. Cornell University, the Smithsonian Institution, and the Société des Américanistes are all implicated in the scheme by anthropologists to create Shining Path. A short additional piece by Mary Goldstein supposedly establishes "The Shining Path's Nazi Drug Connection," in which European fascists control Sendero and the Huallaga drug trade. In "Death Cultists With Backing From Abroad," Goldstein alleges that Sendero's backers include the U.S. Revolutionary Communist Party, as well as international agencies such as the Canadian Overseas Service, International Potato Center, the Convenio por El Taller de Promoción Andino, etc.

219. "Christians Fall Victim to Terrorist Violence in Peru." *Christianity Today* v.28, no.14 (October 5 1984): 90-91.

Evangelicals are being caught between guerrillas and government forces in sierra communities. The Evangelical Pentacostal Church of Peru has lost ten pastors in Ayacucho province to terrorist attacks. In July 1984 terrorists attacked a pentacostal meeting in the jungle village of Santa Rosa, killing seven and wounding fourteen evangelicals. In the same month soldiers interrupted a pentacostal meeting in Callqui-Nisperocniyocc, north of Ayacucho city, dragged six young men outside, and shot them. Church members suspected that they had been falsely denounced to the authorities as *senderistas*. Sendero has prohibited evangelization and other church activities in areas it controls; it is even considered dangerous to carry a Bible.

Evangelicals have become targets for both Sendero and the army. Merely talking with either guerrillas or soldiers is regarded as complicity with one side or the other. Evangelicals in Lima have begun collecting clothing, food, and money for *ayacuchanos* who have been left destitute by violence in the highlands.

220. Seoane, Monica."Encuentro con Sendero."*Caretas,* no.820 (October 9 1984): 10-16.

Seoane and another *Caretas* reporter were on assignment in La Mar province, about 170 kilometers from Huamanga, when their auto encountered a small band of fifteen men armed with carbines, a Molotov cocktail, and a pistol. They acted nervous, yelling at the passengers to get out, shouting "Documents, *carajo!* But when they saw the pair's press passes, they were welcomed. After some negotiating, they were allowed to photograph the group. The *senderistas* were collecting "taxes" from passing vehicles. The youths declared that they didn't fight against the people, because they were part of them. They insisted that the people were united with them, and that Sendero had a national and international presence. They shouted *¡vivas!* for Comrade Gonzalo, the armed struggle, and the popular guerrilla army. But down the road, only 500 meters away, lay the body of a peasant they had just shot. After the reporters were allowed to leave, they encountered the Marines at the next town, who also shouted at them ,"Documents, *carajo!"*

A sidebar to the article documents "The Roots of MRTA," tracing the new movement back to defectors from the MIR and PSR, and chronicling its recent attacks. This week's "Mar de fondo" section reports on a group of North American activists who distributed Sendero propaganda while President Belaúnde met with a group of Peruvians in New York City. They belong to the Revolutionary Communist Party, part of a Maoist international movement. The latest issue of the "Revolutionary Worker" praises the PCP's armed struggle and carries a photograph of Laura Zambrano Padilla with the caption "Save Meche."

221. Gaitán, Julio César. "Quiénes son los Tupacamarus." *Equis X,* no.410 (October 9-14 1984): 8-10.

A new, urban guerrilla movement has arisen: the MRTA, or *Movimiento Revolucionario "Túpac Amaru,"* which made its debut by attacking the US embassy in Lima and announcing its intention to kidnap the American ambassador. Their aim is to subject him to a trial similar to that of Dan Mitrione by the Tupamaros in Uruguay. Who, *Equis X* asks, are these guerrillas? This article explores the origins, leaders, and aims of MRTA, and reproduces a Tupacamaru manifesto. *Equis X* mentions the possibility that MRTA is an operation of military intelligence to steal the limelight from Sendero. A sidebar explores Shining Path's reaction to MRTA: the two movements are diametrically opposed ideologically, and a *senderista* flyer puts MRTA in the enemy's camp.

222. Tragenzies Granda, Fernando de. "Proceso de Uchuraccay: ¿Ritual de la justicia?"*Caretas,* no.821 (October 15 1984): 40-42.

Jurist and chair in the philosophy of law at the Catholic University asks how the judicial proceeding against the inhabitants of Uchuraccay can be justified? Is it an instrument to satisfy emotional frustrations over the killings? Is it a symbolic act to assert the power and authority of the state? Is it really possible to know the truth about the deaths of the journalists from this proceeding? The essential facts were established by the Vargas Llosa Commission of this sad history of error and death. The people of Uchuraccay were in a desperate state of defense--defense of their lives, their animals, their traditions, their culture--which drove them out of fear, anguish, to commit a tragic error. We must remember also that the peasants of Uchuraccay are not people of Western mentality, but representatives of a distinct culture. The author concludes that the people of Uchuraccay are but victims of a judicial rite bent upon vengeance. Is this process licit, he asks? Considering the destruction that it has brought upon the community of Uchuraccay, he tends to say no.

223. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "Las miras de Juliá." *Caretas,* no.822 (October 22 1984): 20-24, 26.

Interview with the new Minister of War, General Julián Juliá Freyra, who interestingly enough has just returned from a visit to the People's Republic of China. Gorriti asks the Minister about the political responsibilities of his position, his opinion of the Chinese military (in particular if he observed any lingering influences from its heritage of revolutionary struggle against the Japanese and Kuomintang), and how he views the antisedition struggle. The General believes that the guerrillas have arbitrarily borrowed from different ideologies and philosophies. Its easy to say that their doctrine has taken certain principles from Mao Tse-Tung, from Mariátegui, and from Lenin; but they are only related to the ends that Sendero seeks.

224. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Ayacucho: informe sobre la guerra sucia." *Equis X*, no.412 (October 22-28 1984): 7-10.

Reprint from the journal *Cambio 16*, in which Gorriti reports on the dirty war in Ayacucho. The policies of General Huamán, which stressed social and economic "civic action" over brute force, brought some respite to the department, during which Sendero shifted the focus of its actions to Lima and other areas. The leftist mayor of Ayacucho even proclaimed the situation tranquil enough to invite Pope John Paul II to visit in 1985! But renewed attacks have put the security forces on the defensive, and have paralyzed coca eradication operations. Gorriti states that there are no relations between *senderistas* and *narcotraficantes*. The renewed attacks are part of the "third offensive" of the "second wave," part of the strategy to expand bases of support. The reaction of the military authorities has been to assign more forces to the emergency zones, and to give them much more latitude in operational terms. After chronicling recent cases of disappearances, Gorriti notes that an ex-minister of war and the interior recently proclaimed his admiration for the Argentine military and its counterinsurgency methods.

A piece in the week's "De buena fuente" section notes that an "International Week of Information and Solidarity" with Sendero was held in early October in Paris, which celebrated the PCP's revolution. The organizers of this event included The International Committee of Solidarity With the Struggle of the Peruvian People, the Committee of Families of Political Prisoners of Peru, the Peru Collective, and the José Carlos Mariátegui Artistic Intellectual Front .

225. Favre, Henrí. "Sendero Luminoso y horizontes oscuros." *Quehacer*, no.31 (October 1984): 25-34.

Favre, a French anthropologist, was one of the first foreign scholars to analyze Sendero, and this article, first printed in a longer form in *Problemmes d'Amérique Latine*, was a very influential work. Favre first reviews the many strands of thought that make up Sendero: a doctrinaire Maoism, combined with the *indigenismo* of Mariátegui, and not a little "luditism," (i.e., a rejection of modernity). The trouble with this view is that Peru of the 1980's is not the Peru of Mariátegui: industrialization and urbanization have made it a different society. Sendero's attempts to impose autarky upon villages in the liberated zones have met with fierce resistance. The remoteness, poverty, and abandonment of Ayacucho, Favre writes, presented exceptionally favorable conditions for Sendero. But they do not totally explain Shining Path; poverty and neglect can also foster conservatism. Favre does not consider Sendero a purely regional and rural phenomenon; in fact, the less Indian, peasant, and remote a community is, the more susceptible it will be to Sendero's message. Agrarian reform has undercut much of its appeal (although Ayacucho benefited least from the reforms of the 1970's). Indians at the very highest altitudes, in the most remote places, do not respond to Sendero; it is among the part-time agriculturalists, miners, workers, and people living in areas influenced by urbanization and internal migration, that Sendero has its greatest success.

The true significance of Shining Path is seen in the context of the disintegration of social and economic institutions in the Andean world. Hardly a vestige of the old Hispano-colonial structure remains. The reforms of the military destroyed the old landed elites without replacing them with anything better: technical assistance, cooperatives, and credit were not forthcoming. Massive migration stripped the countryside of its most able people, who went to Lima to find work. National policies that emphasized coastal industrialization at the expense of the interior have contributed to the marginalization of the sierra. Traditional means of social advancement, notably education, no longer function: colleges produce graduates who cannot find jobs. It is among this "lumpen intelligentsia" and these "cholos" that Shining Path finds its recruits. These sectors no longer accept maginalization from the rest of Peruvian society; that Sendero, with its rejectionist vision of a "return to the past" appeals so strongly to them, is the greatest contradiction of Shining Path.

226. González, Raúl. "¿El despertar de Ayacucho?" *Quehacer*, no.31 (October 1984): 20-21.

Ayacuchanos are starting to think about how the challenges of political violence and retarded social-economic development can be met on a regional level. Alternatives are beginning to be formulated, and fear is on the wane. Under the blows of *senderista* violence and governmental repression, village institutions disappeared. Now a new spirit is arising, one that says: These are our problems, and there are our solutions. The affiliate of the Instituto Nacional de Planificación and the local Colegio de Ingenieros are two institutions that have taken the lead in this search. They have undertaken the most extensive survey of conditions in the department, which changes previous estimates of vital indicators on agriculture, *ganadería* (stock-raising), forestry, land use, water, and electricity. A plan of development has been drawn up, with concrete objectives for the coming years, as well as plans for a program of public investment. The engineers have organized

forums on "Ayacucho: Siglo XXI," with proposals for regional economic alternatives. The possibilities of regional government, with a budget managed locally, which could count on the support of the people, are being envisioned. González is cautiously optimistic: "In 1984, as in 1825, Ayacucho is again the place where the destiny of the country will be decided."

227. González, Raúl. "Sendero visto por un estudioso francés." *Quehacer*, no.31 (October 1984): 23-24.

Quehacer is once again under attack, its analysis of Sendero and political violence misinterpreted as sympathy for terrorism. The editors are sure that social and political phenomena such as subversion and Sendero have to be analyzed politically, sociologically, and historically to understand what is happening in the country; to this end social scientists and journalists have a responsibility to help in this process. Accordingly, *Quehacer* presents part of a larger article published in the French journal *Problemmes d'Amerique Latine* by sociologist Henri Favre, who worked at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos and has written three books on Peru. González introduces Favre to *Quehacer* readers, reiterating Favre's central thesis: that Sendero's social base is a "de-peasantized" and "de-indianized" population, which is why Sendero can thrive in areas that are not rural.

228. McClintock, Cynthia. "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso." *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations* v. 37, no.1 (October 1984): 48-84.

Arguably one of the most influential early articles on Sendero. McClintock asks two key questions: How important is a crisis of subsistence to peasant revolt? And, what kind of agrarian structure is most conducive to revolutionary potential? After all, the peasant revolt in Peru is taking place after a major agrarian reform. However, for complex reasons, reform was less widespread in the southern highlands. Moreover, because leftist groups were allowed more political space, peasants became both politicized and more militant. McClintock traces the growth of radical influence throughout the 1970's in highland departments, as measured by voting patterns. But the core of McClintock's thesis is that conditions in Ayacucho worsened over the course of several decades: per capita income, food consumption and caloric intake fell dramatically, while population density increased. Ayacucho also benefited least from the agrarian reform of the 1970's; fewer families received land, fewer cooperatives were established, and Ayacucho received little credit from the Agrarian Bank. The emergence of Sendero, McClintock proposes, is closely correlated with regions which underwent subsistence crises. In addition, there is evidence about the type of agrarian structure most conducive to peasant movements: rural smallholders relatively inactive in market economies or nonagricultural networks have been Sendero's primary peasant base. Ayacucho's relative inaccessibility and the presence of a university have also contributed to the rise of the movement in that department.

229. Ríos, Lucio de los. "Más fosas y más secuestros." *Equis X*, no.415 (November 11-18 1984): 19-21.

Marines and army troops stationed in the Tambo district, province of La Mar, have massacred peasants and burned their homes in recent weeks. De los Ríos names the small towns that have been victims of repression, accusing the security forces of employing tactics used in Vietnam, tactics that demolish whole communities in order to eliminate sympathizers, collaborators, or members of Sendero. He quotes a soldier at length on the brutal methods used to fight the insurgency, and reports on recent cases of disappearances.

230. "¿Narcos o terrucos?" *Caretas*, no.827 (November 26 1984): 16-17.

Brief report on developments in the Central Huallaga. Pressure from the U.S., European countries, and Colombia and Bolivia, have caused cocaine prices to soar. In the emergency zones, under political-military command, the police and anti-drug forces (GC, UMOPAR, and PIP) have been confined to their garrisons; they are very unpopular with the populace. But violence has increased: 19 mappers and CORAH workers were recently massacred, and armed bands of traffickers are present in the region. The 25 million dollars the U.S. has sent for coca eradication and crop substitution has been lamentably inadequate to control an illegal commerce worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and whose demand comes essentially from the U.S. itself. The pessimistic conclusion: confronting *narcotráfico* in the Central Huallaga is more complicated than confronting Sendero.

231. DeQuine, Jeanne. "The Challenge of the Shining Path: Peru's Enigmatic Killers." *The Nation* v.239, no.19 (December 8 1984): 610-613.

DeQuinne portrays Sendero and its people's war in a negative light. She describes "people's trials" and the seemingly irrational killing of peasants, while human rights abuses by the security forces are downplayed, although many Peruvians are said to be troubled by the militarization of the conflict. Sendero is termed enigmatic, violent, and anachronistic, harkening back to a pre-capitalist and pre-industrial past. Since Sendero receives no outside aid and is described as a rag-tag movement lacking any sophisticated weapons, why, DeQuinne asks, have they been so hard to defeat? One reason is that the army and police are relatively inexperienced at guerrilla warfare, and because Maoist tactics are successful in the bleak *altiplano*. Still, Belaúnde has succeeded in rallying the country against Sendero, which is totally at odds with the rest of the Peruvian left. Sendero has drawn upon Andean resentment of a Lima that has ignored the countryside; the movement as a whole has shown a "capacity for destruction among disaffected people energized by revolutionary chemistry, terrorist strategy, and one relentless zealot."

232. Moreno, Elías. "La 'Camarada Meche': habla lideresa senderista." *Equis X*, no.420 (December 17-23 1984): 26-28.

Equis X interviews Laura Zambrano, "Comrade Meche," in the women's prison in Callao. Zambrano discusses her sentence, her experiences at the hands of the GC, PIP, and DIRCOTE, during which she was tortured, and the objectives of the PCP, affirming her support for armed struggle under the direction of President Gonzalo and his guiding thought. She attributes all massacres to the forces of counterrevolution, claiming that the Party only applies sanctions through "popular justice," the "hammer and shield of the people." She condemns IU's participation in the electoral process as "parliamentary cretinism."

233. Núñez Vidalón, Antonio. "Carta a la Guardia Civil." *Quehacer*, no.32 (December 1984): 18-22.

The Civil Guard has suffered dozens of casualties from *senderista* attacks; it lacks equipment, arms, and infrastructure; its feuds with other Peruvian police agencies and the behavior of some of its members has not endeared it to the public. Retired GC General Núñez Vidalón's letter to his colleagues (which has been circulated to the public) addresses these problems and proposes solutions to restore the efficiency, reputation, and prestige of an institution which the country needs. Discipline, better control from above, and a firmer sense of mission and responsibility to the citizenry of the country are among the general's suggestions.

234. Rubio Correa, Marcial. "Testigos de 'primera' y poderes de 'segunda.'" *Quehacer*, no.32 (December 1984): 12-17.

The work of the commission, headed by Vargas Llosa, which investigated the massacre at Uchuraccay, calls into question the administration of justice in Peruvian society. The Peruvian legal profession is on record as being opposed to the way in which the proper organs of justice were by-passed by the commission's creation. Its conclusions are simply questionable in the light of subsequent evidence. Justice has practically been suspended in Ayacucho; judicial bodies have been intimidated and impeded in their functions. This is in marked contrast to the way authorities facilitated the work of the Uchuraccay commission. Furthermore, the Tribunal Correccional and the judicial magistrates in the emergency zone are between two fires: Sendero and the state. Judicial institutions should function with the same autonomy and respect as other powers of the state. Conditions of constitutionality should be restored in the emergency zone so that the judiciary and Ministerio Público can continue with their mission, without which neither democracy nor anything like it will exist in Ayacucho.

235. Zileri, Enrique. "Peru's Internal War." *World Press Review*, no.12 (December 1984): 28-30.

Interview with the editor of the newsmagazine *Caretas* of Lima. Zileri describes Sendero's leadership as "orphans of the Gang of Four...who suddenly found themselves out in the cold." It was a stroke of bad luck, he says, for the new democratic regime to confront a crisis in the world economy and domestic insurrection at the same time. While the war against Sendero is turning into a "dirty war, " Zileri still believes that the Peruvian military is different from other armies in Latin America, and that its 1968 revolution brought about some necessary social reforms. Zileri is still hopeful in 1984 because "the military has been saying that this anti-terrorist war is not going to be won through military means, that we have to deal with it through social development. That is a good sign." The remainder of the interview deals with politics before the election of APRA, and the Peruvian economy.

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236. Americas Watch. *A New Opportunity for Democratic Authority.* New York: Americas Watch, 1985.

Report on Peru after the election of Alán García in 1985. Americas Watch notes that the government of Belaúnde Terry chose to attack the credibility of its 1983 and 1984 Peruvian reports, rather than to address its accusations of human rights abuses. The report chronicles disappearances and extrajudicial murders, the role of the *rondas campesinas* in counterinsurgency strategy, as well as that of the Peruvian judiciary in the antiterrorist campaign. Hopeful that an incoming socialist government will be less tolerant of past abuses, the report concludes with a list of recommendations for the improvement of the human rights situation.

237. Amnesty International. *Peru: Amnesty International Briefing.* London: Amnesty International Publications, January 1985.

The first in a series of lugubrious reports on human rights abuses. Amnesty chronicles the hundreds of men women, and children who have been victims of political killings by government forces in the emergency zones. More than 1,000 persons have "disappeared" since the area came under political-military command in December, 1982. Early reports of secret mass graves and roadside dumping grounds for bodies were discounted by the Peruvian government. The inaccessibility of the area and the threat of Shining Path acted as a kind of insulation of public awareness. Eventually, protest against what was happening spread nationwide. The security forces have continued to violate human rights in the emergency zones through 1984 with impunity, and the government has done little to control them. The majority of these abuses seem to be confined to one specific area; Peru's attorney general is making efforts to bring the facts out into the open. The report includes sections on the role of civilian defense patrols, secret detention centers, and the role of the courts, and Public Ministry in battling these violations. A number of case studies are appended, as is a lengthy list of the disappeared, as of November, 1984.

238. Andreas, Carol. *When Women Rebel: The Rise of Popular Feminism in Peru.* Westport: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1985.

An impassioned examination of the emergence of political consciousness among women in Peruvian popular movements. Women are organizing themselves within peasant organizations, in fishing cooperatives, in factories, shanty-towns, women's shelters, artisan cooperatives, "people's kitchens," and are especially active in radical political parties, particularly Shining Path. Andreas is open about her political engagement with and sympathy for Peruvian women in struggle. She examines how foreign economic penetration has exacerbated the already precarious position of women in Peru. In cities and rural areas integrated into the capitalist world economy, organization and resistance have taken a myriad of forms. Andreas chronicles cases of successful cooperation among factory workers, housewives, street vendors, *barriada* residents, etc. In remote rural "Indian" areas, resistance to cultural and physical genocide has brought about a revival of nativism in which women are asserting themselves as leaders. Andreas looks at women's prominent role in Sendero, and at the life and death of Edith Lagos, the 19-year old *senderista* leader who died in police custody. Her funeral in Ayacucho was attended by 30,000 people. Government repression against suspected terrorists has brought women to the forefront of prisoner defense and aid. According to Andreas, *feminismo popular*, rather than intellectual middle-class Western-style feminism, is the future for women in Peru.

239. Díez Canseco, J. *Democracia, militarización y derechos humanos en el Perú, 1980-1984.* Lima: Asociación por Derechos Humanos, 1985.

Díez Canseco, national deputy, member of the legislature's national commission on human rights, secretary-general of PUM, and national director of United Left, has assembled what he calls an "accusatory polemic" on human rights abuses in Peru. The economic and political situations as they existed in 1980 meant inflation, unemployment, and debt, which brought protests and strikes, and counter-repression by the government. As the government has become more authoritarian in fighting Sendero, democratic norms and legal, constitutional rights and safeguards have been undermined to the point where they are no longer functional. Lawyers and legal organizations have protested against the widespread militarization of civil procedures and public office. Broad decrees against terrorism have given the security forces powerful weapons with which to intimidate anyone protesting against human rights abuses in general, and the press in particular. Díez Canseco chronicles a long history of abuses, documenting torture, extrajudicial executions, and

disappearances in the emergency zones, complete with gruesome photographs of the victims. An introduction by Javier Valle-Riestra, deputy for the province of Lima, calls Peru a pseudo-democracy, and terms the military's counterinsurgency strategy a "blitzkrieg" designed to pulverize the phenomenon of guerrilla terrorism. Valle-Riestra calls for an *entente* of APRA, IU, independent Marxists, the church, and progressive forces advocating a program of public liberties, social revolution, popular self-government, and unrestricted amnesty to pacify Peru.

240. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "'Sendero Luminoso': Los hondos y mortales desencuentros." Series: Antropología no.2. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, September 1985.

A presentation to the seminar "Social Movements in Latin America" held at the University of the United Nations-Social Sciences Council on Latin America, in Lima in January, 1985. Degregori seeks to clear up some of the confusion surrounding Sendero; its silence, and the speculations (often ignorant and inaccurate) of the press only deepen its mystery. It was the same in the 1970's; apart from some numbers of *Bandera Roja* and a few mimeographed documents, material about Sendero is almost nonexistent. Degregori examines the national and regional contexts out of which Sendero arose, stressing the isolation and underdevelopment of Ayacucho. The role that the University played in Sendero's emergence is crucial to understanding why and how the movement originated in such a remote area. Degregori sketches the convoluted politics of the UNSCH, and how PCP-SL finally broke with more mainstream leftist student groups over its ultrarigid ideological philosophy. Sendero's messianic mentality, its belief in itself as the "chosen party" was only sharpened by the school's fierce polemical struggles; when Sendero finally lost its hold on the executive council of the University in 1974, it was able to withdraw to reconstitute itself in preparation for the eventual launching of armed struggle. Degregori concludes that Sendero resulted from the convergence of an elite provincial university and a provincial youth, a youth which in a time of social ferment grasped an absolute and ordered explication of the world in order to save and orient itself. Abimael Guzmán and his comrades were more than ready to provide that framework

241. Flores Galindo, Alberto and Nelson Manrique. *Violencia y campesinado.* Lima: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario, [1985].

A pair of essays by two of Peru's most prominent anthropologists. Manrique's "Democracia y campesinado indígena en el Perú contemporáneo" examines the reaction of Andean society to the "invasion" of military forces from outside. The interaction of a pauperized native culture and a foreign army of occupation can only be negative, says Manrique: the results are prostitution, a distorted economy, a paralysis of tourism (crucial to Ayacucho), and massive emigration.. The fundamental racism of the outside troops (most of whom do not speak Quechua, and are from the coast or the jungle), reinforces the abyss between Indians and non-Indians. The prejudices of the military reinforce its hostility towards the *indígenas*, who are regarded with suspicion as liars and hypocrites, not to be trusted. Manrique underlines what he sees as a profoundly racist gulf between Indian and "white" society, that manifests itself in how the war is being waged in the sierra.

Flores Galindo's "La guerra silenciosa" is the last chapter in his book *Buscando un Inca.* Political violence today, he writes, is often interpreted as a modern expression of an old and profound violence which has always characterized Peruvian society. But elevating this concept to an abstraction obscures the people who are its victims, as well as its perpetrators. Flores Galindo shows that Sendero's first actions were almost victimless; only after the security forces entered the department did violence and the death toll accelerate. Since Sendero follows Maoist doctrine, the guerrillas hide among the people as fish swim in the sea. The modern arms and helicopters of the army are thus neutralized. Instead, the military has taken to organizing and arming certain factions among the peasants, playing upon old rivalries and hatreds. They allow no neutrality in the war: each village is either for or against the guerrillas, and must prove its loyalty to the government or suffer the consequences. Manrique discusses in detail the doleful impact of the war upon indigenous communities, which reinforces daily the overwhelming framework of Peruvian society: racism and authoritarianism.

242. Gianotten, Vera, Ton de Wit and Hans de Wit. "The Impact of Sendero Luminoso on Regional and National Politics in Peru." In *New Social Movements and the State in Latin America.* Edited by George Slater. Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1985, pp. 171-202.

An extremely perceptive analysis and summary of Sendero's origins in Peruvian radicalism. Gianotten and De Witt review in detail the ideological battles among Peruvian leftist parties that ultimately produced Guzmán's splinter faction of the PCP. Sendero learned from the

failures of the Peruvian guerrilla movements of the 1960's. Two lessons they took to heart were that the party cadre had to come from the region in order to know the language, customs, and territory; and that a long period of education and preparation (reconstruction) was necessary prior to the initiation of armed struggle. The authors review the struggles between various student factions in Ayacucho, and outline the social and economic structure of Ayacucho, noting that a prolonged period of struggle over land had produced many villages which possessed strong local identities and communal organizations. Sendero's dogmatic Maoism has meant a strong emphasis on peasant participation in the revolution; this extreme *campesinismo* has meant until recently a neglect of the urban struggle. Sendero's rural strategy derives from its Maoist roots, not, as some have insisted, from old Andean cultural values. Shining Path has no intention of restoring the Inca empire; the extreme isolation of the *campo* from the city, which Sendero seeks to impose, derives not from Quechua tradition, but from an ideology similar to that of the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia. The author's analysis of Sendero's strategy and tactics mentions several weaknesses, including isolation from the rest of the Peruvian left, alienation of many peasants due to extremist policies, and insufficient work at mass organization.

243. González, Raúl. "Violencia e insurrección en el Perú." In *Siete ensayos sobre la violencia en el Perú.* Edited by Felipe MacGregor and José Luís Rouillon. [Lima]: Asociación Peruana de Estudios e Investigaciones para la Paz/Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 1985, pp.137-151.

Sendero was originally interpreted in three ways, says González: as part of an international communist subversive movement; as a movement of national liberation produced by Peru's misery and poverty; and as part of the collision between Western and Andean culture. How to explain Sendero, asks González? Are any of the explanations outlined above satisfactory? How can one explain the violence plaguing Peru? González examines why Sendero developed, and why it began in Ayacucho. In doing so, he relies upon Degregori's analysis of centralizing capitalism in Peru and regional "disarticulation," the crucial role the University of Huamanga played in permitting a disciplined cadre of ideologues to develop, and how the complex social culture of the countryside gave the guerrillas ready-made divisions that they could exploit for their revolution. In summation, González asserts that it is impossible to understand the "whys" of Shining Path without integrating political, sociological, economic, and anthropological explanations, and without taking into account the historical context of Peruvian political evolution. In this sense, the Sendero Luminoso is not only the result of the existence of a Maoist group risen in armed struggle, but also of a conjunction of social, economic, political, and cultural conflicts, which the insurgents intend to resolve through violence.

244. Larson, Everette. *Sendero Luminoso: A Bibliography.* Hispanic Focus, no.3. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1985.

The very first bibliography compiled on Shining Path. Larson, head of reference in the Hispanic Division at the Library of Congress, has compiled a list of 281 newspaper and magazine articles from Peruvian and U.S. sources. Although unannotated, each citation has noted either its location within the Library or the notation that it is "Not in LC." The latter are acknowledged as derived from Salomón Carrasco, who shared with Larson his collection of materials. Larson also notes that the Library holds a copy of a large unpublished bibliography on terrorism compiled at the Biblioteca Nacional in Lima.

245. McClintock, Cynthia. "Peru." In *Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary Record.* Edited by Jack Hopkins. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985. V.5, 1983-84, pp. 431-444.

Annual review of political and economic developments in Peru. In 1983, McClintock writes, Peru was beleaguered as never before, by serious economic problems and Sendero Luminoso, the scope and intensity of whose attacks were unprecedented. McClintock reviews the sorry state of the Peruvian economy, and the likely successor to Belaúnde when he leaves office. She also provides a succinct review of Sendero's development and actions over the past two years. The military's counterinsurgency campaign has had a measure of success, in that the majority of militants have been driven from Ayacucho to other areas of the country--but at a high cost. The military has made no effort to win the "hearts and minds" of the peasantry. Still, municipal elections were held, even in Ayacucho, and that is a victory of sorts.

246. Mercado, Rogger. *El APRA, el PCP y Sendero Luminoso.* Peru: Fondo de Cultura, 1985.

Mercado traces the growth and development of political radicalism in Peru, from the origins of APRA through Shining Path. He begins by pointing out that republican Peru has been

governed by 65 presidents, 44 of whom came directly or indirectly from the military. Of the remaining 21, few, he says, truly represented the will of the people. The political and economic crises of the early 20th century produced anarchism, sindicalism, the emergence of the Peruvian socialists and communists, and the vision of Víctor Raúl de la Torre, whose APRA coalition of the middle class, peasantry, and workers was to dominate Peruvian radicalism for decades. While the PCP has, despite "mistakes and errors," maintained its philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, APRA or *aprismo* has "mutilated its founding principles many times" in maintaining its bourgeois legality and aspirations to govern. The parties of the right have defended the established order, formal democracy, the bourgeoisie, "Western and Christian civilization," as well as the capitalist system and the exploitation of man by man. In opposition has been the revolutionary left, many of whose parties have joined to win electoral power in United Left. The exception, is, of course, Shining Path. An extremely acute, if partisan, examination of the complex evolution of Peruvian political tendencies.

247. Palmer, David Scott. "The Sendero Luminoso Rebellion in Rural Peru." In *Latin American Insurgencies*. Edited by Georges Fauriol. Washington, D.C.: The Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies and the National Defense University, 1985, pp.67-96.

Palmer, arguably one of the foremost senderologists in the United States, taught at the UNSCH as a Peace Corps volunteer in the early 1960's and knew Abimael Guzmán. In his first extended piece on Shining Path, he argues that the movement evolved in a manner *sui generis,* and is unique as a Latin American revolutionary movement. Palmer's account of the impact of the social and economic policies of Velasco's military government on Ayacucho in the 1960's and 1970's is probably the most detailed and extensive available in English. The department has always been a marginalized one, on the periphery of Peruvian development. However, many small-scale development projects were begun in Ayacucho in the 1960's; its university attracted United Nations, Fulbright, Danish, Dutch, and Swiss programs. The military's radicalism eliminated some of these efforts, especially the North American initiatives. The agrarian reform altered the department very little, inasmuch as its *haciendas* were smaller and less prosperous than in other areas, so the peasants gained correspondingly less. Ironically, it was the university that played a greater role as an agent of social change than any other institution, and as it became more radicalized, Sendero's influence throughout Ayacucho grew. Palmer characterizes Sendero's plans for a post-victory Peru as Indian, millenarianist, and adhering to the concepts of the primitive and pure Indian communism outlined by José Carlos Mariátegui. In pointing out some of Sendero's weaknesses, Palmer uses empirical data to suggest that popular discontent may not be quite high enough to give Sendero the support it needs to move from a rural to an urban insurrection.

248. Partido Comunista del Perú, Comité Central. *¡No votar! Sino, ¡Generalizar la guerra de guerirllas para conquistar el poder para el pueblo!* Lima: Ediciones Bandera Roja, February 1985.

A primary document from the Party's Central Committee. The PCP calls for a boycott of the municipal elections of 1985. Its analysis of Peruvian society, (semi-feudal, semi-colonial, and bureaucratically capitalist) concludes that to participate in elections is to endorse a sick system, and exchange one "starvation-ridden and genocidal" government for another. To Sendero, civilian and military regimes are no more than "cliques which take turns exercising dictatorship over the people, over the proletariat, peasantry, petit bourgeoisie and even over the national or medium bourgeoisie itself" on behalf of the grand bourgeoisie, bankers, landowners, and Yankee imperialism. The PCP astutely underlines that the legislative branch of government has abdicated its functions on behalf of the executive, which has become the real power in Peru, "with the country's basic laws in the hands of greasy bureaucrats, technocrats trained and advised by the imperialists, with superministers who give and take away like the old aristocracy." The only fitting response to this farce, declares the PCP, is not to vote, but to step up guerrilla warfare to seize political power for the people.

249. *Presos políticos y derechos humanos: razones para una amnistía.* Edited by the Comité de Familiares de Presos Políticos de Izquierda Unida e Independientes y el Sindicato de Trabajadores de Editora "La República." Lima: Ediciones Derechos Humanos, [1985].

Document prepared by the General Assembly of the Committee for Political Prisoners of Izquierda Unida and independent parties. The Popular Action government of Belaúnde has denied the existence of political prisoners in Peru, calling all people detained in the present state of emergency "terrorists" or "common delinquents." The committee believes that over 1,500 persons have been detained under antiterrorist legislation, incarcerated in Lima and provincial prisons. Information from the report establishes widespread torture, abuse, and maltreatment, lack of

adequate legal representation, poor prison conditions, and a generalized violation of the civil and human rights of prisoners, many of whom have not yet been tried for their alleged crimes. The commission outlines the roles popular committees, family support organizations, church and human rights groups are playing in the fight to improve this situation. In its conclusions, the committee declares that the government 's and state's repression is aimed at the just struggle of the people against domination and exploitation. It affirms that political prisoners are a product of the class struggle in Peru and vindicates their political fight to transform society.

250. Reid, Michael. *Peru: Paths to Poverty.* London: Latin American Bureau (Research and Action), 1985.

Peru has changed dramatically over the past decades, from a rural and agricultural nation to an increasingly urbanized and industrialized country, one in which the traditional Indian community has been even more marginalized than before. Reid traces the origins of the current crisis, showing how the country's resources have been exploited by foreign interests and a national ruling elite. The heart of the book is an extensive study of the economic and social policies of the Velasco reformist military regime (1968-1975), although Reid takes his book up through the government of Belaúnde and the resurgence of the left in the municipal elections of 1985. In his last section, Reid gives a compressed but clear account of Sendero's rise and first years of war. The failure of successive governments, military and civilian, to break the cycle of dependence and poverty through varied economic policies is the nation's greatest political failure. The state has been unable to tame Sendero without declaring war on a large segment of the rural population. Still, Reid believes Shining Path offers in its present form no more than "a blind alley of violent protest to a frustrated and marginalized generation rather than an alternative path to national development."

251. Renshaw, Ricardo.*La tortura en Chimbote: un caso en el Perú.* Chimbote: IPEP, 1985.

Renshaw served as chaplain in Chimbote prison from 1981 to 1984, and is a member of the Commission for Social Justice of Chimbote diocese. To "wake the conscience of the public," Renshaw has gathered testimony and figures on torture and other forms of abuse inflicted upon prisoners in Chimbote. Renshaw explores the psychological effects of torture, philosophical arguments that justify its use, and the Church's present and historical position on this practice. Renshaw believes the Church has an important role in the effort to eliminate torture, recognizing that it itself has used torture in the past (the Inquisition). He takes a detailed look at Chimbote's police and judicial system and at conditions within the prison system, making the case that widespread abuse and maltreatment of persons enmeshed in the judicial system pre-existed the current state of emergency. He concludes with recommendations for legal and institutional reforms, a call for greater activity on the part of outside organizations (NGO's), and a plea for professionals (doctors, lawyers, psychologists) to accept responsibility for helping prisoners who have suffered abuse.

252. *Revolution in Peru.* Berkeley: Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru, 1985.

Polemic explaining Shining Path's aims and objectives by the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru. The CSRP begins by summarizing the history and background of the PCP, declaring that "When the Communist Party of Peru launched the armed struggle in 1980, the political-economic situation was at an extreme." The United States, fearing that economic conditions in Peru would trigger an uprising, fashioned Belaúnde's "return to democracy." The pamphlet reviews the history of the struggle, Sendero's rural organization, and highlights the role women play in the revolution and the importance of the urban battlefield. Short sections deal with Uchuraccay and its aftermath, and urge readers to help "Free Meche" (Laura Zambrano Padilla). Another chapter asks, "Who are the real terrorists?" and blames the government for unrestrained brutality against the peasantry of the sierra. The pamphlet explains that, "The PCP is fighting a war in order to overthrow those who would maintain a status quo that is steadily drowning the majority of Peruvians in death and misery." It concludes by asking, "Which road to follow?": the armed struggle or the electoral circus that will never change anything? The CSRP cites the presence of foreign mercenaries, the beginning of aerial bombing, strategic hamlets, and the use of napalm in the Andes, and predicts that the U.S. will eventually intervene. It concludes, "The armed struggle being led by the PCP is the most significant revolutionary struggle being waged in the world today. It is a tremendous material force on the side of people's yearning to be free of the powers in this world that hold us all hostage to their empire building and rivalry. It is a revolution that should be supported and upheld by progressive people, and all moves to attack and slander it should be exposed, denounced, and opposed."

253. Villacrez Riquelme, Eloy. *Nuestra guerra civil: Ayacucho 80--*. Lima: Graphos 100 Editores, [1985].

Extremely dry and theoretical analysis of the Peruvian "civil war," written by an ex-army captain and ex-Sandinista fighter, exiled to Venezuela and amnestied in 1980. After a brief description of the social and economic characteristics of the combat zone, the author examines how Sendero is waging its people's war, and how the government is responding. The author's conclusion is that Sendero seems to be more successful at fulfilling its objectives (widening operations, wrecking the national economy, and gradually bringing the war to Lima) than the military is in stopping them. For the great pauperized mass of the nation, which believes that life will not be improved by normal means, the guerrilla represents an outside hope. In this regard, the military's indiscriminate use of force has aided Sendero. Above all, there is a gulf between the mentalities of the combatants: for the military, the occupation of territory is paramount. For the guerrilla, the capture of men's minds is the most important objective.

254. Ortiz Casas, Carlos. "Cambio de rumbo." *Caretas*, no.834 (January 21 1985): 12-13.

The new commanding general of the army, Germán Ruiz Figueroa, has brought a new style of leadership to his position. The general, accompanied by aides and the press, visited his command in the emergency zones last week. He listened patiently to the complaints of peasants, *ronderos* and troops alike, but his prescription is always the same: rapid pacification of the base zones and an increase in aid from the armed forces to the people. "The fundamental base of victory is the relations that they have with the civil population, with their brothers." General Ruiz Figueroa counseled his men to respect human rights and act in accordance with the Geneva Convention. *Caretas* describes the general's visit to various garrisons, his conferences with commanding officers, and the complaints which peasants summoned the courage to report to him. Underlying his visit is the scarcity of resources to fight Sendero, especially in advanced posts in rigorous conditions, where life is difficult and spartan month after month. A photograph accompanying the article shows *ronderos* from Lloshegua greeting the general, armed only with spears and machetes; the caption reads "Fighting for their future with the weapons of the past..."

255. Gaitán, Julio César. "Sendero rodea Lima." *Equis X*, no.423 (January 21-27 1985): 21-22.

Sendero is moving, without haste but without pause, into the phase "from the countryside to the cities." While the government is fixated on Ayacucho, Sendero has established forces in new areas all over the country. *Equis X* delineates the new fronts, and describes the tactics the guerrillas are using, sending their columns into communities, establishing Popular Committees, and recruiting young men for the struggle.

256. Bennett, Philip. "Pol Pot in Peru." *The New Republic*, v.192, no.4 (January 28 1985): 16-18.

Bennett, former editor of *The Lima Times*, describes a nation under siege. He quotes novelist José María Arguedes, who called places like Ayacucho and other small, isolated, highland communities Peru's "fenced-in nation." Peru's multiple crises have enhanced the visibility of that nation, but also expanded it to include cities as well as rural areas: per capita income has dropped 20% since 1980, inflation is running at 100% annually, and two-thirds of the urban work force may be involved in the underground economy in order to survive. Bennett profiles Fernando Belaúnde Terry as a tireless visionary, a former architect with quixotic schemes for the nation, but now a man who reacts to Sendero and accusations of human rights abuses as if they were personal insults. He seems unable to recognize that the war cannot be ended by presidential decree. His peace overtures rejected by Sendero, he is marking time until he leaves office. Alán García of APRA and Alfonso Barrantes of IU are the likeliest candidates to win the presidency. García's solution to Sendero would seem to be throwing money at sierra development projects; Barrantes' election as mayor of Lima prompted the *Wall Street Journal* to editorialize that "Peru is obviously a juicy target for international communism." Bennett concludes that most Peruvians support democracy, but pessimism about the future predominates. A social scientist in Lima observed: "Peru is a country where the worst is coming."

257. Maust, John. "Terrorist Death Threat Fails to Force Palau Out of Peru." *Christianity Today* v.29 (January 1985): 51.

Braving death threats from Sendero, Argentine evangelist Luis Palau successfully completed a crusade in Arequipa and Lima. Approximately 250,000 people attended his meetings during the eight days Palau preached in Lima, despite the crusade's location in a stadium in the seedy barrio of La Victoria, a jump in local bus fares of 30%, and a blackout caused by the

bombing of electrical transmission towers his first day in the capital. A police battalion patrolled outside the soccer stadium where the meetings were held, and volunteer police and soldiers worked as security inside. Despite the obstacles and threats of violence, Palau made some 15,000 new converts in Lima and 6,000 in Arequipa.

258. Central Department of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru. "Report on May Day and the New Offensive." *A World to Win*, no.1 (January 1985): 32-33.

A World to Win is a glossy magazine published in Europe by the Maoist Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, with an emphasis on the worldwide people's struggle. Extremely valuable for the current and "correct" party line, *A World to Win* has published the texts of most Sendero proclamations. Here it prints a letter from the PCP's Central Committee, outlining recent armed actions, and heralding the growth of the People's Guerrilla Army, the People's Committees, and the People's Schools. On June 22, 1984, the PCP initiated a new military campaign called "Begin the Great Leap!" as part of the strategy of "Conquering Bases," or establishing revolutionary base areas. The letter also outlines the structure of some of the essential components of the new revolutionary state.

259. "Free Meche." *A World to Win,* no.1 (January 1985): 34.

Text of a letter "from Peru," alerting the world that Laura Zambrano Padilla ("Comrade Meche, the great revolutionary fighter") has been arrested, and that her life is in danger from DIRCOTE. The *Llapan Atiq* of the Guardia Republicana has violently abused and robbed the women of Callao prison, who are listed by name.

260. "Letters From the PCP to the Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement." *A World to Win,* no.1 (January 1985): 31.

The Central Committee of the PCP congratulates the RIM on the conclusion of the Second International Conference of Marxist-Leninist parties. The armed struggle in Peru continues to blaze victoriously; the building of the People's Guerrilla Army that will help establish the New State under the leadership of the Party continues. "Strengthen the People's Democratic Republic" is the watchword of the day. The PCP reiterates that the revolution in Peru is only one part of the world revolution.

261. "Message of the Second International Conference." *A World to Win,* no.1 (January 1985): 30.

The Second Internationalist Conference sends fraternal greetings to the comrades of the PCP. The RIM reminds readers that the war in Peru shows that "a correct line can enable even the people of a small country to initiate and develop their just war against all imperialisms and their reactionary puppets."

262. "When the Andes Roar." *A World to Win,* no.1 (January 1985): 24-29, 34-40, 42-43.

Long and detailed, if didactic, analysis of Sendero's own revolutionary progress. Valuable clues can be winnowed from the text of its proclamations; here the article calls "lies and distortions" press reports that Sendero is "guided by 'messianic Inca nationalism' or just about anything else imaginable except what the PCP has openly declared: 'Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.'" The report outlines the spread and extent of the war in 16 provinces with over a million inhabitants. Particularly valuable is the PCP's own version of how People's Committees function in liberated areas.

263. "Not Even the Pope." *The Economist* v.294, no.7380 (February 9 1985): 42.

Peru has guerrilla warfare, unstoppable drug trafficking, appalling slums, debts it cannot service, inflation it cannot break, and a democratically-elected government that is weak. Pope John Paul II's visit merely reminds people of how bad things are. Visiting Ayacucho briefly, he challenged 20,000 Quechua-speaking Indians: "I ask you in the name of God: change paths. Convert to the cause of reconciliation and peace." Sendero responded by blacking out Lima for the tenth time in two years. With the economy in such dismal shape, the government can do little to foster development. The upcoming elections will feature APRA versus United Left.

264. Arroyo, Abilio. "Más sangre." *Caretas,* no.837 (February 11 1985): 22-25.

Report on journalist Arroyo's encounter with a band of *senderistas* in Huanta. Sendero has recently murdered a number of people there, including a Protestant vicar and the leftist ex-president of the Defense Front of Huanta. Arroyo describes how *rondas* from a number of villages, consisting of 80-90 persons each, were reinforced by Marine units. In many sierra villages the *ronderos* read out names; people have to either sign up or face arrest. The operation is called "gleanings" by the *ronderos,* virtually all of whom are peasants. Arroyo was contacted by a youth, who led him to a nearby band of *senderistas.* The masked guerrillas, some of whom were girls as young as 12, seemed to enjoy being photographed, and displayed a combination of secular messianism, ferocity, and primitivism in their attitudes. Some spoke Spanish with a strong Andean accent. Arroyo asked them about the visit of the Pope. He asked about the reprisals the peasants suffered on their behalf. One replied, "There always exist these types of difficulties in war. And millions of *campesinos* will have to die. That's war." They denied that they were terrorists, declaring "We are members of the PCP, Popular Guerrilla Army of the republic of the New Democracy." They also swore that "the enemies of the people will be crushed like rats, like insects, *compañeros."* One discussed his decision to join Sendero, and said that he had personally seen President Gonzalo with his own eyes. They rejected elections as revisionist, and called the *rondas* "retinues of the reaction," declaring that the peasants belong only because they are forced to do so. Asked whether Sendero has any international help, they replied "We have help only from the guiding thought of President Gonzalo."

265. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo and Abilio Arroyo. "La guerra de Sivia." *Caretas,* no.838 (February 18 1985): 36-38, 72.

Report on the war in Sivia, on the banks of the Río Apurímac, in the jungle about 200 kilometers northwest of Huanta. Sivia raises coffee, cacao, and coca. After painting walls with slogans and clandestinely raising flags, Sendero committed its first assassination in October, 1983, murdering a retired Civil Guardsman. The army came to Sivia in November, and a short and brutal war followed. Much of the population fled. But now the town is seeing a different face of counterinsurgency warfare: Captain "Amador," who speaks Quechua with a Cuzco accent. Captain Amador named town officials, divided the population into four sectors, and explained his plans. Sivia, he said, was a town where will had surrendered and the spirit of cooperation had atrophied. "If we wait for money from the government, we'll die of hunger." Communally the town was cleaned, a *plaza de armas* was constructed with a borrowed tractor, and water and drainage works were accelerated. Captain Amador prohibited the local commerce in coca, punishable by a fine, jail, and communal labor. He even summoned men and women to the plaza for community calisthenics, which he led by himself! Civil patrols were organized, and a system of local vigilance instituted. Sendero counterattacked, but could not recover the initiative. After many small encounters in the jungle, the guerrillas abandoned the zone and operations terminated in November, 1984. When Amador was transferred, the townspeople asked that he be reinstated, but without success. Arroyo concludes: "There remains the recent memory of violence, and of victory. But now that they have had time to think, the people take warning that what they thought was a war, was no more than a battle."

266. Acevedo, Jorge Luis. "Estado real de Sendero hoy."*Equis X,* no.427 (February 18-24 1985): 8-10.

Despite 5,000 deaths and more than 2,000 detained, Sendero continues to make headway. Dirty war has not finished the guerrillas off; quite the contrary. The PCP's declaration of the formation of a popular guerrilla army (EGP) is not an empty boast, but a significant step in the progress of people's war. Acevedo discusses details of the latest *senderista* advances, and analyzes the meaning of the vocabulary (adjustments, popular voting, popular assemblies) of what he terms the "embryonic Sendero state." Following the article (p.11) is the text of an alleged letter from the PCP to *La República,* justifying the "execution" of a PIP agent, and attacking the lies and distortions of the press about the Party.

267. González, Raúl. "Ayacucho: El desfile de la violencia." *Quehacer,* no.33 (February 1985): 34-37.

Sendero and the security forces may be losing control of the militias that each has created and armed. González describes how three *campesinos,* traveling with animals in the province of Hunata were detained by an unknown group of men, taken to the Plaza de Armas, accused of being spies for the Marines, and sentenced to death. When word reached their home village, a rescue party was sent out. The result was a battle between opposing communities, in which many people died. The civil defense patrols established by the military are engaged in open warfare with peasant groups sympathetic to Sendero. Villages in the highlands are said to be "with" one side or the

other. González relates how civil war is raging in the countryside, a by-product of the war between Shining Path and the state.

268. Isbell, Billie Jean. "Languages of Domination and Rebellion in Highland Peru." *Social Education,* v.44, no.2 (February 1985): 119-121.

Isbell explores the connections between Shining Path and the *hijos de pueblo* (sons of the people) of the highlands whose language and culture have been denigrated by and alienated from mainstream Peruvian society. The war between Sendero and the state has deepened old social cleavages among the 7.5 million Quechua-speakers of Peru. Old lingual and cultural polarizations have intensified, fueled by competing world ideologies. Isbell describes Uchuraccay, Lucanamarca, and other atrocities perpetrated not by soldiers or *senderistas,* but by highlanders upon outsiders and upon each other. The roots of these cleavages go back to the conquest, and have deep cultural resonances among peasant society; Isbell describes rituals such as skits that glorify the Inca past while deprecating the Spanish present. The images of domination imposed upon native culture require children to denigrate and reject their parents' language and clothing--in essence, their culture. The Maoists of Sendero Luminoso are following a path that originated in their ancestor's colonial past--"a past rooted in a cultural and historical mosaic of domination. Potent symbols of rebellion and domination continue to clash in the Peruvian highlands."

269. Monier, Claude. "Perou: la longue marche de 'Sentier Lumineux.'" *Defense Nationale* (France) v.41 (February 1985): 119-125.

Brief summary of Sendero's origins and evolution. Sendero, writes Monier, is the descendant of both the Castroite and Maoist revolutions, and the depository of the Peruvian socialist tradition. Sendero is based in the student "proletariat" of the impoverished province's university, and implanted in the peasant communities. It is aided by the region's economic and social underdevelopment, and the rejection of the Hispanic administration imposed from Lima. The rebellion is also colored by Andean messianism and seems to be jubilant at the destruction of society. Monier's conclusions at mid-decade are startling: he says that today Sendero is sure in its power; like the ancient Inca runners, it is endowed with a web of relations with certain neighboring countries, notably Colombia. Its contacts with APRA and the left furnish it the beginnings of an international opening. Finally, its growing collaboration with organized crime and drug trafficking procure it new means to free itself little by little from the ideological control of Abimael Guzmán. Sendero seems likely therefore to turn its back on the Maoist Indian "banditry' *(bandolerisme)* of Abimael Guzmán in order to become a destabilizing narco-terrorist movement in the Colombian manner and to lead a classic civil war.

270. "El feminismo de Abimael. " *Caretas,* no.841 (March 11 1985): 52-53.

From the capture of Edith Lagos, barely 18 years old, to the death of Carmen Rosa Julca, killed two weeks ago as she tried to dynamite a bridge, the role of women in Sendero has constituted a remarkable Peruvian political phenomenon. Abimael Guzmán, in his 1974 work "El Marxismo, Mariátegui y el movimiento femenino," linked the subordination of women to the class struggle. Guzmán did more than theorize; by 1968 a small group of women were leading the FER at the UNSCH. In 1973 the Party formed the Movimiento Femenino Popular; a year later another group was formed in Lima for university women. However, in order for the women's movement to grow "correctly," it must avoid the grave danger posed by "bourgeois feminism," which proclaims women's liberation. The Party espouses not women's liberation, but the "emancipation of women," which will be achieved in the new society built by the working class. *Caretas* concludes by noting that with many women guerrillas fallen in battle, Guzmán correctly prophesied "the importance of the feminine masses in the great struggles which are approaching." A sidebar displays the photos of and brief mentions of eight prominent women in Sendero, including Comrade Mecha (Laura Zambrano), Comrades Sara, Techi, and several others.

271. Acevedo, Jorge Luis. "Guerrillas urbanas en Lima." *Equis X,* no.431 (March 18-24 1985): 8-10.

The recent murder of several policemen and police women in Lima points to a growing urban guerrilla infrastructure in the capital. "Thus die squealers, executioners, torturers, and rapists," declares Sendero. Acevedo traces the establishment of Sendero's network in the capital, and its ominous implications for a widening of the war.

272. "¡Combatir y resistir, repudiar las elecciones del régimen genocida y desarrollar más la lucha armada!" *Equis X,* no.431 (March 18-24 1985): 12-13.

Reproduction of the text of Sendero's call to "Combat and resist, repudiate the elections of the genocidist regime and widen the armed struggle!"

273. "Un cambio de estrategia: los arrepentidos de Sendero." *Caretas,* no.843 (March 25 1985): 36-38.

An important change in counterinsurgency strategy is being tried in Ayacucho: the army has begun to try and induce *senderistas* to surrender, and to incorporate them into local self-defense forces. *Caretas* 's Abilio Arroyo and other journalists were shown a *ronda* in Challhuamayo, between Tambo and San Francisco. Along with other village patrols, the *ronderos,* brandishing their "pathetic" arms (lances and huaracas), sang the national anthem and paraded before the press. Among them was a 13-year-old boy, whose father and grandfather were murdered by Sendero, Along with 20 other boys and adolescents, he was taken by Sendero to caves in a remote area, and was soon participating in guerrilla attacks. He belonged to a company of approximately 100 persons; they were frequently hungry because of a scarcity of supplies. However, his "spiritual nourishment was more abundant, but uniformly toxic." He was told that *pensamiento Gonzalo* would carry them to power within two years. The boy was able to slip away during an attack. He and other deserters were turned over to an army patrol for questioning and incorporation as guides. "People who were recruited by force cannot be called *senderistas,"* declares an army officer. They know the enemy, and they are very valuable to the army, which sees a new opportunity to fight the guerrillas.

274. García-Sayán, Diego, Fernando Olivera, Jorge Trelles, and Javier Valle-Riestra.. "El terrorismo." *Debate,* no.31 (March 1985): 42-46.

Four views on terrorism and Peruvian society. All four men stress that the phenomenon of Sendero and terrorism has to be attacked at its roots. Phrases like *armas de la paz* and *paz y justicia* run through each declaration. Concrete suggestions include the establishment of a peace commission, development investment applied along with military pressure, and a definitive end to the dirty war or "official terrorism" which seems to be the government's response to the guerrilla challenge.

275. Cabrera, Julio Moreno. "Liberen a Sybila Arguedas." *Equis X,* no.434 (April 8-14 1984): 7.

The editor of *Equis X* calls for the freeing of Sybila Arredondo de Arguedas, widow of the late eminent novelist, now a prisoner in Canto Grande. Her arrest was groundless, without proof; her continued incarceration is an insult to the memory of a great writer. The week's "De buena fuente" section reproduces two documents smuggled out of El Frontón prison. The inmates, who identify themselves as "transitory prisoners of the shining trench of combat" in El Frontón, have taken prison personnel as hostages. In their statements, they name their hostages, and demand better conditions from the authorities. They also demand that the press, human rights workers, and officials from the justice ministry be allowed access to the jail.

276. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "¿Sendero en derrota?"*Caretas,* no.846 (April 17 1985): 34-36.

In an unconventional war, a war without fronts or identifiable enemies, traditional strategies are useless; it is also hard to tell whether one is winning or losing such a war. It is common, for example, to confuse retreat with defeat; the government has made this error many times in relation to Sendero. Premature optimism has been dramatically refuted by Sendero more than once. The general elections of Sunday, April 14 posed a challenge that Sendero could not refuse. According to Shining Path, there are two co-existing governments in Peru, and two Presidents; theirs is Gonzalo, president of the Republic of the New Democracy. Gorriti quotes from Sendero's manifesto, which rails against the "Papal offensive" and the "electoral carnival"*(farándula).* The response of the Ayacuchan people, writes Gorriti, to those secular dervishes of blood and extermination, could not be more resounding. In Huamanga 133,000 people voted; the number of spoiled or blank votes was significantly low, similar to the national percentage. In Huanta these invalid ballots were even fewer than in Huamanga. Gorriti analyzes the vote, both in statistical and in political terms (APRA versus IU). He also examines Sendero's influence in specific departments; there are areas where its control seems to be slipping in recent months. While it is premature to declare victory (as some in the government would do), there may be room for cautious optimism.

277. "From Callao Prison: Comrade Meche Undaunted." *A World to Win,* no.2 (April 1985): 56-57.

Interestingly, *A World to Win* reprints a translation of the December interview with Laura Zembrano Padilla published in *Equis X*, declaring that the interview "appears to be authentic." Comrade Meche discusses her trial, her treatment at the hands of the intelligence services, and defends Sendero as a moral, not indiscriminate, instrument of justice.

278. "New Pamphlet From Ayacucho: 'After the Papal Offensive...The Election Hoax.'" *A World to Win,* no.2 (April 1985): 58-60.

Text of a PCP pamphlet distributed shortly after the Pope's visit to Ayacucho and before municipal elections. *A World to Win* cannot verify whether this is an official party statement, but believes it is genuine. Sendero calls not only for the people to boycott the elections, but declares its intention of stopping them where revolutionary forces are strong enough. It concludes: "Fight and Resist, Repudiate the Genocidal Regime's Elections and Further Develop the Armed Struggle!"

279. "PCP Document: On the Shining Path of Mariátegui." *A World to Win,* no.2 (April 1985): 46-51.

Excerpts from the pamphlet "Reclaim Mariátegui and Rebuild His Party," originally published by the PCP in 1975. It sets out the political and ideological line of the party, the basic line for revolution in Peru, its targets and goals, and its appraisal of the current political situation. A valuable primary document, and one that demonstrates that Sendero's plans and aims were clearly laid out well in advance of the ILA in April, 1980.

280. "Peru: Pope Fails to Halt Revolutionary Tide." *A World to Win,* no.2 (April 1985): 46-51.

Virulent attack on the Pope after his February visit to Ayacucho. Sendero, it notes, is accused of being "messianic" or "fanatical." Now the reactionaries "send a true religious fanatic, a man who calls himself a personal representative of the Messiah on earth, to demand that the oppressed rest content with this world for the sake of some other, and lay down their arms and cease striving to bring about material changes by material means." The Pope, it points out, condemned only the violence of the so-called terrorists, never mentioning those killed by the security forces. A summary of the papal visit, the January 1985 Amnesty International Report, and a general review of the strategic situation follow.

281. Lernoux, Penny. "Will the People Now Take Power?" *The Nation* v.240, no.18 (May 1 1985): 552-555.

Report on the growth of grass-roots organizing in Peru's hard-hit cities. Lernoux describes Villa El Salvador, one of the *pueblos jóvenes* of Lima, where brick and cement homes are replacing mud huts, some streets are being paved, and block-by-block mobilization has organized the first- and second-generation peasants who left the sierra for the city. García of APRA and Barrantes of IU are reaping the benefits of the grass-roots efforts first encouraged by the Velasco regime of the early 1970's. The desperate economic situation in Peru has hit the shanty-towns around the capital especially hard. One-third of the nation's population now lives in or near Lima. Real wages have declined 40% in four years. Local banks charge 120-200% interest for loans. Lima, once a regal metropolis, now resembles Calcutta. Lernoux briefly describes the social and economic plans of Velasco, which were abandoned by those who overthrew him. Each swing of the pendulum brings a more violent response in Peru; that response is now Sendero, which advocates a violent cleansing of Andean society while invoking a pseudo-Inca mysticism. Sendero, apart from rural areas, seems to appeal most strongly to poor urban youth frustrated by lack of jobs and educational opportunities. Women's groups, grass-roots level political organizations, and other popular organizations are the best defense against the guerrillas. Lernoux believes that these slum movements offer a genuinely democratic bottom up alternative to violence.

282. Acevedo, Jorge Luis. "¿Qué trama Sendero?" *Equis X,* no.438 (May 6-12 1985): 7-9.

Recent attacks, including the attempted assassination of Domingo García Rada, head of the national election board, have drawn attention to Sendero's presence in Lima. The actions appear to be part of a "great leap" by Shining Path, whose emphasis is not selective assassination, as some have surmised, but the establishment of the base of popular committees central to the Popular Republic of the New Democracy. Acevedo analyzes the recent *senderista* broadside against the elections, and examines the role of the popular committees in the revolution.

283. Flores Araoz, Fernando. "Sendero en Nueva York." *Oiga* (May 20 1985): 28-31.

An active campaign of support for Sendero has been mounted in European capitals and North American cities. Peruvian diplomats have been threatened in anonymous phone calls, and demonstrations have been held in front of Peruvian diplomatic offices. The U.S. government, preoccupied with Cuba and Nicaragua, is indifferent to these alarming developments. Behind the movement, *Oiga* believes, is the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, to which the PCP-SL belongs. *Oiga* visited Revolution Books in New York City, the center of Sendero activity in this country (together with the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru, based in Berkeley, California). There its reporter purchased Sendero propaganda from a *simpático* gringo. Shining Path, the article says, must be fought internationally as well as in Peru.

284. "The Sword That Hangs Over Peru." *The Economist* v.295, no.7395 (May 25 1985): 42.

On the tenth anniversary of ILA, the "fourth sword of Marxism" struck 20 times in Lima, attacking both the U.S. and Chinese embassies. Sendero has declared war on APRA, killing a congressman and the heads of the election commission. Sendero is characterized as very rural, drawing its strength from peasant areas like Ayacucho. The army's crackdown has partially driven it from Ayacucho, but this has only caused it to spread: to Lima shantytowns, to the northeast coca-producing areas, to Cajamarca in the north, and to Puno on the Bolivian frontier in the south. Alán García denounced Belaúnde's "dirty war" against Sendero during the campaign, but said nothing about how he would fight the guerrillas; now that he is president, it is his party that is under fire.

285. "Comunicado sobre 5° aniversario del inicio del movimiento guerrillero." *Equis X,* no.440 (May 20-26 1985): 14-15.

Text of a proclamation by the imprisoned *senderistas* in El Frontón, entitled "On the May 17 5th anniversary of the victorious armed struggle," in which the "prisoners of war" pledge to "hoist even higher the red flag of the Peruvian revolution," and celebrate their faith in complete, total, definitive, and perfect victory.

286. González, Raúl. "Sendero del terror." *Debate* v.7, no.32 (May 1985): 19-20.

A reflective essay on the war. If the government's many errors in fighting Sendero could be reduced to just one, González writes, it would be a failure to comprehend the causes and nature of the insurrection, and therefore no idea on how to fight it. The state first characterized the revolution as the work of "delinquents," easily handled by the police. When it became clear that the magnitude of the problem was much greater, the military decided to "cleanse" the zone as if *senderismo* were a plague. More than 5,000 deaths later, with 21 provinces in a state of emergency, the government is no closer to a solution than it was in 1980. Now that the *belaundistas* are leaving and the *apristas* are taking power, the country waits for imagination, audacity, and intelligence to confront a problem that squeezing a trigger will not resolve.

287. Atlin, J. and J. Nef. "Peru's 'Shining Path.'" *International Perspectives* (May-June, 1985): 25-28.

Workmanlike if conventional account of the war in the mid-1980s. The authors lay emphasis on the strains of messianism and personalism that run through Sendero, noting that Guzmán was expelled from *Bandera Roja* in the 1960s for heresies, one of which was "occultism," the use of local customs and messianic traditions to gain the support of the peasantry. Atlin and Nef are pessimistic about the failures both of development and of the government's counterterrorism. They conclude with an arresting quote from a Bolivian magazine: "In the Corner of the Dead life is worth little. To be a Senderista suspect is dangerous. To be on the side of the government is also dangerous. Not to be either can be mortal."

288. Peckenham, Nancy. "Ayacucho Under Siege." *NACLA Report on the Americas,* v.19, no.3 (May/June 1985): 6-8.

Sympathetic account of a city under military occupation. Five thousand people have died in Ayacucho since 1980, and 2,000 more have disappeared. Peckenham spoke with the city's mayor, Leonor Zamora, a professor from Lima, who campaigned for an end to human rights violations, and to Pablo Rojas, director of the National Human Rights Commission, about the widespread military campaign of terror. She describes several recent instances of blatant police and Marine atrocities, and intimidation of the press and human rights workers to prevent investigation of such abuses. She also visited the island prison fortress of El Frontón. She concludes with a quote by the father of a prominent *senderista:* "There is an old saying...When all the doors of reason and of justice

close, the doors of violence open. When state violence is permanent, the violence which is the response of the people will be permanent. Sendero's best ally is the violence from the state."

289. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "La pachamanca fue después." *Caretas,* no.854 (June 10 1985): 32-34.

Caretas publishes a rare photo of Abimael Guzmán Reynoso at an rural picnic in 1963, soon after his arrival in Ayacucho. Gorriti recreates a golden time when people believed that Ayacucho might become the primary university city in Peru. Some of the most promising intellectuals and professors in the country, as well as notable foreign scholars, had come to a vigorous and restless university in one of the most backward and traditional places in the Peruvian Andes. The following years repeatedly battered what was believed to be a difficult, but entirely feasible idea: that a university could be the engine of local development. Cuts in pay, the slow emigration of academics, friction between "cosmopolitan" and "provincial" intellectuals, and above all, political sectarianism, increasingly impoverished the university. Gorriti recounts Guzmán's growing influence at the University, where, despite reports to the contrary, he and the rector, Morote Best, did not get along. One professor remembers Guzmán's aggressive, combative style in faculty meetings, his intolerance of ideas contrary to his own, and his habit of labeling opponents "idiots" *(babiecas).* At the same time, he gathered disciples around himself as he preached the gospel according to Chairman Mao (who had just launched the Cultural Revolution in China). The formal dominance of Sendero at Huamanga ended with violent disputes with other leftist groups in the 1970's. Expelled from the University, Sendero prepared for war.

290. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "Terrorismo: el plan de Apra." *Caretas,* no.855 (June 17 1985): 38-42.

What will Apra's plan be for fighting terrorism? *Caretas* reports on discussions with diverse elements within the party on the García government's blueprint for combating Sendero. Gorriti names the Apra functionaries and advisors who are influential in the planning of a new counterinsurgency strategy. In studying the reasons why Sendero chose Ayacucho to launch their revolution, Apra has critiqued the Belaúnde government for minimizing Sendero, and forcing a poorly-disciplined and underequipped police force to fight the guerrillas alone. Apra's new strategy for "pacification" will stress development. Despite plans for a Peace Commission, one *aprista* close to García asked "Dialogue with who? There's no vocation for dialogue on the part of Sendero, and not even any leaders authorized with whom we could talk."

291. Ash, Robert B. "The Rural Struggle in Latin America: The Case of Peru and Sendero." *RUSI* [Royal United Services Institute] *Journal,* v.130, no.2 (June 1985): 39-42.

Ash, writing for a military audience, focuses primarily on Sendero's strategic and tactical blueprint for revolution. Guzmán has outlined a five-stage war against the state, adapting Mao's traditional three-stage plan to Peruvian realities. He appears to have substituted a fifth and final stage of his people's war--terror to paralyze first the rural, and finally the urban populations in order to bring about the collapse of the cities--for Mao's third stage, in which a people's army would launch a strategic offensive to bring down the state and take power. In this way Sendero avoids the need to build a regular army, with the large number of combatants and the broad popular support required. Ash wonders whether cities and the countryside can be controlled by terror alone, and whether that terror can bring about an Inca agrarian society in a predominantly urban nation.

292. Ash, Robert B. "Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian Crisis."*Conflict Quarterly,* v.5 (Summer 1985): 19-31.

Extremely well-written overview of Sendero's revolution. Ash places Sendero within its Andean context, stressing the movement's messianic nature and its appeal as a war of "Incaic national liberation." He also outlines Peruvian politics from the 1968 military coup through the post-military administration of Belaúnde, and the socio-economic makeup of the rebellion's heartland. Ash analyzes Sendero's Maoist ideology, linking it several times to Cambodia's Khmer Rouge. He notes that Sendero differs from Maoist "people's war" through its use of terror: where Mao urged the revolution to befriend, not intimidate the peasantry, Sendero has apparently decided that it need only convert a part of the populace; it can neutralize through violence those whom it does not convert. Ash concludes that Sendero's success in the countryside will not automatically translate into equal success in Peru's urban areas; he also wonders if alternative leadership (Guzmán at the time was rumored to be ill or dead) will be as farsighted and decisive as Sendero's founder. Much, he concludes, rests with the incoming administration of Alán García.

293. "Partido Comunista del Perú (SL) contra Moviemiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru." *Equis X,* no.446 (July 1-7 1985): 15.

According to *Equis X* 's sources, MRTA has sought out the highest levels of Sendero in order to coordinate action. But Sendero's response has been cool. After listening to Túpac Amaru's proposals, the *senderistas* replied that the Peruvian and world revolution were being directed by President Gonzalo according to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist guiding thought. Anyone who wished to participate had to accept his leadership before ideological preparation. Sendero considers MRTA a rival group composed of petit bourgeois radicals. The remainder of the piece discusses the possibilities that Sendero will give the new *aprista* government breathing space before renewing its war.

294. Boris, Jean-Pierre and Jan Thielen. "Testimonio de un senderista." *Debate*, no.33 (July 1985): 33-42.

Debate publishes the transcript of an interview conducted by reporters in Ayacucho with a *senderista,* originally printed in *Le nouvelle observateur.* The guerrilla describes his early education in a popular school, and his first contributions to the struggle: painting slogans on walls and putting up posters, before moving up to simple sabotage and bank robberies. He is now a member of a platoon of fighters in the jungle, and describes its arms and composition; he also describes several actions in which he participated against the army. The reporters challenge him on thornier issues, like the execution of peasants (which he says are fabrications of the government-partial media). Local authorities who deserve death are killed only after being judged by the people. But, say his interviewers, isn't Sendero's brutality responsible for its losing support among the people? Isn't this proof of ideological weakness? No, responds Comrade Abraham; President Gonzalo himself said "the traitors against the people should be torn into a thousand pieces." As he explains the political and military strategy of the party, his discipline and thorough ideological training are strikingly apparent.

295. Information Bureau, Revolutionary Internationalist Movement. "Expand and Strengthen the Movement to Support the Revolution in Peru." *A World to Win,* no.3 (July 1985): 60.

The March 1984 Second International Conference of Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations has called upon the revolutionary proletariat and oppressed peoples to support the People's War being waged under the leadership of the PCP. The proletariat is a single class worldwide, and therefore the struggle in Peru is merely part of a international struggle to liberate all of humanity from the world system of imperialism.

296. "PCP Central Committee: Don't Vote, Step Up Guerrilla Warfare to Seize Political Power for the People." *A World to Win,* no.3 (July 1985): 52-59.

Text in English of the PCP's call for the people of Peru to boycott the elections of April, 1985.

297. "Peru Support Sprouts Everywhere." *A World to Win,* no.3 (July 1985): 61-65.

In contrast to the Peruvian government's insistence that Sendero is "isolated," support for the PCP is growing all over the world. *A World to Win* lists some of the activities of committees and organizations from Nepal, India, France, Italy, England, Sweden, and the United States, protesting the Peruvian government's repression and demonstrating solidarity with the people of Peru. Committees to Support the Revolution in Peru have been formed in Spain and the Dominican Republic; in Colombia, New Zealand, Denmark, and other countries. Leaflets and newspaper articles have helped "rattle the walls of silence and slanders" with which the imperialists and their flunkies have tried to contain the revolution in Peru.

298. "Peru's New President of Counterrevolution." *A World to Win,* no.3 (July 1985): 66-72.

A new face has been chosen to preside over the armed counterrevolution: Alán García. *A World to Win* condemns the Peruvian elections as a sham, carried out under the guns of helicopters, tanks, and armored cars. The article attacks García and APRA, as well as Barrantes and Izquierda Unida, as actors in a farce, a "chronicle of an election foretold." The military, the article declares, will continue to be the final arbiter of political life in Peru. The issues and positions involved in the transfer of power from Belaúnde to García are interpreted from a Maoist point of view.

299. Montiel, Edgard. "El Perú en la encrucijada." *Cuadernos americanos,* v.261, no.4 (July-August 1985): 50-57.

A reflective essay, in which Montiel begins by recalling the emergence in 1971 of the Student Revolutionary Front "by the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariátegui," when it won elections at the UNSCH. The FRE soon distinguished itself from the many other radical groups agitating on campus by its extremism. Montiel links together several themes: Ayacucho as an older, more ancient Peru, an area "unlinked" to the rest of the country today; Fernando Belaúnde Terry's administration as a "government of whites," lacking any vision of Peruvian reality; a Peru governed by a "dominant class" that is nevertheless still not a "directing class;" and a "historical amnesia" that seems oblivious to the needs of the nation. Montiel is disappointed at the "atomization" of the left, but slightly more hopeful that APRA is modernizing and re-radicalizing itself, and might become a party that will seek alternatives for the country.

300. Arroyo, Abilio and José González. "Signos de la lucha." *Caretas,* no.863 (August 12 1985): 40-44.

Reporting from the Ayacuchan jungles, Arroyo describes signs of a *senderista* retreat. Since Sendero was forced to withdraw into northern Ayacucho, thousands of people have begun an exodus to escape "people's trials" and forced recruitment. Now many are returning to their lands, and forming self-defense patrols against the *senderista* terror. Arroyo describes an army patrol 250 kilometers north of Huanta which finds, in the stifling heat of the jungle, a *senderista* cemetery, with each grave marker bearing a drawing of a hammer and sickle. The graves all carry the same date: September 28, 1984, when helicopter-borne commandos trapped a Sendero column. Five hours' march from the cemetery is a "New Peking," a guerrilla garrison established in the jungle, from where, according to *ronderos,* members of the political-military bureau of Sendero had planned the opening of a new front based in Canayre. Arroyo describes in detail a vicious struggle for the remote jungle areas of Ayacucho department, where Sendero and the army vie for the loyalty of the peasant population. Sendero obliges the peasants to cultivate crops, participate in ambushes, and submit to indoctrination; the army helps the peasants to organize themselves in self-defense patrols.

301. "Sendero y APRA: reunión del comité central del PCP (SL)." *Equis X,* no 451 (August 12-18 1985): 12-13.

According to sources, the Central Committee of the PCP recently met to discuss the political line it should adopt with respect to the new APRA government. Apparently it was decided to prosecute guerrilla war throughout the entire country, without remission, against any new measures the *apristas* might adopt, including a general amnesty. The leadership was concerned that APRA might mobilize its militants and "shock forces" against them. The new government has a high approval rating with the public, and world admiration; *Equis X* feels that it should move against subversion with good sense, replacing the "hard hand" with which the Belaúnde regime prosecuted the war.

302. "Primer documento de Sendero después de la transferencia." *Equis X,* no.453 (August 26-September 1 1985): 13.

Reproduction of a document issued by the Movimiento de Obreros y Trabajadores Clasistas (MOTC), one of the PCP's "party-generated organisms." The first "official" word since the inauguration of Alán García, the broadside calls the governments of Peru, whether civilian or military, elected or not, merely rotating cliques that exercise dictatorship over the people, proletariat, peasantry, small bourgeoisie, etc., for the benefit of the grand bourgeoisie of the landowners, dominating classes and Yankee imperialists. A proof of this is the reactionary government of García, which tries to confuse the people with talk of "lowering prices and ending corruption." It calls for strikes, widening guerrilla war, and victory to the PCP and popular guerrilla army!

303. González, Raúl. "Sendero: cinco años después de Belaúnde." *Quehacer,* no.36 (August-September 1985): 37-40.

Review of five futile years of an counterinsurgency strategy that has failed miserably. When Belaúnde sent the armed forces in to fight Sendero in 1982, he made a purely military choice; no political or economic measures were formulated to address the root problems of the affected area. The strategy mounted against Sendero has had three stages: to "cleanse" the zone, to confront the guerrillas using the civilian population, and to consolidate control of territory thus

gained. Sendero, in response, has retreated from areas it controlled (Huamanga, Cangallo, and Víctor Fajardo), and transferred its area of operations to the north (Huanta and La Mar). It has been able to maintain a growing political presence throughout the country, and the government has been forced to deploy large numbers of troops to the new "red zones." González analyzes Sendero as a politically subversive movement designed to subvert order, suggesting that it must be fought politically as well as militarily. Sidebars feature a psychological profile of *senderistas* and *senderismo*, and the four stages of people's war carried out to date (agitation and propaganda, sabotage and initiation of guerrilla war, widening of guerrilla war, and conquering bases).

304. "¿Qué harán los apristas con la subversión?" *Quehacer*, no.36 (August-September 1985): 41-42.

Persons close to the incoming administration of President García report that two books are being carefully studied, Robert Taber's *War of the Flea*, and David Galula's *La lucha contra la insurrección*, both classic works on subversive warfare. The article distills their messages into fourteen theses on how to defeat a guerrilla war.

305. "Hacia una verdadera pacificación." *Quehacer*, no.36 (August-September 1985): 43-49.

Two short pieces, "The enemy out of focus," and "Towards a new approach," plead for new thinking in the fight against Sendero. The former laments the tendency to reduce all citizens in the zone of contention to potential subversives, and to strip them of all democratic rights, giving the counterinsurgency forces *carte blanche* to fight the war in the most savage manner possible. The latter urges an end to dirty war, and an antisubversion strategy of development as well as new tactics against Sendero. Authentic local government, a statute of "social reinsertion" of the subversives, and effective regionalization are among the approaches that should be tried. President García's announcement of the establishment of a national commission of pacification is hailed as a significant step in the right direction.

306. Salcedo, José María. "Puno: ¿esperando a Sendero?" *Quehacer*, no.36 (August-September 1985): 51-64.

Sendero is moving its operations into Puno, one of the poorest and most backward departments of the country. Puno is almost a laboratory in which to observe the "Ayacuchanization" of the country, with neglect by Lima, abuse by local authorities, a tightly-interlinked elite, and poorly-prepared police providing fertile ground for Sendero. But Puno also possesses social forces that could stop subversion. The new government sees Puno as a sort of test, to see if development can block the spread of terrorism. Salcedo travels throughout Azángaro, perhaps the department's most vulnerable zone, to talk with people and see for himself if this might be so. He finds that despite its problems, Puno also has strong *campesino* organizations and social projects, such as communal stores, run by the Catholic Church. Salcedo paints a picture of a department warily neutral, one in which Sendero must act in a more restrained and less brutal manner than in Ayacucho. An old peasant naively asks Salcedo, the first *limeño* journalist he has ever met, to take a message back to President García, to tell him that his corner of Puno has been forgotten by the authorities, and needs electricity, roads, more land. Salcedo ends rhetorically, "*Señor Presidente*, you are informed."

307. "La cuarta guerra: la nueva ofensiva de Sendero, planes y misterios." *Caretas*, no.866 (September 2 1985): 24-A-24-D.

Two weeks ago a member of the "Metropolitan Political Bureau" of Sendero was captured, along with important documents. They reveal that in July, 1985, Sendero's Central Committee met somewhere in Lima, to "amplify" its 3rd national conference. The members decided to begin the "Fourth Campaign," with the objective of continuing "agitations, sabotage, and armed actions." Sendero calculated its own activities: 15,000 armed actions, more than 7,200 since the entrance of the military into Ayacucho, 472 towns taken, 1,200 "people's trials" and 5,400 executions. *Caretas* points out that Sendero has a habit of exaggerating its own deeds. It quotes further from the documents, which indicate that Comrade Gonzalo defined Sendero's posture towards the APRA government: "The attacks should continue without giving APRA the opportunity to deceive us"; the attacks should be aimed where the government places its greatest interests and investments.

308. Acevedo, Jorge Luis. "Comisión de paz: ¿Diálogo con Sendero?" *Equis X*, no.455 (September 9-15 1985): 7-9.

On July 28 the President announced his intention to form a Peace Commission to explore ways of ending the country's violence. Acevedo gauges the reaction of various civilians and security force members. Certain sectors of the government are opposed to even attempting dialogue with the guerrillas. It is interesting that *Expreso, Caretas,* and *Oiga* have emphasized recent car-bombings and ambushes, as proof that Sendero is uninterested in talking. The article analyzes where members of the Peruvian left, the people of Ayacucho, and certain officers stand on the question of dialogue. It concludes with some recommendations for immediate consideration by the new Commission.

309. Arroyo Espinoza, Abilio. "Marcas de la muerte."*Caretas,* no.868 (September 16 1985): 26-31.

Arroyo puts all too human a face on the war with a chilling piece about a *senderista* attack on a sierra village. The reporter arrived in the village of Marcas, in the province of Acobamba, department of Huancavelica, the day *campesinos* were buried after an assault by a Sendero column. Arroyo relates how 50 terrorists launched an attack on August 29, shooting and hurling dynamite; the village *ronda* fought back furiously and compelled the guerrillas to retreat. The peasants managed to capture the woman *senderista* who had led the assault, as well as a young boy who appeared to be no more than 13 years old. Arroyo writes, "Despite the authorities' intentions, the lynching could not be stopped. The woman died the same night, while the boy remained naked and in agony in the plaza." The next day an army patrol arrived; they dressed the boy and tried to help him, but he died of a fractured skull. The *senderistas* were buried in opposite corners of the plaza, in the direction from where they had launched their attack. According to a ritual belief, this will free the pueblo from a new attack, or in any case from a possible defeat.

310. "Terrorismo y violencia en Lima metropolitana." *Debate,* no.34 (September 1985): 50-56.

Debate asks *limeños* a series of questions on terrorism and violence in Peru today. An overwhelming majority of those polled do not believe that violence is justifiable, and almost half support repression as the best means of suppressing Sendero. More than 50% also believe that Sendero is receiving financing from abroad, and a majority rejects any amnesty for guerrillas and favors the death penalty for terrorists. The questions reveal a populace frightened by car bombs and the murder of policemen; however, 80% support President García's formation of a peace commission.

311. Steinitz, Mark S. "Insurgents, Terrorists, and the Drug Trade." *The Washington Quarterly,* v.8, no.4 (Fall 1985): 141-153.

Criminal elements have traditionally dominated the international narcotics trade. Lately, they have been joined in drug trafficking by a growing number of insurgent terrorist groups. Many factors account for this phenomenon: the explosive growth in demand for narcotics, the lucrative nature of the business, and the growing tendency for insurgency, terrorism, and the drug trade to be located in the same area, usually in remote rural areas where central authority is weak and economic infrastructure lacking. Steinitz, a former DEA intelligence officer, analyzes Peru, Colombia, Burma, Lebanon, Turkey, Italy, and the Basque country for similarities and differences. Steinitz believes that the presence of insurgencies in narcotics-growing areas may spur governments to greater efforts to combat both dangers, but that problems in waging simultaneous counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics campaigns may outweigh the advantages of such an approach.

312. Flores Galindo, Alberto. "Pensando el horror." *El zorro de abajo,* no.2 (September-October 1985): 36-38.

The discovery of a mass grave at Pucuyacu has moved Flores Galindo to reflect with horror upon what is happening in his country. The spiral of violence, with clandestine cemeteries, disappearances, extrajudicial executions, is reminiscent of Buenos Aires in 1977-78. Society must fight back against the savagery and barbarism into which it is slipping. Torture predated the appearance of terrorism in Peru; maltreatment at the hands of the GC or PIP is indiscriminate and widespread. Flores Galindo comments upon a book by a Canadian priest, Richard Renshaw, on police abuses of civilians even in places far away from the emergency zones. Torture must be confronted, he says; the silence surrounding it must be broken. Authoritarianism, barbarism, and frustration are incompatible with a democratic society.

313. Acevedo, Jorge Luis. "Exterminio o diálogo." *Equis X,* no.459 (October 7-13 1985): 8-10.

The government and the armed forces have to choose between one of two strategies to fight against Sendero. While congressmen of Izquierda Unida are complaining that no progress in human rights is apparent under the new government, others are asking, if this is a war we're in, why pretend to put restrictions on those fighting it, restrictions that the guerrillas don't have to obey? Acevedo examines the debate now being conducted at the highest levels of government. Does the naming of a Commission of Peace indicate the abandonment of what amounts to a doctrine of "dirty war"?

314. Cabrera Moreno, Julio. "Viernes negro." *Equis X,* no.460 (October 14-20 1985): 3.

Editorial on the massacre of 34 political prisoners in the "Británica" wing of Lurigancho, killed on October 4 when special police, the *Llapan Atic* of the Republican Guard, stormed the prison. The country is repelled by the brutality and bad faith of the assault, during which the GR blew out the walls of the prison with dynamite. Many of those imprisoned for "terrorism" have been jailed without trial for a year or longer. Cabrera Moreno places the blame directly on callous officials. In the "De buena fuente" section of the journal, the editor of *Equis X* interviews one of those wounded in the assault. The *senderistá* declares that some of his fellow prisoners died crying *"¡Viva el Partido Comunista! Viva el Presidente Gonzalo! Viva la revolución! Viva la lucha armada!"*

315. Moreno, Elías. "Habla abogada de senderistas."*Equis X,* no.460 (October 14-20 1985): 28-31.

Interview with Martha Huatay, lawyer for many of the prisoners who died in the Pabellón Británico. She calls the massacre an act of genocide, and accuses the government of deliberately concentrating political prisoners accused of terrorism in one wing of the prison, precisely in order to carry out such a massacre.

316. "Sendero Luminoso y terror selectivo." *Equis X,* no.462 (October 28-November 3 1985): 12.

Miguel Castro Castro, director of El Frontón prison, has been assassinated, almost certainly in retaliation for the deaths of *senderistas* in Lurigancho. A list of those who would be on Sendero's "hit list" *(ajusticiamientos)* would include the national prison director, the head of Lurigancho, and the chiefs of the GR and Llapan Atic. Within Sendero's popular guerrilla army is an intelligence apparatus that compiles information on officials slated for "popular justice." *Equis X* states that there are five cells inside Lima for such executions, and describes how Sendero plans and carries out these terrorist actions. The "Semana política" (Political week, p.16) section describes how the four men and one woman hit squad carried out the murder.

317. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "Entre dos fuegos." *Quehacer,* no.37 (October-November 1985): 52-54.

Degregori, now director of the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos in Lima, taught at the UNSCH in the 1970's and knew many who would later become *senderistas;* he is acknowledged as the leading expert on the origins and rise of Shining Path. Ayacucho city, he reports, is fairly normal, but in the countryside, the situation is very different. In the northern jungle area, and in the southern province of Vilcashuamán, whole communities have been exterminated. The situation is one of genocide, a confrontation between a colonial army and a strange lordly juvenile contingent in an almost medieval war. This, he says, is not a metaphor; the army in Ayacucho is acting as a colonial army of occupation, employing a counterinsurgency strategy imported from France that was used without success in Algeria and Indochina, as well as by the United States in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the peasantry is literally trapped between two fires. Only the reconstruction of the social fabric, of civic and popular organizations, and the restoration of regional government can win the war.

318. González, Raúl."La otra estrategia." *Quehacer,* no.37 (October-November 1985): 55-61.

One of most important decisions facing incoming President Alán García is how to modify the counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the previous government. The military in Ayacucho is operating according to three sinister propositions: everyone is under suspicion, there are no prisoners of war, and the populace has to understand that the power of the armed forces is infinitely greater than that of the guerrillas, including the power to generate terror. Not only are these policies incompatible with human rights, but they are inefficient. The government must decide to adopt political policies that will address the socio-economic problems of the zones affected by the insurgency. If Sendero seeks to destabilize the system, the government has to work to stabilize it; to do this, it must accept that to a large segment of the population it has lost its

legitimacy. To regain the support of these people must be its goal. It must demonstrate that social justice can be gained without violence. González outlines the principal areas that must be addressed, including who should take responsibility for the conduct of the war (the Palacio de Gobierno, and not the armed forces), who should command in the emergency zones, and what changes the military should make in its conduct of the antisubversive campaign.

319. Macera, Nelson. "Guerra sucia, etnicidad y racismo." *Quehacer,* no.37 (October-November 1985): 66-69.

The discovery of a mass grave in Pucayacu has brought to the forefront the question of the nature of the war that is raging in the country. The explanation of the military, which is that individuals made a "human error"--the cowardly murder of old men, women, and children--does not absolve the armed forces. It is the government's policy of pacification, which is similar to colonial strategies pursued in Africa and Asia, that must bear responsibility. The Peruvian army is behaving like an army of occupation. Macera reminds readers that the Ayacuchans fiercely resisted the Chilean army when it invaded *la patria* during the War of the Pacific. Nor can ethnicity and racism be discounted as important factors in the security forces' behavior in the emergency zones. Most of the personnel deployed are outsiders, who do not speak Quechua; in fact, most of the elite forces are from the coast or jungle, and are now immersed in a culture that they do not understand. Macera elaborates on the gulf of ignorance and prejudice that divides the armed forces and the inhabitants of the war zones.

320. Salcedo, José María. "Zona de emergencia: el precio de la paz." *Quehacer,* no.37 (October -November 1985): 70-85.

Detailed description of what the war has done to traditional village life in the emergency zones. Townspeople are ordered to join civil defense patrols, on pain of being considered *senderistas* for refusing; either you are with the Marines or with the guerrillas. Civil defense committees have flourished in Huanta and La Mar; they provide security patrols against Sendero, but at the same time legitimize the traditional violence between peasant communities. Sendero and government repression have catalyzed these rivalries, and raised inter-communal violence to previously unknown levels. The "sides" seem to matter very little; whole villages considered "red" two or three years ago are now with "the forces of order." The military is all-powerful in the emergency zones; they totally dominate the civil authorities, and judges have virtually no power left. The changes of command from Generals Noel to Huamán to Mori have made no discernible difference at all in military policy and strategy. Salcedo paints a grim and meticulous picture of a society polarized into warring extremes.

321. "Informe secreta sobre Ayacucho." *Equis X,* no.463 (November 4-11 1985): 30-34.

Reproduction of a secret Peruvian army document, first published abroad, of an inquiry into the discovery of seven bodies in a mass grave at Pucayacu. Its recommendations include the punishment of army personnel for covering up the detention and elimination of presumed communist terrorists, and for abuse of authority.

322. "¿Es posible la pacificación?" *Debate,* no.35 (November 1985): 8-18.

Debate interviews a number of prominent Peruvian social scientists, asking them how they view the counterinsurgency war now being waged, how the insurgency should be fought, etc. Among the respondents are Hector Béjar, Francisco Díez Canseco, Monseignor Augusto Beuzeville, and Diego García Sayán. Common to their responses are the ideas that respect for human rights must be a component of the fight against Sendero, that the rule of law must be upheld, that to pacify the country a social conscience must be established, that the war zones need development. Above all, the populace needs an alternative to the two poles of violence.

323. "People's War Continues: New Regime--Same Reaction." *A World to Win,* no.4 (November 1985): 4-13.

Long analysis of the state of the struggle. The García regime has taken office promising to inaugurate a nationalist, democratic, and popular state for all Peruvians. But García can do little to address the economic crisis facing Peru, and as for "subversion," he immediately launched bloodthirsty attacks against the revolution. *A World to Win* examines the electoral campaign, the PCP's response, and the extent to which García's APRA will be unable to break with the policies

of the Belaúnde government, despite its promises. An important study of the war from the "other side."

324. "Revolutionary Art From Peru's Prisons." *A World to Win*, no.4 (November 1985): 14-21.

As part of the "Worldwide Campaign to Support the People's War in Peru," *A World to Win* reproduces paintings created by *senderistas* inside Peru's prisons. All portray attacks against counterrevolutionaries, and the triumphant progress of the people to victory. They display titles like "Break the Chains--Unleash the Fury of Women as a Mighty Force for Revolution!"

325. "Shining Trench of Combat." *A World to Win*, no.4 (November 1985): 8.

The Belaúnde government has moved hundreds of captured revolutionary fighters to three main Lima prisons (Lurigancho, Callao, Frontón), after a successful and embarrassing jail break in Ayacucho staged by Shining Path. The prisoners have turned these jails into "Shining Trenches of Combat." The daily schedule of the prisoners, which includes political education, is given. A very short piece, little more than a sidebar, but a fascinating look at the lives of imprisoned Sendero fighters.

326. "Worldwide Peru Campaign." *A World to Win*, no.4 (November 1985): 10-11.

Text of a leaflet prepared by the "Worldwide Campaign to Support the People's War in Peru," which explains the nature of and reasons behind the people's struggle to create a world free of class distinctions and oppression.

327. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "Violencia: nunca tan cerca arremetió lo lejos." *El zorro de abajo,* no.3 (November-December 1985): 33-38.

There has been a good deal of discussion about *la rabia andina*, the "Andean rage," the result of centuries of oppression and destruction of native culture and society, as a principal cause of the rise of Sendero. Degregori believes this to be simplistic. Anger exists, but another cause for violence up to the present decade has been, paradoxically, a general process of social democratization and national integration. These processes have led to confrontations between old and repressive institutions and new hopes and aspirations. But in the 1980's, Degregori says, a mutation or regression has resulted, with devastating effects on native communities. Authoritarianism and disintegration have replaced the positive movements of earlier years. Degregori discusses the horrendous impact of the war between Sendero and the state on traditional and changing cultures in the altiplano.

328. Urrutia, Jaime. "Ayacucho: los frutos de la guerra." *El zorro de abajo,* no.3 (November-December 1985): 51-53.

The sheer demographic impact of the war on Ayacuchan communities has been devastating. One notices everywhere the absence of young men, and the predominance of women, children, and the elderly. The thousands of casualties have profoundly altered the social and economic structure of highland communities. Urrutia reports on the *despoblamiento* of traditional society. The collapse of productive agricultural and pastoral systems is one effect of the war. Another is the distortion of communal structures: the imposition of civil patrols has replaced village leadership with military commanders.

329. "Terror sin tregua." *Caretas,* no.884-885 (December 30 1985): 32-35.

A wrap-up of the year 1985, which has seen attacks rise, but deaths fall. Sendero's blood-letting became more selective, and its bombings more sophisticated. A chart gives the casualty figures: 394 civilians, 14 civil authorities, 56 policemen and soldiers, and 618 civilians were killed in 1985. Since the war began in 1980, 6,936 people have died and 6,528 attacks have been carried out by Shining Path. The article analyzes the patterns of destruction: figures indicate a retreat by Sendero in the countryside, and a major offensive aimed at Lima. Spectacular car-bombs are part of what Sendero calls its "Fourth Campaign." The counterinsurgency campaign, on the other hand, has had some successes in Lima (with the capture of a *senderista* assassin), but disasters in the emergency zones; retirements of certain generals and the discovery of mass graves and massacres point to continuing human rights violations.

330. Roett, Riordan. "Peru: The Message From García." *Foreign Affairs,* v.64, no.2 (Winter 1985/86): 274-286.

Alán García, the new president, has thrown down the gauntlet at home and abroad, challenging Shining Path by undermining its appeal to Peru's disenfranchised, cracking down on the drug trade, restructuring the military, purging the police, and redefining the debt problem as a political, not economic issue by challenging the IMF. His efforts could reverse Peru's decline and stop the unraveling of its economic and social structure. If he fails, the only alternatives would seem to be the Marxist left or another military regime. Roett, professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, summarizes the record of Peru's governments since Velasco in 1968, the APRA challenge, García's initiatives, and the threat of Sendero. He calls for greater U.S. understanding of the severe constraints under which García must operate, and characterizes his administration as a dramatic experiment to demonstrate that social and economic reforms are compatible with democratic institutions.

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331. Degregori, Carlos Iván. *Ayacucho, raíces de una crisis.* Ayacucho: Instituto de Estudios Regionales "José María Marguedas," 1986.

A fundamentally important work for the study of Sendero's singular origins. In his analysis of Ayacucho, Degregori publishes the awful indices: migration, mortality, literacy, standard of living, income, electricity, potable water, hygienic services; in each Ayacucho ranks at or near the bottom among all Peruvian departments. Degregori also analyzes the economic and agro-industrial structure of Ayacucho. His conclusions are that centralizing, dependent, capitalist development in Peru has widened the gulf between Lima and many provincial areas. Ayacucho has been particularly disadvantaged by these developments; together with Apurímac and Huancavelica, these three departments form the poorest and most backward area in the country. Demographically, Ayacucho's population is scarcely increasing due to high migration; its infrastructure is seriously deficient in all aspects of modernization. The cold facts, he writes, show that the grave crisis and convulsion now affecting Ayacucho has unquestionable roots in the exploitation, misery, and abandonment of the department.

332. Degregori, Carlos Iván. *Sendero Luminoso: I. Los hondos y mortales desencuentros. II. Lucha armada y utopia autoritaria.* Documento de trabajo, 4 y 6. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1986.

One of the most significant works ever written on Shining Path's origins and objectives. Originally published as a seminar paper in 1985, Degregori's two-part study examines the environment from which Sendero emerged. He observes that Sendero chose to launch its people's war at a critical moment in Peru's history, when a weary military left politics after twelve years, a period that began progressively and ended in reaction. The PCP's audacity, political will, organization, and decentralized structure were more than a match for the civil authorities in the first years of the struggle. Sendero arrived in Indian communities not as outsiders, like other factions of the left, but within an indigenist and authoritarian tradition: "Sendero appears really like a good new landlord, almost a kind of *Inkarri* (a Quechua mythic figure) which arrives from above to impose a new order, or restore, perhaps, an old one, more just, but not necessarily democratic." Sendero emphasized communal and collectivist structures in the areas it controlled. But it also destroyed old traditional structures, like *compadrazgo*, civic and religious institutions, and familial relationships. Degregori outlines how Sendero's ruthlessness, its puritanical rule and its fanatical insistence on cutting off peasant communities from the outside world and imposing autarky on the *campesinos* eroded support for Shining Path. He concludes that Sendero cannot repeat the experience of victorious people's war in China. Nevertheless, the poverty and misery of many sectors of the population give Shining Path a tremendous advantage among Peru's young. The movement's greatest weaknesses are its rigidity, its refusal to form alliances with any other sector of the Peruvian left, and its tactics, which call for a violent frontal assault upon society to gain power. Ironically, Sendero's violence has caused not a fragmentation of society, but rather a drawing together of the center-left of the country, demonstrated by the proliferation of popular and worker organizations, peasant groups, *barrio* community organizations, women's and youth groups, and the organizing of professionals, intellectuals, journalists, and political activists. It is these groups that form a democratic alternative, and thus a threat, to Sendero.

333. Fernández Salvatecci, José Antonio. *Terrorismo y guerra sucia en el Perú.* S.l., s.n., [1986].

Expanded version of his 1984 work, *Guerrillas y contraguerillas en el Perú.* After expounding on the theory and practice of guerrilla war, Fernández Salvatecci examines how Sendero has waged this war in Ayacucho; he says that Shining Path has merely acted as the vanguard for the Ayacuchan people, whose natural rebelliousness has manifested itself since pre-Inca times. The advantage lies with Sendero, he writes, since it initiated the struggle and now channels reaction against violent repression and social injustice into daily and popular resistance. Fernández Salvatecci has added substantial sections on counterinsurgency, narcotics trafficking and fascism (which he links to the decay of capitalism in Latin America) to his original work. He identifies three models of counterguerrilla warfare that can be used against a revolution: the "bad" model (a "dirty war" of terror, characterized by torture, disappearances of suspects, and indiscriminate killing); a "good" model, in which civic action, psychological warfare, and selected violence isolates the guerrilla from the people; and the technique of "everyone against everyone and no one against anyone," in which paramilitary bodies raised from the population (popular defense committees) assume the brunt of the battle. These models have been used by successive commanders in Ayacucho, but Fernández Salvatecci believes that each has brought its own quotient of pain and suffering to the people in different ways. A detailed, if partisan, examination of how the war is currently being waged.

334. Jones, Frank Thomas Bradford. "Sendero Luminoso: Origins, Outlooks, and Implications." MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1986.

Unclassified thesis written at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Making good use of the materials available on Sendero in the first half of the decade, Jones examines the movement's use of Maoist strategy and tactics, the government's counterinsurgency program, and the relationship between the revolution and the central government's policies over the previous two decades. Jones concludes that Sendero poses no immediate danger of assuming power, but does have the capacity to inflict damage for the immediate future. Jones's analysis of the errors and failures of the counter-guerrilla strategies of the security forces is especially useful. He suggests that the U.S. can best help the Peruvian government by offering relief on its crushing debts, supporting the democratic administration of Alán García, and continuing its military training of the armed forces at the School of the Americas and in Peru (without, he cautions, permanent military advisors). He concludes, "A liberal democracy headed by a non-Marxist executive is preferable to either a Marxist or military regime on economic and political grounds."

335. Melgar Bao, Ricardo. "Una guerra etnocampesina en el Perú: Sendero Luminoso." *Anales de antropología* [UNAM-México], v.23 (1986): 163-194.

There has been a growing body of work on the phenomenon of Shining Path, amounting, Melgar Bao notes, to an interdisciplinary specialization, *senderología.* He believes, however, that despite copious academic work, there is also a consensus that the political-military praxis of the movement remains elusive. Melgar Bao's principal focus is delineating the major ethnohistorical approaches that social scientists have taken with respect to understanding Andean society. He examines in detail the economic and social structure of the Andean peasant community, as well as agrarian politics, cooperative organizing, and how Sendero and the military (through its paramilitary patrols) have utilized these communities to support their respective sides in the war. Melgar Bao believes that Sendero has achieved a cultural-military syncretism unusual in guerrilla armies. This in spite of the fact that the movement began in the cities; although the peasant appears in party documents as the principal motivating force of the revolution, the party's composition appears to be largely non-peasant. Nevertheless, Sendero has made full use of Andean traditions: the identification of Abimael Guzmán as *Puka Inti* (Red Sun) represents a blending of native lore and a cult of personality typical of leftist movements.

336. Méndez, Juan E. *Human Rights in Peru After President García's First Year.* New York: Americas Watch, 1986.

Americas Watch has closely monitored the new administration of Alán García. In his inaugural speech, García offered hope for change, making specific references to new policies that proposed to instill a scrupulous respect for international standards of human rights in the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign. Although there has been a marked decrease in cases of disappearances, extrajudicial murders, and indiscriminate killings, these abuses are still occurring in the emergency zones. Only rarely have any of these cases been investigated, and attempts to punish

those responsible have languished in the courts. Americas Watch believes that the gains that have been made in President García's first year in office are in serious jeopardy, and that the military's influence and power grows as Sendero's war widens. The report discusses a serious erosion in the independence of the national press, which has been censored and pressured to censor itself in its coverage of the war and human rights abuses. A government-convened peace commission, Congress, the judiciary, have all striven to some degree, and largely failed, to reverse the growing tide of violence and the complete militarization of the conflict. The timidity and hesitation of the nation's Supreme Court with regard to certain anti-terrorist cases before it have been particularly disappointing, as has been the conduct of the attorney general's office. Local prosecutors in the emergency zones have been far more active in acting on complaints of disappearances, which is an improvement on the record of the previous government.

337. Mercado, Rogger.*Periodismo para el pueblo y por el pueblo: artículos inéditos silenciados por la prensa burguesa del Perú, sobre Sendero y otros temas.* Lima: Ediciones Latinoamericanos, 1986.

Articles by Mercado written over a period of some six years, many of which never appeared in the Peruvian press. Mercado believes that all means of communication in his country depend on and defend the interests of the state. To Mercado, the *aprista* government is nothing more than a mask of democracy to maintain capitalist imperialism. In each article he viciously attacks García, his APRA administration, and the Peruvian military, and emphasizes the hunger, misery, uprooting and terrorism that have reached alarming proportions in Peru. In "The Red Army and Señor García" he mocks the military, which first treated Sendero Luminoso as a minuscule band of terrorists, mere cannon fodder for the powerful Peruvian armed forces: "The Red Army of Sendero fights intact in the countryside, made up of peasant soldiers who have felt at first hand the exploitation, misery, and abuse of Western and Christian civilization as well as the brutal lash of the omnipotent landlords." In an open letter to Belaúnde, he asks about human rights abuses. A footnote states that only two dailies accepted articles by Mercado which referred to armed struggle and the "open defense of popular interests." In "The Instigators of the War," he declares that exterminating a *foco* of popular insurrection has never solved anything; in another article he calls the militants of Sendero *compañeros* even though they belong to another part of the left. In a series of articles about the massacre of journalists at Uchuraccay, he accuses the military commander of Ayacucho of direct responsibility for the killings (the *campesinos* are only the material authors of the crime; the intellectual authors are the *sinchis*), and declares the Commission's report to be a cover-up.

338. Mercado Ibáñez, Iván. *El genocidio aprista contra Sendero Luminoso.* S.l.: Ediciones Latinoamericanos, [1986].

Broadside attack against the García government for its responsibility for the massacre of hundreds of *senderistas* in three Lima prisons in June, 1986. Using reporting from *Quehacer, Cambio,* and *Nuevo Diario,* Mercado Ibáñez concludes that nearly 500 political prisoners were deliberately murdered in an act of political genocide by the APRA government. The rebellion of the prisoners was provoked by the indifference of the authorities to their complaints; their uprising posed no threat to public security. García's responsibility lies in his complete abrogation of legal authority to the armed forces; the jails were declared military zones by his Council of Ministers, acting under his authority. The final victor of this bloody act is not the government, he declares, but Sendero Luminoso, in spite of the extremely high cost in human lives.

339. Partido Comunista del Perú, Comité Central. *Desarrollar la guerra popular sirviendo a la revolución mundial.* Lima: Ediciones Bandera Roja, 1986.

Six years into the struggle, Sendero asks, "How have the forces of counterrevolution reacted?" The dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and landlords, backed by Yankee imperialism, have turned the masses against each other and conducted genocidal acts against the people of Peru. The PCP catalogs a grim list of massacres, of villages raided and peasants killed, the discovery of mass graves, and incarceration and torture on a wide scale. Still, such tactics have not availed the government. Sendero boasts that it has inflicted humiliating defeat on the government, and driven it from the countryside, forcing it to take refuge in provincial and departmental capitals. A specific and detailed list of actions and a summary of the course of the struggle carried out by department and type of action (military attack, selective raid, propaganda, and armed agitation) follows. The PCP also analyzes voting patterns in the election of 1985, the state of the Peruvian economy, and agrarian reform, mocking Alán García's attempts at reform and revitalization. Sendero still believes that the ultimate aim of civilian government, even the new APRA administration, is the strengthening of "bureaucratic capitalism" and semifeudalism under the aegis of imperialism,

especially North American imperialism. It concludes, "Widen guerrilla war to serve the world revolution! Glory to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism! Long live the world proletarian revolution! Long live President Gonzalo!"

340. Partido Comunista del Perú, Comité Central. Luminosa Trinchera de Combate de "El Frontón." *Nada ni nadie podrá derrotarnos.* [Lima], 1986.

From the "Shining Trench of Combat of El Frontón" prison, a combatant declares his love for truth and freedom, and pledges his faith in the final victory of the people, even over the bodies of his murdered comrades. We were born to win; they can blow us into a million pieces, but they cannot crush our morale, he declares. "I reaffirm my commitment to our revolution with the world revolution, with the blood of our people, of our brave fighters, with the blood of our communist comrades which flows in streams washing away the old and generating the new. Never more will I see their faces, their smiles, but [they] live inside me; I will be the bearer of their ideals...I will follow their examples, to fight for our people, to serve the people with all my heart...Long live President Gonzalo, guarantor of the triumph! Long live the PCP! Glory to the fallen guerrillas!"

341. Ridgway, John. *Road to Elizabeth: A Daring High Adventure in the High Country of Peru.* London: Victor Gollancz, 1986.

Ridgway is one of a group of British adventurers hiking the Andes. Encounters with suspicious, wary peasants and alert Republican Guardsmen remind them that they are in a war zone. Although lucky enough to encounter neither Sendero nor the *rondas,* Ridgway captures the sense of remoteness, fear, and isolation in the areas affected by the war. Excellent for conveying the atmosphere of the altiplano, and the gulf between native and European worlds. A series of brilliant color photos conveys the natural beauty of the highlands.

342. Rumrrill, Roger. *Narcotráfico y violencia política en la Amazonia peruana: dos nuevos variables en la vieja historia de la selva alta y baja del Perú.* S.n., s.l., [1986?]

Brief examination of the history of coca cultivation in the Huallaga, and the radical economic, political, and cultural transformations that coca has produced. Rumrrill describes the government's program of road construction into the jungle, and the immigration from the highlands which followed. The massive influx of *andinos* from the highlands impacted upon the indigenous and mestizo populations of the area, producing economic transformation and social change. Sendero, Rumrrill notes, is operating in an area that is ecologically, culturally, and historically different from the Andean world in which it developed; but the *selva* too has its history of native resistance to outsiders. Methods that worked well in the sierra did not evoke a response among peoples molded by a complex fluvial ecology and a mythical and legendary *cosmovisión.* "In the Amazon," Rumrrill declares, "Pol Pot is tropicalized." The rigid, disciplined "Bolshevik" movement is foreign to the Amazonians; still, Sendero seeks support among the rural peasantry. Rumrrill also decries the militarization of society and violence which coca has brought. Coca expansion threatens the whole region's economy, as it replaces conventional commercial agriculture--the very reverse of the state's intentions in promoting the region. Rumrrill calls the consequences of this trend calamitous, not least ecologically, as agricultural techniques used in coca production degrade and erode the soil. Economically and socially, coca brings inflation, corruption, and violence. Nothing has slowed this destructive process. Rumrrill concludes by stating that it is time to confront the problem with the cold blooded weapons of capitalism and the free market: he proposes nothing less than to sell all the coca that Peru produces to the United States: "They will know what to do with the sacred leaf."

343. Valencia Q., Félix. *Ayacucho, sangre y miseria.* S.l.: Tierra y Liberación, [1986 or 1987].

Leftist attack on both Sendero and Peruvian society. Valencia divides his work into three parts: in the first he discusses feudal and semifeudal relations of production in Ayacucho; in the second he examines Sendero; in the third he attacks "fascist genocide" in Ayacucho. Valencia criticizes Sendero as an exclusively military organization; assaults like dynamite attacks on power lines are military actions, not the result of political work and mass popular organization with peasants and workers. Sendero's coercion and violence have caused peasants to repudiate it; Valencia quotes a 1965 MIR statement: "A revolution can never triumph by threatening or pressuring the peasants or working people." *Lucha armada* must be combined with *lucha política,* as in Vietnam against the U.S., or in Albania against the fascist Italians. Valencia calls Sendero's social composition "lumpen": students, frustrated professionals, delinquents, renegades,

narcotraficantes, et al. Because Sendero has assassinated peasant leaders and brought repression to the Peruvian left, Valencia suspects links to Yankee imperialism. He concludes that terrorism is no solution, much less when it is linked to and sustained by counterrevolutionary forces. Only a movement mobilized, politicized, and organized by the working class can convert revolutionary force into a popular victorious struggle.

344. Vevon, Gerald N. "Sendero Luminoso: Rural Revolution and Its Impact on Peru." MA thesis, University of South Carolina, 1986.

Vevon, a captain in the U.S. Army, examines Shining Path's appeal and success in Ayacucho. He commends its long and careful preparation among the Indian communities of the department, noting that it utilized the Incan superstitions of the peasants. The government's response, one of repression and force rather than economic aid and social development, has further aided the guerrillas. Vevon's observations and conclusions are based upon English-language sources; he relies extensively on the work of Palmer and McClintock.

345. Woy-Hazelton, Sandra, and William A. Hazelton. "Peru." In *Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary Record.* Edited by Jack Hopkins. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986. V.6, 1984-85. pp. 375-391.

Annual review of economic and political developments in Peru. The battered Belaúnde government has limped to the end of its term, leaving behind a virtually bankrupt and polarized nation threatened by social unrest and a raging guerrilla war. The authors spend the greater part of their essay on the presidential succession and on Peru's relations with the IMF and other foreign economic institutions. Sendero has tenaciously pursued its goal of producing generalized violence and creating bases of support among peasant communities in the Andes. Attacks have spread to every area of Peru, including the Amazon. The government, which had avoided a total militarization of the conflict, has given the armed forces complete control over the counterinsurgency war. Notable developments of the past years have been the use of civilian patrols to fight the guerrillas, and large numbers of human rights violations, a tragic commentary on the government's inability to cope with Sendero.

346. "¡Sendero nos telefonea! Texto del diálogo." *Equis X,* no.471 (January 13-19 1986): 12-13.

Switching abruptly from one phone to another, an unknown *senderista* calls *Equis X* to make certain things clear: to claim responsibility for several recent bombings, to reject any claim that Sendero is coordinating its attacks with any other group (MRTA), and to announce that Sendero's sphere of action will know no limits whatsoever. The journal believes that this is the first time ever that Sendero has communicated in this way, and acknowledges that the group has never before taken credit for or denied any attack. However, the statements of the alleged guerrilla conform to the general *senderista* ideological line.

347. Palmer, David Scott. "Rebellion in Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso." *Comparative Politics,* no.18 (January 1986): 127-146.

Sendero Luminoso, Palmer believes, evolved in unusual circumstances, which include a region isolated geographically and marginalized socially, an area that had been losing central government resources for years, an historically exploited Indian population, an energized and politicized university environment, and a charismatic leadership. In a wider sense, Palmer theorizes that although it is unlikely, the "Battle of Ayacucho" in the 1980's may acquire the same significance for the marginalized of Latin America that the Battle of Ayacucho in 1824 did for the liberation of South American from Spanish domination. Palmer traces the long history of Sendero from the early 1960's, through its various incarnations as factions of the ELN and PCP, until Abimael Guzmán perfected his 5-point plan for armed struggle and the seizure of power, a battle to which he is committed, even if it takes 75 years. The rapid changes of the decades prior to 1980 left Peru both transformed and disappointed, as rapid but maldistributed gains were followed by stagnation. Palmer shows how Ayacucho benefited from development projects in the 1960's, as access roads, potable water, health and educational facilities projects were initiated, largely by foreign agencies. The reopening of the University was a very significant change for Ayacucho, although not in the way the authorities had intended. The impulse behind the reactivation of UNSCH was to break the inertia of centuries, to foment development at the community level. Palmer shows how agrarian reform left Ayacucho worse off than before. He concludes that Sendero is in some ways only the most recent manifestation of an historic pattern of periodic organization at the periphery in opposition to the center, linking Shining Path to colonial, Incan, and Quechua

uprisings of the past. Ultimately, he says, the tardy response of the central government to the development crisis in Ayacucho, along with its emphasis on force and repression rather than economic and social development assistance, seems likely to prolong the cycle of violence.

348. Ranly, Ernest W. "Under the Peruvian Volcano." *Commonweal,* v.113, no.3 (February 14 1986): 78-82.

Ranly, a priest who has spent 12 years working and teaching in Peru, gives his own perceptions of highland culture and of the present situation in Ayacucho. He brought a mixture of radical thought, liberation theology, and Gandhian non-violent philosophy with him to the central Andes. His pastoral work at the grassroots level *(base)* sometimes brought him into conflict with Marxist church groups, whose intellectual shallowness and sloganeering dismayed him. Ranly describes the dirty war and fear now gripping the highlands communities. As a "messenger" for the Council of the Religious, he examines how the church should react to Sendero's war. The PCP itself seems to be virulently atheistic and anti-Christian, although it has so far left the church alone. However, too many of the clergy in the highlands have a pre-Vatican II mentality, and are totally unequipped to deal with the present crisis. Ranly questions whether a "non-political" church ultimately can, or should, minister to the faithful. The church must say no to violence, but it must demand peace, a fair distribution of food and medicines, and a good life for all: "It must be a church without feudal power, and without oligarch and capitalist privileges. Cathechisis, worship, and the Eucharist must go on."

349. González, Raúl. "Puno: el corredor senderista." *Quehacer,* no.39 (February/March 1986): 48-58.

Exploration of Sendero's growing influence in Puno. González describes how and when Sendero brought its war to Puno, its first attacks on police posts, its campaign of patient proselytizing in small villages, and its assaults on SAIS farms. Interviews with the leftist mayor of Chupa and SAIS employees reveal fierce struggles among *senderistas* and community leaders and activistsfor the allegiance of the people, as well as widespread fear: those who are the best bulwark against Sendero are frightened and defenseless in the highlands. But González also finds considerable support for Sendero, sometimes backed by simplistic reasoning. One teenager says "Everyone here supports them; no one is against them." Asked why he likes the guerrillas, he replies ,"Because they're in favor of the poor...they want to humble the rich." Even the president of a *campesino* organization concedes that some peasants support Sendero, because "they find themselves forgotten, there is a shortage of land, of everything. Because the peasant wants the situation to change." González finds that the peasantry understands its situation very well, and that it itself must be the agent of change. Unfortunately, little has been done by the authorities for the people, and now they are being wooed and won by Sendero, which is promising them a better world. In a short accompanying piece, a doctor who is secretary general of APRA declares that Puno will be "a second Ayacucho."

350. Salcedo, José María. "Con Sendero en Lurigancho." *Quehacer,* no.39 (February-March 1986): 60-67.

Quehacer finds it necessary once again to make clear its rejection of violence and terrorism, including Shining Path, before publishing an account of the prison life of committed revolutionaries. One of Salcedo's primary reasons for going to Lurigancho is the chance to meet with Antonio Díaz Martínez, legendary ideologue and "brain" of Sendero, supposedly the number three man in the PCP. Salcedo describes the oppressive atmosphere of the prison, the disorder and chaos outside the *senderista* block, and his entrance into another world. In contrast, the atmosphere of the guerrilla pavilion is almost monastic. Slogans, red flags, and murals cover the whitewashed walls of the prison. Young provincial and university men are in the majority. Over coffee and hot dogs, served in a manner that can only be termed gracious, Salcedo talks with Díaz Martínez. The renowned engineer acknowledges that most journalists are afraid to come to Lurigancho, but blames the authorities for fostering an atmosphere of hostility. Díaz Martínez describes the government of García as a continuation of reactionary power, which is carrying out a campaign of genocide against Sendero and its political prisoners. As for himself and his fellow *senderistas,* the life of an individual means nothing; the only thing that counts are the masses. The reporter and the guerrilla discuss the progress of people's war; Díaz Martínez denies that the movement is in retreat, even tactically. He affirms his faith in President Gonzalo, the greatest Marxist-Leninist alive, and in Sendero's revolution, the only Marxist-Leninist-Maoist party in the world in arms.

351. "Sigue la sangre." *Caretas,* no.897 (March 24 1986): 18-22.

Sixteen thousand miners of Centromín in Pasco have been on indefinite strike since February 24; since March 11 fifteen have begun a hunger strike as well. A week later an inscription appeared in their hall: "The traitors who signed [the strike accord] will pay with their lives." On March 24, Tomás Miranda Trinidad, the strikers' leader, was leading a demonstration with other union leaders and a noisy, demonstrative crowd, when a man approached him and fired four shots. Miranda died with his wife at his side; the attacker was caught a short distance away by a mob that beat him severely before turning him over to the Civil Guard. The man was identified as a *senderista;* this attack signals a new and dangerous offensive against labor leaders. *Caretas* describes Sendero's activities in the Cerro de Pasco, and the renewed calls from certain government ministers for the reinstatement of the death penalty for subversion, as well as the legal ramifications of such a move.

352. "Toque de difuntos." *Caretas,* no.898 (March 31 1986): 10-15.

The murder of the prefect of Ica, the venerable Manuel Santana Chiri, demonstrates with near-total certainty, that Sendero is persisting in its strategy of selective assassination, without regard to age (the latest victim was 76 years old), popularity, or consequent repudiation which these acts provoke. *Caretas* reviews other killings: that of Walter Wong Gutiérrez, director of the Instituto Nacional de Cultura in Ayacucho, the subprefect of Huamanga, the populist mayor of Huamanga, and many others. A report from military intelligence (SIN) says that Sendero is preparing to accelerate its campaign of selective terror, assassinating selected political figures, not merely from APRA, but from previous regimes--most of whom lack police protection--and of other prominent figures, including public servants. The report also predicts more bombs planted in public places. The government considers the curfew *(toque de queda)* to be a major weapon against terrorism; in an opinion poll, 54% of those questioned were in favor of maintaining it. The SIN believes that the "IV Campaign" of Sendero, launched in December 1984 with the slogan "Undermine the foundation of the new government," and a call to boycott elections, ended in early March. Sendero's grand plan is divided into waves, which are subdivided into steps and campaigns. Documents captured by SIN indicate the country will next see the fifth campaign of the third wave. In any case, the indications are sufficient to warrant the retention of the curfew.

353. Sobrevilla, David. "¿Es moral la acción política violenta?" *Socialismo y participación,* no.33 (March 1986): 1-10.

Sobrevilla asks whether the violence of Sendero or that of the counterinsurgency forces is justified on moral and ethical grounds. Shining Path appears to be reacting to an extremely unjust and inhuman situation in order to change it; in response the security forces claim to be upholding the democratic order. Sobrevilla looks at Sendero's own texts for clues to its motivations, analyzing them within the context of Marxist philosophy. He sets up a dialogue between opposing views on the question of whether human rights are more important than the preservation of democratic society. Those who are dogmatically in favor of revolution or its violent repression are little disposed to consider alternatives, but Sobrevilla hopes that some are open to rational discussion.

354. "Los derechos humanos en el Perú." *Quehacer,* no.40 (April-May 1986): 32-43.

In July of 1985 an international commission, headed by Nobel Prize winner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, completed an inquiry into the situation of human rights in Peru. The members of the commission visited prisons, interviewed activists, prisoners, military and judicial officials, and traveled to many parts of the country. The commission's report is not merely an enumeration of human rights violations, but an examination into the context of misery and underdevelopment in which they took place. The report further tries to comprehend the mentality prevailing among the security forces as a conditioning response to subversion. *Quehacer* lists the commission's recommendations, which include re-establishment of executive power over the armed forces, demilitarization of daily life in the emergency zones and the repeal of some of the more notorious anti-terrorist laws. Following is an interview with a member of the commission, Monsignor Luciano Metzinger ("Disappearances, Torture, Murders: No One Can Deny Them"); a rebuke to the magazine *Oiga,* which attacked the commission's findings; eight *testimonios* from Ayacucho, chosen from hundreds chronicled by the commissions; and an op-ed piece, "Further from good intentions," which charges that the writ of law has been abandoned in the emergency zones. The editorial also charges that the most stringent anti-democratic measures are being taken in the defense of democracy, and it calls for political reorganization so that the military in Peru is subordinate to the civil authorities.

355. González, Raúl. "Los mineros de Pasco: El talón de Aquiles de Sendero." *Quehacer,* no.40 (April-May 1986): 19-29.

Reports of attacks by Sendero bring González to ask, "Does Puno represent a new front for subversion?" He finds, to his surprise, that Sendero has been firmly rejected by the miners who work at Cerro de Pasco; in fact, they almost lynched a *senderista* who killed a union leader. One reason is that Revolutionary Vanguard (VR), a Trotskyist group, tried to organize the miners as early as 1969. VR's success was more practical than ideological; it helped the miner address abuses and problems in the mine, but was not able to incorporate them politically into a movement. Between 1981 and 1983, Sendero visited small settlements, called meetings, and spoke to the villagers of local problems and of desired changes, always ending by inviting them to renounce local authorities. Starting in 1984, Sendero stepped up attacks and efforts in mining communities themselves. While the guerrillas have made significant gains in many areas (typically in the most remote and elevated regions), they have so far failed to make headway among the miners themselves. González (echoed by local sociologists, journalists, and labor officials) believes that the miners are largely apolitical, interested in little beyond economic issues. Luis Kawata tried to incorporate the VR-PC militants of Cerro into Sendero in the 1970's, but failed. The miners simply rejected ideological organizing. Cerro, González writes, may be Sendero's Achilles heel.

356. "Informe secreto sobre guerra sucia (I)." *Equis X,* no.488 (May 5-11 1986): 31-34.

Publication of a secret report prepared by the International Commission of Investigation of Human Rights in Peru headed by Nobel Prize-winner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel. The report was given to President García and top members of his administration by the Commission; in the first extract published by *Equis X,* the Commission examines the relationship between the military and politics in Peru.

357. "Informe secreto sobre guerra sucia (II)." *Equis X,* no.489 (May 12-18 1986): 32-34.

In the second extract from the Commission's secret report, the Peruvian military's counterinsurgency doctrine is analyzed. The army has acted in the emergency zones as an army of occupation, with the majority of its soldiers non-Indians from coastal areas. Racism and cultural differences have therefore played a significant role in the military's treatment of civilians. The army has also used paramilitary patrols, not only to fight the guerrillas, but as a test of loyalty; those who join the patrols "pass" this test.

358. "Contrainsurgencia: ¿Se ha hecho algo?" *Caretas,* no.905 (May 19 1986): 34-38.

Three military chiefs, ex-president Francisco Morales Bermúdez, ex-Comandante General of the army Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, and ex-Minister of War Luis Cisneros Vizquerra, as well as two politicians, Alberto Borea and leftist Enrique Bernales, discuss the military situation with *Caretas*. The journal asks, Is there a counterinsurgency strategy? What would you do if it were in your hands? Has anything changed since APRA assumed power? All generally consider that the *aprista* government has not sufficiently altered the strategy of its predecessor, and has not advanced substantially in intelligence capabilities. Morales Bermúdez believes that the answer of the previous government, one of unmitigated repression, has only helped terrorism advance. He details a five-part plan to fight Sendero. Mercado Jarrín reviews the army's failures, and theorizes about possible extraterritorial links with Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile; on a global scale, terrorism is not in retreat. He calls for a national front against Sendero. Cisneros echoes the suggestions of his fellow *militares,* declaring that it would be better to call the struggle what it is, revolutionary war that seeks to destroy the political, social, and economic system. Both politicians criticize the APRA government for its policies, or lack thereof. All five men are in agreement that military solutions alone will not defeat Sendero.

359. "Informe secreto sobre guerra sucia (III)." *Equis X,* no.490 (May 19-25 1986): 32-34.

Third in a series of reports from the human rights commission. The Commission itself met with a wall of silence on the part of the military with regard to its behavior in the war zones, part of its institutional imperative to preserve itself at all costs. Denial of the "dirty war" being waged in the highlands is almost universal. One significant conclusion of the Commission is that the military is in a blind alley of its own making. Its determination to "control" the population and "exterminate" Sendero is apparent in interviews and military doctrine. The total militarization of the war resembles the situation of Argentina, including the denial of and silence on human rights abuses.

360. "Informe secreto sobre guerra sucia (IV)." *Equis X,* no.491 (May 26-June 1 1986): 38-42.

In the fourth installment of its report, the Commission examines the origins and growth of Sendero in Ayacucho. The Commission found that some peasant communities, particularly those in the Altos Valles, rejected Sendero after it forced them to abandon commercial agriculture, and closed their fairs and regional markets in its effort to "starve" the cities by destroying the commercial networks. In this context, Sendero's success in the plains translated into resentment at higher elevations, reviving old quarrels with respect to the independence of the mountain communities from those below them. In these communities, Sendero had to impose itself by force.

361. Bourricaud, François. "Pointes de vue sur la situation péruvienne: Pérou 1986." *Problemmes d'Amérique latine,* no.80 (2e trimestre 1986): 4-11.

How, Bourricaud asks, is the Peruvian situation evolving since the election of Alán García? The new administration's inheritance from the Belaúnde government were inflation, corruption, narcotics trafficking, and insecurity bred from terrorism. The problems of corruption in the state, army, and police, exacerbated by the drug traffic, have produced in the state a sort of "generalized delinquency." García, in order to instill confidence in a demoralized people, has turned to symbolism and imagination in his actions. Bourricaud wonders how effective this course will be. He has never understood exactly what motivates the people of Sendero, but it is not difficult, he writes, to imagine why provincial intellectuals oppose a society that has so denied them their place in a nation so profoundly "disarticulated." The potential anger and frustration of the *serranos* (mountain dwellers) living in their *bidonvilles* (shanty towns) in Lima is not at all mysterious. How to regard these fanatics? After conversations over the past year with President García, Bourricaud believes he knows what must be done with regard to addressing the needs of the people, but that change will take time. He discusses the ramifications of wider respiration, the added menace of *narcotráfico*, and the dangers of an evolution towards "Colombianization."

362. Favre, Henri. "Vers une sentiérisation de la société péruvienne?" *Problemmes d'Amérique Latine,* no.80 (2e trimestre 1986): 14-16.

Short but striking piece by the *doyen* of French senderologists. In 1985 Peruvian voters saw Alán García as the only man capable of dealing with the menace of Shining Path. How, Favre asks, has he responded to that challenge? While hundreds of policemen have been fired for corruption, incompetence, or abuses (and the three police agencies forced into greater collaboration), the new President has had to be more prudent *vis-à-vis* the armed forces. The military budget has not been cut, but García is working to redirect the military from its preoccupation with external threats (Chile and Ecuador) to the internal struggle with the guerrillas. García has also turned the perception of the sierra from "the Indian stain" to "the Andean trapezoid," in need of social and economic development. Nevertheless, Favre is concerned about a "senderization" of Peru; i.e., the danger of a "murderous entropy" which threatens the immense part of the population not integrated into national life, "deracinated, de-classed, de-cultured," united by the same feelings of exclusion.

363. "Informe secreto sobre guerra sucia (V)." *Equis X,* no.492 (June 2-8 1986): 34-36.

The fifth installment of the Pérez Esquivel Commission report concentrates on the government's response to the challenge of Sendero. From contemptuous dismissal by Belaúnde as "delinquents," to "dirty war" under General Noel, the state has moved to the total militarization of the conflict. The armed forces do not seem to realize that their terror and violence play Sendero's game; the guerrillas use the slogan, "See how a democratic government behaves." The state has reacted in a purely military way to Sendero's essentially political struggle. The report also states that the peasants have largely had to face Sendero alone; neither the political parties nor the Church have offered much in the way of real support. The Commission met with high church officials in Ayacucho and Cusco; their responses to questions indicated a certain distance from the conflict, if not a degree of collusion with the civil authorities.

364. Puertas, Laura, Carlos Noriega, Gustavo Gorriti, and Miguel Gonzales del Río. "Lurigancho después del exterminio: el motín, la batalla, y la matanza." *Caretas,* no.910 (June 23 1986): 7-17, 70-71.

Long, multi-part special report on the Lima prison uprisings and the government's massacre of the rebellious *senderistas.* The report describes how President Alán García was informed of the mutiny, how he convened his Council of Ministers for an emergency meeting with

the armed forces Joint Command, and their briefing by the director of prisons. The chances, he reported, that the prison guards and Republican Guard could smother the revolts by themselves were slim. The mutineers had a few machine guns, plus slingshots, bows and arrows, spears, and knives, and possibly explosives. Why not use gas, he was asked? Impossible, he replied; the prisoners had dug tunnels and built fortifications. García indicated that it was imperative that the principle of authority be immediately restoreed, and for this, military participation would be necessary. Strangely, the military did not initially receive the idea enthusiastically, but they agreed after a short discussion. Did anyone consider the casualties that might result from this decision, asked *Caretas?* The answer was no. The article describes the public announcement of the government's decision, the political maneuvering that followed, and the attack. When members of the Peace Commission arrived at El Frontón, they found some 90 Republican guardsmen present; at 3:30 p.m. the first 25 members of a Marine special operations unit reached the island by launch. At 5:30 they opened fire. The assault left the Blue Pavilion in ruins. At Lurigancho tensions were high; lawyers spoke with *senderista* rebels inside, but without result. The army arrived that evening, and at 9:30 they and the GC cordoned off the prison perimeter. Just after midnight, the attack began. Of the 126 prisoners in the Industrial Pavilion, none survived.

Caretas also describes briefly the political aftermath of the operation to retake the prisons. An editorial that describes the events in Lurigancho as an atrocity, and special reports detail the casualties of the mutiny (which included Antonio Díaz Martínez as well as other prominent *senderista* leaders), and a history of mutinies at Peruvian prisons (subtitled "Chronicles of myopia and incompetence"). A sidebar entitled "Beginning of the End?" examines Sendero's response to the "exterminations" in Lurigancho and El Frontón; another entitled "What should be done?" explores alternartives to inefficiency and brutality.

365. "The Hard Hand." *The Economist,* v.299, no.7452 (June 28 1986): 35.

The riots by imprisoned *senderistas* in three Lima prisons were accompanied by a wave of bombings in the capital; this led some to argue that an insurrection or breakout by the inmates was planned. The scale of the subsequent casualties has led many to believe that there is substance to these rumors. While there is little sympathy for Sendero, there is less affection for the Peruvian military. The brutal suppression of the riots may actually help Sendero by undermining public support for the García government. The bombing of a tourist train to Machu Picchu, which killed four foreigners, is leading some on the political right to call for harsher counterterrorist measures. Alán García said the use of force was justified; he hoped to win the backing of the Socialist International (which was meeting in Lima at the time) for his refusal to service the national debt. The visitors issued a careful statement of support, but expressed concern about possible excesses in retaking the jails.

366. Acevedo, Jorge Luis. "Monzón debe irse." *Equis X,* no.496 (June 30-July 6 1986): 7-11.

Report on how the García administration made its decision to retake the jails by force, and the legal and political ramifications of that decision. The damage done to Peru's reputation and its democratic government is immense and will be difficult to repair. General Monzón Arrunátegui, head of the joint command responsible for fighting the war and retaking the prisons, should resign. The week's "De buena fuente" section reprints translations of the stories *The New York Times* and*Washington Post* carried on the prison massacres. The *Times* emphasizes that Alán García's reputation as a social democrat and Peru's best hope for a peaceful future has been put in grave doubt by his compliance with the military's demand for a hard line with the rebels. *Equis X* also carries a statement by IU's national leadership in the form of a full-page ad, denouncing the government's handling of the uprising.

367. Cooper, Nancy and Liz Balmaseda. "Peru's Rebels Flame Out." *Newsweek,* v.107, no.26 (June 30 1986),: 42.

Story on the prison uprisings in Lima. The *senderistas* prepared for war, Cooper reports, digging tunnels and trenches, and making flame throwers and bows and arrows. They initiated the revolt by seizing hostages and attacking guards. At Lurigancho, the rebels held out all night, manning makeshift barricades and singing revolutionary songs. *Newsweek* reports that an opposition senator charged the government with murdering about 60 rebels after they had surrendered. Is the high body count a measure of Alán García's desperation? Sendero has spurned his offer to dialogue, and the generals are frustrated and wanted to hit back hard at the guerrillas. García could not hold off the military without seriously damaging its already fragile support of his presidency. Cooper concludes, "The bloody outcome may have looked bad internationally, but García was undoubtedly more interested in how it played at home."

368. "Aquí fue: la pugna y la denuncia." *Caretas*, no.911 (June 30 1986): 12-17, 72.

Report on the aftermath of the prison uprising and massacre. Rumors about a possible military coup swept not just Peru, but throughout Latin America. Politicians from all over the continent expressed their support for the democratic government of Alán García.

369. "Savage Path." *Time*, v.127, no.26 (June 30 1986): 55.

Brief report on the prison uprisings at El Frontón (on an island in Callao harbor), Lurigancho in Lima, and the women's prison at Santa Barbara. "After mediation efforts failed," the President sent in 200 Marines, backed by armored cars and helicopter gunships. As many as 400 *senderistas* died; government casualties were 3 dead and 20 wounded. *Time* states that "Nearly all the 300 inmates at El Frontón are reported to have died in gunfights with troops or after tunnels that they had dug on the island collapsed on them. At Lurigancho, about 100 rebels died of burns and asphyxiation when troops fired antitank missiles into their fortifications." *Time* concludes that "the swift suppression of the prison riots may have marked a turning point in the President's counterterrorism policies."

370. Berríos, Rubén. "The Search for Independence." *NACLA Report on the Americas*, v.20, no.3 (June 1986): 27-32.

The military coup that overthrew Fernando Belaúnde Terry's civilian government in 1968 differed radically from other revolts in Latin America. The Velasco regime instituted policies of agrarian reform, economic nationalism, limited nationalization, and a strong anti-U.S. foreign policy. A decade of technological and doctrinal ties with the Soviet bloc (partly initiated by the U.S.'s refusal to sell Peru advanced weaponry), exacerbated U.S.-Peruvian relations. Now Alán García has staked out bold new positions on Peru's foreign debt, its relationship with the IMF and World Bank, its diplomatic relations with Cuba, Nicaragua, and other Latin American nations, and with the Reagan administration. Berríos concludes, "...as García attempts to diversify Peru's international alliances in an increasingly bipolar world, he is likely to find that his chosen path is a bumpy one."

371. González, Raúl. "Gonzalo's Thought, Belaúnde's Answer." *NACLA Report on the Americas*, v.20, no.3 (June 1986): 44-48.

Important synthesis of González's many articles in *Quehacer*. The civilian government of Belaúnde initially paid absolutely no attention to the new guerrilla movement in a remote and unimportant department. Belaúnde's ministers consistently downplayed the scale of the insurrection, until Sendero moved its operations closer to Lima, blacking out the capital and attacking the headquarters of the ruling Popular Action party. The police proved unable to contain Sendero, and this challenge to the government's authority, combined with the deterioration of the economy, eroded the regime's credibility. When it became apparent that the police had failed, Belaúnde sent in the army. The military's strategy was to block the classic Maoist prescription for guerrilla war: the dictum that the guerrilla is the fish that swims in the sea of the people. The army conducted sweeps through the mountains in "cleaning up" operations, intent upon separating the rebels from their base of support --i.e., draining the sea in order to kill the fish. Under General Noel's command, two grim rules were established. One was that no prisoners were taken, which meant the security forces had a license to commit extrajudicial murder. The other was to make the civilians understand that the power of the state to inspire terror was infinitely greater than that of Sendero. After national and international outcries over widespread human rights abuses, Noel was replaced by General Huamán, whose strategy was to build anti-Sendero organizations, the *rondas campesinas*. After Huamán complained that a lack of funding prevented him from fulfilling his plans, he was sacked. This is the strategy and the military situation that García has inherited. González concludes by describing Sendero's plans for a five stage-revolution which they believe will bring them to power.

372. Reid, Michael. "Building Bridges? García Confronts Sendero." *NACLA Report on the Americas*, v.20, no.3 (June 1986): 43-45.

A confidential report by the National Intelligence Service (SIN) predicts that Sendero will soon be a real threat to the García government. Guerrilla actions increased from 2,408 in 1984 to 3,079 in 1985. Although severely repressed in Ayacucho, Sendero has succeeded in spreading to Puno, Ancash, and La Libertad, as well as stepping up urban actions around Lima. A new

guerrilla group, MRTA, has joined Sendero in challenging the state. García has introduced a new strategy to fight the rebels, combining sophisticated counterinsurgency techniques with political and economic reforms. He is diverting resources from debt service to what he calls the "marginalized 70% [of Peru's population], agricultural and *campesino,* unemployed and street vendor, provincial and shanty town." He has also promised to punish violators of human rights, saying "To fight barbarism it is not appropriate to fall into barbarism." Three generals have been sacked so far, but Reid believes that García and the army have reached an understanding, in which there will be no investigations of past allegations of abuses in return for an end to indiscriminate massacres and disappearances. Reid also questions whether the government has been able so far to come up with any policies with which to implement its broad goals. Meanwhile, Sendero shows absolutely no sign of compromise or softening of its hard line. In a rare interview, a *senderista* called the APRA government "the continuation of a reactionary power."

373. Salcedo, José María. "The Price of Peace: A Report from the Emergency Zone." *NACLA Report on the Americas,* v.20, no. 3 (June 1986): 37-42.

Extremely important report from towns in the emergency zones. Salcedo shows how communities like Vicos and Tapuna in Huamanga illustrate the complexity of the current situation in the emergency zones. Rather than just a battle between civil patrols and guerrillas, the fight is also between rival communities over long-standing grudges and grievances. With rare exceptions, civil defense committees have become a civilian arm of the counterinsurgency war. Any community that refuses to join the civil defense network--indeed, any person who refuses to enlist--must automatically be considered *senderista*, either by the military or by a rival community. But even though the patrols now constitute the first line of security and vigilance in the highlands, "they are a way of legitimizing the traditional violence between rival communities." Both Sendero and the military have "capitalized on these longstanding rivalries, unleashing a cycle of violence whose consequences are incalculable. Civil defense patrols often have little to do with politics; the 'war against subversion' is often a cover for land seizures, robbery, violence, and looting." Nevertheless, Salcedo feels that the tide has turned against Sendero in many areas. The "dirty war" unleashed by the military has forced many communities to collaborate with the new and more powerful terrorism of the armed forces. In addition, Sendero's efforts at forced collectivization antagonized villages with differing traditions and property arrangements. The war has left traditional structures in the highlands in ruins. The Church for the most part is silent; judges are servile, too intimidated to rule independently; and in Ayacucho itself APRA is bitterly divided between rival factions. A vibrant civil society is desperately needed as a corrective to the power of the army and the police, and in most parts of the emergency zones it is no longer functioning. Salcedo describes a reception given by the Republican Guard in Ayacucho for the local elite. Apparently, the security forces believe that improving civil-military relations in the emergency zones means wining and dining a handful of local dignitaries who have no standing with average citizens; as long as this kind of mentality prevails, the population's view of the security forces is not likely to change. Salcedo also describes the experience of Tayacaja, a town in Huancavelica. Tayacaja already had a strong peasant federation, born out of bitter land disputes with landowners in the 1970's. After communities met and decided to expel the *senderistas* in their midst in 1982, the sinchis began large-scale sweeps in which many peasants were thrown into jail, from which they were released only after paying exorbitant bribes. Mass rapes, the burning of houses, and the razing of several hamlets followed. By late 1984 peasants began to evacuate the Tayacaja area, fleeing in a mass exodus to towns like Huancavelica, Ayacucho, and Lima. Thus the state itself destroyed the only independent structures capable of standing up to the guerrillas--the popular organizations of the peasantry itself. Salcedo concludes by telling of a peasant leader from Tayacaja who had led land seizures and opposed Sendero. He was "disappeared" by the police; in jail he has become a *senderista.* Personally he favors peace and dialogue, and would like to abandon the armed struggle. A lot of people want to get out, he says, but they fear the consequences of vengeance from both Sendero and the police. "How," he wonders, "can a member of Sendero Luminoso hope to return to a normal life?"

374. Wise, Carol. "The Perils of Orthdoxy: Peru's Political Economy." *NACLA Report on the Americas,* v.20, no. 3 (June 1986): 14-26.

Long analysis of Peru's cyclical economic crises, from the Velasco regime (1968-1975) to the present APRA government. Wise examines how Alán García has altered Peru's relationships with international foreign institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. García's defiant stand has earned him enormous support within Peru, but inflation, dependence on foreign capital and commodity exports, corruption, and inefficiency all remain serious problems. Above all, the war against Sendero and the need to support large military expenditures (even now most of the military budget is directed toward external threats like Chile,

and not dedicated to counterinsurgency), prevent Peru from taking García's "alternative path to economic recovery."

375. Vázquez, Mario and Paul Doughty. "Cambio y violencia en el Perú: el problema del indio hoy." *Socialismo y participación,* no.34 (June 1986): 115-123.

Paper prepared for the symposium on "Anthropological Perspectives on Peace in Guatemala and Peru" at the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association in December, 1985. Vásquez and Doughty explore the complex question of ethnicity in a European, mestizo, and Indian Peru. In the 1970's students at the UNSCH elaborated plans for a project in the department, focusing on communal organization for small-scale infrastructure development for crops, potable water, reforestation, etc., only to have their plans rejected by elitist officials at the national level. The sense of disillusionment on the part of the students was strong, and many believed it would be futile to remain and try to pursue careers in their local communities. Vásquez and Doughty ask, How Indian is Sendero? Most *senderista* leaders seem to be university students, rural teachers, and frustrated unemployed laborers. They are acculturated Indians, "cholos," provincial in attitude and orientation, frustrated at being shut out of the national system. The Indians are in effect the troops of the revolt, led by traditional rebellion leaders: a provincial intellectual elite. The forces fighting against Sendero are also largely lower-class and Indian, acculturated into a military system of values and rules. The sinchis especially are recruited from poor urban and provincial areas. Vásquez and Doughty write that a long history of neglect and discrimination help to explain the rise of Sendero. But even when efforts are made to address these problems, the Indian is still seen as an obstacle to national progress. The authors suggest that the ideas of legitimizing native culture and cultural pluralism in Peru be explored. Not only is concrete development desperately needed, they argue, but also a rethinking of attitudes about the Indians and their role in the national culture.

376. González, Raúl. "La tragedia de los penales. Entre dos violencias: ¿Atrapados sin salida?" *Quehacer,* no.41 (June-July 1986): 6-14.

Discussion of the political ramifications of the prison massacres. When Sendero took control of the jails on June 18, its actions were a carefully prepared political coup, before which the government showed itself negligent, careless, and lacking in foresight. The fortifications in El Frontón and Lurigancho were not dug or built overnight, nor could they have been fabricated without materials provided by the prison authorities themselves. Sendero's insurrection forced the government to react, not to lead, as has been the case throughout the history of the rebellion. There is no doubt that Shining Path chose its moment well; it had nothing to lose, and had the government not reacted the way it did, the Socialist International would almost certainly have had to intervene with the government on behalf of the *senderistas.* For Sendero, the loss of hundreds of lives means nothing: "blood fertilizes new lives of struggle for the revolution." What the country has seen during this week is the pure *senderista* strategy of violence, face-to-face with a no less violent counterinsurgency strategy. Subversion is to be fought, not with democracy, but with force.

377.González, Raúl ."Lo que persigue Sendero."*Quehacer,* no.41 (June-July 1986):10-11.

Shining Path's objectives at this stage of its struggle can be perceived very clearly: the destabilization of the system, social and political polarization, and the creation of conditions that will advance future grass-roots organizing in the countryside. Sendero believes that it can win this war, but *Quehacer* believes that a strategy of violence will never win, because the rejection that it inspires will always be stronger than the possibility of its winning power. The trouble is that the means to counter terrorist violence employed now by the government can only mean more blood, a diabolical spiral in which not only Shining Path, but all of us will lose.

378. González, Raúl. "Lo que nos dejó ese 18 de junio." *Quehacer,* no.41 (June-July 1986): 12-13.

A cold, modern computer might have programmed the situation on June 18, 1986, writes González. The XVII Congress of the Socialist International was in Lima, and hundreds of foreign journalists were present. On one side, the Marines demand the death penalty; conservatives are clamoring for more stringent measures against the "communist threat," which has to be fought on multiple fronts: the universities, the unions, leftists in parliament, and Sendero. On the other side, Shining Path's latest attacks seem to have been deliberately calculated to anger the government: an admiral and several APRA officials have been assassinated. The events which transpired have brought Peru to a point of crisis; González suggests that it is time to stop and evaluate the way

the war is being fought. If Sendero seeks to destabilize the system, the government and political forces must work to consolidate it. If Sendero seeks to polarize the nation, those same forces must seek a national consensus. If Sendero needs to create conditions in the countryside for grass-roots support, the government must seek to compete politically with those in arms.

379. "Subversión: 7 tesis equivocados." *Quehacer*, no.41 (June-July 1986): 15-17.

Quehacer refutes some common beliefs about fighting subversion, which it says are wrong. Chief among them is the idea that violence can only be met with violence. The public voted for real changes, *Quehacer* contends, which García should not be timid to initiate. Civilian, not military tribunals should try terrorists, reinforcing the supremacy of civil over military authority. It is wishful thinking that the deaths of hundreds of *senderistas* in the Lima prisons have eliminated the "*senderista* command." Finally, it is dangerous for the opposition to approve the situation on the grounds that García will fall. Destabilizing the APRA government will only weaken democracy and bring either the military or the most reactionary sectors to power.

380. Caballero, Antonio. "Perú: Masacre con fondo de Internacional." *Cambio 16*, no.762 (July 7 1986): 98-102.

President Alán García announced that 15 officials and 80 members of the Republican Guard will be tried for allegedly having murdered 40 *senderistas* after their surrender. This is the first official recognition of what amounts to a massacre inside Peru's prisons. Only hours before, the Vice President had declared that the victims were actually killed by their own comrades. That such a statement could even be made demonstrates the reputation for barbarism which Sendero has earned. Caballero examines the political and public relations debacle in the aftermath of the prison uprisings, including foreign and domestic press reaction.

381. "Excessive Force." *Time*, v.128, no. 1 (July 7 1986): 40.

Public opinion at first backed President Alán García in his use of force to quell the prison riots, in which at least 250, and perhaps as many as 400 radicals died. But after García conceded that paramilitary police had massacred some 30-40 inmates after they had surrendered, the public wavered. García, while condemning the police, strongly defended the Marines who assaulted El Frontón. *Time* says, "By authorizing the use of lethal force, García underscored his determination to defeat Shining Path." Sendero had timed its revolt to humiliate him while prominent world figures were in Lima for the Socialist International Congress. The gathering was held in Lima to recognize efforts by García's center-left government to stabilize the country's battered economy.

382. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Democracia y contrainsurgencia." *Caretas*, no.912 (July 7 1986): 28-29.

In Buenos Aires, an organization for retired military officers recently tried to vindicate the "Argentine model" of counterinsurgency war: "free and civilized society," said the announcement, "exposed to subversive action, finally understands that the only course of action to defeat it is violent and annihilating confrontation..." Gorriti refutes the idea that only "dirty war" can defeat terrorism. To this end he briefly quotes three experts in counterinsurgency warfare. John McCuen writes that the armed forces must avoid at all costs the "shotgun method" in which one accepts some civilian casualties in order to eliminate subversives; the trouble is that each dead innocent can produce ten new rebels. Robert Thompson, who defeated the Communists in Malaysia, stresses that the government must function within the law; French expert David Galula writes that "it is possible that the mimeograph can be more useful than the machine gun," and "a solider who knows pediatrics more important than an expert on mortars..."

383. Leger, Kathryn. "A Climate of Fear." *Maclean's*, v.99, no.27 (July 7 1986): 29.

After only eleven months in office, Alán García's government has suffered a severe blow to its prestige and integrity. United Left has denounced the government for not trying to find a peaceful solution to the prison standoff. Opposition figures said, "The outcome of this barbarous action will not be pacification. It will only feed the spiraling violence." Still, a poll in *El Comercio* shows that 75% of *limeños* approve the use of military force, an indication of how frightened people are of Sendero. While García announced the arrest of policemen, he did not mention the marines or army as culpable in murder. One analyst remarked: "You've got a 37-year-old with no previous political experience and the hounds of the military lapping around him. He's scared."

384. "Informe secreto: Comando Conjunto encubre masacre." *Equis X,* no.498 (July 14-20 1986): 17-21.

Information from a secret report by the armed forces Joint Command to the Permanent Commission of the Congress of the Republic. The report concedes that "an undetermined number" of prisoners surrendered, and that 89 were murdered in cold blood in Lurigancho. Who gave that order is not made clear. The report gives a detailed description of the fighting in each prison.

385. Wilde, Margaret D. "Prison Massacre in Peru." *Christian Century,* v.103, no.22 (July 16-23 1986): 639-640.

Tensions between Sendero fighters and prison authorities resulted in rioting in Lurigancho and El Frontón prisons, and in the Santa Barbara women's penitentiary. Approximately 200-300 prisoners were killed by the Peruvian military in its suppression of the revolts. *Senderistas* controlled large areas of each prison, and violent confrontations with guards were commonplace. After some 30 prisoners were killed in October, 1985 in Lurigancho, the director of prisons was murdered in Lima, apparently in retaliation by Sendero. What sparked this violence were plans to move many prisoners to a high-security facility at Canto Grande. It appears to have been timed to coincide with a meeting of the Socialist International in Lima. Sendero probably hoped to force a violent confrontation in order to embarrass President García and undermine civil-military relations: "They may have underestimated the force of the reaction, since *Sendero* does not usually engage in suicidal tactics; but provoking such a crisis is entirely consistent with Sendero's overall strategy." García had to acknowledge that at least 100 prisoners were murdered after the rebellion was quashed. Promising a thorough investigation, he dismissed the chief of the Republican Guard (responsible for prisons) and ordered 100 policemen arrested. But no one expects either the truth or punishment to emerge from such an investigation; Sendero has "so thoroughly alienated public opinion that almost any action against it would be widely accepted in Peru."

386. Macera, Pablo. "El 18 de junio." *Debate,* no.39 (July 1986): 39-44.

Political analysis of the prison massacre. The murder of almost 300 *senderistas* in three Lima prisons was a crime, its origins a stupid policy contrary to the interests of those who decided to execute it. Macera's conclusion is that June 18 was the greatest political triumph for Sendero Luminoso. APRA has been isolated, young *apristas* have been alienated from their president, tensions with IU have been exacerbated, the armed forces have gained political power, and international attention has turned, unfavorably, to Peru. Macera examines the ramifications of the uprisings, and their probable effect on the political future of the country. He also charts a likely future course for Sendero, which he believes will concentrate its efforts in 1987 in Puno, Huancayo, and Lima.

387. Zileri, Marcos. "Haciendo tierra." *Caretas,* no.916 (August 11 1986): 40-43.

The government, in order to redefine relations between the capital and the "marginalized" sierra, has created the concept of the Andean Trapezoid to give the region maximum developmental priority. Zileri reports on the government's efforts to bring agrarian reform to the province of Melgar, in Puno department. The five ERPS (Empresas Rurales de Propriedad Social) are to be divided into lands for 32 communities, and another 25,000 hectares are to be distributed; altogether the government intends to distribute some 744,000 hectares in Puno.

388. "Big Strides in Peruvian Revolution: Flames Leap to Puno." *A World to Win,* no.6 (August 1986): 37-38.

Reports from Peru indicate that the PCP is establishing a series of guerrilla fronts extending along the spine of the country from Cajamarca in the north to Puno in the south, and in the eastern jungle highlands and western coastal cities. *A World to Win* reviews how Sendero is fulfilling its promise to "Begin the Great Leap to seize power piece by piece." The report gives details on the establishment of people's committees, village militias, the people's guerrilla army, and organizing committees. The PCP is also making headway among miners, among peasants in the coca-growing areas, and in Puno.

389. "Excerpts From Worldwide Campaign Speech: Five Years of People's War." *A World to Win,* no.6 (August 1986): 44-45, 70-76.

Prepared by a Peruvian living abroad, this speech reviews the progress of five years of people's war in Peru. An excellent source for the PCP's view of its own historical background

from the 1960's until ILA in 1980, the speech examines the periods, stages, and "milestones" of the party's carefully-plotted design to achieve power. Extremely detailed, the article reminds the reader that in spite of its alleged Inca messianism, Sendero is basically a political movement with its roots in Marxist and Maoist dialectic.

390. "Massacre in Peru's Prisons: 'This Blood That Has Been Spilt Shall Never Be Forgotten.'" *A World to Win*, no.6 (August 1986): 34-36.

Polemic against the slaughter of hundreds of *senderistas* in three Lima prisons. In July, 1985, prisoners seized guards as hostages at Callao, El Frontón, and Lurigancho to force the government to promise them that they would not be dispersed to other prisons, nor transferred to a new high-security prisons under construction at Canto Grande. The Belaúnde government made these promises, but the new APRA administration repudiated the agreements and sent troops into Lurigancho. 50 prisoners were murdered in this act of revenge. *A World to Win* details the insurrection in Callao, El Frontón, and Lurigancho. The rebels made several demands, principally that the government honor the promises made by the Belaúnde regime and recognize them as special prisoners, and not as terrorist criminals; they also demanded that no prisoner of war be transferred to Canto Grande. According to *A World to Win*, when the revolt began, the government gathered the Peace Commission, the Parliamentary Human Rights Commission, and the armed forces joint command. At this meeting, the decision was made to send in the military. The government later claimed that they had tried to negotiate with the rebels, but failed due to the prisoner's "fanaticism." The article honors the men who held off a modern army with slings, crossbows, and a handful of guns.

391. "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru: 'Day of Heroism.'" *A World to Win*, no.6 (August 1986): 32-33.

The PCP's Central Committee enshrines forever the 19th of June as The Day of Heroism. The reactionary APRA government, Alán García, his cabinet, army, and police are covered with indelible shame that the people shall never forget and that only the people will punish! The prisoners, the fighters with their watchword "It's right to rebel," fought heroically and boldly, setting a landmark for heroism, valor, and courage. Before their spilt blood, the fighters and sons and daughters of the people pledge their unwavering commitment to follow their shining example, to advance people's war to serve the world revolution. "Glory to the fallen heroes, long live the revolution!"

392. "RIM Committee Greets Peru Campaign." *A World to Win*, no.6 (August 1986): 46-47.

Statement by the Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement in support of the Worldwide Campaign to Support People's War in Peru. Oppressed and revolutionary-minded people on every continent are looking to the Peruvian revolution as an example. The statement hails the Peruvian struggle as the basis for a worldwide revolutionary movement.

393. "A 'Shining Trench of Combat'--Statement on the Massacre in Peru's Prisons by the Committee of the RIM." *A World to Win*, no.6 (August 1986): 28-31.

A ringing condemnation of the Peruvian government, which, egged on by imperialism, sent in its marines, helicopter gunships, and artillery to crush the struggle of the prisoners of war in Callao, El Frontón, and Lurigancho. Since it could not resolve its problem with propaganda outside of the prison and with repression within, it tried to wipe out the symbol of revolutionary resistance which these prisoners represented. It is the same method the government has tried to use to quell the revolutionary flames that have flared throughout Peruvian society. The Information Bureau of the RIM salutes its fallen brothers and sisters; their spilt blood shall never be forgotten.

394. "Support for People's War Echoes on Every Continent." *A World to Win*, no.6 (August 1986): 39-41.

The struggle waged by the people of Peru has found an echo on every continent. A determined international campaign has spread to organize support for the war. *A World to Win* describes activities in Bangladesh, in Paris, in the Dominican Republic, and in Colombia. Discussion of the struggle in Peru has sparked intense debate everywhere, leading the people to change political conditions in their own nations.

395. González, Raúl. "De como Lumbreras entiende al Perú de Sendero." *Quehacer*, no.42 (August-September 1986): 33-34.

González interviews Luis Lumbreras Salcedo, Peru's most prominent archeologist and a native of Ayacucho; he taught at the UNSCH and knew Abimael Guzmán. Lumbreras describes Ayacucho and its peasantry as still trapped in a semifeudal relationship with the rest of the nation. A large portion of the interview deals with Ayacucho's long Andean heritage, and the University and its role in Ayacuchan society. Lumbreras, for example, rejects the simplistic idea that the University has a central role in socioeconomic development. Instead, he believes that the University was the detonator of a social situation that was about to explode. He ultimately describes Sendero as the expression of a social phenomenon that transcends its own existence, one with deep roots in Peru.

396. González, Raúl. "'Desexorcizando' a Sendero: una entrevista con Henri Favre." *Quehacer,* no.42 (August-September 1986): 44-48.

Favre, the eminent French anthropologist, talks with González about Shining Path. Favre reiterates his thesis (in "Sendero y horizontes oscuros") that the movement offers structure, norms, and values to individuals who are neither *campesinos* nor workers, neither Andeans nor *criollos*. He has never believed that Shining Path is a regional, peasant revolt; while Ayacucho is very poor and underdeveloped, poverty and backwardness have never been sufficient by themselves to spur people to rebellion. Favre discusses Sendero's political and military strategy, and most importantly, the sociological significance of Sendero in a Latin American context. While he concedes that the movement is linked to a specific Peruvian environment, Favre also believes that Sendero is a manifestation of the failure of a model of economic development that originated after the Great Depression of 1929, and was adopted by all Latin American countries in the 1940's. Import-substituting industrialization, Favre says, has helped to break up traditional peasant society, while ultimately failing to enrich the nation as a whole. He concludes by reminding readers that the per capita income of Argentina in 1937 was close to that of France; in 1950, the per capita income of Peru was greater than Japan's. What remains of this in 1986? It would be too cruel, he declares, to answer the question.

397. González, Raúl. "Para entender a Sendero." *Quehacer,* no.42 (August-September 1986): 28-33.

To help its readers understand the phenomenon of Shining Path, *Quehacer* prints some texts that throw light upon Guzmán's war. In one, Sendero lays out the fundamental conditions for the success of revolutionary war. In another, the various levels of clandestine warfare (sabotage, terrorism, guerrilla warfare) are enumerated and explained. *Quehacer* also publishes an explanation of the five stages of people's war, according to classical Maoist theory: from clandestine to open agitation and propaganda, to the creation of revolutionary cells and other grass-roots popular organizations. After the outbreak of violence, sabotage and terrorism are intensified, liberated zones and a provisional revolutionary government are created, and finally the guerrillas wage prolonged and total popular war until final victory.

398. Vásquez, Fernando. "Las alturas de Sendero: informe de Puno." *Debate,* no.40 (September 1986): 29-38.

Puno is today in its hour of extremity. The question of land tenancy is central to this agricultural and cattle-raising province. Sendero, having patiently recruited among young people in normal school, is attempting to win peasant support by appropriating the land issue. Vásquez describes the deep Incaic roots of the people of Puno, and how the agrarian reform of the 1970's, while converting haciendas into CAP, SAIS, and ERPS cooperatives and farms, did little to change the peasantry, which is still comprised of rudimentary laborers. Vásquez shows how Puno continues to be desperately underdeveloped. He interviews the department's bishop, its *alcalde,* and its prefect about the challenge Sendero's violence poses. He concludes by relating a conversation with *"compañeros"* in a tiny and impoverished town which, he says, lacks everything, including its mayor, assassinated by *senderistas.* The *compas* support Sendero, in the simple belief that they favor the poor, and deny that Sendero has ever hurt poor people. In Ayacucho, they declare, they only killed "squealers."

A sidebar, "Las huellas de la dinamita," describes a clash between Sendero guerrillas and security forces in June, in which 3 *senderistas* died, two of whom were primary school teachers from the normal school at Azángaro. A third, captured later, was also a school teacher. *Debate* spoke with his mother, a populist registrar of the town's provincial council, who admits that there are many *senderistas* in her community.

399. Rubio Correa, Marcial. "Militares y Sendero Luminoso frente al sistema democrático peruano." *Revista de estudios políticos* [Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid], v.53 (nueva época), (September-October 1986): 161-174.

Examination of the evolution of democratic government in Peru, with particular reference to the roles that the military and Sendero have played in the political process. Rubio Correa posits that Peru as a nation was redefined in the 1930's, when a number of trends became clear: power was exercised by a landed oligarchy; Peru was industrializing and become dependent upon external capital; large numbers of Indians began to migrate to the cities; political movements such as the Peruvian Communist Party and APRA came into being. Rubio Correa investigates the role of the armed forces in Peru, from the reign of General Odría in the late 1940's through the two military governments of the *docenio* (1968-1980). He makes the point that although the military was not drawn from the aristocratic class, it has always had a central role in Peruvian society; from the 1930's on, it concerned itself with the modernization of the country. he says that its coups were never caudillist, but transformationalist and developmentalist. Rubio Correa explores in detail the administrations of Belaúnde (1963-1968), Velasco, and Morales Bermúdez before turning to Sendero. Drawing upon the work of González and Degregori, he emphasizes that Sendero is a militant, disciplined and extremely violent movement, totally isolated from the Peruvian left (even from other Maoist parties in IU), and composed primarily of university students of peasant origins, and immigrant marginalized groups. He denies any real millenarianist or Indianist influences. He concludes on a gloomy note: Sendero's subversive violence has been met with equally ferocious countersubversive violence by the military; one casualty of that violence has been all opposition parties in general, and Peru's legal left in particular. Another result has been a polarization of the country, a growing authoritarianism, and an narrowing of the opportunities for political democracy.

400. "Qué hacer." *Caretas,* no.926 (October 20 1986): 29-31.

A thoughtful analysis of effective counterinsurgency war. How to respond to the "sickness" of terrorist violence? Massacres, points out *Caretas,* are not only destroying democracy and put us on the road to barbarism, but play the terrorist's game and achieve little militarily. Attacks have increased, not decreased, since the prison massacres. Applying the death penalty against terrorists will be counterproductive; each execution becomes a national or international drama that gains sympathy for the terrorists. The Italians, who have considerable experience at fighting terrorism within a democratic system, believe that reactions of anger disperse collective energy and produce showy but inefficient methods. What to do, then? First, accept that the sickness of Sendero's messianic and pathological violence cannot simply be liquidated. The idea that only economic and social development can defeat sedition is also questionable. (*Caretas* points out that agricultural cooperatives have been destroyed, their valuable animals slaughtered, their tractors vandalized; in addition, engineers, and doctors working in the depressed zones have been murdered.) Next the police and military must secure the areas. *Caretas* makes a number of practical suggestions: establish rewards for information leading to the capture of *senderistas,* encourage defections, initiate campaigns of disinformation and internal disorganization, reinforce DIRCOTE, establish an elite counterinsurgency unit like the British Special Air Service (SAS), set up special tribunals to try terrorists, and segregate prisoners from outside contact to impede communication with their comrades. Above all, says *Caretas,* look to examples like West Germany, Italy, and the British in Malaysia for successful models of fighting terrorism.

401. Petras, James. "Peru's Sendero Luminoso Influence Grows." *In These Times,* v. 10, no.40 (October 22-28 1986): 12.

Petras, a reporter with considerable experience in Latin America, writes that many academics and journalists have been more intent on denouncing than understanding Sendero's dynamics, its Maoist ideology, its alleged affirmation of an Inca past, or its violent methods. But a detailed Peruvian military intelligence report from which Petras quotes extensively ("Evaluation of Subversive Action During 1985") sharply contradicts assessments that Sendero is a transitory sect on its way to extinction. Despite military saturation of Ayacucho, Sendero has expanded its operations nationwide, especially in Lima. In its shift from rural to urban warfare, Sendero has demonstrated the capacity to recruit new personnel and develop new constituencies. The intelligence report describes the movement's internal financing ("voluntary contributions," extortion from businesses, robberies, and taxes on coca flights). Sendero seems to be more than just a military organization; it also maintains cultural and educational activities such as theater, folk music, puppet shows, preparatory classes for university entrance, etc. It is active in the trade unions; there are also reports of a tactical alliance with MRTA. "Contrary to the rigid imagery concocted by writers eager to satanize Sendero, it has demonstrated an ability to combine several

layers of struggle, politico-cultural as well as military, and to engage in a variety of political arenas while maximizing internal security." Attempts to explain Sendero as a by-product of Ayacucho's poverty fail to account for its spread throughout Peru.

The report also highlights the failure of García's counterinsurgency strategy: "The organic structure of Sendero Luminoso has not been sufficiently affected by the losses and arrests inflicted by the armed forces and police. On the contrary, the facts demonstrate a new perspective of growth and of perfecting its structure and its projection to new geographic zones." The report states that there is no evidence that Sendero has any relations with criminals and drug traffickers. It asserts: "The Sendero Luminoso organization has advanced substantially in the insertion and development in the peasant social base, both in rural zones as well as in the marginal urban areas, with rural antecedents, facilitating the development of a parallel political power to that legally constituted." Sendero's shift from Ayacucho to Lima and other areas is probably a tactical retreat to preserve its political-military cadres; the PCP has also reportedly replaced guerrilla platoons with village-based peasant militias, which form a power structure parallel to that of the communal authorities. Its growth as a national movement contradicts established Maoist doctrine for guerrilla warfare, which suggests doctrinal rigidity combined with tactical flexibility. Petras concludes that the failure of both the García social-democratic regime and United Left to transform basic structural conditions has polarized Peruvian society, allowing Sendero to present itself as a credible alternative to an increasingly militarized society.

402. Komisar, Lucy. "Darkness on the Shining Path." *The Progressive,* v.50, no.10 (October 1986): 17-18.

More than 150 peasants were detained by the army in Puno for accepting livestock "expropriated" by Sendero from haciendas. Many were beaten: "They stepped on us like frogs," said one weeping man. Agrarian reform came to Puno from the same military fifteen years ago, but few peasants profited; the cooperatives formed were often corrupt and unproductive. President García has promised to redistribute land, but has done nothing. Sendero's plan is not to alter these relationships, but to destroy them. Burning haciendas and destroying equipment, they hope to achieve the militarization of the region, counting on government repression to polarize the people. Since mid-June, Sendero has attacked 16 cooperatives and private farms, often killing estate managers and other employees, and forcing peasants to take cattle, sheep, and alpacas. When the army comes, they turn on the peasantry and punish them for "cooperating," willingly or unwillingly, with the guerrillas.

403. García-Sayán, Diego. "La justicia sin poder." *Quehacer,* no.43 (October/November 1986): 61-65.

Lawyer, member of the Andean Commission of Jurists and ex-member of President García's first peace commission, García-Sayán is extremely disturbed over the militarization of the conflict in the emergency zones, which, he says, is incompatible with democracy and constitutional norms. Civil authority has virtually abdicated its functions to a *"Comando-político-militar,"* in which all powers have been invested. Governors, prefects, subprefects, and other officials have been replaced by soldiers, and the lawful state has been displaced. Constitutional guarantees and laws have been suspended, and the citizenry is virtually unprotected from both *senderista* and official violence. García-Sayán enumerates how such a state has encouraged abuse of human and civil rights, and calls such a course a "dangerous road" in confronting the grave phenomenon of Sendero.

404. González, Raúl. "¿Qué pasa en Puno? El PUM, el PAP, Sendero y Alán García." *Quehacer,* no.43 (October-November 1986): 40-51.

The struggle for Puno--indeed, the battle for "the Andean trapezoid" of highland provinces--is no longer a simple affair. APRA, Sendero, and leftists are all battling for the support of the people. The Catholic Church is crusading for peace, and has denounced recent terrorist actions as the work not of *senderistas,* but of paramilitary right-wing groups. Puno is a polarized department, and tensions between *apristas* and supporters of PUM (United Mariateguista Party) remain high. If Puno were a country, González writes, it would be in a state of civil war. González describes the history of this rivalry, and the present political situation in the department. This polarization only helps Sendero, which, focusing on gaining support among the peasantry, considers PUM its primary enemy. Sidebars chronicle growing incursions by the guerrillas, especially against SAIS, and describe "A Day in the Country With Sendero."

405. United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations. *Human Rights in Peru. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign*

Affairs, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st Session, November 13, 1985. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986.

This hearing includes testimony by Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and representatives of Americas Watch, Amnesty International U.S.A., and the Washington Office on Latin America. Materials submitted for the record include a list of "disappeared" persons in Peru as of July 1985, and a report by Dr. J. Samuel Fitch of the University of Colorado and the Colorado Center for Public Policy, entitled "Human Rights and U.S. Military Aid Programs." The tone of the hearing is generally one of support for Alán García, and praise for his steps to address Peru's economic ills, eliminate corruption, and address human rights violations by Peruvian military and police forces. A delegation of congressmen who went to Peru spoke with President Belaúnde, various government ministers, and human rights organizations about such abuses. Abrams affirms that Sendero seems to have no external support, commenting "...one of the reasons for it frankly, is that Sendero is such a wacky group politically." Recommendations made to the committee and to the government is that the U.S. support García, provide debt relief, and step up economic and military aid.

406. "Las rondas de Triboline." *Caretas,* no.933 (December 9 1986): 72-73.

All too often communities have been abandoned to *senderista* violence, their self-defense patrols practically unarmed except for knives, rocks, and spears. However, the *ronda* of Triboline has been equipped with shotguns. In 1983, when the army took control of the emergency zones, they began to organize the peasantry into self-defense patrols; by July 1984, 90% of the rural population was participating in the program. But lack of organization and arms left many exposed to guerrilla retaliation. Although there is consensus among the military about the effectiveness of the *rondas,* there is also reticence about giving them arms for fear that weapons will fall into guerrilla hands, or that the armed forces will lose control of the patrols. The *ronderos* of Triboline, in the jungle some 220 kilometers north of Ayacucho, are among the few given arms and rudimentary uniforms (pants, shoes, and T-shirts). The article describes how the town's inhabitants rebuilt their community after fleeing from Sendero in 1984, and points out the advantages of arming the patrols.

407. "Bautizo en la sierra: Abimael Guzmán en 1983." *Caretas,* no.934 (December 15 1986): 24-27.

Caretas publishes the last-known photo of Guzmán, taken secretly at the end of 1983 in Huancavelica. Its authenticity demonstrates that Guzmán cannot be, as the Ministry of the Interior insists, the invalid who needs daily dialysis and suffers from psoriasis. The article also reproduces all known photos of Guzmán, and describes the capture of top *senderista* leaders.

408. Asheshov, Nick. "Contrainsurgencia: los cinco mandamientos." *Caretas,* no.935 (December 22 1986): 34-37.

Asheshov, director of the *Andean Report* and *Lima Times,* interviews Sir Robert Thompson, considered the West's leading expert on fighting guerrillas. Thompson, who served in Malaya during the Emergency, was head of the British assessment mission in Vietnam between 1961 and 1966; (he declares that the helicopter lost the war for the Americans; they simply didn't walk). Asheshov reproduces Thompson's five rules of counterinsurgency war: 1). Have a clear political objective. All actions must contribute to that objective. 2). All branches of government, including army, police, and civil administration, must function according to the law, and in accordance with the highest standards of civilization. This cannot be emphasized too strongly. When something goes wrong, the error must be rapidly and clearly admitted. 3). The key to counterinsurgency is organization. The counterinsurgents must demonstrate greater efficiency and capacity than the other side. This applies particularly to intelligence. 4). Psychological aspects are paramount. Press briefings must be conducted at the highest level, not by a lieutenant colonel. Economy of force is crucial: too many soldiers can be as damaging as too few. Too large an army unbalances a country, especially politically . 4). Secure support bases. 5). Priority in attack should be directed against the infrastructure of the guerrilla and not against guerrilla units. Mass search and control operations are futile. Thompson suggests that only elite units should strike guerrillas in remote areas.

Since Thompson was not familiar with the Peruvian situation, Asheshov briefed him on Shining Path. He commented that insurgencies are rarely a problem of poverty, and that Sendero appeared to be not a problem of revolutionary war, but one of rural administration, which needed organization and time--five to ten years--to solve. The assumption of political and administrative control of the emergency zones by the military appears to Thompson to be an absolutely fatal error.

A system of government that functions, he declares, is essential; there are going to be many more *senderistas* if Peru does not build an efficient and well-organized political system.

409. "Violencia '86." *Caretas*, no.936 (December 29 1986): 16-19, 57.

Review of 1986, month by month. When the year began, certain illusions about dialogue and peace inspired hope; at the end of this particularly violent year, those illusions have been shattered. Despite the differences between the APRA and the Belaúnde governments, one basic problem persists: the lack of a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy which finally ends repressive brutality and the deaths of innocents. *Caretas* reviews month by month the course of the war: from the first meetings of the national Peace Commission in January, to the imposition of a curfew in Lima in February, to renewed Sendero attacks throughout the spring (including the assassination of two admirals of the Peruvian Navy), to the mutiny and massacres in the Lima prisons in June. The remainder of the year has seen stepped-up levels of violence from Shining Path, and corresponding hardening of attitudes in the government: the Senate has approved harsher penalties for terrorists and the creation of special tribunals. Several tables chart the levels of attacks by region and deaths among security forces, presumed terrorists, civilians, and civil authorities.

410. Sardón, José Luis. "La generación de Sendero." *Debate*, no.42 (December 1986): 61-63.

Sociologists say the majority of *senderistas* are between 15 and 30 years of age; in fact, most of the members of Sendero are young, university-trained, and from the provinces. This is the "generation of Sendero." What particular history, Sardón asks, do those born between 1955 and 1970 share? What produced this generation? The nucleus of Sendero consists of people born between 1960 and 1965, who were young during the Peruvian [military] Revolution, the seven years of Velasco, during an atmosphere of social revolution. Sardón explores how *velasquismo* and its emphasis on social development and national integration and mobilization affected Peruvians of different generations.

411. González, Raúl. "La cuarta plenaria del Comité Central de S.L." *Quehacer*, no.44 (December 1986-January 1987): 49-53.

Certain internal documents of Sendero from the fourth plenary session of its Central Committee have reached *Quehacer*, which has scrupulously researched them to ensure their authenticity. Daniel Zanabria, known as Comrade Pedro, who was recently captured, is known to figure prominently in an ongoing debate among the *senderista* leadership over how to develop urban guerrilla war without deviating from the strategic objective of "conquering bases" of support and widening guerrilla war in the countryside. An internal rift among the top guerrilla leadership may be developing: Comrade Pedro was exhorted to submit to a session of Maoist "self-criticism" and accused of having links to MRTA, which has carried out urban attacks and bombings attributed to Sendero. González reproduces the substance of the fierce ideological debate raging inside Shining Path, in which Cuban, Soviet, Nicaraguan, and other foreign deviationist ideas were trounced, the Metropolitan Committee was declared in need of reorganization, and the supremacy of the rural struggle over the urban battle was upheld. The Metropolitan Committee approved the document *Desarrollar la Guerra Popular, sirviendo a la revolución mundial.*

412. Berg, Ronald H. "'Sendero Luminoso' and the Peasantry of Andahuaylas." *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, v.28, no.4 (Winter 1986-87): 165-196.

Berg asks why has Sendero apparently appealed so successfully to the peasants in core areas around Ayacucho. He reviews some of the prevalent arguments on this subject: McClintock discusses the origins of Sendero in terms of a subsistence crisis--a radical decline in standards of living. Palmer believes that the failure of agrarian reform exacerbated the situation: by raising and then dashing hopes, communities were alienated from the state. In Favre's opinion, support for Sendero derives from a marginal, de-peasantized strata, which can no longer support itself by agriculture, but cannot find work in the cities. Berg's perspectives comes from fieldwork among peasant communities in Andahuaylas, in the department of Apurímac. He describes at length the area's history, its involvement in the agrarian reform of the 1970's, and Sendero's military actions in the department, as well as the government's ineffectual and brutal countermeasures. He concludes that the peasants have a good deal of sympathy for what they perceive as Sendero's goals. This does not extend, however, to active support, although they generally do not help the police in pursuing the guerrillas. The *senderistas* exploit conflicts in peasant society, including a deeply-rooted dislike of merchants and the state. The peasantry generally approves of "killing the rich," and may actively support attacks on unpopular individuals. Sendero also arrived in Andahuaylas at

a time of heightened conflict, following a frustrated agrarian reform. However, the aspirations of a majority of the peasants are different from those of Shining Path, and the movement is unlikely to attract widespread active support. The peasantry of Andahuaylas is disinterested in Sendero's brand of land reform; they are afraid that Sendero will collectivize the land. Their goal is to gain ownership of plots of land in order to pursue subsistence agriculture. Berg concludes: "Sendero Luminoso is a transplanted ultra-Left student political party, whose program and ideology is alien from those of the peasants. Sendero exploits popular resentment against merchants and the state, and it fosters numerous localized antagonisms, but it has not succeeded in rallying the peasants under the banner of Mao--nor is it likely to do so."

1987

413. Amnesty International. *'Disappearances,' Torture, and Summary Executions by Government Forces After the Prison Revolts of June 1986.* London: Amnesty International Publications, 1987.

Findings of AI's investigation into the prison revolts of June 1986. Amnesty concludes that although President García initially helped expose the summary execution of at least 100 inmates, there has since been a deliberate cover-up by both civilian and military officials of gross human rights violations. Amnesty reconstructs in detail the events leading up to the insurrection, the prisoners' claim that they were about to be victims of "genocide," the deliberate breaking-off of negotiations by the government, the assaults by Marines and army troops, and the cold-blooded murders of surrendered prisoners as they lay on the ground. The government's secret deliberations and public statements (and the gap between the two) are also chronicled. Many of the dead *senderistas* were buried in secret graves far from Lima, and Amnesty expresses its concern over reports that a number of prisoners transferred to the Navy's special operations forces and intelligence division barracks in Callao. Sketches, maps, and photos complement the most complete account of the prison uprising and massacre available in English.

414. Anderson, James. *Sendero Luminoso: A New Revolutionary Model?* London: Institute for the Study of Terrorism, 1987.

An excellent, clear, and well-written, if brief (88 pages) summary of the background on Sendero and its war up to 1987. Anderson is especially good at providing the political and social context of Shining Path's rise, and at delineating the labyrinth of Peruvian leftist parties and radical unions out of which Sendero emerged. Guzmán was metamorphisized from non-violent admirer of pre-Socratic thought into "Presidente Gonzalo" by three factors: the social conditions of Ayacucho, his interpretations of Mariátegui's writings, and the influence of Augusta de la Torre, his wife, whom Anderson says goaded the mild-mannered academic into political activism.

Anderson finds Sendero's ideology flawed in its acceptance of Mariátegui's premise of a pre-Inca communal land system as equivalent to primitive communism. Sendero has also deviated from Maoist strategy in excluding from its front the rural petit bourgeoisie, which is numerous in many parts of the sierra thanks to the military's land reform. Anderson provides a good description of Sendero's fighting structure, its strategy and tactics, leadership, and its record of rural warfare and urban terrorism. He explains that a large share of Sendero's success is due to the inadequacies of its opponents, especially the police forces. They are "ill-trained, ill-equipped, poorly paid and deeply corrupt. The public has little or no confidence in them, and they enjoy the distinction of being--with the possible exception of the Mexicans--the worst police in Latin America." The three police forces are riven by internal rivalries and jealousies, and were deliberately kept underarmed by and subordinated to the military government of the 1970's. The armed forces Anderson rates as much better, but how they have been employed is another matter. Brutal countermeasures against the populace after the army was deployed in Ayacucho drove many to Sendero's side. The original commander, General Noel, was replaced by a native Quechua speaker, General Adrián Huamán Centeno, who instigated an imaginative "hearts and minds" campaign, developed rural development projects, disciplined the sinchis, and thereby won a measure of trust and respect in Ayacucho. He was replaced in August 1984 after a newspaper interview in which he laid the blame for Sendero's rise on "160 years of neglect, of indifference to and ignorance of the indigenous people of the sierra on the part of the white ruling elite in Lima."

Anderson summarizes: "Sendero's aims in the establishment of its 'New Democracy' could succinctly be said to be the expulsion from Peru of the white man and his mixed-race allies and all

their works, and the re-imposition of the primitive, autarchic and paternalistic agricultural society which existed in Inca times. To achieve this it will be necessary to overthrow the entire established structure of the state as it now exists. Even within the extended time-scale which Sendero envisages, it seems well-nigh inconceivable that Sendero could bring such an event about." To do so would require overwhelming peasant support sufficient to blockade Lima and all other cities, widespread social misery and discontent at epidemic levels, the infiltration and demoralization of the armed forces, and the state in a condition of total political-economic collapse. None of these factors has yet come to pass. Anderson believes that if the worst happened and Sendero seized control of the state, there would follow almost certain military intervention and seizure of national territory by Peru's neighbors.

415. Baratta, Robert Thomas. "Political Violence in Ecuador and the AVC." *Terrorism* (Great Britain), v.10, no.3 (1987): 165-174.

Ecuador's geographical proximity to Colombia and Peru has worsened its internal security problems. "Colombia's M-19 guerrillas, pursued by Colombian authorities, sought refuge in Ecuador. Peruvian criminals, allegedly linked to the Maoist guerrillas from the diabolical *Sendero Luminoso,* were feared to be exporting their anarchist ideology to Ecuador when they were not helping themselves to banks in Quito and Guayaquil. To make matters worse, narcotics traffickers, *narcotraficantes,* began to move operations into remote areas of Ecuador as the Peruvian and Colombian governments increased their anti-drug operations." Baratta examines the increasing tide of political violence in Ecuador, particularly the newest and most dangerous challenge to regime stability, the domestic terrorist organization *¡Alfaro Vive, Carajo!* (AVC). Beginning as a small, student-led subversive group in 1983, the AVC now appears to be coordinating efforts with M-19 and Sendero and with regional *narcotraficantes.* Baratta cites a FBIS report to the effect that a number of bank robberies in August, 1983 were committed by Peruvians, allegedly members of Sendero, and at least some of the stolen money was being channeled back to the movement's war chest.

416. Blanco, Hugo. *Comunidad campesina: SL, PUM, Patria Roja.* Serie: Educación Popular Chapuimayo. S.l., s.n., October 1987.

Blanco, who led an abortive attempt at guerrilla warfare in the 1960's, contrasts the *campesino* movement led by his own PUM (Partido Unificado Mariateguista) with the path chosen by Sendero Luminoso. In this short study, he summarizes the evolution and survival of peasant communities, the "Sendero option," the PUM alternative in Puno, and the experiences of *rondas campesinas* led by Patria Roja in Chota and Hualgáyoc. Blanco, while admiring Sendero's revolutionary bravery, believes that its strategy substitutes isolated action for communal energy, that it is anti-democratic (democracy, he says, is a bulwark of the collective *ayllu*), and that it precipitates repression against peasant communities. In Ayacucho, the *campesinos* have been massacred; in Puno, under the PUM, their cause has advanced.

417. Calderón, Carlos. "The Role of Ideology in the Origin of Sendero Luminoso." MA thesis, University of Florida, 1987.

Calderón, a U.S. Army officer, investigates the origins of Shining Path within Peruvian historical, cultural, and socio-economic contexts. Calderón traces the historical antecedents of Sendero in Andean peasant rebellions, and analyzes socio-economic data on highland conditions to establish a relationship between underdevelopment and support of Sendero. Calderón finds that a direct connection between deprivation and *senderista* appeal is difficult to prove using statistics from the sierra departments; innumerable cultural, linguistic, and geographical variables tend to undermine neat theoretical models in analyzing Shining Path. If some senderologists have assumed that misery automatically translates into anger, Sendero may also have miscalculated, mistaking "bellicose potential for revolutionary potential." Calderón's master's thesis in Latin American studies is noteworthy for its sophisticated use of Peruvian primary material, including reports on the conflict from the newspaper *El Comercio.*

418. Ceresole, Norberto. "Peru: Senderización, militarización y social democracia." In *Peru: Sendero Luminoso, ejército y democracia.* Compiled by Norberto Ceresole. Madrid: Prensa y Ediciones Iberoamericanas; Buenos Aires: Instituto Latinoamericano de Cooperación Tecnología y Relaciones Internacionales, 1987, pp. 13-45.

Ceresole examines Sendero in the context of what he defines as a profoundly significant chapter in Peru's history: the progressive military "dictatorship" of the Velasco years, and its

revolutionary *Plan Inca,* which was followed by the regressive *Plan Túpac Amaru.* In the space of twelve years the military swung from a leftist to a reactionary socio-economic philosophy. Ceresole analyzes at length the economic and political crisis to which successive civilian governments have brought Peru. He characterizes Sendero as expressing in a logical, understandable, and ancestral form the struggle of the Peruvian peasantry of the south-central Andes, a struggle of undeniably "Inca-peasant roots," which appeals also to the immense marginal urban masses. Sendero has adapted itself to Andean mythological realities, attacking "enemies of the community," enforcing a puritanical morality in much the same way the Inca code held stealing, lying, and laziness to be grave sins. Ceresole examines what he calls the academic and political "cradles" of Sendero, the University and PCP, as well as the crucial relationship between the government and armed forces. His prognosis is not hopeful: the extreme conditions in countryside and city will continue to give Sendero a base of support, in spite of the relatively efficient counterinsurgency strategy the government has employed. Sendero cannot achieve power; that much is obvious. But neither can the government eliminate Sendero. Also included in the volume are essays on the military government of Velasco, the "institutional" left in Peru, recent economic policy, and Carlos Iván Degregori's seminal essay *Sendero Luminoso: los hondos y mortales desencuentros.* Appended are several documents, including "Declarations of a *senderista,*" reprinted from *Proceso* , and various texts from the PCP.

419. Chang-Rodríguez, Eugenio. *Opciones políticas peruanas.* 2nd ed. Trujillo [Peru]: Editorial Normas Legales, 1987.

Lengthy study of the development of political parties in Peru, from the late 19th-century political factions of the republic, through González Prada and anarchism, Haya de la Torre and *aprismo,* Mariátegui and socialism, the Communist and Trotskyist parties, *velazquismo* (the movement of the military reform government of 1968), Izquierda Unida, Belaúnde's Acción Popular, the Christian parties, and Sendero Luminoso. Chang-Rodríguez finds that Peru seems to conform to the "iron law" of German political scientist Robert Michels: an oligarchical tendency in social movements. At both ends of the political spectrum in Peru, an active minority controls parties and diverse social organizations. In Peru, he writes, an elected minority ends up tyrannizing the majority. Chang-Rodríguez includes Sendero as the most extreme form of political alternative for Peru. He explores the conjunction of Andean millenarian myth and the ideological "four swords" of Shining Path (Marx, Lenin, Mao, Gonzalo thought). By the time Sendero was expelled from the UNSCH, it had compensated by extending its influence among the peasants and the urban poor. Chang-Rodríguez suggests that Sendero has tapped into an almost primal force; in the words of Mariátegui himself, "the strongest reservoir of revolutionary energy in Latin America sleeps in the depths of the Quechua peasantry."

420. Cristóbal, Juan. *¿Todos murieron?* Lima: Ediciones "Tierra Nueva", 1987.

Cristóbal states his objectives clearly in his opening paragraphs: to shine a light on the dark deeds of what is supposed to be a "nationalist, anti-imperialist, and revolutionary" government, and to ensure that the memory of the people continues shining and singing in spite of the barbarism of the cruel genocidal suppression of the prison revolts of June 19, 1986. To do so, Cristóbal and his comrades gather official statements and manifestoes, as well as testimony from government officials, Parliament, political parties both left and right, and diverse social institutions, to produce a documentary record of the events leading up to the uprisings, and the aftermath of the prison massacres. Cristóbal emphasizes the collective disbelief that such a government, despite the presence of invited representatives of the Socialist International, with the full support of the judicial branch, would utilize bombs, dynamite, and helicopters against defenseless people. What follows is a collection of primary materials reflective of a wide spectrum of Peruvian opinion on the events of June 1986.

421.Favre, Henri. *Peru--Sendero Luminoso y horizones ocultos.* Mexico: UNAM, 1987.

Expanded version (29 pages) of his previously published essay on Sendero. As before, Favre divides his work into three parts: the expansion of Sendero's war and the government's response, the genesis of Shining Path from PCP to the embodiment of "Gonzalo thought," and the movement's social base, which he calls a "de-peasantized" and "de-Indianized" rural population. Favre reiterates that poverty and underdevelopment alone cannot account for the rise of Sendero. Rather it is the product of "an explosive encounter" of a lumpen intelligentsia and a *cholo* environment. The result is a class no longer content to remain marginalized on the periphery of society.

422. Flores Galindo, Alberto. *Buscando un Inca: identidad y utopia en los Andes.* Lima: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario, 1987.

A deeply influential work often cited by senderologists for its insights into Andean society and identity. Flores Galindo explores a world that has been dominated by violence and "impositions" since the Spanish conquest. The idea of a utopia in the Andes prior to the arrival of the Europeans, shattered forever by the conquest, is a central theme of the work. The question of whether such a paradise existed, and whether it can ever be recovered, is obviously central to the question of Sendero's rebellion in the highlands. The long struggle between native culture and the church, the *tupamarista* revolution of 1780 (an attempt to convert the Andean utopia into a political crusade), and the Indian's role in the republic are the main focuses of the work. *Indigenismo, aprismo,* and the socialism of Mariátegui are 20th-century attempts to revive the utopian ideal. The peasant movements of recent decades, dealing with land tenure and the abolition of old forms of coercive labor, really address the central question of power in the countryside. Ultimately, Flores Galindo concedes that utopia is ideally without place, time, or space. The Inca empire, an unequal and coercive society, is transformed in the collective memory and imagination into a just and homogeneous one. The return of the Inca is a messianic and millenarian idea, one which Flores Galindo implies is an impossible dream, especially in a society in which both countryside and peasant are becoming increasingly less important to a modernizing Peru.

423. [Grupo Intelectual Popular]. *Maestros: defender y combatir.* S.n., s.l. [Lima], February 1987.

Transcript of a flyer from the Popular Intellectual Group, which calls on teachers to join with the proletariat and other popular sectors to fight the government, which in its defense of the bureaucratic-landowning class, has violated the most elementary rights: life and physical integrity, liberty of thought, meeting, and strike, labor stability and social benefits, and the right to education and culture. The GIP goes on to affirm its faith in the ideological and political leadership of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Guiding Thought, and the Communist Party of Peru, which directs people's war. "Our PEOPLE'S WAR is a peasant war, it has created SUPPORT BASES in the New Power, first in their embryonic form, which are Popular Committees in the countryside, with the objective of forming the Popular Republic of the New Democracy...We conclude that the people's war of Peru is the only authentic people's war." The GIP attacks García's APRA as a party of genocide, starvation, and demagoguery. It also slanders SUTEP's political links (other leftist parties) as supporters of fascism and corporativism. The only road to follow, it concludes, is to develop people's war to serve the world revolution. It ends with vivas for President Gonzalo, the proletarian world revolution, and Marxism-Leninism-Maoism.

424. Haya de la Torre, Augusto. *El retorno de la barbarie: la matanza en los penales de Lima en 1986.* Lima: Bahía Ediciones, 1987.

A straightforward attack on the García government for the massacre of 248 prisoners during the brutal suppression of *senderista* revolts at three prisons in and around Lima on June 18-19, 1986. Haya de la Torre traces the path of decision in the government that led to the handing over of responsibility for the prisons from judicial authorities to the Joint Command of the armed forces. Once the government declared that it would not allow the prisons to be converted into territory outside the authority of the state, the Marines were given the responsibility of retaking Frontón prison, where 152 *senderistas* died, the Army was sent into Lurigancho, killing 124 guerrillas, and the Air Force was handed control of the Santa Barbara jail in Callao, where 64 women fighters perished. Haya de la Torre declares that restoring order with the maximum of force permitted by the law is no more than to apply the law of the jungle. Individual chapters chronicle the battle for each jail, and also the approval given to the Joint Command for its efficient execution of its charge. Haya de la Torre's conclusion is aptly summed up by his chapter's title: *"El estado de derecho: desecho"* (The lawful state: Undone). Documents appended to the book include the text of the actual order signed by President García, the after-action report of Joint Command, and a chronology of the massacres released in a declaration by Sendero itself, in which each prison is labeled a *luminoso trinchera de combate,* or shining trench of combat. Haya de la Torre twists the knife by quoting from García's own inaugural address: "To fight against barbarism it is not necessary to fall into barbarism." He also recalls García's pledge to censure human rights violations and extrajudicial executions, torture, and abuse of power.

425. Harding, Colin. "The Rise of Sendero Luminoso." In *Region and Class in Modern Peruvian History.* Edited by Rory Miller. Institute of Latin American Studies, Monograph Series, no.14. Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1987, pp.179-207.

Succinct and well-informed overview of the origins of Sendero. Harding lays particular emphasis on the formative period of the late 1960's and 1970's in Ayacucho and at the University Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga (UNSCH). The university's allotted role was "to act as a powerhouse and laboratory of controlled social change and economic development." UNSCH's academic programs had a decidedly vocational bias, concentrating on agricultural engineering, vocational science, anthropology, and education, all designed to benefit an area that was the focus of government-sponsored, foreign-funded projects in agronomy and community development. It is the failure of many of these efforts that shaped the thinking of some of Sendero's future leaders.

Harding traces Sendero's evolution, ideology, and strategy, which flow linearly from one to the other. The fact that it mistakenly characterizes an independent, democratic, urban, industrial Peru as a semi-feudal and semi-colonial bureaucratic fascist state has not been an impediment when it comes to working among the *campesinos* of the sierra. Harding takes the view that Sendero has been successful in channeling peasant discontents into revolutionary action. He relates the backgrounds and experiences of a number of Sendero leaders besides Guzmán and Díaz Martínez, among them Julio César Mezzich, Hildebrando Pérez, Osmán Morote, Nora Canchari, and Edith Lagos. Economic recession in Ayacucho has aided Sendero in recruiting young students; this "'revolutionary petty bourgeoisie' appears to have acted as the liaison and transmitter of instructions between senior leadership and the grassroots." Harding characterizes support for Sendero as a "high degree of tacit acceptance," involving supplying food to the guerrillas, and allowing transit without informing the authorities. This later changed, however, when Sendero began to exercise greater control in peasant villages; closing down markets and access to the outside, and the establishment of a "war economy" were unpopular measures. Harding cites Henri Favre, who differentiates between poorer upland and comparatively more prosperous valley communities in acceptance and support of Sendero. Indeed, virtual warfare between sierra communities has been epidemic, exacerbated by the guerrilla-sinchi war. Harding also evaluates the government's successive "hard" and "soft" anti-guerrilla strategies.

Harding concludes with slight optimism: Alán García's election, which saw very high voter turnout in some disputed areas, suggests that "people who have been made to feel powerless welcome any opportunity, however limited, to influence the circumstances that govern their lives." However, a postscript from June 1986 is more somber: attacks on APRA officials and the massacre in Lima prisons appear to doom President García's attempts to open a dialogue with the guerrillas. His appointment of a Colombian-style "peace commission" to explore talks with Sendero has been scorned by both the guerrillas and by the military, both of whom prefer "final solutions" to Peru's problems. The growth of violent crime and of another guerrilla movement, MRTA, demonstrate that there is a growing rejection of the possibilities of democratic politics and peaceful change in Peruvian society.

426. Johnson, Peter T. "Continuidad y discontinuidad histórica en las rebeliones peruanas: el caso de Sendero Luminoso." In *America Latina dallo Stato Coloniale allo Stato Nazione*. Edited by Antonio Annino, *et al.* 2v. Milan: Franco Angeli, [1987], v.ii, pp. 723-753.

Sendero, Johnson says, must be considered within an historical, regional and ethnic context, with particular attention to the continuity of Indian beliefs. Often indigenous rebellions that utilize Marxist doctrine are framed within concepts of class struggle, the imposition of a foreign ideology, and East-West relations. Shining Path merits the additional perspectives of Andean cosmology, and the long tradition of rebellion against central authority that predates the Spanish conquest. Johnson explores the geographical and historical forces that have shaped Andean society, what he terms the *weltanschauung indio*, and the origins, strategy, and ideology of Shining Path. The legacy of Andean rebellion, rooted deeply in Peruvian ethnohistory, helps explain Sendero's initial success in the *campo* and urban areas. The leaders of Sendero have managed to integrate Indian and *cholo* myths and traditions into the vision of Mao Tse-Tung, and the beliefs of Mariátegui that primitive Marxism could build a better future for Peru. Sendero has taken a socially and economically marginalized population, a group with an historical memory of its past struggles for justice, and channeled its eager ability to visualize a better world into revolutionary violence. The desire to bring about *pachacuti*, the upheaval that will bring the end of the white world and restore that of the Indian, coincides perfectly with Guzmán's goal of destroying existing Peruvian society and rebuilding it in his image.

427. Johnson, Peter T. "Sendero Luminoso as Considered by the Western European Press." In *Intellectual Migrations: Transcultural Contributions of European and Latin American Emigrés. Papers of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the Seminar on the Acquisition of Latin American Library Materials.* edited by Iliana L. Sonntag. Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut Preussischer Kulturbesistz, Berlin, Federal

Republic of Germany, 20-25 April 1986. Edited by Iliana L. Sonntag. Madison: SALALM Secretariat, 1987, pp. 260-271.

Examination of how the domestic and foreign press has covered Shining Path. An important factor that distinguishes Sendero from other revolutionary groups is its hermetic nature: it has disdained use of the press, and prior to ILA in 1980, its only publications were a handful of Communist Party leaflets and newsletters. Coverage by journalists is dangerous and limited by fear of both guerrillas and the army. Much of the reporting by Peruvian journalists is restricted by political bias, meager access to unfiltered *senderista* documentation, and commercial pressures. Coverage by foreign media is freer, but also limited by considerations of geographical remoteness, language, preconceived biases, and the relative importance of Peru in economic and political terms. Johnson describes the options available to the Western European press in covering Peru, and how it has in general reported both the guerrilla war and the larger political, social, and economic situation in the country.

428. McClintock, Cynthia. "Peru." In *Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary Record.* Edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987, v.5, 1985-86, pp.B169-B185.

Annual review of political and economic developments in Peru. Democracy in Latin America, McClintock writes, does not usually endure in the face of severe economic problems and serious guerrilla threats. Yet it has survived in Peru, in spite of the fact that Alán García has alienated important powers: drug traffickers, sectors of the military and police, international bankers, and the U.S. McClintock summarizes the presidential election and the economic policies of the APRA government. García has tried various new approaches to Sendero, but without success. Guerrilla violence has escalated, especially in Lima. The government is aware that a purely military approach to the rebellion will not work, and seeks to address the economic and social conditions that have deeply alienated large numbers of Peruvians, particularly young people. Implementation of these changes, however, will be difficult.

429. McCormick, Gordon H. *The Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism.* Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1987.

The first RAND report by one of the most influential and cited U.S. scholars of Sendero. Making excellent use of a variety of sources, including JPRS translations, the RAND chronology on international terrorism, and Peruvian and American sources, McCormick reviews Sendero's campaign to topple the Peruvian state. Shining Path, McCormick notes, differs from any other Latin American guerrilla movement in several respects, particularly in its isolation, personalistic leadership, and dogmatism. In form and expression, Sendero resembles a religious cult, founded on the revelations of Comrade Gonzalo, who has sharply divided the world between good and evil. The movement maintains a highly rigid belief system, and demands absolute commitment from its cadres. Still, over the course of six years, despite high casualties, Sendero's morale, motivation, and solidarity have remained strong. But McCormick's prognosis is that the movement's future may not be as bright as its past; Sendero's structure, modus operandi, ideology, and world view reveal a number of weaknesses. Its total isolation and extremism, a source of past strength, may be a detriment in the future. The "united front" concept has played a key role in most successful revolutionary struggles; Mao made it the centerpiece of his political strategy during the Chinese civil war. The purpose of the united front is to mobilize the largest possible level of opposition against the target regime by appealing to a broad range of potential supporters. Sendero has moved in the opposite direction, despite the fact that the FSLN, M-19, and FARC have achieved a high degree of success and durability using these tactics. Sendero has refused to establish ties to outside sponsors or links to other underground organizations. Its use of terror has probably become self-defeating; terrorism alone has rarely been successful in a revolution. Finally, Sendero faces some technical constraints: its tactics and weaponry remain at low levels, due to its parochialism. In addition, it is too centralized, and too much power and responsibility rests with its leader, Abimael Guzmán. McCormick concludes with the observation of a political scientist, that revolutionary subversion will not succeed in the face of a capable and cohesive army. Insurgent bands can wreak havoc, but they cannot topple a regime that commands an effective army determined to preserve the status quo.

430. Méndez, Juan E. *A Certain Passivity: Failing to Curb Human Rights Abuses in Peru.* New York: Americas Watch, 1987.

Fourth report by Americas Watch on Peru. The number of incidences of murder, disappearances, torture, and other crimes committed by both sides places Peru near the very top of a

list of Latin American nations where human rights are being violated. On the other hand, Americas Watch believes it unfair to say that the present Peruvian government engages in these practices as a matter of deliberate, centrally-determined policy. President García has an obligation to disavow and end such practices, but the results have so far been disappointing. Americas Watch accuses the government of "a certain passivity" in investigating abuses by members of the security forces. But there are encouraging signs: the lifting of curfews in Lima and Callao, and the formation of a special commission of prosecutors to investigate instances of disappearances in Ayacucho. AW concedes that many abuses are the responsibility of governmental agencies not strictly under the President's authority, especially the judicial system. Still, they would be morally influenced by presidential example and leadership. Americas Watch is also encouraged by the continuing improvement in methodology and performance by the country's human rights movement.

431. Mercado, Rogger. *Algo más sobre Sendero Luminoso:*. 3rd ed., corrected and expanded. Lima: Mergraf, 1987.

Third edition of Mercado's basic work on Shining Path. In addition to his essay on the PCP, the beginning of armed struggle, and Dr. Guzmán's address to fighters at the initiation of ILA, Mercado has added some documents on developing guerrilla war, "dirty war" and *aprista* genocide, the prison massacres, and an interview in *El Nuevo Diario* with Abimael Guzmán on the uprisings of June, 1986 and his analysis of the García APRA government.

432. *Los niños de la guerra.* Lima: IER "José María Arguedas, " Universidad Nacional San Cristobal de Huamanga, [1987].

A volume of essays originally presented at the seminar "Violence, Family, and Child" at the University of Huamanga in 1986. All deal with the impact of the war upon families and children in the department of Ayacucho. Among the diverse offerings are explorations of physical and psychological impact of violence upon children, comparisons with the parallel experience of "dirty war" in Argentina, and the work of various NGO's with children and families, particularly in Lima, where thousands have fled the war. Especially noteworthy are Jaime Urrutia's "La violencia en la región de Ayacucho," which briefly sets out the parameters of the work in terms of background and context, Isabel Coral's "Refugiados ayacuchanos en Lima," which examines the refugee situation in the capital, and "Violencia, familia y menor," which details the religious and civil institutions that have responded to the familial crisis in Ayacucho.

433. Orrega Moreno, Alfonso. *Ayacucho, ¿Capital de la revolución mundial?* Lima: Ediciones Jurídicas Sociales, 1987.

The author, a lawyer and *ayacuchano,* seeks to underline the fact that the department did not live in idyllic peace prior to the rise of Sendero. Although Ayacucho is rich in natural resources, a voracious, corrupt, exploitative bourgeoisie has been the only beneficiary, according to the author. Orrego Moreno reviews the depressingly familiar indices of life in Ayacucho, stressing that Sendero could easily find fertile ground there in which to operate. Ayacuchans were fighting for their survival long before its arrival. Violence in many forms has long been a constant of life in the department; Shining Path is merely its latest manifestation. Much of the work is a detailed analysis of the geographic, social, economic, political, and ideological structure of what Orrego Moreno calls "the capital of world revolution," referring to Sendero's boast that Ayacucho and Peru itself are merely the flashpoints of a worldwide Maoist movement.

434. Sanders, Thomas G. *Peru: Alán García's First Two Years.* UFSI Reports, 1987, no.12, Latin America. Indianapolis: Universities Field Staff International, 1987.

Alán García's controversial administration continues to be plagued by severe economic problems and a guerrilla war of widening intensity. Sanders reviews in detail the 1985 elections, the initial economic and social initiatives of the APRA government, and García's radical proposal to limit repayment of the Peruvian debt. The new government has had no more success than the old in dealing with Shining Path, which has expanded its operations to new areas of the country and enlisted the sympathy, if not the support, of more Peruvians, especially the young. Sanders details Sendero's chronology for taking power, now in its fourth stage: that of consolidating liberated zones under People's Committees. Sendero believes that it is adhering to its timetable for taking power, especially now that it has significantly expanded its operations in Lima. Although a common prescription for undermining guerrilla movements is a reformist government like García's, so far Sendero and the other leftist guerrilla groups (MRTA and MIR) have not taken him seriously; in fact, they stepped up attacks as his inaugural date neared. Human rights abuses have

gone virtually unchecked; the Lurigancho episode showed that García's control over the military is more rhetorical than real. While new approaches have been suggested (payments for information, amnesty or leniency for surrendered guerrillas, special prisons and courts), they go nowhere, because Sendero refuses to negotiate. "Despite his hope of reaching a solution through fresh initiatives, García has made no progress in reducing the damage to life, property, and the political tensions produced by SL."

435. *Sendero Luminoso, la rebelión justificada: un documento auténtico.* Montevideo: Editorial Eco, 1987.

Harsh polemic against the "genocidist" Peruvian government, and in favor of Sendero, "the justified rebellion." The administration of Alán García appears to be in the vanguard of the democratic process. But is this really so? asks the anonymous author. The answer is no: the Peruvian state (the dictatorship of the landowners and big bourgeoisie under the protection of Yankee imperialism) is waging a genocidal war against the people. A long and exhaustively detailed accounting of counterrevolutionary atrocities follows. But has this terror succeeded in its objectives? No, people's war has demonstrated its superiority, its capacity to stand up to sinister, persistent violent offensives and continue growing, the turbulent trumpets of a New State which is being born. On the sixth anniversary of the start of the struggle, this "authentic document" reviews the ideology of Shining Path, the progress of its struggle, its relations with the Peruvian left, the failures and treacheries of the García *aprista* government, and concludes by reprinting several *senderista* manifestos.

436. Wieviorka, Michel. "L'experience du 'Sentier Lumineux' au Perou." *Etudes Polmologiques,* v.43 (1987): 153-174.

Generally well-informed overview of Sendero's emergence and evolution. Wieviorka begins with a brief overview of the 1960's, when the idea of revolutionary ideology was reborn with the Cuban revolution; he also criticizes *foquismo,* the "foco" ideology on which many 1960's guerrilla movements were based. Wieviorka considers five "axes" of Shining Path: its ideological matrix; the struggles at the University of Huamanga which helped form Shining Path; the relationship between Sendero and its principal target of mobilization, the peasantry; the relationship between Sendero and its enemy, the Peruvian state; the extension of Shining Path from its initial "space," and the internal differentiation that extension has brought. Making good use of experts such as Favre, Degregori, McClintock, *et al.,* and primary sources published by *El Diario* and Rogger Mercado, Wieviorka reconstructs Sendero's split and evolution away from orthodox Peruvian Marxism. It is difficult, says Wieviorka, to say precisely what is the relationship between peasants and Sendero, but it is certain that it goes beyond [social] rejection or terror. Sendero's militants were not only ideologues, but also men and women sufficiently tied to the peasant communities, which enabled the movement's discourse to have a genuine hold on them. The rural communities where Sendero appeared did not define themselves solely by rural misery; they barely participated in the great land tenure movements of the 1960's and 1970's. They remained little concerned by the formation of union or corporatist organizations that appeared in the 1970's.

437. Woy-Hazelton, Sandra and William A. Hazelton. "Sustaining Democracy in Peru: Dealing with Parliamentary and Revolutionary Changes." In *Liberalization and Redemocratization in Latin America.* Edited by George A. López and Michael Stohl. (Contributions in Political Science, 178). New York: Greenwood Press, 1987, pp. 105-135.

Discussion of the fragility of democracy in Latin America, with regard to the Peruvian experience from the mid-1960's to 1987. Peru's redemocratization in 1980, after 12 years of military rule, should in theory demonstrate the enduring strength of its institutions. However, enthusiasm for participatory civilian government has been tempered by prolonged economic crisis, terrorism, and Peru's authoritarian traditions. Sustaining democracy is far more difficult than merely holding elections to reinstate civilian rule. The greatest challenge for any democratic system, especially a newly-reconstituted one, is how to deal with opposition, both legal and extra-legal, without undermining the principles and procedures upon which the regime is based. The Woy-Hazeltons examine the transition to civilian rule and how APRA and IU reacted to Belaúnde's AP government, as well as popular opposition to the government's economic program. Sendero's challenge to democracy is much more formidable, however. Its strategy to discredit and destabilize Belaúnde's civilian government by provoking repressive measures has been on the whole a successful one. A democratic regime must fight guerrillas by undermining their appeal and denying them a popular base of support, and by addressing the root causes that gave rise to the

insurgency. The Belaúnde regime's policies tended to exacerbate, not ameliorate, these popular discontents. Peru's prospects for democratic survival are somewhat hopeful; the national elections of 1985 and the military's acceptance of APRA's legitimate claim to power, as well as the large voter turnout, constitute proof that democracy may survive in the face of repression and terror.

438. Puertas Meyer, Laura. "Habla la senderista arrepentida." *Caretas,* no.937 (January 12 1987): 28-31, 40.

Godelia Cerón Cardozo was recruited by Sendero Luminoso at the age of 17. Captured a short time later, she cooperated with her captors, but has never received any benefit from her collaboration. Abandoned and threatened, she fears for her life. *Caretas* publishes her testimony about her recruitment to Sendero, the meetings she attended with movement leaders, her capture and imprisonment in Canto Grande (where the prisoners studied and were lectured about President Gonzalo), her interrogations by Dircote, and her stays in Callao and Chorrillos. She was sentenced to 10 years in prison. *Caretas* believes her case is an important precedent; as in Italy, favorable treatment of captured terrorists can turn them against their former comrades and aid the authorities in their counterinsurgency efforts.

439. Werlich, David P. "Debt, Democracy, and Terrorism in Peru." *Current History,* v.86 (January 1987): 36-37.

As Alán García completes his first year in office (July 1986), he has made little headway against Peru's staggering problems, although he remains popular with the public. Compared with the disastrous administration of Belaúnde, García has had "a very easy act to follow." Peru's problems include huge deficits, ballooning debts, soaring inflation, idled industries, falling wages, and a bloody insurrection. Werlich provides a short, if compact, synopsis of how García's APRA party won power in 1985, and the foreign and domestic measures he has taken since his inauguration to address problems besetting the country. With regard to Sendero, García has promised to "humanize" the struggle, engaging the guerrillas politically and attacking the roots of the insurgency--peasant poverty and a stagnant economy that denies work to Peru's frustrated youth. His peace commission and promises to curb future human rights violations (while overlooking past abuses) have so far shown few results.

440. "Lo del Frontón (II)." *Caretas,* no.940 (February 2 1987): 13, 72.

Amnesty International's report on the Lima prisons massacres quotes a Ministry of War official as claiming that some 60 prisoners were captured alive in El Frontón. The Ministry of Marine and Naval Command have both denied Amnesty's and *Caretas* 's reports; the journal publishes without comment their statement. Owing to the quantity of arms they held and their decision to fight, the "subversive delinquents," according to the statement, were able to hold off the Republican Guard. Accordingly, the Joint Command ordered the Marines to retake El Frontón on June 19 at 4:00 a.m. The Marines outline how they carried out this operation, which they assert was in accordance with the law and respect for human rights, and deny that any prisoners were conveyed to the naval base at Callao. They declare that the base lacks the facilities for imprisoning such a large number of persons, and that it would be impossible to keep such a jail secret, owing to the large numbers of civilians, contractors, construction workers, students, *et al.,* who frequent the base.

441. Basagoyita, Arnulfo. "Uchuraccay: Noel por fin al banquillo." *Equis X,* no.525 (February 9-15 1987): 20-21.

History was made last week as the *fiscal superior* asked for judicial proceedings against the former political-military commander of Ayacucho, General Clemente Noel Moral, as well as against seven soldiers and policemen. The *fiscal* accuses the eight men of crimes against justice and abuse of authority. *Equis X* names the eight, including PIP and GC personnel. As for General Noel, the *fiscal* cannot prove that he ordered the massacre of the journalists at Uchuraccay, but asserts that he did know almost immediately the circumstances of the murders. Beyond justice, what is at stake here is the principle that no one is above the law. The minister of war declared that General Noel will be called before the army high command if the judicial branch decides to open proceedings against him.

442. "En las universidades: Operación relámpago." *Caretas,* no.942 (February 16 1987): 10-17.

The police raided four universities simultaneously at dawn: at La Cantuta, San Marcos, UNI, and San Fernando; hundreds of students were detained, and arms, red flags, and a huge quantity of leftist publications were seized. Operation "Relámpago" was one of the biggest roundups ever to take place in Peru, with some 4,400 Civil Guardsmen and PIP personnel taking part. Dynamite, cartridges, time bombs and other material taken out of the "Mao Tse Tung" pavilion at San Marcos attest to the deep involvement of students in Sendero and MRTA. On a wall in the "Amauta" pavilion at San Marcos was painted the Maoist slogan, "Finish off the Great Leap with a Gold Seal!"; another building had a *mirista* mural which carried the slogan "Genocidal Alán, Barrantes whore of the fascists."*Caretas* describes the aftermath of the raids, and publishes the names of some of those detained. The article implies that the Latin American tradition of university autonomy may be to blame for many bloody incidents.

443. Salcedo, José María. "El caso Uchuraccay: cuatro años después." *Quehacer,* no.45 (February-March, 1987): 14-21.

Contrary to many predictions, the attorney in charge of investigating the Uchuraccay massacre has emphatically underlined the participation of the "forces of order" in the deaths of the journalists. Salcedo recounts the "official" version of both the government and its special investigatory commission, which stressed confusion on the part of Uchuraccay's peasants; no agent "foreign" to the community was involved. In reality, the commission did no more than give official credibility to the version of events offered by General Noel, the political-military commander of Ayacucho. Salcedo carefully refutes, point by point, the theses and explanations proffered by Vargas Llosa and the government commission, in the process asking a series of semi-rhetorical questions about how the war against subversion in Ayacucho is being waged. Included is an interview with the investigating official, and with several prominent lawyers who participated in the investigation.

444. "Alfaro vive, pero en cana." *Caretas,* no.946 (March 16 1987): 18-19.

Brief note that Edgar Antonio Frías, allegedly the number two leader of the Ecuadorian guerrilla movement ¡Alfaro Vive, Carajo!, was detained in Lima. MRTA has openly confessed that it has a transnational America Battalion, composed of members of the Ecuadorian and Colombian M-19 guerrillas. Perhaps, suggests *Caretas,* the capture of Alfaro's leader can shed some light on the political and financial links MRTA has with outside groups.

445. Arroyo, Abilio."En un pueblo dominada por Sendero."*Caretas,* no.946 (March 16 1987): 34-36, 72-D.

Despite (unconstitutional) prohibitions by the Joint Command against journalists entering certain emergency zones, Arroyo was able to visit some villages deep in the *selva* north of Ayacucho, where he reports on communities completely terrorized by Sendero. In Santa Rosa, 200 kilometers from Ayacucho, two women and two men have been murdered by the guerrillas; one for having a son who cooperated with the army, another for leading the village *rondas. Senderistas* were able to force the leader to turn over 23 shotguns that the government had given the villagers; no one reported the theft out of fear of reprisals. Arroyo describes the struggle between the *ronderos* and Sendero. A typical incident is of a guerrilla column entering the small community of Comumpiari. The *senderistas,* who met with no opposition, gathered the 200 families and detained the *ronda* leaders. They told the villagers that it was futile to take arms against the party. "The black heads must pay their debts with blood," they said, and cut the throats of two old men before the villagers. Sendero is winning control of this area, says Arroyo, because the villagers have been disarmed by the Marines and left open to guerrilla reprisals. "Here Sendero governs," declares one peasant; "The government is not concerned with us; because of this we are fighting. Mao Tse Tung, fighting like this, won in China; here we are going to triumph." This bitter lesson is being learned because the Joint Command is not supporting the self-defense patrols; "a legitimate alternative of counterinsurgency war is being lost."

446. "Sendero urbano." *Caretas,* no.947 (March 23 1987): 10-16.

Special report on Sendero's urban campaign of assassination. In 1980 there were 38 attacks in Lima; in 1986 the number rose to 854. Jorge Morales, 40 years old, married, executive of the Compañía de Envases S.A., was shot to death by a young woman wearing blue jeans during an attack on his firm. Draped across his body was a notice that read, "So die class enemies--PCP." This action has all the classic characteristics of an urban Sendero assault. *Caretas* describes how recent *senderista* attacks have been carried out in Lima (including the assassinations of two navy admirals). The PIP, thanks to this rash of attacks, has been able to put together a picture of how

Sendero's "annihilation squads" have been operating in Lima. In 1986 alone, Sendero has carried out 39 selected assassinations, and 10 so far this year. The article goes on to describe Sendero's urban makeup, including a diagram of the Metropolitan Committee and the movement's urban fronts: the Association of Democratic Lawyers (which defends accused terrorists for free), the Committees of Popular Aid (which supports the families of imprisoned terrorists), etc. Dircote has been able to ascertain that the urban *senderistas* are divided into various categories of participation: sympathizers, activists, militants, *cuadros* (military commanders), and *la cúpula,* or "dome"--Guzmán and the Central Committee. *Caretas* briefly describes the duties of each category of movement member, and publishes a chart of the symbols used in Sendero documents (combatants, campaigns, peasants, capitalist, etc.) and a photo of the small buttons distributed to selected members of the Party. A sidebar lists the "façade organs" of Sendero: the MOTC (workers), MCP (peasants), MPJ *(pueblos jóvenes)*, MFP (women), CTIM (intellectuals), MBP (popular bases), MOTAG (agricultural workers), and MRPJ (shantytown dwellers).

447. Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru. "Develop People's War to Serve the World Revolution." *A World to Win,* no.8 (March 1987): 4-13, 77-88.

The most extensive document yet from the PCP dealing with the revolution. In this first part, "Six Years of People's War," the Party reviews its progress since the inauguration of armed struggle. The beginning of armed struggle, of guerrilla warfare, dates to 1980; 1981-82 saw the unfolding of guerrilla war and the sprouting of People's Committees, the new political power of the workers, peasants, and petit bourgeoisie. The following two years, 1983-84, were years of struggle in which the counter-revolution tried to smash the new political power and restore the old order, and revolutionary war sought to defend, develop, and build people's power, a war waged by the People's Guerrilla Army. From 1985 to the present there has been a continuing effort to build and develop base areas and expand the people's war from North to South. There follows a lengthy analysis of the reactionary army's counter-revolutionary war, including detailed descriptions of massacres and other genocidal acts against the people. The article concludes with an explanation of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and an extensive discourse on the PCP's strategy to take power.

448. Granados, Manuel Jesús. "El PCP Sendero Luminoso: aproximaciones a su ideología." *Socialismo y participación,* no.37 (March 1987): 15-35.

One of the most significant essays ever published on Shining Path, by a Quechua-speaking native of Ayacucho who attended the UNSCH and knew many of the first *senderistas* before they went underground. Granados's bachelor's thesis at the University, copies of which were confiscated by Sendero and the government, is one of the earliest studies of Shining Path. Granados's goal is to penetrate the air of mystery surrounding the PCP. In its Maoist ideology peasants are the motor of the revolution. Anyone who works for the national or local government is a traitor; anyone who owns wealth of any kind, even if it is a few cows or a small store, is seen as an enemy, a seeker of *decencia,* or respectability, synonymous with *blanqueamiento* (whitening), Europeanization, or bourgeois values. Sendero's main tactic is sabotage. Granados denies that Sendero engages in terrorism, which he sees as lacking a driving ideology. Sendero acts from a strategy that it has clearly announced to the world. Granados, because of his background, is able to confront directly the ethnic dimension of the revolution. The PCP uses the resentments and frustration of centuries of history; it presents itself as a "we," a defender of indigenous society against "them," the exploiters. But neutrality is impermissible; either one joins the revolution or dies. Granados is unequivocal in his position on Shining Path. He acknowledges that as an educated Indian, he is automatically suspect of being a *senderista.* But he still believes Sendero's triumph would utterly devastate Peru, comparing the movement to Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge: "If Sendero triumphs, how many Peruvians will be left to tell the story? A million, half a million? For Sendero, in its Marxist conception, these 'cleansing operations' are necessarily indispensable in order to adequately secure their aims." According to Raymond Bonner, Granados's article shocked and alarmed many Peruvians, and came to be the topic of discussion among a wide circle of influential *limeños* as no other work on Sendero had been up to this time.

449. "Desmantelan células del MRTA y de Sendero." *Equis X,* no.535 (April 26-May 3 1987): 16-18.

The minister of the interior announced that 71 "subversives," 46 from Sendero and 25 from MRTA, have been recently captured, including guerrillas who had taken part in assassinations of members of the police and armed forces. About one-third of the prisoners were university students or graduates, and 10 were women (all belonging to MRTA). The article draws some conclusions from the information released by the government on the structure of both guerrilla organizations. MRTA is a more traditional Peruvian Marxist organization; Sendero is more

stratified according to the functions each cell has to carry out. A brief analysis of Sendero's strategy (including its preference for "propaganda of the deed" and its aim of fostering "liberated zones") follows.

450. Taylor, Lewis. "Agrarian Unrest and Political Conflict in Puno, 1985-1987." *Bulletin of Latin American Research,* v.6, no.2 (1987): 135-162.

Puno is a region with a tradition of peasant rebellion and Andean millenarianism, and more recently of heightened social conflict. In addition to longstanding peasant-landlord confrontations, there have been clashes between peasant communities and peasant-rural proletarian rivalries. Now political parties such as the PUM, the PCP (Sendero Luminoso), and APRA, as well as social movements like the Catholic Church are competing for the loyalties of the population. Sendero has earmarked Puno as a focal point for a new guerrilla front. If successful, it would mark a significant step towards Sendero's goal of encircling the cities from the countryside. It would also reinforce trends towards the "Colombianization" of the war. Taylor traces the historical background of Puno department, the bleakest and highest in all Peru. Puno had experienced many *guerras de casta* (race wars) and rural revolts prior to the social upheavals of the 1960's. Radicalized in part by political forces like VR (Revolutionary Vanguard), Puno's peasants staged land invasions and strikes, and were severely repressed by the military government in the mid-1970's. The land reforms of the military only intensified *minifundismo* and the exploitation of peasant labor; to the *haciendas* were now added SAIS and CAP as dominant landed institutions. Izquierda Unida won the majority of the vote in 1983. Sendero's foothold in certain provinces of the department and its vicious attacks on APRA officials mark its campaign to create a "second Ayacucho" in Puno. Sendero has encouraged land takeovers and the occupation of SAIS cooperatives, promising to defend the peasants from police or military reprisals. But a strong PUM (a marriage between the old VR and the MIR) means that there is a radical alternative to Sendero other than APRA, an option that many have chosen. Still Shining Path is making strong efforts to win support in a poor rural department wracked by severe inequalities and long-standing land problems. Sendero hopes to deepen the conflict between APRA and the PUM, thereby gaining *pumista* defectors to their cause, and to "militarize" the department, forcing the army to occupy Puno, ruin the government's development plans, and abuse the peasantry on which it depends. Taylor's article is a detailed and incisive examination of the complexities of rural Peru and the peasantry's politicization.

451. "Encuesta en Lima: Los medios y la violencia." *Quehacer,* no.46 (April-May 1987): 42-45.

A survey conducted by the Asociación Peruana de Estudios para la Paz (APEP) explores public perceptions of how violence is treated by the media. For example, 75% of those surveyed believe that at least half the media exaggerates violence. Several newspapers and a television program are singled out as particularly egregious offenders in this regard. A majority in turn believe that this flow of information influences the development of violence. Many would like to see a code of ethics, or perhaps government or self-censorship of the media to curb what many see as an "enchantment" with violence.

452. González, Raúl. "Campesinos, ronderos y guerra antisubversiva: tres experiencias." *Quehacer,* no.46 (April-May 1987): 72-79.

At the end of March a meeting of *rondas campesinas* was held in Lima. González discusses the experience of three distinct types of civilian defense patrols: those of the northern Peruvian sierra, those promoted by the military in the emergency zones, and those created by the Guatemalans security forces. The first arose in 1977, when peasant communities organized themselves into *rondas* to combat an epidemic of horse and cattle thefts, and were a supplement to or substitute for lax local officials who were not doing their job. The second type of *ronda* was created by the Peruvian army to combat Sendero. Membership was anything but voluntary; peasants who declined to join the patrols were automatically regarded as *senderistas.* Unfortunately, the peasants tended to use the *rondas* less to fight subversion than to settle old scores with traditional enemies. The town of Chuschi, for example, had had a feud with Quispillacta over land for generations. When Chuschi was chosen in 1983 as an anti-subversion base for a "civil defense committee," peasants were moved out of their villages and resettled. The inhabitants of Quispillacta were humiliated by being forced to live in the town of their traditional enemies. A clash between the two communities is inevitable. The third example, that of Guatemala, owes much to the experience of "protected hamlets" which the U.S. tried in Vietnam. Peasants were formed into "patrullas de autodefensa civil" (PAC), part of a broader scheme of "re-education" and control by the military government. González judges the first example of *rondas* to be a legitimate

entity, and the second as involuntary, artificial, and prone to exacerbate, not alleviate, rural violence. The third is a specific response to particular Guatemalan military needs, designed to militarize society and ensure that "subversion" cannot take root.

453. González, Raúl. "Sendero vs. MRTA." *Quehacer,* no.46 (April-May 1987): 47-53.

Sendero seems to be extracting revenge for the killing of militants in the prisons by targeting military and APRA personnel. Selective killings may be aimed at goading the government into still more savage repression. Adding to recent bombings, the abandonment of municipal positions by frightened civil servants, insubordination from a group of Air Force officers, and the assassination of security force and APRA party members, a new threat has arisen: MRTA. González reviews Shining Path's four stages to power, and its recent shift of emphasis from the countryside to Lima. But in the cities Sendero is competing directly with MRTA, IU, and other progressive organizations for influence. González briefly reviews MRTA's history; initially the *tupacamaristas* were linked to Sendero's Metropolitan Committee. But the PCP quickly called MRTA the arm of Soviet social imperialism, which was trying to infiltrate Sendero. It now appears that some *senderistas* and *miristas* planned operations and "confiscations" together, without authorization from the Metropolitan Committee, a situation now definitely at an end. González implies that IU has not been forceful enough in competing with Sendero and MRTA for the people's support; the left must confront both movements in each union, shantytown, and popular organization. A chronology of armed actions by Sendero and MRTA from January 1987 through March is appended.

454. Nieto, Jorge. "Lobo, ¿estás? Prensa diario y violencia política." *Quehacer,* no.46 (April-May 1987): 35-41.

Does reporting about violence really encourage it? How should the press do its job in an atmosphere of social and political violence? Nieto examines the role of the press in reporting the war. The prison riots and the takeover of the national universities present test cases to see how various sectors of the daily press reacted. In both, "official" government information, widely accepted at the time, turned out to be erroneous. Nieto analyzes five daily newspapers, comparing their coverage during 1984 and 1986. He determines that in spite of increased political violence and economic crisis, all the papers ran fewer headlines about these subjects, and more about politics, corruption, and social violence. Nieto also examines how certain dailies have covered Sendero. He finds that few carry informed discussions of terrorism, and tend to emphasize sensationalistic actions, presenting the guerrillas as irrational or demented. He recommends the creation of a body to bring together journalism unions, media tycoons, and representatives of the church, universities, and political parties, to foster discussion of the press's role in supporting democratic values. He also concludes with a plea for freedom of the press, especially in view of restrictions that the security forces have placed upon journalists in the emergency zones.

455. Malcomson, Scott L. "On the Shining Path: Peru's Killing Zone." *The Village Voice,* v.32, no.18 (May 5 1987): 22, 24-32.

Vivid, first-person account of the war in Peru. Malcomson visits Lurigancho; in contrast to the squalid anarchy of the rest of the prison, the imprisoned *senderistas* live in "pristine quiet." No one will give his name: "Our struggle is for the people, for groups rather than individuals and we struggle as a group." The prisoners read lessons aloud, analyze current events, chant slogans and sing revolutionary hymns. They seem serene; Malcolmson is intrigued by the remarkable placidity of *senderistas*, "like Marxist Moonies with guns." He also visits a much-delayed trial in Ayacucho of soldiers accused of committing an atrocity, as well as several outlying villages, where the atmosphere of tension and fear is palpable. Malcolmson's judgments are sharp, even pithy. Owning a few too many cows can turn a peasant into a bourgeois, and to be bourgeois in a Sendero zone is to risk death. Technology represents an accumulation of capital, so no one can run machinery any more. Sendero's "judgments" have been getting more arbitrary: "It used to be, however imperfectly, the rich or the exploitative who died; now it was the unlucky as well." The military is every bit as bad as the guerrillas: they direct their terror against the lower classes, Sendero against the "exploiting classes," a group that can include anyone above subsistence level. Between the military and Sendero, all Peruvians are at least potential targets for assassination. The *rondas* are too poorly armed to fight the guerrilla: "They provide a human cushion to make life easier for the army." Malcolmson tries to return to Lurigancho to collect answers to the written questions he had submitted to the *senderistas* during his first trip. But in the interim the uprising has taken place; all the people he spoke to during his earlier visit are dead.

456. "Dark Path Ahead for García." *The Economist,* v.303, no.7498 (May 16 1987): 44.

A rash of bombings, blackouts and assassinations may force Alán García to put terrorism ahead of external debt as Peru's number one problem. In the first quarter of 1987, Sendero Luminoso has carried out 29 bombings, 12 murders, 7 attempted murders, and numerous other acts of mayhem. MRTA has carried out 75 bombings in Lima. García hoped for negotiations with the terrorists, but violence has only increased. The country's eight intelligence organizations have been reorganized, and the U.S. has promised more counterinsurgency aid. But top officials complain that the government still has no plan to beat the insurgency. Sendero's strategy is to force the military to stage a coup; the masses will then supposedly rally to Sendero's side. The violence and a general strike announced for June 19 (the anniversary of last year's prison massacres) have some officials calling for martial law. García is resisting this step.

457. Arroyo, Abilio. "Contacto con Sendero." *Caretas,* no.955 (May 18 1987): 26-31.

On assignment in Chuschi (where the revolution began on May 17, 1980), Arroyo and photographer Oscar Medrano were captured by a *senderista* column. What might have been a tragic episode was turned into a sort of "political class," in which the *senderistas* talked for an hour with the two journalists. After a debate in which the pair were nearly held responsible for everything *Caretas* has published about Sendero, they were given a "political class." The *senderista* leader reviewed the progress the movement has made since 1980: since November, 1986, the Party has been developing popular committees and establishing support bases. The function and purpose of both are explained. The movement will never entertain dialogue with the government. The *senderistas* scorn IU (Barrantes is a pro-*aprista)*, MRTA lacks a head and a party and will disappear, and the peasants are with the Party, says the lecturer. "What do you offer the country when you take power?" asks Arroyo. "What the people need," is the reply; "We will totally do away with hunger, misery, oppression and exploitation. Afterwards we will build from the ground up our entire country, build all its needs, and the people will be free."

458. Lévano, César. "Los mitos de Sendero." *Caretas,* no.955 (May 18 1987): 70-71.

Short but biting critique of Shining Path. In seven years the movement has generated a number of myths, accepted by impressionable intellectuals and columnists. Levano confronts these myths with reality. Is Sendero a peasant organization? Six hundred delegates from 230 peasant communities in Ayacucho rejected Sendero last year, declaring that violence from one side and repression from the other have only heightened poverty, death, and desolation. Citing Ronald Berg, Levano points out that one must distinguish between sympathy, active, and passive support for the guerrillas, and brute coercion. Is Sendero orthodox Maoist? Perhaps, but Guzmán and his disciples have blindly copied and repeated Maoist formulas that may not correspond with present Peruvian reality. Is Sendero a guerrilla movement? Levano terms the PCP a terrorist movement that has carried out guerrilla actions. Finally, he asks, is it Mariateguist? No, he says, it has always been closer to Mao than to Mariátegui, differing from the latter's philosophy on a number of points.

459. Acevedo, Jorge Luis. "¿Estamos perdiendo la guerra?" *Equis X,* no.538 (May 18-24 1987): 6-10.

After seven years Sendero is still growing and increasing its actions throughout the country. Is Peru losing the war? asks Acevedo. But first he must define what victory means. Is it purely military? Or is capturing the imaginations of large numbers of people more significant than numbers of soldiers or guerrillas killed? The debate, he says, is too often framed in a way calculated to "prove" one side or the other is winning or losing. Sendero, as a Maoist "subversive" movement seeking to de-legitimize the existing regime, knows well the maxims of *guerra popular.* Its basic strategy is to force the government to maximize repression, thus winning the allegiance of the masses, whose psychology it seeks to manipulate. The regime's response, which more and more resembles that of Argentina and Uruguay, indicates that it has not learned the lessons of China, Vietnam, and Algeria.

460. Durr, Barbara. "Shining Path Burns With a Hotter Flame." *U.S. News & World Report,* v.102, no.20 (May 25 1987): 35.

In spite of years of effort in impoverished, isolated, and oppressed Puno, Sendero has won little support here. Instead, the guerrillas threaten Alán García's government with a campaign of assassination and urban bombing. García's counterinsurgency strategy combines military force with economic development. Some 400 million dollars have been promised for land reform, agricultural assistance, and social services for the country's 3.5 million Indians. The government considers

Puno "an important social laboratory for implementing reforms designed to eliminate the insurgency's social and economic roots." However, many reforms still exist on paper or are seriously incomplete, such as land reform, bogged down by inter-village rivalries and obstructionism by local elites. Sendero's violence is calculated to polarize the situation; the guerrillas could win victories by default that they could never win by military might or political allure.

461. Nieto Montesinos, Jorge. "Embattled in Peru." *World Press Review,* v.34 (May 1987): 39.

In an excerpt from *Proceso,* Nieto Montesinos reports on a Peru engulfed by a new wave of violence. Acts of sabotage have increased, and the assassination by Sendero of a top APRA politician strengthens the hands of the conservatives, who want sterner measures. However, an Amnesty International report criticizes the government for disappearances, torture, and summary executions, especially in the prisons. The military lied to García's government about these killings, and a congressional investigative commission achieved nothing. The occupation of universities by the army points to a dangerous militarization of the conflict; all this "alienates the government from those social forces which support its anti-imperialist role against the foreign debt and against American policy in Central America. Both the military and the leftist terrorists seem to be working to destroy Peru's democracy."

462. Flores, Heriberto. "Démocratie, autoritarisme et militarisation dans le Pérou d'Alán García." *Probl`emes d'Amérique latine,* no. 84 (2e trim. 1987): 121-144.

The first two years of Alán García's government have been marked by an intensely personal style in both the international and domestic spheres. García has appealed directly to the impoverished masses, the inhabitants of the shantytowns, peasant communities, and has even made overtures to the right, not without causing some tensions within his own party. Flores explores García's new directions, from his style of government ("the solitary exercise of limited power") to his economic policies, to his confrontation with Sendero Luminoso. The *senderistas* understand, says Flores, that their battle is being waged on political, economic, and psychological fronts as well as militarily. According to Henri Favre, their aim is a "senderization" of society; i.e., to exacerbate all of Peru's problems and polarize society. The personal power that García enjoyed in the first months of his presidency was supposed to neutralize the three forces between the president and the masses: Sendero, APRA, and the military. What happened between June and November 1986 modified the relationships between these three forces and García: the Socialist International Congress and prison uprisings, APRA's triumph in municipal elections, and the economic "unknown" of foreign debt problems. Flores examines the narrowing options for García in his attempts to fight terrorism, maintain support within his own party, retain the support of the nation's poor and marginalized, and bring the economy under control.

463. "El senderismo realmente existente." *Debate,* v.9, no.44 (May-June 1987): 10-19.

In April, a group of journalists and students gathered at the University of the Pacific to hear Raúl González and Gustavo Gorriti, the two most knowledgeable journalists in Peru on Shining Path, discuss Sendero. Among the issues raised are where Sendero stands in its quest to topple the Peruvian state, how the movement has succeeded in rallying support when so many other guerrilla factions have failed, and what APRA and the government must do to defeat the insurgents. González stresses that too many have failed to perceive that Sendero is a distinctive revolutionary organization very different from any other in Latin America; neither killing its jailed cadre nor closing the universities has destroyed a movement that has built a following among marginalized rural and urban sectors. Gorriti concurs that Sendero has been seriously underestimated by the state. Both men declare that military solutions, while necessary, must be subordinate to political solutions and subject to civil control. The pair also discuss the differences between the Belaúnde and García approaches to counterinsurgency, the role of the press in combating subversion, and the part the *rondas campesinas* play in fighting Sendero directly in the countryside. An extremely valuable dialogue between two experts who have covered Shining Path almost from the initiation of its armed struggle.

464. "Primicia exclusiva: Habla Sybila de Arguedas." *Equis X,* no.542 (June 15-21 1987): 12-13.

Equis X has obtained an interview with the imprisoned widow of José María Arguedas. She describes conditions in Canto Grande, proclaims her solidarity with oppressed peoples, and declares she is innocent of the charge that she belongs to Sendero. She explains that her political and literary background has led her to identify with the woes of her fellow prisoners. In another

interview (pp.28-31), Senator Javier Valle Riestra calls for an amnesty for Señora Arguedas, and discusses his call for "responding to violence with peace" in the struggle against Sendero.

465. Acevedo, Jorge Luis. "A un año de la masacre." *Equis X,* no.543 (June 22-28 1987): 8-10.

Just a few days before the prison uprisings of June, 1986, Alán García, in an interview with the Spanish paper *El País,* declared that his counterinsurgency strategy would take two parallel roads: a military road, with a scrupulous respect for human rights, and a road that addressed social and economic development. The state, he said, must not be the protagonist of barbarism. Twenty days later, the police and armed forces perpetrated the nation's largest massacre. *Equis X* reviews the events leading up to the revolts, including the political demands of the *senderista* prisoners, the government's decision to turn the situation over to the security forces, and the aftermath of the killings, in which not one person has been brought to justice for abuses of power.

466. "Ayacucho: cómo fueron las emboscadas."*Equis X,* no.548 (July 27-August 3 1987): 12-13.

Security forces in Ayacucho have suffered not two (as reported in the press), but three ambushes by Sendero in the preceding days. *Equis X* describes in detail the circumstances of each attack, which according to its sources signals the start of a new *senderista* offensive. The rural offensive should, according to the doctrine of guerrilla war, have an urban counterpart.

467. Crabtree, John. "The Consolidation of Alán García's Government in Peru." *Third World Quarterly* v.9, no.3 (July 1987): 804-824.

When Alán García took office on July 28, 1985, most observers expected his "honeymoon" to be brief; Peru faced awesome challenges of debt repayment, an economy in ruins, falling living standards, and a growing guerrilla insurgency. By the time municipal elections were held in November, 1986, APRA had shown itself to be not only surprisingly adept at dealing with these problems, but also in building and maintaining popular support and a powerful political apparatus. Crabtree analyzes how García has gained support from the military and business sectors, revived APRA's declining fortunes, and dealt with Sendero. His basic approach has been to recognize the long-term social and economic problems that have nurtured the rebellion, and to mobilize institutions to challenge not only Sendero, but also Izquierda Unida in the countryside and *pueblos jóvenes* around the cities. Crabtree describes several programs established by the government to channel development aid to poor urban and rural sectors. With regard to the war, García has stressed respect for human rights, established a peace commission, called for dialogue with the guerrillas, and vaguely promised a future amnesty "when conditions are right." But in spite of several shocking instances of military atrocities (including the prison massacres), he has been reluctant to go beyond rhetoric in punishing or reining in the security forces. One of his long-term goals seems to be greater civilian control over defense, leading some officers to fear an *aprístización* of the military establishment. Military resentment and a declining economy could present future challenges to his popularity.

468. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "Sendero Luminoso: el desafío autoritario." *Nueva sociedad,* no.90 (July-August 1987): 25-34.

Succinct synopsis of Sendero's origins, development, and appeal. Shining Path emerged out of the interstices between state and society, capital and provinces, city and countryside, and *criollos* and *andinos.* It represents the defensive and authoritarian reaction of the most alienated sector of Peru, the Andean provincial peasantry. In spite of its organizational capacity and its exceptional political will, Sendero has not been able to penetrate the popular "mainstream." Degregori describes how an Andean, marginalized, provincial youth, largely sons of peasants, the petit bourgeoisie, or of recent immigrants form the basis of Sendero's membership. Such people seek security and identity, which Sendero is happy to provide. For the peasantry, Shining Path is an alternative state; its "Popular Republic of New Democracy" provides a structure closer to the peasants than the actual Peruvian state. Seven years into the war, Degregori sees but two possible alternatives. One is a growing polarization of the country between militarization and *senderismo,* which will lead to the "fascist-ization" of the country. The other alternative is a democratic strategy of peace based on popular participation. An example he gives is Puno, which despite Sendero's best efforts, has not been turned into another Ayacucho, due entirely to the existence of strong peasant, political, and church groups.

469. Puertas, Laura. "El último tango: Sendero en París." *Caretas,* no.966 (August 3 1987): 38-40.

On French television, a university professor affirms that if he were Peruvian, he would be a *senderista.* Why should he say that if Peru is a democracy? Democracy exists in Europe, he answers; what's happening in Peru is a fight for justice. In 1983, paintings on Paris metro walls proclaimed *"Vive Sentier Lumineux."* Four years later, friends of Sendero have organized a Comité Sol Perú, directed by Maximiliano Durand. For romantic Frenchmen, Sendero is an exotic and interesting movement. Sendero has put special emphasis in Europe on propaganda, including a radio program (with call-in questions), and seminars in the universities (run by the "Commission for the Defense of the Rights of the Peruvian People"). Puertas describes these activities, and the harm they are doing to Peru's image abroad.

470. "Senderistas asesinan a campesinos de Rimanacuay en Huancevelica." *Equis X,* no.549 (August 10-16 1987): 14.

A group of peasants from Santa Barbara was on its way to Huancavelica to participate in celebrating Rimanacuy '87 when it was attacked by *senderistas,* and 11 peasants were murdered. The government's Instituto Nacional de Planificación is assisting the festival with a large cash subsidy to benefit peasant communities of the area, and the Institute condemns the massacre.

471. "La pentagonización tiene la culpa." *América Latina* (USSR), no.8 (August 1987): 53-56.

Interview with Valentín Pacho, vice-president of the Federación Sindical Mundial (FSM) and secretary general of the CGTP. Pacho blames much of the violence in Peru on the desire of imperialism and the right to perpetuate instability and insecurity, in order to promote a fascist coup. At the same time, García's APRA is coercing the union movement, using Sendero's terrorism as a pretext. He states the Sendero has failed to win over the peasantry with their "Pol Pot" tactics. The prison massacres are a good example of how the government plans to use wholesale repression against the entire left. He notes that the right never says "Sendero," but always speaks of "communist subversion." The aim of the reactionary forces is the "pentagonization" of the country, which is not merely militarization, but the passing of control of the Peruvian military to the Pentagon, which Pacho declares operates openly in Peru along with the CIA.

472. Starikov, Evgueni and Alexander Sliñkó. "¿Quién impone las reglas del juego?" *América Latina* (USSR), no.8 (August 1987): 43-53.

Analysis of the Peruvian situation by two Soviet academics. Starikov and Sliñkó describe Peru as a dual society, in which the traditional indigenous sector is marginalized from the modern economic sector, which includes the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the intelligentsia. They echo David Scott Palmer in postulating a set of coastal/Andean, rural/urban dichotomies that run throughout the entire history of Peru, which they characterize as in a permanent state of struggle. They describe Sendero as a "subculture of the Sierra," noting that earlier guerrilla attempts to mobilize peasants were defeated precisely because they failed to break ethnic and caste barriers. Sendero, on the other hand, has succeeded in integrating itself into traditional society. Its leaders have astutely made pragmatic use of racial and clan divisions and tensions, the heritage of patriarchal obedience and violence ingrained in that society. Sendero utilizes the clientelism, paternalism, violence, and "Mafia" structure characteristic of a terrorist organization. The authors echo the judgment of most analysts that Sendero has no clear or positive program, and mock the idea of the restoration of "Inca socialism" (which is implicit in Sendero's ideology) as a "infantile sickness of *indigenismo* " from which all Peruvian political movements (except the pro-Moscow Communist Party) have suffered. They sum up the components of Sendero's ideology as the restoration of *Tahuantinsuyo;* the harnessing the hatred of Indians toward "white civilization"; an eagerness for a "social revenge" that might involve genocide against the entire coastal (urban) population; a utopian egalitarianism based upon a conception of primitive communism and a subsistence economy; an obscurant and anti-intellectual moral Puritanism grounded in a spirit of primitive asceticism; an extreme ferocity against its victims which sometimes conforms to Inca rituals, accompanied by a pathological sadism. This withering attack on Shining Path extends to characterizing a PCP document as "concluding with long and boring eulogies to 'President Gonzalo.'" The authors conclude that APRA still has the moral prestige to guide the country through its multiple crises, although they imply that it would be best if the *apristas* were to join forces with IU to challenge dependent capitalism.

473. Arroyo, Abilio. "Encuentro: Sendero en el Alto Huallaga." *Caretas,* no.971 (September 7 1987): 30-40.

Exclusive report from the Huallaga, where Arroyo and his cameraman are permitted to photograph a large *senderista* encampment. No one covers his or her face here, where all feel safe from government patrols. The leaders of this camp appear to be Andean, but the troops are local. The guerrillas sing their revolutionary hymns, and are taught the "eight rules of the party." Much of the report concerns the coca traffic of the valley; a *senderista* defends the party's involvement in the traffic as supporting the peasants and fighting the government and the U.S. He denies that they receive any arms, or any money beyond voluntary contributions from traffickers. There are progressive sectors, he affirms, that love the revolution, but we don't have any signed any pact or treaty to receive aid. Sendero definitely does not act against the traffickers. Coca is a form of imperialist domination. The peasants only grow the raw materials; the traffickers are the bourgeoisie of the trade. Asked what they might do to break the peasants' dependency upon the coca trade, he answers that it's a social problem; as long as the peasants grow coca, they can eat. A follow-up report ("¿Y la coca?") looks at the Proyecto Especial del Alto Huallaga (PEAH), and the hard facts of the drug trade: the value of the basic cocaine paste exported from the valley is 630 million dollars annually; 5 million dollars in crop substitution aid is not going to work.

474. Acevedo, Jorge Luis. "Rodrigo Franco: un mártir de la paz." *Equis X*, no.553 (September 7-13 1987): 6-10.

Rodrigo Franco Montes, president of the ENCI (the national import commission), described as "a true promise for Peru," has been assassinated by Sendero Luminoso. Franco came from a dedicated *aprista* family and worked hard for the election of Alán García. Acevedo describes his career, his murder by the guerrillas, and the sense of hopelessness that the killing of a man with a bright future has engendered. One observation is that it is not appreciated how Lima has become "a city surrounded by subversion," and how at risk all APRA leaders now are. In a preceding editorial, Julio Cabrera Moreno, editor of *Equis X*, pays homage to Franco, asking what justifies the murder of an honest and efficient man, and how people who claim they are fighting on behalf of the poor can kill a man who defended the poor. [Ominously, within the year a right-wing death squad will begin operating in Lima, named the Commando Rodrigo Franco.]

475. Villanueva Ramirez, Amelia. "Sendero: ¿fenómeno patológico?" *Equis X*, no.553 (September 7-13 1987): 24-28.

Interview with Javier Mariátegui Chiappe, distinguished Peruvian psychiatrist, who examines Shining Path from a clinical point of view. Are *senderistas* paranoid, demented, or abnormal? What personality is a *senderista* likely to have? To a dedicated revolutionary with concrete objectives, the ends justify the means, and society's "normal" code of ethics is suspended. The psychiatrist believes that the violence which appeals to the average *senderista* has deep roots within Peru's culture, especially its Andean culture. But he denies that psychological diagnostic categories can be applied to political phenomena. Instead, one has to study the ideological scale of values that has replaced those of society. While he feels uneasy at generalizing about Sendero, his observations on the impact of the war's violence in general on the Peruvian psyche are relevant and interesting.

476. "Repudio a la muerte: El pueblo frente a Sendero." *Caretas*, no.972 (September 14 1987): 34-36.

Interview with Carlos Iván Degergori, who theorizes about the aims of Sendero's latest wave of attacks, which have focused on APRA officials like Rodrigo Franco. Franco's killing is probably designed to prevent any alignment of APRA, IU, and certain sectors of the right. Degregori reminds readers that Sendero operates according to its own cold logic, which claims to be scientific; this is why it can carry out a cold-blooded murder that has dismayed the entire country. Sendero, Degregori explains, suffered hard blows in the emergency zones in 1983-84, with the result that it has extended the war to the whole country, and especially to Lima. In this way it has broken the siege of the emergency zones. Degregori discusses the situation in Puno, where popular organizations have acted as a barrier to Sendero. Many people are surprised at how Sendero has grown, but Degregori is surprised that in spite of seven years of war, a terrible crisis in society, and an inadequate response to that crisis, Sendero has not grown more. It cannot gain sympathizers in many sectors of society; in spite of hunger and misery, the people repudiate Sendero. Degregori reiterates his book's thesis: Sendero is not a millenarian, utopian, Andean, messianic, peasant movement, but a hyperrational movement; rationality has almost become its religion, a cold and sectarian faith.

477. "Narco-terrorism." *National Review*, v.39 (September 25 1987): 50.

There are indications that Sendero has allied itself with powerful cocaine exporters. However, there may be a divergence of aims between the two sides which could doom any such alliance. Sendero wants peasants to devote at least one-third of their land to truck crops. It has also established minimum prices for coca leaves to protect small farmers from exploitation by drug traffickers. Sendero has in recent attacks used sophisticated arms which they could only have obtained from the drug dealers' arsenals.

478. "Cartas a Guzmán." *Caretas,* no.974 (September 28 1987): 34-36.

If one were to call a meeting with people who have been involved with Sendero--police, military, sociologists, judges, lawyers, politicians, *et al.*, and asked them whether Abimael Guzmán is alive or dead, the answer might be surprising. For some Guzmán is no more than a myth based on the real existence of someone who directed a criminal movement at its beginnings, but who, after his death has acquired theological characteristics. Others believe that he is the "maximum leader," cerebral conductor and strategist of a terrorist movement he directs in person. *Caretas* has obtained from police files a series of letters to "Guzmán," written by a national-level coordinator named "Pavel." The letters are revealing, in their reverence towards "President Gonzalo," and demonstrate the verticality, dogmatism, and unconditional submission that Sendero demands from its adherents. *Caretas* reprints selected passages from the letters, which include passages of*autocrítica* ("I express my most sincere self-criticism for having committed the gravest error of my life upon separating myself from the Party's line..."). The letters also reveal details of Sendero actions.

479. Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru. "Develop the People's War to Serve the World Revolution--Part Two: One Year of APRA Government." *A World to Win,* no.9 (September 1987): 62-65, 69-88.

Second part of seminal PCP manifesto, in which the Party examines the first year of Alán García's APRA government. The Party disputes the idea that the elections of 1985 were anything but a farce, in which a large percentage of the populace declined to participate, and over which the military exercised a dominant role; the PCP furnishes tables demonstrating that the categories of unregistered, non-voting, and spoiled and blank ballots constitute a third of the eligible voters. Is this, the PCP asks, a demonstration of "the people's sovereignty? Even Izquierda Unida, the "so-called left," (tied to reckless Soviet and Chinese revisionism), garnered only 21% of the votes. APRA's election totals, especially in departments under political-military command, were a total fabrication. From the election the PCP passes to the "so-called nationalist, democratic and people's state" of APRA. García has pontificated about the "three injustices" that he claims he will address (the division between coast and sierra, the economic gap between modern, industrialized Peru and marginalized, rural, traditional Peru, and the social injustice of income disparities between the few rich and the many poor). The PCP analyzes each of these vaunted promises and finds both APRA's analysis and its solutions to be hollow, a recycling of antiquated ideas, whose ultimate purpose is to defend the exploiters and oppressors of the people. The PCP goes on to excoriate the government for its genocide against *senderista* prisoners of war, and reiterate its explicit rejection of the parliamentary path to power: "Every Communist must grasp the truth, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'"

480. Comrade Gonzalo [Abimael Guzmán]. "To Give One's Life for the Party and the Revolution." *A World to Win,* no.9 (September 1987): 43.

Lyrical polemic in honor of the martyrs of the prison uprisings and against the rotten, fascist, and corporativist APRA government and its demagogic "Führer." The fighters and sons and daughters of the masses who audaciously unfurled and held high the banners of their ideology, courage, and heroism in the midst of their raging warriors' defiance, while the reactionary beast drank its fill of their blood...became immortal, giving shape to the monumental trilogy of the shining trenches of combat of El Frontón, Lurigancho, and Callao, an historic milestone that will ever increasingly proclaim the greatness of the Day of Heroism. "Their rebellion, though it cost them their lives, brought about a great moral, political, and military triumph for the Party and the revolution."

481. "19th June--Day of Heroism: Anniversary of Peru Prison Uprising." *A World to Win,* no.9 (September 1987): 40-41.

The Revolutionary Internationalist Movement and other Maoist and revolutionary forces around the world solemnly affirm the PCP's declaration that June 19 will forever be stamped as the

DAY OF HEROISM. On the first anniversary of the prison uprisings, the RIM issues three calls: to honor fallen Peruvian comrades, to support imprisoned revolutionary fighters all over the world, and to urge prisoners not to let themselves be degraded or broken, but to dedicate themselves to revolution, study, and to uphold the banners of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-Tung.

482. Morales Bermúdez, Francisco. "Como luchar contra el terrorismo: ¡Organicémonos!" *Debate,* no.47 (September 1987): 27-31.

The war against Sendero is entering its eight year, and still there is a marked lack of political will to neutralize or defeat the movement. Morales Bermúdez says that to confront terrorism, it will be necessary to replace the existing inefficient and uncoordinated mechanisms, and establish a body such as a Grupo de Trabajo Contrasubversivo Unificado to formulate a national counter-subversive strategy. This group should include political experts, sociologists, anthropologists, linguists, geographers, police, and other specialists as well as soldiers. A national and international campaign of information is needed. Civilian and military institutions should together coordinate their work. The goal is to unify the country, not militarize it. Sendero's Marxist-Leninist ideology must be fought with an ideology based on Western Christian values and in the praxis of a true democracy. Sidebars analyze Sendero's political origins, the causes and motivations that gave rise to the rebellion, "what we know about Sendero" in political and military terms, and a theoretical "scheme to combat terrorism," in which civilian and military institutions join in a common effort. Necessary to the strategy is military action, intelligence and counter-intelligence, psychological warfare, economic and political reforms, human rights, community action, education, and the administration of justice.

483. González, Raúl. "Coca y subversión en el Huallaga." *Quehacer,* no.48 (September-October 1987): 59-72.

On July 15 the government declared a state of emergency in the Alto Huallaga . Officially, this is due to the growing menace of narcotics trafficking. But it is common knowledge that Sendero has established solid roots in the area and threatens to expand its influence. In this critical, much-cited article, González reconstructs the history of Sendero's influence in the Huallaga, a story that includes both MRTA and the *narcotraficantes.* The entire zone between Tingo María and Juanjuí is a vast basic coca paste (PBC)-producing area. Ironically, it was during Belaúnde's first government in the 1960's that immigrants were persuaded to settle the jungle (allegedly to deprive Brazil of an excuse to expand its territory). But the government soon abandoned the pioneers to their own devices. The settlers began to cultivate coca, and in the 1970's found a ready market for their product. Development of the area quickly followed, as small businesses, and coca buyers (mostly Colombians) flooded the area, and restaurants, discoth`eques, and brothels sprang up. An opulent life-style was common for many of the *narcotraficantes,* who flew in orchestras from Lima for dancing. In 1978, under pressure from the U.S., the military government prohibited coca production. Two programs designed to eradicate coca, financed by American money, were launched (PEAH and CORAH). From that time the populace, whose livelihood almost entirely stemmed from the coca trade, began to oppose the government and the Guardia patrols designated to enforce the programs. (The police, ironically, remained neutral, either from lack of resources or because they were suborned by the traffickers.)

González poses these questions: How did this zone become a *senderista* stronghold? Is there an alliance between the guerrillas and the traffickers? In other words, can one speak of "narco-terrorism"? He describes how militants, first from *Puka Llacta* (Red Homeland), then from MIR, came to organize the corn and coca growers. The producers, if organized, could defend themselves from the police and the eradication programs, and also bargain for better prices from the traffickers. The area was very violent, because everyone was armed, and because there was effectively no law and order. González describes how the MIR, later to join MRTA, began the work of organizing the peasants *("¡Coca o muerte! ¡Venceremos!"),* clashing with other leftist groups. By 1985 Sendero arrived and tried to woo the patrols MRTA had established. By 1986 they were using stronger tactics to eliminate all opposition and take control of the settlements. In some areas where MRTA is strong Sendero has joined forces with the *narcotraficantes* to fight them. By 1987 they controlled a majority of the zone's districts; MRTA far fewer. There have been fierce gun battles between the two guerrilla groups. Sendero has also attacked the security forces; their destruction of the GC post in Uchiza in May demonstrated their power. By July the government had no option but to declare the valley an emergency zone. For Sendero, the Alta Huallaga is critical. Not only can they openly build their military strength there, but also an estimated 600 million dollars a year flows through the zone. Sendero's annual income is said to be nearly 30 million dollars from the coca trade, a sum ,González reminds us, no other political force in the country has at its disposal.

484. "Primicia: campamento senderista en Tocache."*Equis X,* no.557 (October 5-11 1987): 14-15.

From various sources, *Equis X* has put together a picture of one of Sendero's most important military camps, on the banks of the Río Huallaga in the department of San Martín. The *senderistas* have organized public assemblies in the plaza of Tocache under the noses of the civil authorities, who dare not oppose them. The narcotics traffic that moves through the area has made it a prime target for the guerrillas. The article describes how the *senderistas* operated brazenly out of hotels right in the town itself, until the anti-narcotics and counterinsurgency forces began to move into the area to oppose them. Displaced from Tocache, the guerrillas have retreated to take control of other nearby towns. To date not a single important trafficker or Sendero leader has been captured.

485. "Sendero y MRTA se baten a tiros." *Equis X,* no.558 (October 12-18 1987): 15.

There are confusing and conflicting reports about the relations between Sendero and MRTA. Some in intelligence circles believe they are cooperating in attacks. Others think that Sendero, MRTA, and other smaller groups such as the MIR and *Puka Llacta* have joined forces. Still others discredit these reports; Sendero zealously maintains that its ideology is the only "true revolutionary line," and will not tolerate competition. Clearly there is an intense rivalry among these organizations for the loyalties of the rural and urban masses. There have already been instances of armed clashes between Sendero and MRTA in the capital. The article describes the circumstances of several of these firefights, as well as clashes between imprisoned *senderistas* and *miristas* in Canto Grande prison. The authorities have had to separate imprisoned guerrillas to prevent fights.

486. "¿Sendero en busca de un frente civil?"*Equis X,* no.560 (October 26-November 1 1987): 12.

According to reports, the directorate of the PCP has issued orders to create a civil or mass front that will be, more or less, legal. The target of this movement will be labor unions, student groups, and diverse popular organizations, with the aim of forming "social support to complement the armed struggle." Sendero seeks to utilize popular discontent with the economy, to directly compete with Izquierda Unida in the popular sector, and to give itself greater intellectual legitimacy among professionals. Abimael Guzmán himself is said to have personally approved this course of action, and to have given the task of *trabajo de masas* to Hildebrando Pérez.

487. Chávez Toro, Carlos. "'Rolando' se define." *Caretas,* no.981 (November 16 1987): 8-B-17, 70.

Multi-part report on MRTA. *Caretas* interviews "Comandante Rolando," who sheds light on MRTA's philosophy of revolution. *Miristas* recently shot several policeman dead; Rolando points out that his group attacks only those who can defend themselves. Between MRTA and Sendero, he declares, there are profound political, ideological, and methodological differences. MRTA believes Peru to be a capitalist society, and that their revolution will be carried out not just by peasants, but also by the working class, intellectuals, professionals, etc. Rolando denies that MRTA has any relations with *narcotraficantes,* and criticizes Sendero for adopting the philosophy "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" in this regard. He names at least one Sendero garrison that is allied with drug traffickers. In terms of MRTA-Sendero relations, *miristas* have been forced to recant publicly at the point of a gun; but MRTA and Sendero have not fought each other openly. Ideologically, MRTA uses Marxism-Leninism as a method for analysis, but not as dogma. He explains the party's "platform," its analysis of Peruvian society, and gives his opinion of Alán García and his government (which is highly negative). Rolando's group appeared to be about forty-strong. A follow-up story entitled "Who is Rolando?" identifies the *mirista* commandant as Víctor Polay Risco, a former *aprista.*

488. "El informe Ames." *Equis X,* no.561 (November 16-22 1987): 12-13.

Senator Rolando Ames has released his much-awaited report on the Lima prison massacre. In an exhaustive analysis of the events of June, 1986, the commission has established that 249 *senderistas* died during the uprising, 124 of them in Lurigancho. Many were executed after surrendering. Three women died in Santa Bárbara, Callao, and 122 men in El Frontón. Although no direct presidential or cabinet order precipitated the massacre, constitutionally the government must take responsibility for the actions of its subordinates, in this case the joint command established by the military. Although various officers have denied any knowledge of how the orders to kill the prisoners were issued, the commission has fixed responsibility on a number of individuals. The commission's report includes a detailed chronology of what took place in all three

prisons, and explores the decision-making process that led to the virtual abdication of civil authority to the military in handling the prison uprisings.

489. Campos, Mario. "¡Monte adentro!" *Caretas,* no.982 (November 23 1987): 10-17.

Photographer Alejandro Balaguer and a colleague were able to spend a day and a night in an encampment of MRTA, and to speak with *Comandante* "Rolando"--Víctor Polay Campos, who posed for photos. Invited by the guerrillas, the journalists had to shake off the PIP and cross difficult mountainous terrain to reach the guerrilla camp. Campos describes the perilous journey (during which they were searched by a roving army patrol), their arrival (where they were greeted with shouts of "with the masses and the arms, we will win") and their interview with Polay Campos. The *mirista* described his *aprista* roots, including his year in Spain with Alán García, and his respect for many in the opposing camp. Why the rifle, he is asked? We don't take up arms because we like them, he replies; we have grasped them out of political conviction. Questioned about the situation in the Alto Huallaga, Polay Campos says that Sendero has allied itself with *narcotraficantes,* and ordered MRTA to withdraw. We were working with the front defense organizations, the *rondas,* he says. Sendero began to attack those fronts and replace them with "popular committees" and the "Republic of the New Democracy." They killed our comrades. Because they were allied with the traffickers, we decided to withdraw our *compañeros.* The interview was abruptly terminated, and the guerrillas escorted the journalists out of the jungle. A sidebar, "Playing at guerrillas?", looks at the *mirista* "column." The guerrillas were a mixture of teenagers (some as young as fourteen), bearded, blue-eyed *limeños* or *costeños,* and even a few Colombians. Despite bold talk of peasant militias and a political-military organization, it appeared to the journalists that MRTA, at least around San Martín, did not present much of a military threat.

490. "MRTA versus Sendero Luminoso." *Equis X,* no.563 (November 23-29 1987): 16-17.

Comparison of the two competing guerrilla groups. MRTA is characterized as a romantic and adventurous group much influenced by the "foco" theories of Régis Debray, a 1960's French revolutionary intellectual. MRTA's guerrillas broke away from the Partido Socialista Revolucionario; one of its leaders fought with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Several other small groups (such as the MIR) contributed members as well. MRTA's operations and methods are described, as are its increasingly violent confrontations with Sendero.

491. Gonzáles, José. "¿Se despunta Sendero?' *Debate,* no.47 (November 1987): 33-39.

Gonzáles asks whether the PCP has been blunted in its drive to take power. He examines Puno in particular, where Sendero began its indoctrination and military training in 1980. By 1986 its actions in the region had been intensified. But Puno has been different. President García is deeply interested in "the Andean trapezoid," and the region's problems are well known. A Unidad Táctica Antisubversiva (UTA), consisting of the army, and the three police forces, will be carrying out a detailed plan as part of a new counterinsurgency strategy. The UTA, imitating its enemy, will be more mobile, and operate in small columns. Better intelligence is crucial to success. Above all, there is a new attitude towards the populace: "The people are allies and not enemies." Even small details, such as ensuring that security forces pay for their sodas and not steal them from storekeepers, are important in this plan. The UTA has met with the Church and other popular organizations, as well as the PUM, the region's dominant political party. Results have been encouraging: Sendero's freedom of action has been restricted. Some communities have succeeded in rejecting Sendero and opposing the sentences its "popular courts" have tried to impose. Documents captured from ambushed *senderistas* reveal that the Southern Regional Committee of Sendero has been weakened. For the first time, Gonzáles reports, the security forces have succeeded in reversing the polarization Sendero is accustomed to fostering, and demonstrated to the populace that their force was greater than that of the terrorists, and that their ends could be just. For the first time, the armed forces have shown that they perceive the political dimension of the war, and that they can seek common ends with regional organizations. In the rest of the country, however, the picture is not so sanguine. Sendero has made significant gains in the Alto Huallaga and in Lima. Gonzáles reviews the strategies of Sendero and the government, the appearance of left and right paramilitary groups, and the scale of fighting since January. The massacre in the Lima prisons is a reminder of the government's capacity to still lose the war.

492. Salazar A., José. "Arte y violencia." *Debate,* no.47 (November 1987): 41-43.

The violence in Ayacucho is reflected in the traditional indigenous folk art of the sierra. The Jiménez family, on the anniversary of the massacre at Uchuraccay, has created a carved *retablo*

in which the death of the eight journalists is included along with the crucifixion of Christ on Calvalry. *La guerra sucia del Perú* ("the Peruvian 'dirty war'") is an increasingly common theme in sculpture, *retablos,* paintings, and ceramics. Ayacucho, "the corner of the dead," is famous as a center of popular art in Peru. It is only natural that the region's violence is reflected in the regional culture. Salazar interviews artisans, social scientists, and experts on folk art, and provides a number of striking examples of how violence and fear are impacting the traditional arts. "Art follows life," says one anthropologist. "The artist cannot speak, but he incorporates reality into his artisanry, painting, or music."

493. Villanueva Ramirez, Amelia. "¿Dónde están nuestros familiares?" *Equis X,* no.564 (November 30-December 6 1987): 28-31.

Interview with Angélica Mendoza, president of the Ayacuchan branch of ANFASEP, the National Association of the Families of Kidnap Victims, Detainees, and the Disappeared. Mendoza and her organization demand justice for their family members who have been imprisoned, kidnapped, or "disappeared" by the security forces. She describes the brutal crimes, including rape, abuse, looting, wanton destruction, and murder that have taken place in Ayacucho. Her own son was kidnapped in 1983, and has never been heard from since. The climate of fear in Ayacucho has given the authorities an excuse to ignore complaints and pleas for the investigation and redress of grievances. Asked about Sendero Luminoso, Mendoza concedes that she has heard that they punish those who commit abuses in the towns, and execute a rough justice against exploiters of the people.

494. González, Raúl. "Ayacucho: Sendero y pistacos. Shakespeare en Ayacucho." *Quehacer,* no.49 (November-December 1987): 63-66.

Nicholas Shakespeare, an English reporter for the London *Times,* and son of a former ambassador to Peru, travels to Peru to write a report on the political and social situation. Everyone advises him to visit Ayacucho without fail. There he finds a story worthy of the more famous Shakespeare, the immortal playwright. An atmosphere of fear and paranoia grips the city. The legendary *pistacos,* or *nakaqs* (Quehcua) are said to have returned. *Pistacos* are literally "throat-cutters" *(degollados),* who kill *campesinos* and render their body down for its fat and grease. A story is told that when two Frenchmen boarded a microbus in Ayacucho, the passengers immediately got off, and a crowd formed, accusing the pair of being *pistacos.* So pervasive is the dread and hatred of both the sinchis and Sendero that a legendary "boogie-man" from the Andean past has surfaced to express the anxiety of the public consciousness. [Shakespeare has since written a novel, *The Vision of Elena Silves,* set in contemporary Peru, that contemplates Sendero Luminoso and magical realism in equal measure.]

495. Vergara Figueroa, Abilio and Freddy Ferrúa Carrasco. "Ayacucho: de nuevo los degolladores." *Quehacer,* no.49 (November-December 1987): 67-71.

Anthropologists Vergara and Ferrúa examine the phenomenon of the *pistacos* in present-day Ayacucho. The *pistaco* is a human being who cuts the throats of lone travelers, and extracts the grease from their bodies. In some versions, the *pistaco* uses the body fat to make medicinal salves. In other stories, the grease is sold to city dwellers; the peasant is unconsciously adding a mythical element to his situation of exploitation. Sometimes the *nakaq* is an *hacendado,* or owner of a landed estate. The authors cite fellow anthropologists Juan Ansión and Jan Szeminski in their belief that the identification of *hacendado* with *pistaco* symbolizes for the peasant the extraction of his labor, which is then used to make money for the merchants of the city. When the *nakaq* is a foreigner, the rendered products return to the countryside in the form of fats that the peasant must buy at inflated prices. That these mechanisms for the expression of long-standing resentments resurface in a time of heightened tensions and fear demonstrates the "elastic capacity which Andean myths have to represent changing conditions of reality." The *nakaqs* which are said to be roaming Ayacucho today are tall blonde whites, carrying machine guns and wearing blue jeans. If these *nakaqs* are detained by the police or army, they are always released, because they are said to be acting with official authority and carrying passes signed by President García. In some Ayacucho barrios the story is told that the government has brought in thousands of *nakaqs* to the province, identifying the mythical *pistaco* with the dreaded sinchi special police. The alienation of the peasantry of Ayacucho from the Peruvian state is complete with the widespread belief in the return of the *pistacos.* Vergara and Ferrúa fear that this fracture may be irreversible.

496. [Ned, Hugo.] "Los arrepentidos de Chapi." *Caretas,* no. 985 (December 14 1987): 52-53.

Short piece on the latest defectors from Sendero's ranks. In 1985 the security forces received their first deserters from Shining Path. They were integrated into the local self-defense committees, but since they were not given adequate means to protect themselves, they were open to *senderista* vengeance. *Caretas* hopes that this error will not be repeated with the 178 *campesinos* who are the guerrillas' latest defectors. Hugo Ned, invited to the village of Chapi by the local military commander, talked with the peasants and describes their experiences. One, Emilio Sánchez was with Sendero for four years. Most deserted because they couldn't stand the punishments and the hunger they suffered. The army's objective is to induce peasants who fled to return to their communities. "Only with security and development," says one officer, "can we achieve the pacification of the zone." The government has sent social assistance personnel to help in the task. One of the most important elements of counterinsurgency war is to implement a policy for encouraging guerrillas to surrender to government forces.

497. Pásara, Luis. "Para apagar el incendio." *Caretas,* no.986 (December 21 1987): 60B-60C.

Much can be gained by studying terrorism from a comparative perspective. Specialists distinguish four categories of political violence: anarchist movements in industrialized nations (Germany, Italy), where intellectuals and middle-class students resort to bombs because the existing political system does not give their radical views an audience; Third World guerrilla groups that fight external dependency or local oligarchies (Cuba, Nicaragua); ethnic or cultural separatist movements; international terrorism waged against industrial democracies. In which does Sendero belong? Somewhere in the third category: Shining Path is a movement whose roots are fundamentally ethnic, in which a young generation of peasant origins cannot find an economic or cultural place in the "system." MRTA belongs to the second category. Pásara looks at the theories of Germans Peter Waldmann and Ekkart Zimmerman on the differences between fighting violence from the middle and the lower classes. Lower-class movements tend to be more violent; they have less to lose and are more accustomed to brutality in everyday life. Also, the more ideologized the movement, the less rational are its goals and tactics. Are the *senderistas* so eager to die for their cause fueled by ideology, or the accumulated hatred of generations? Herbert Kitschelt posits that an authoritarian system is like oxygen feeding the fires of fanaticism. A sidebar details recommendations from Zimmerman on "How to give the fire more fuel" (literally "how to put more wood on the fire")--how to encourage armed struggle.

498. "¿Líos internos en el MRTA?" *Equis X,* no.566 (December 21 1987-January 12 1988): 12-13.

MRTA has suffered setbacks at the hands of Sendero recently, especially in the area of Tingo María. These problems are converting MRTA into an exclusively urban guerrilla movement. In the judgment of *Equis X,* MRTA is becoming a "late and minor echo" of Shining Path. MRTA cannot attract recruits as easily as the more closed and fanatical Sendero. Its social program is minimal, and it has had to initiate armed struggle prematurely in order to demonstrate that it exists and must be taken seriously. There are reports that outside powers, notably the Libyans, may be supporting MRTA. All these problems have bolstered rumors that the organization is suffering from serious internal tensions and conflicts.

499. "Violencia '87." *Caretas,* no.987 (December 30 1987): 28-31.

Year-end wrap-up of 1987. A chart traces the discouraging figures: 228 security force personnel, 283 presumed terrorists, 350 civilians, and 150 civil authorities killed during the year. Although "terrorist" and civilian casualties are down from 1984 levels, selective assassinations of APRA officials by Sendero are up and MRTA has renewed its attacks. *Caretas* traces the year's events month by month, from the murders of engineers and army officers in January to the assassination of the *alcalde* of Huanta and a Catholic priest in Huamanga in December. Highlights of the year include a summit on counterinsurgency strategy called by President García (which included retired army generals), a car bomb exploded during Aprista Fraternity Day, the wiping out of the police post in Uchiza in May (with seven policemen killed), and the murder of Rodrigo Franco in August. Following the annual summary is a short piece on the economic devastation that the war has wrought; seven years of people's war has cost Peru some five billion dollars [!] in damages (five thousand million). An accompanying table charts estimated losses caused by terrorism.

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500. Amnesty International. *Peru: Violations of Human Rights in the Emergency Zones.* New York: Amnesty International, August 1988.

A consistent pattern of "disappearances," extrajudicial executions, and torture in Peru has been of grave concern to AI since the beginning of 1983. In December 1982 a number of areas already under states of emergency were placed under the administrative control of army officers appointed by the President. Since that date, a dramatic decline in respect for human rights has been apparent, and continues today in the *zonas de emergencia* regulated by Law 24,150 of June 1985. This law allows the President to appoint senior officials to head the *comandos político-militares* which administer the zones. Amnesty provides a detailed report on individual cases in various areas, detention procedures, and domestic remedies and safeguards. There are provisions in Peruvian law which may not be suspended even under states of emergency, including *habeas corpus.* However, most of these provisions seem to be routinely and uniformly ignored in the emergency zones.

501. Ames, Rolando. *Informe al Congreso sobre los sucesos de los penales.* Lima: The Commission, 1988.

Senator Ames chaired the government investigation of the events surrounding the uprisings in Lurigancho, El Frontón, and Santa Bárbara prisons in June 1986. The result is an exhaustive (379 pp.) compilation of official testimony, documents, and chronology. The commission examines the mutinies themselves, the decision of the government to hand over the situation to the military, and the attacks on the prisons, which resulted in a vast loss of human life. The commission's conclusions criticize the government for not recognizing the dangers of a mutiny, especially in light of previous prison uprisings by militants, and for virtually ceding control of the *senderista* block to the militants. Once the uprisings began, the government released false information, which exaggerated the facts (for example, insisting that the prisoners had arms and explosives). The government also lied about the deaths of many of the prisoners, and exaggerated the scale of fighting and government casualties. Above all, the commission accuses the government and military of using excessive and disproportionate force to crush the revolts. Only in El Frontón did the militants possess arms, which amounted to three rifles and a machine gun with 200 bullets. Against this puny armory the government threw plastic explosives, machine guns, dynamite, antitank rockets, and 81mm cannon. Worst of all, members of the armed forces committed extrajudicial executions, shooting prisoners after they had surrendered, and then sought to cover up these human rights violations. The commission found that the deaths of 250 persons were attributed to the president's decision to apply repressive measures as a reply to the demands of the mutineers.

502. *Ayacucho siglo xxi: paz, justicia y desarrollo.* Compiled by Javier Iguiñiz and Pedro Francke. Lima: Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 1988.

Essays from two forums on "Ayacucho, siglo xxi" held in 1984 and 1988. The focus of the seminars was on strategic planning for Ayacucho, including investment, transportation, agriculture, industry, mining, health, education, electricity, and local government. Two sections which deal with violence are compilations of short statements by a number of social scientists. Among the subjects covered are the characteristics of counterinsurgency, the impact of the war on the families of the detained and the "disappeared," and the origins of Ayacucho's violence. Two of the discussions are especially noteworthy: Raúl González emphasizes not structural, but political violence, pointing out that it would be a mistake to believe that Sendero arose merely from its own political will. He cites *conjunto social,* a "social conjuncture," in which Sendero's revolutionary violence and the resentments of many Peruvians coincided. González observes that while the Belaúnde government thought only of a military solution to Sendero's challenge, the García government stresses development for the "Andean Trapezoid." In contrast, Javier Díez Canseco scorns the money pumped into the "Andean Trapezoid" as a drop in the sea of injustice, and a smokescreen for continued human rights abuses. The characteristics of counterinsurgency, even under the APRA government, are forced disappearances, the institutionalization of torture, and compulsive membership in the civil patrols. Soldiers and policemen still constitute an army of occupation in Ayacucho; to regain legitimacy, they need to recover a role linked with the people

503. Benavides, Gustavo. "Poder político y religión en el Perú." *Márgenes,* v.4 (1988): 21-54.

Published in English as "Millenial Politics in Contemporary Peru." See no. 604.

504. Berg, Ronald. "Explaining Sendero Luminoso." In *The Legitimacy of Political Violence? The Case of Latin America.* Proceedings from the Area Studies Association Symposium, "The Legitimacy of Political Violence?" University of Massachusetts at Amherst, April 10-11, 1987. Amherst: International Area Studies Programs, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1988.

Berg's research is partly based on his stay in a peasant village in Andahuaylas in 1981-82, where he had the chance to observe Sendero beginning to infiltrate the area. In searching for the roots of Sendero's support among many peasant communities, Berg provides a historical analysis of class structures and village social institutions. Land redistribution is plainly a key emphasis of Sendero, as manifested in the writings of Mariátegui and Antonio Díaz Martínez. Sendero has consistently made agricultural cooperatives and commercial farming enterprises important targets; in Puno and Andahuaylas they are clearly exploiting popular resentment of established enterprises. Machinery has been wrecked, livestock seized and distributed, and foreign technical advisors driven away. Reciprocity is all-important in Andean social structures; growing disparities between rich and poor peasants have given rise to bitter antagonisms. In areas of the Andes where haciendas have been replaced by agricultural cooperatives, and where wealth is polarized, Sendero has been most welcome. In places where small-holdings predominate, Sendero has been less successful, as is true for more capitalist and wealthy areas of the highlands, such as Junín. He concludes that it is unlikely that Sendero will win power or even control areas of the Andes for long periods of time. Its ideology is foreign to the peasants and at odds with their fundamental principles. It exploits popular resentments and localized antagonisms, "but it has not succeeded in rallying the peasants under the banner of Mao--nor is it likely to do so."

505. Chang-Rodríguez, Eugenio. "Origins and Diffusion of the Shining Path." In *APRA and the Democratic Challenge in Peru.* Edited by Eugenio Chang-Rodríguez and Ronald G. Hellman. New York: Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies, City University of New York, 1988, pp. 65-90.

Excellent, detailed, concise summary of Sendero's origin and war against the Peruvian state, with an unusually reflective conclusion about Sendero's *mithos.* Chang-Rodríguez is especially good at tracing the political evolution of the PCP after the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960's, and its relationships with other Peruvian leftist factions. He considers the messianic interpretation of Sendero, but notes that the PCP itself has explicitly rejected this thesis (although its documents call for a general uprising in the Andes). In his extremely thoughtful evaluation, he wonders why "economic and social reasons, including overpopulation, unemployment, extreme poverty, internal migration, centralization, lowering of the standard of living, increasing external debt, corruption, and so on, have failed to explain satisfactorily this Andean phenomenon." The answer, he concludes, lies perhaps in historical and ideological factors as well as in Peru's acute socioeconomic crisis. Although Sendero considers itself Maoist, its strategy more closely resembles that of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and Mau Mau in Kenya than the praxis applied in China by the Communists. Do its tactics represent the expression of a true Pol Pot communism or a Marxism with messianic overtones? "Sendero's *praxis* seems to rely on irrationalism and willfulness." Its apocalyptic vision of the total destruction of Peruvian society as necessary to the birth of the "new democracy" is not fanciful. Guzmán and his followers have forged a quasi-religious faith combining two great myths to which humans respond, the long march and the lost paradise: "Sendero apparently aspires to return to the community of wholeness disrupted and alienated first by the *conquistadores* and now by the capitalists." To the *senderistas,* Marxism-Leninism-Maoism provides the Andean a mystical and mythological vision of regeneration; Marxism is understood not as a scientific theory, but as a quasi-religious myth. "For them, as for André Malraux, the communist myth gives creative energy to the heroic soul." They will usher in the new dawn: "They are the chosen; the rest are the damned...*Sendero's* agenda is a general national conflagration, a holocaust that leads the way toward their millenarian order."

506. Communist Party of Peru. *Programa. Congreso marxista. Congreso marxista-leninista-maoista, pensamiento Gonzalo.* [Lima]: Ediciones Bandera Roja, 1988.

Program of the first congress of the PCP. The Party is rooted in and guided by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, principally Maoism, and more specifically by Gonzalo Thought, which is the application of universal truth to concrete conditions of the Peruvian revolution, created by President Gonzalo, chief of the Party. The PCP is the organized vanguard of the Peruvian

proletariat, which is an integral part of the world proletariat. The general program calls for the demolition of the Peruvian state, struggle against Yankee imperialism, destruction of bureaucratic capitalism, liquidation of semifeudal property and confiscation of lands for the peasantry, respect for the property and rights of the middle and national bourgeoisie, real equality for women, a new culture as a weapon to serve the masses, guided by the scientific ideology of the proletariat, (and giving special importance to education), and fighting for the world proletariat, against the United States, the Soviet Union, and imperialism in general. The concrete program enumerates the party's principles, which include class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the rightness of rebellion, the need to combat imperialism, revisionism, and reactionism, the imperative to conquer and defend power with people's war, the militarization of the Party, the construction of the three instruments of revolution, the two-line struggle as an impulsive force of party development, as well as the need to serve the people and the world proletarian revolution.

507. Couderc, Martine. "Violence et désagrégation sociale au Pérou." *Etudes polémologiques*, v.2, no.46 (1988): 105-112.

Discussion of the war, with emphasis mainly on current (1987) trends. The scale of casualties seems to have fallen recently, probably due to a more "selective" counterinsurgency policy adopted since the García administration came to power. Couderc delineates a number of types of *senderista* action, distinguishing violence against property (private and state) from violence against soldiers, policemen, *ronderos*, civil servants, and people who help the authorities. Couderc also shows how MRTA differs ideologically and tactically from Sendero. The article concentrates on the counter-terrorist policies of the government, and how they reflect the hardening of internal political attitudes in Peru, particularly on the part of the right. The "end of the state of grace" which APRA initially desired, along with the dismal shape of the economy, has produced a "degeneration of the social fabric" along the lines of the Colombian experience. In this environment, Sendero has prospered.

508. *Democracia y violencia en el Perú.* Edited by Diego García Sayán. (Serie Seminarios, Mesas Redondas y Conferencia, no.4) Lima: Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales (CEPEI), 1988.

A volume of essays grouped around the theme of democracy and violence in Peru, by well-known senderologists and social commentators. In "La violencia en el Perú," Raúl González asks why Sendero has continued to flourish after eight years of hard, implacable, and systematic repression. He reminds readers that in 1967, General Edgardo Mercado Jarrín prepared an analysis of subversion in Latin America, blaming a lack of national integration, geographically, politically, and culturally isolated areas, structural disequilibriums and social and economic inequalities, as well as a growing discontent and loss of confidence by the governed for guerrilla movements. Those rising in arms do not have to do anything but exacerbate the structural problems of their countries and underline the lack of capacity to govern on the part of the political classes. González echoes Mercado Jarrín's judgment that revolutionary war is foremost a political war; political solutions must take precedence over military means, while political, economic, and social development is crucial in counterguerrilla warfare. He does not absolve Sendero from its responsibility for having initiated revolutionary war, but he calls for a new counterinsurgency strategy in which the security forces reclaim political legitimacy. Cynthia McClintock, in "Perspectivas para la consolidación democrática en el Perú," places Peru within the context of a resurgent democratization in Latin America. While most political scientists believe that a guerrilla war threatens democracy's survival, McClintock maintains that such a war can unite political factions, including the military, with democracy as the only alternative to civil war. In fact she believes that Peru's elites have made just such a strategic decision, and her essay explores political, economic, and external variants that sustain this conclusion. Finally, Francisco Morales Bermúdez C. ("El rol de las fuerzas armadas en el contexto de la democracia y la violencia política en el Perú") defines democracy and violence as antagonistic to one another, and examines the role that the military as an institution plays in this struggle. The volume is rounded out by commentary, and an addendum on "Subversion and democracy" by ex-general Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, whose striking analysis of the late 1960's prefigured the tragedy of the 1980's. Mercado Jarrín outlines a national strategy to combat Sendero, based on political change, economic development, and a reinvigorated military effort based on mobility, more flexible tactics, and coordinated intelligence capabilities.

509. Doughty, Paul L. "Crossroads for Anthropology: Human Rights in Latin America." In *Human Rights and Anthropology.* Edited by Theodore E. Downing and Gilbert Kushner. (Cultural Survival report 24) Cambridge, MA.: Cultural Survival Inc., 1988, pp. 43-71.

Doughty examines, nation by nation, the "Indian question" in Latin American societies. In Peru, the vicious and fratricidal war in the highlands is directed by whites and mestizos on both sides, but is being fought by "soldier-pawns," recruited from the ranks of alienated urban migrants drafted into the army or from Indian villages. "Why," Doughty asks, "should a movement like Sendero Luminoso act with terrifying vehemence against the vulnerable population everyone *assumes* to be the intended beneficiaries of protest?" Among possible explanations is the fact that the leadership of Sendero is made up of whites, mestizos, and acculturated "ex-Indians" known as *cholos*. Sendero pits community against community, taking advantage of old conflicts and antagonisms, tapping into the "veins of alienation that reach every hamlet." Above all, "whatever the political reasons underlying the capricious killing of defenseless peasants, they are rooted in an ethnocentric racist attitude that devalues Indian life on another scale of priorities." On the other side, the military recruits naive Indian youths and immerses them in a nationalistic military culture which is thoroughly anti-Indian. The draftees are largely urban poor and provincial youth; "their lack of any sense of pan-Indian, social class, or highland cultural solidarity lends itself to a certain freedom from constraint when assigned elsewhere." The poor Indian communities are caught in the middle between two sides that demand their complete support or obedience.

510. Estellano E., Washington. "Vidas paralelas: los guerrilleros peruanos y guerrerenses." In *Peru, una luz en el sendero.* Mexico: Distribuciones Fontamara, 1988, pp.39-47.

Comparison between Shining Path and the guerrilla movement in Guerrero, Mexico, in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Both insurrections had deep roots in university and popular organizations, Sendero in the UNSCH and Mexican guerrillas at the Universidad Autónoma de Guerrero. In both regions impoverished young peasants sought to advance through university education; in both the failure of legal leftist movements led to frustration, radicalization, and ultimately to armed struggle. Although Estellano concedes that Sendero is far more authoritarian than the Mexicans, both movements exhibited vertical patterns of leadership that were morally austere. However, the differences between Mexico and Peru are many. The Guerrero movement arose because the Mexican system was incapable of dealing with a democratic opposition. Its ideological foundations were nowhere as rigorous as Sendero's blend of Mariátegui and Mao, and it was deeply influenced by the experiences of Che Guevara. Guerrero's military actions were carried out by students and teachers, not peasants. [The author does not mention that the Guerrero guerrillas were ruthlessly stamped out by the Mexican army.]

511. Favre, Henri. "La dialéctica de la toma del poder de Sendero Luminoso." In *Perú, una luz en el sendero.* Mexico: Distribuciones Fontamara, 1988, pp. 210-216.

Reprint of interview of Favre by Raúl González, originally published in *Quehacer* in 1986. See no.396.

512. Flores Galindo, Alberto. "A guerra silenciosa." In *Sendero Luminoso.* Compiled by Enrique Amayo. São Paulo: Edições Vértice, 1988, pp.103-122.

Exploration of the dimensions of violence in a nation where it has become all too abstract. After 1983 figures show a huge increase in casualties in Ayacucho, and Flores Galindo links this directly to the way in which the counterinsurgency war is being waged: *senderismo* is being treated almost as a virus, to be extirpated from the body politic. The establishment of counter-guerrilla patrols now pits *mononteros* against *terrucos* (the guerrillas are always called "terrorists"), subversion against civil defense, the red against the white flags. The countryside, moreover, is not homogeneous; multiple conflicts between more prosperous and poorer villages, between farmers and herders, between mountain and valley dwellers exacerbate a struggle in which simple neutrality is not permissible. Sendero has to be demonized, stripped of its ideological trappings, its members treated like criminals. If the guerrilla is the fish that swims in the sea of the people (as Mao asserted), the military is draining that sea ("the ocean is transformed into a bog"). The army has only to wait for Sendero to bleed to death. Flores Galindo chronicles the results of this philosophy, in numbers of dead and disappeared, showing how villages are being turned against each other and depopulated (Huambalpa once had almost 3,000 inhabitants; in 1983 only 42 old people remained). This kind of war is spreading to other regions beyond Ayacucho. Flores Galindo concludes by asking whether APRA will change this military strategy.

513. Flores Galindo, Alberto. *Tiempo de plagas.* Lima: Caballo Rojo Ediciones, 1988.

Collection of previously published essays on Peruvian society in its "time of plagues." Flores Galindo ruminates on society, politics, socialism, power, traditional Andean society, and, of course, Sendero Luminoso. Several short pieces are especially relevant: in "Uchuraccay: el psicoanálisis como metáfora," he ponders the links between Marxism and psychoanalysis, and the deep attraction both hold for Peruvian intellectuals. Both are Western ideas alien to the Andean world; this makes the inclusion of a psychiatrist on the Uchuraccay commission especially intriguing. The idea that psychoanalysis might offer insight into the enigma of that horrific massacre seems bizarre to Flores Galindo. In "El exterminio y el recuerdo: la masacre de los penales," he examines the prison uprisings of June, 1986. The extermination of virtually all the *senderista* prisoners represents a total abdication of legal authority by the elected government; the "colonial inheritance" of authoritarianism bodes ill for the nation's future. Will the "model of June 18" be applied in the future to universities, schools, and factories? A final piece, "La utopia andina: esperanza y proyecto," does not mention Sendero by name, but ponders the peculiar Peruvian, indeed Andean, need for a utopian, messianic, and millenarian future which must needs be authoritarian. He reminds us of the Chinese model, in which Marxism and peasant messianism were enthusiastically linked by Chinese intellectuals, harking back to an illusory past.

514. Foo Kong Dejo, Hermania C. "Perú: seguridad nacional contrainsurgencia y guerra popular." In *Peru, una luz en el sendero.* Mexico: Distribuciones Fontamara, 1988, pp. 143-209.

Densely written, sociopolitical examination of the relationship between national security, counterinsurgency, and guerrilla war in the context of Latin America and Peru. The author reviews the rise of a post-war doctrine in which "communist" subversion had to be combated everywhere around the world, especially in Third World countries. Foo Kong Dejo describes a Peruvian military that has moved into a double role as an engine of development and instrument of national defense. But it also acts to inflict terror upon the population; state terror is used to quell any form of protest against the National State. The author describes the structure of that force: the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of War and the National Intelligence Service, the Council of National Defense, the Joint Command of the Armed Forces (commanding the Army, Navy, and Air Force), the Superior Council of Police Forces (which commands the Civil Guard and sinchis, Republican Guard and Llapan Atic, and Peruvian Investigation Police [PIP]. These forces and their "legitimate violence" have converted Peru into a virtual concentration camp, with 7.5 million of its 20 million citizens living under military authority. Foo Kong Dejo calls the struggle between the government and Sendero a civil war; Sendero has succeeded in raising to the level of social actor that always silenced voice in Peru's history: the native peasantry.

515. Forgues, Roland. "Mesianismo y senderismo: un desafío para la imaginación." In *Peruanistas contemporáneos.* Edited by Wilfredo Kapsoli. 2v. Lima: CONCYTEC, 1988, v.1, pp.123-140.

If one were to believe the numerous declarations of intellectuals, inside and outside Lima, and reports in the national and international press, Sendero Luminoso is essentially a "messianic movement" rooted in a vision of the millenarian world of the Quechua ancients. Forgues is utterly determined to refute this belief, for which he blames, among others, Pablo Macera and Mario Vargas Llosa , and additionally, the Marxist left in Peru. Forgues explores the meaning of "messianic," which he defines as a political-religious movement that seeks happiness and eternal good, a re-ordering of the world through a prophet-guide. Forgues looks at such movements in Peruvian history, from Inkarri through Taki Onquoy and Túpac Amaru to rural rebellions of the early 20th century. As all of these movements claim some degree of descent from the Incas, and prefigure their return, it is clear that Sendero Luminoso has nothing to do ideologically or in practice with millenarianism. Sendero is based on an ideological concept totally alien to the restoration of *Tahuantinsuyo.* Those who categorize Sendero as a messianic movement base their thesis, in Forgues's opinion, on arbitrary arguments such as the movement's enigmatic and rejectionist nature, and on its use of symbolism, such as the hanging of dead dogs from lampposts. Such gestures are deliberate u cultural references. For example, Sendero's employment of Indian slings to hurl dynamite is more due to a lack of sophisticated weapons than a return to the prehispanic past. Forgues analyzes Sendero's own documents to show that it is a movement based on a rigid political and military structure, not a messianic movement; he further suggests that the left's interpretations of Sendero are partly the result of its own ambivalence at being marginalized by Sendero's violence.

516. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Democracia, narcotráfico y la insurrección de Sendero Luminoso." In *Democracia, sociedad y gobierno en el Perú.* Edited by Luis Pasara and Jorge Parodi. Lima: Centro de Estudios de Democracia y Sociedad, [1988], pp.193-212.

Gorriti explores the "dynamic of interdependence between the state, the *senderista* insurrection, and *narcotráfico.*" The cultivation and trafficking of basic cocaine paste increased significantly during the second, more conservative phase of military government in the late 1970's, due to increased demand from Europe and the U.S. But Gorriti also cites a slow and insidious infiltration of *narcotráfico* into the nation, and links between cocaine kingpins and some high government officials inside the *junta.* In fact, the military government itself created a new class of state-dependent entrepreneurs and bureaucrats, and an anesthetizing climate in which such corruption could flourish. Even after the return of nominally democratic rule in 1980, corruption and protection of *narcotraficantes* continued (Gorriti cites the case of the notorious Carlos Langberg). Langberg fell from favor after APRA took power, but incompetence and long-established ties of influence and money, even among the GC and PIP, ensured that business continued as usual. Gorriti sketches the economic importance of coca to the Alto Huallaga, and to Peru itself. What is Sendero's role in this dirty equation? The security forces of the state have been losing the fight against terrorism for a number of reasons: inefficiency, a total lack of coordination among institutions, poor equipment, internal rivalries, deficient intelligence, and, according to Gorriti, the most important factor, corruption. Under the "fracturing impact of *narcotráfico"* the problem of corruption exploded, especially in the PIP, the most vital organ of intelligence. The army's theory and praxis of counterinsurgency has placed it outside of the legal democratic order. Gorriti concludes that if the Peruvian state does not define legal ways of confronting the insurrection efficiently, the "governability" of the entire state in a democratic system will progressively shrink.

517. Harding, Colin. "Antonio Díaz Martínez and the Ideology of Sendero Luminoso." *Bulletin of Latin American Research,* v.7, no.1 (1988): 65-73.

One of the most important articles to appear on Shining Path, frequently cited by other senderologists. Harding explores the life and thought of the man widely assumed to be "number two" in Sendero's hierarchy, Antonio Díaz Martínez. Díaz Martínez was born in a poor, but culturally "de-Indianized" department in the sierra. After earning a degree as an agronomist in 1957, he carried out a statistical and socio-economic study on agriculture in Ayacucho at Huamanga. Several years of working as a government agronomist convinced him that the technical emphasis in land "reform" movements of the time, which favored large-scale colonization schemes, failed to address the real needs of the country's peasantry. By the mid-1960's he had joined the faculty in Huamanga and was carrying out fieldwork and study visits throughout Ayacucho; the result was his classic work, *Ayacucho, hambre y esperanza,* published in 1969. Díaz Martínez concluded that the main problem in Ayacucho was still the domination of *latifundios* and the entrapment of the *campesinos* in inequitable labor or land-tenure arrangements. Agriculture in Ayacucho was still feudal, even though he recognized that changes in land tenure had taken place. The trouble was that these changes had not benefited the majority of the peasantry.

Sendero is often accused of rejecting modernity. Díaz Martínez did not reject modern technology so much as oppose it being imposed from above, without taking into account local expertise, tradition, and customs: [Outside experts] "failed to use the fund of practical knowledge accumulated by the Indians over the centuries, and ignored the old traditions of self-help and cooperation which were still there if only they could be brought out and developed." The role of the agronomist should be to give advice, not to impose his ideas. Schemes in other areas of Peru had failed because they emphasized inappropriate and expensive technology, crops, and techniques. Coming from an area that had lost its traditional culture, Díaz Martínez hated the "insidious introduction of values and behaviour from an alien culture, thereby destroying the emotional and ecological equilibrium which had enabled *campesino* communities to withstand centuries of exploitation and aggression. Teachers, engineers, government officials, bank employees, all brought in a foreign way of life which left the Indians at a disadvantage." Radical politics at the University radicalized him as well; he came to the conclusion that rural areas would not benefit until the country as a whole had changed. He concluded *Ayacucho, hambre y esperanza* with the sentence: "Peru will have to take the socialist road to development, the only road left to the semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries of Latin America." Díaz Martínez went to China in 1974, and came back two years later an enthusiastic Maoist. Something he subsequently wrote in a book on Chinese agriculture presages one of Sendero's guiding philosophies: "While there are men with a correct ideological line they will be capable not only of overcoming all obstacles, but of transforming the world." Much of Sendero's strategy and philosophy comes directly from the experiences that people like Díaz Martínez and Abimael Guzmán underwent in China. He and his wife, Catalina Adrianzén, joined the guerrilla movement, and both were captured by security forces. He died in the prison uprising at Lurigancho in June 1986.

518. Hazelton, William and Sandra Woy-Hazelton. "Terrorism and the Marxist Left: Peru's Struggle Against Sendero Luminoso." *Terrorism,* v.11, no.6 (1988): 471-490.

Examines Izquierda Unida (IU) and its prospects for winning elections in 1990, prospects that have been aided by Sendero's terrorism. Since 1980 the political balance in Peru has shifted decidedly to the left. The Woy-Hazeltons trace the origins and development of IU, whose constituent parties were much influenced by the radical military government of Velasco. IU's chances of winning in 1990 depend upon a number of factors: the guerrillas, the performance of García's APRA, and sectarian struggles between hardline and moderate factions within IU. Shifting to Sendero and MRTA, the authors provide a succinct summary of their rise and revolutionary struggle. They cite Raúl González's contention that Sendero radically changed course in 1987, when it switched emphasis from "protracted rural war to a quicker, urban-based revolution." While IU and Sendero are competitors for the mantle of revolutionary vanguard, there is disagreement within IU on how to deal with Sendero. Some leftist elements like the PUM say they will offer dialogue with and amnesty for Sendero should they gain power; more moderate factions reject any compromise with terrorists. IU's main concern is the championing of human rights, and the advocacy of socio-economic development to win people away from the guerrillas. But Sendero has proved adroit in infiltrating and strong-arming IU meetings and demonstrations. The authors discuss IU's chances of victory and its particular dilemma vis-`a-vis Sendero and the challenge of revolutionary violence.

519. Irusta Medrano, Gerardo. "Algo para final: Sendero Luminoso camina por las calles de Lima-Perú. Una experiencia personal." In *Lucha armada en Bolivia.* La Paz: Editorial Calama, 1988, pp.351-355.

In June, 1988, the author, a Bolivian, attended a meeting of Latin American parliamentary reporters in Lima. Irusta Medrano contrasts the misery and poverty of Peru with that of his own country, where the 1952 agrarian reform has ameliorated some of the inequalities he saw in Peru and enabled Bolivia to escape the sort of violence now wracking its neighbor. Sendero's influence appears to be profound, especially among the young people he encountered in Lima, whose songs contained barely hidden *senderista* messages. Popular pro-guerrilla songs have proliferated in Peru, a reflection of people's yearning for social and economic justice. Irusta Medrano reproduces the lyrics of two *"canciones senderistas": "Flor de retama"* ("Where the blood of the people has been spilt, there the *flor de retama* grows") and *"El hombre"* ("I don't want to be the executioner whose blood stains the world; nor tear out hearts which seek justice; nor tear out hearts which love liberty").

520. Ladrón de Guevara, Matilde. *Sybila en Canto Grande.* Buenos Aires: Ediciones "Editorial Nueva", 1988.

Sybila Arredondo, widow of renowned Peruvian author José María Arguedas, was arrested in Lima on suspicion of having links with Sendero. Chilean writer Ladrón de Guevara, who admits that she knew almost nothing of Sendero, gained access to Sybila in Canto Grande prison, to tell her story and those of other imprisoned fighters for Shining Path. Arredondo has been kidnapped, tortured, robbed, and persecuted for her denunciations of the fascist and barbaric Lima prisons; for her sufferings she is now known as the "heroine of the jails." Interviews with the imprisoned, and with Peruvian intellectuals and politicians, help the author paint a picture of state terrorism, a lying, cynical APRA in power, and the history of the rise of Abimael Guzmán and Sendero. Much of the book consists of appeals by Latin American intellectuals on behalf of Arredondo, and denunciations of the government. Ladrón Guevara, however partial and partisan, chronicles conditions in the jails and the destruction wrought by the state after the uprisings of June, 1986.

521. Manrique, Nelson. "Democracia e campesinato indígena no Perú contemporaneo." In *Sendero Luminoso.* Compiled by Enrique Amayo. São Paulo: Edições Vértice, 1988, pp.94-102.

Peru, asserts Manrique, presents one of the more complex political panoramas in Latin American today: coexisting within the country (although not in the same space) are the strongest guerrilla force in the continent, a legalized left with a major political role (IU), and the most historically important reformist party in Latin America, APRA. At the same time, a political struggle is being waged in a country deeply divided by race and ethnicity. Manrique characterizes the Peruvian army as an army of occupation in the sierra, its counterinsurgency campaign modeled on imperialist attempts to defeat wars of national liberation that took place in Africa and Asia after the Second World War. He traces how the army in the 19th century acted in much the same manner, with a coastal army repressing an Indian mountain society. Manrique discusses the psychological

and cultural gap between the two Perus, and the ethnic abyss and racism which he says are fueling the "dirty war."

522. Matias, Andreo. *CIA, Sendero Luminoso.* Lima: Universo Gráfico, [1988].

Matias (a pseudonym for Washington Huaracha Apaza) attempts to prove that Sendero is a tool of the CIA. What really is Sendero, he asks rhetorically? A Maoist instrument of popular war? Or an operation of low intensity warfare organized and utilized by foreign intelligence services to destroy the social forces of insurgent Peruvian nationalism? Matias builds an elaborate model in which Peru and the Pacific Rim are central to the strategic cold war vision of the U.S. Tying the SL insurrection in Peru to counterinsurgency in Chile, Argentina, Nicaragua, and Grenada, he draws together a string of coincidental factors--external debt, falling commodity price levels, drug interdiction, and economic liberalization--to paint a picture of a Pacific Rim divided between China and the U.S., at the center of which is a Peru desired for its great natural resources, its "biooceanic condition," and its access to the Atlantic via the Amazon. Nor are Peru's neighbors innocent bystanders; they are central to the scheme to destabilize the country and weaken its national will. In the last section of the book, Matias asks if the neurotic and confused Professor Guzmán has the caliber of mind to direct a movement such as Sendero. The author thinks not.

523. Matias, Andreo. *Revolución o provocación.* [Lima?]: Asociación de Periodistas y Escritores por la Paz, [1988].

Another attack on Sendero, based on differing analyses of Mariátegui's philosophy and the condition of Peru, (which Matias believes is capitalist and dependent, not semi-feudal as Sendero has declared). Matias resurrects an interesting charter that *Amauta* , the newspaper of the PUM (Partido Unificado Mariateguista), published in 1929, in which the Latin American revolution was declared simply the first step of a world socialist revolution, but one which would have to be a heroic creation of Latin America, not a copy or imitation of another, but one based in Latin America's own language and reality. This is a credo which Matias believes Sendero has misappropriated for its own ends. After a lengthy analysis of many critics of Sendero such as Favre, Degregori, Gonzales, Gorriti, McClintock, *et al.* (some of whom he labels *"senderólogos soviéticas"),* he concludes that Shining Path's violence is polarizing and disintegrating the country, aborting any authentic revolution. This, he declares, is true national suicide. In addition, this violence provokes the armed forces to forget their recent revolutionary past (a reference to the 1968 *golpe)* and return to their old position as defenders of the oligarchy.

524. McClintock, Cynthia. "Peru." In *Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary Record.* Edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988, v.6, 1986-87, pp. B157-B186.

Annual review of socio-economic developments. In mid-1987, Alán García is completing his first two years in office. Judgment may be premature, as García appears to have had an especially long political honeymoon. Still, it appears that his administration may be the most popular and legitimate ever. Approval ratings remain high, the economy has performed relatively well, and there is optimism on the war against terrorism. García believes that if the government moves dramatically to satisfy basic human needs and respect human rights, the country's poor and intellectuals will not have to resort to violence, and the guerrilla movements will dissipate. However, as the government's hopes that economic and political measures alone will end Sendero's challenge diminish, it seems to search desperately for alternatives. Money and other resources have been directed to the "Andean Trapezoid" of impoverished Andean departments, and human rights standards have been raised, but the country's overall record remains mixed. The prison massacres in Lima lost García much support within Peru IU in particular was outraged over the killings. The war is eroding the social fabric of Peru, as terrorism, crime, drugs, and unemployment take their toll.

525. Melgar Bao, Ricardo. "Una guerra etnocampesina en el Perú: Sendero Luminoso." In *Perú, una luz en el sendero.* Mexico: Distribuciones Fontamara, 1988, pp.105-142.

Melgar Bao examines what he calls an "ethnic peasant" war in Peru, focusing on the Andean peasant communities as the locus of a struggle between Sendero Luminoso and the government. He discusses the literature of senderology, as well as that of Andean ethnohistory. Parallels can be made between "exotic" Andeanism and other ethnic peasant movements such as the Movement Naxalita in the Indian Punjab and the New Popular Army in the Luzon mountains of the Philippines. For both the guerrillas and the army, the peasant community is a strategic asset; traditional rural organizations have been converted into the objects of a political-military struggle. The Andean community has always been the focus of state control, whether as *mitmas* under the

Incas, *reducciones* during the colonial period, or *aldeas estratégicas* organized by the Peruvian army. The guerrillas have attempted to play on long-standing ethnic class or factional disputes to recruit peasants for their forces, using traditional authorities or "popular schools." The military has used these same divisions, relying on the families of rich peasants and their relatives and neighbors to form their paramilitary forces, *rondas campesinas* or *montoneras. Senderista* militancy in the Andean context is predicated on the asymmetrical demographic composition of communities: 48% of the population is under 15 years of age. Melgar Bao builds a detailed demographic and socieconomic profile of Andean communities to argue that the Peruvian state's marginalization of the peasantry has never varied; even the agrarian reforms of the last decades have tended--indeed, were designed--to maintain that marginalization in a "divide and conquer" strategy that has kept the peasantry at war with itself. The vicious attacks of Sendero on the agrarian cooperatives reflect the intense hatreds of the "have-not" peasants for the "haves." Melgar Bao also analyzes Sendero's relationship with Mariátegui's philosophy, trying to explain the inherent contradictions between Maoist people's war and Andean communitarianism.

526. Méndez, Juan. *Tolerating Abuses: Violations of Human Rights in Peru.* New York: Americas Watch Committee, 1988.

Annual report on human rights in Peru, characterized by Americas Watch as among the most violent and dangerous places in South America. Civilian governments have consistently failed to affirm democratic authority over the military, and civilian leaders have tolerated human rights violations which sectors of the security forces have deemed necessary to defeat the guerrillas. President García had an excellent opportunity to break with this approach to counterinsurgency war. He enjoyed unprecedented popularity and legitimacy after his election, and his party had severely criticized the conduct of the Belaúnde regime in prosecuting the war. But the fundamental changes that were expected of the García government have not been forthcoming. The security forces are operating on the premise that the war against Sendero has no limits. Extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests, torture, disappearances are not mistakes or exceptional episodes, but central features of counterinsurgency operations. There is virtually no democratic control of the forces fighting the war; a Senate commission and an interior ministry report both concluded that there is no coordination of these forces, nor a coherent counterinsurgency strategy. This last conclusion is seen by many as the principal reason for the failure of the government forces to defeat the insurgents. The report continues with a detailed examination of the war's casualties, anti-terrorist legislation, the fragile state of Peruvian democracy, specific instances of human rights violations, diminishing freedom of expression, and the role of other branches of government, such as Congress, the judiciary, the office of prosecutor general, as well as that of the United States, in protecting human rights. The conclusions of two commissions on specific incidents of abuses, the Ames and Melgar commissions, are reported.

527. Mercado, Rogger. *La realidad política del Perú: la crisis actual, la I.U., la guerra popular y el terrorismo.* Lima: Ediciones Latinoamericanos, 1988.

Another in a series of works by leftist Mercado on contemporary Peruvian politics. Among the disparate essays are reflections on the nation's external debt, criticism of IU's "debacle" in futile attempts to win power through elections (postponing the alternative of armed struggle), an examination of the concept of terrorism (as practiced by the state as well as by the guerrillas), and an analysis of Sendero's people's war. Mercado does not assert that IU's politics are incorrect, but does criticize the way it minimizes them in order to win bourgeois support. Throughout, Mercado reaffirms his belief in Marxism-Leninism as the means to fight the old order and build a new one, repeating the slogan "A new*patria* in a new world."

528. Montiel, Edgard. "Signos del accidentado sendero de la democracia peruana." In *Perú, una luz en el sendero.* Mexico: Distribuciones Fontamara, 1988, pp.87-103.

Sociological ruminations on Sendero's challenge to Peruvian society. In the 1970's Peru went through a process of *cholificación,* in which *cholos* (mestizos) emerged from the universities to claim their place in the ruling elites, part of the modernization through which the country was going. Other Quechua-speakers in turn entered the provincial universities, bringing with them new perceptions of political struggle. Many, of course, ended up in the ranks of Sendero. In the parliamentary sphere, the election of a Marxist candidate as mayor of Lima marks the emergence of a new structure of classes that is replacing the old oligarchy. Montiel contrasts the misery and poverty of Ayacucho with the "government of whites" which is represented by the Belaúnde regime. In the most reactionary of fashions, the government reversed and deactivated all the reforms--agrarian, educational, economic--of the previous decades. This lack of vision, which

includes halting land reform, restoring estates to *latifundistas,* and supporting local oligarchs, has resulted in violent reactions like Sendero, supported by the poorest peasants, receptive to their redentrist and messianic message. It extends to the government's response to the guerrillas; confronted by economic, political, and cultural problems, its response was purely one of force, if not farce: it loaded a plane with maps, dictionaries, sweets, caramels, pictures, and flew it to Ayacucho to pacify the population! The Belaúnde administration lacked any coherent strategy with which to confront structural violence in Peru. The García APRA government, on the other hand, is dedicated to transforming Peru, reviving industry and bringing prosperity to the countryside. The recent attacks on the APRA party itself are an attempt to eliminate the social base of the party. It is in this context that García unleashed the military to assault the Lima prisons in June, 1986.

529. Nef, Jorge and J. Vanderkop. "The Spiral of Violence: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Peru." *NS: Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies/ Revue Canadienne des Etudes Latino-Americaines et Caraibes,* v.13, no.26 (1988): 53-72.

The authors explore "the context, the structures, the processes and the effects of the current (1980-1988) spate of violence in contemporary Peru." They contend that this violence is not irrational, but a particular form of conflict management between conflicting social forces over a lack of political consensus and legitimization, and the incapacity of the government to exercise effective control. Nef and Vanderkop place Sendero within the historical contexts of the abortive 1965 guerrilla movement, radical military government, failed socioeconomic reform, mass rural poverty, and a deeply-divided society. Peru has tended to nurture ideologies that employ violence either to overthrow the existing system or to maintain it. Violence can be institutional (poverty, alienation, hunger, lack of education, etc.), repressive (employed to maintain the status quo), or insurrectional (Sendero's Maoist revolution). Nef and Vanderkop review Sendero's ideology and methods of operation. While Sendero takes a heavy toll on the peasantry in terms of food, shelter, money, and the imposition of autarky on local economies, the movement still offers the dispossessed a way to strike back at the society that has rejected them. The effects of the spiral of violence are striking: an erosion of support for García's government, the failure of the regime's "soft" line on counterinsurgency (which has faltered due to economic decline and lack of resources), and polarization throughout the country that may bring IU to power. Comparing Peru to Argentina and Uruguay, the authors suggest that "a far more likely outcome of a catharsis of violence is plain state terrorism."

530. Partido Comunista del Perú, Comite Central. *El PCP el y maoismo.* S.l., s.n., 1988.

A collection of materials that celebrates Mao Tse-Tung, explains the relevance of Maoism to people's war, and extols Sendero's general ideological line. There is no evidence of where this book was printed, but an end paper that featuring a portrait of Mao and several slogans ("Proletarians of the world, unite," "*Viva* Maoism," and "Down with revisionism") has "Communist Party of Peru" and "December 26 1986" printed at the bottom. The work begins with some poems written by Mao, reprints some speeches and lectures of the chairman, and carries messages and manifestoes of the Peruvian Communist Party (some from *Bandera Roja),* all seemingly written in the 1970's during the PCP's underground phase prior to ILA. The most significant pieces are a short note on "Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as a point of departure for waging people's war," and a longer essay, "On Marxism-Leninism-Maoism," a "fundamental document" from 1988 that lays out Sendero's ideological foundation and justifications for taking power through armed struggle.

531. *Perú y Chile: poder judicial y derechos humanos.* Lima: Comisión Andina de Juristas, October 1988.

Comparative analysis of human rights and the power of law to protect those rights in Chile and Peru. In both nations normal constitutional, civil and human rights have been suspended, in Chile by the military *junta* after the overthrow of the Allende government, and in Peru by civilian governments fighting the Sendero insurgency. Comparisons are made of specific constitutional guarantees of personal liberty, the tradition of *habeas corpus,* freedom of association and expression, and the legislation that has curbed or abolished those freedoms. The Commission concludes that the judiciary in Chile has "legitimized" government actions; its hierarchical, even authoritarian structure has reinforced the tendency to accede to the will of the Executive. In Peru the judiciary, within a social context of economic crisis and political and social violence, has the duty to protect civil rights. But many of its citizens cannot enjoy the exercise of these rights; a "regime of exception" has allowed the suspension of guarantees in the declared "emergency zones." The judiciary has historically been fragile in comparison with the other

branches of government; the Commission concludes with recommendations for strengthening judicial power in Peru, for modifying certain anti-terrorist laws passed in recent years by the legislature, and for extending guarantees of liberty to all members of the community.

532. Ratliffe, William. "Revolutionary Warfare." In *Violence and the Latin American Revolutionaries.* Edited by Michael Radu. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988, pp.15-36.

Analyzes the strategies and tactics of Latin American guerrilla groups, including Castro's anti-Batista rebels, Che Guevara in Bolivia, the ERP in Argentina, the MIR in Chile, and Sendero Luminoso. Few revolutionaries have adopted Maoist tactics, which call for developing rural bases for a protracted peasant-based war. Still, Ratliffe criticizes Maoist guerrilla theory, since, like that of the *foco*, it "often failed to recognize in practice, if not in theory, the need to cultivate all sorts of allies in the early stages of the struggle." Sendero, which eschews all external support and any ties to the legitimate left in Peru, violates what Ratliffe sees as a necessary element for victory. He calls Sendero the only legitimate Maoist organization in the Americas, and concedes that it is waging rural guerrilla war strengthened by ties to certain Indian communities. But he sees it weakened by an almost "Pol Potian" mistreatment of natives and an inability to broaden its base of support to include other groups in other provinces. This deliberate tactic of self-isolation is "altogether consistent with the Chinese practice of the mid-1960's which won Guzmán over. The Maoism propagated by Chinese leaders at that time was a dogmatic little recipe...which had only a superficial relationship to the rich Chinese revolutionary experience."

533. "Semblanza de Antonio Díaz Martínez, asesinado en el penal de Lurigancho, Lima, el 19 de junio de 1986." *Boletín americanista,* v.30, no.38 (1988): 17-30.

Tribute to the agronomist who became one of Sendero's founding theorists, and died in the uprising at Lurigancho prison in June, 1986. Apparently written by Díaz Martínez's widow, the document was delivered to *Boletín americanista* by a professor, a personal friend of the slain Peruvian. The obituary describes Díaz Martínez's youth in Chota, a province of Cajamarca: "brave land, land of rebellion...was the native land *(terruño)* of Antonio." His circumstances, education, family, and early reading all inculcated within Díaz Martínez a spirit of social responsibility and rebellion. His early work investigating agro-economic problems in the sierra, and subsequent time working with peasants in the eastern jungle, led to growing disenchantment with the state and academia. At the University in Ayacucho, he met Abimael Guzmán and other intellectuals. There he wrote his master work, *Ayacucho, hambre y esperanza* (1969), a withering critique of the Peruvian land tenure system and labor relations. In 1974 he traveled to China, and became fascinated at its agrarian transformation; out of this trip came the work *China, la revolución agraria* (1978). He also observed first hand the struggle between the heirs of Mao and rightists like Teng Siao Ping. Upon returning to Peru, he continued to teach and work in the sierra at the UNSCH until his arbitrary arrest in 1983. His incarceration in Lurigancho, struggles in prison, and revolutionary martyrdom are described in detail, and numerous quotations from his prison letters are included. His widow concludes, "Antonio, like the other fighters, has written with his precious blood, which is our blood, beautiful pages in the History of the struggles of humanity. And they are not dead. They live in the hearts and in the minds of the most profound masses of our people."

534. *Sendero Luminoso.* Edited by Enrique Amayo. São Paulo: Edições Vertice, 1988.

A collection of essays, translated into Portuguese, which are reprinted from other sources. Those which cannot be located from their original venue of publication are annotated in their Portuguese versions. See no. 512, 521.

535. Simons Munaro, Yehude. *Estado y guerrillas en el Perú de los '80.* [Lima]: Asociación Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos y Sociales, [1988].

Compressed and thorough analysis of violence, both state and revolutionary, in Peru in the 1980's. Simons Munaro begins by examining the phenomenon of "terrorism," differentiating it from guerrilla war and other forms of organized violence. Terrorism, he notes, is a convenient label used to discredit certain revolutionary movements, but it should not be confused with struggles waged by Third World national liberation movements, even when those mainly rural struggles include urban sabotage and armed propaganda. Simons Munaro reviews the country's long history of violence from pre-Inca through Spanish colonial and Peruvian national periods. After analyzing Sendero and MRTA, he excoriates the government's counterinsurgency policies, which, borrowing heavily from foreign "national security" doctrines, launched an out-and-out dirty war characterized by massacre and brutality. APRA's strategy for fighting Sendero, which was supposed to represent

a fundamental change from that of the Belaúnde regime, has proved a disappointing failure. Simons Munaro quotes from CONAPLAN's "Antisubversion Strategy, 1980-1985," which lays out official errors and makes extensive recommendations for change in the future. Among them is a willingness to recognize the social, economic, and political roots of the insurgency, and address those causes with development and respect for human and civil rights. Simons Munaro's conclusions are that the armed forces's fight against Sendero and MRTA has been a failure. To advance the cause of peace, it will be necessary not only to recognize the existence of a civil war, but to discern the political objectives of the insurrectionists and formulate a political solution: "...we must try to cure the sickness in order to save the patient, and not vice versa."

536. Skar, Harald Olav. *Between Freedom-Fighting and Terrorism in Peru--the Case of Sendero Luminoso.* NUPI notat, no.393. [Oslo]: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1988.

"One man's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter" is an axiom which Skar refutes in the case of Peru. Freedom-fighting, he argues, should be distinguished from terrorism as a strategic method. Skar differentiates between strategies aimed at establishing "new orders" through the "freeing" of peasants (as in Russia in 1917 or China in 1949), and strategies that terrorize populations into unwillingly performing political roles. Pointing out that Mao was against terrorism, he asks whether Sendero is trying to gain the confidence of peasants, or trying to frighten them into compliance. The answer, he suggests, is not clear-cut; the movement has evolved through different phases in its struggle. Sendero under Guzmán in Ayacucho is different from Sendero under Mezzich in Apurímac. Skar, in reviewing Sendero's history, suggests that it began as a liberation movement in its early stages, intent upon freeing peasants from the old hacienda system of domination, but that it has become a terrorist movement, concentrating on the destruction of infrastructure and assassinations. However, he does not absolve the government of counter-terror. In a sense, terrorists and society's leaders (the authorities) are both outsiders, competing to impose their will on the populace at large: "Locked in a supreme opposition, each side represents the other's acts of physical force as barbarism, but considers its own as heroic." Skar concludes by suggesting that MRTA, by eschewing terror and trying to win support among popular, church, and political groups in Peru, is stepping into Sendero's shoes "after Sendero had a change to new boots."

537. Stein, Steve and Carlos Monge. *La crisis del estado patrimonial en el Perú.* Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos; University of Miami, 1988.

In a leftist analysis of Peruvian society, Stein and Monge assert that an oligarchic Peru is characterized by the systematic exclusion of "popular sectors" from political power and material well-being. In the current crisis, a number of movements have arisen to claim a role in finding solutions to the country's problems, including soup kitchens and community and neighborhood organizations, all autonomous and separate from the state. The most extreme response to the Peruvian oligarchy is, of course, Sendero Luminoso and MRTA. Stein and Monge review the history of Peruvian popular protest movements, classifying Sendero as a relatively new phenomenon: a radical and widescale popular response to Peru's "structural violence." Most political protest has historically thrived in small, vanguardist movements; only since the 1920's with APRA and the Communist Party has Peru seen political protest in a wider context (although peasant uprisings and movements have always existed). Sendero has tapped into tensions and contradictions in a Peru polarized not just between rich and poor, but also along ethnic, regional, and cultural lines. After a long analysis of Sendero's rural origins and evolution, Stein and Monge conclude that it is more than a mere expression of accumulated frustrations--it is a concretization of a collective counter-identity that sees in violence the total destruction of the established order and the mechanism for the construction of a new one from below--an apocalyptic vision.

538. Valqui Cachi, Camillo. "Insurgencia y contrainsurgencia en el Perú y la administración Reagan-Belaúnde." In *Perú, una luz en el sendero.* Mexico: Distribuciones Fontamara, 1988, pp.13-37.

Virulent attack on "the Reagan-Belaúnde" administration, in which Sendero Luminoso is barely mentioned. Valqui Cachi postulates a profound crisis in the capitalist-imperialist system, in which Latin America is an essential component, and Peru a vital link. The structural crisis of capitalism can be seen in Peru's desperate economic situation, its servitude to the IMF and foreign business interests, the rise in prices and fall in wages that the government's economic policies have brought about. Narco-corruption, anarchy, *desgobierno* (literally, "un-government"), political-military maneuvering, all demonstrate the accelerated unraveling of the fabric of the imperial system. The result is an unleashing of bourgeois repression by the civil-military government (institutionalized in a series of anti-terrorist laws), a political repression fueled by millions of

dollars. Valqui Cachi lists a long series of terrorist actions, including persons tortured and murdered, by the GC, GR, and PIP. The government has also imprisoned striking workers under the same conditions as accused "terrorists." The Belaúnde administration has justified this repression with a fable of foreign meddling, attributing the economic structural crisis to outside causes. Despite supporting socialist revolution as an answer to the region's problems (indeed, an inevitable outcome, according to the author), Valqui Cachi does not believe that the Maoists are on the path of proletarian revolution: "the ideology and practice of Maoism are incapable of conducting a movement towards revolutionary socialism." He concludes with suggestions on how true Marxist-Leninists can work towards taking power.

539. Valqui Cachi, Camillo. *Partes de guerra en el Perú.* Mexico: Ediciones Nueva Sociología, 1988.

Extreme leftist analysis of the situation in Peru; essentially a collection of virulently anti-government criticism. Valqui Cachi, a Peruvian exiled in Mexico, reproduces articles from a variety of newspaper and periodical sources to paint a picture of a society under siege. He vividly describes the dirty war in the Ayacuchan countryside, reprinting testimony and pieces from *Quehacer* on human rights abuses. Another section criticizes the inadequacies of the agrarian reform, relating how 130 communities in Puno seized 200 farms or haciendas during a day of protest against the APRA government, forcing the government to accede to the takeovers. Still other articles decry the violation of the universities, protest the growing militarization of the nation, explore the "coca war," the death of Edith Lagos, and mock the APRA government's anti-imperialism as false. A final section entitled "'State-ization and fascism" flays Alán García and APRA, accusing the President of "Bonapartism" and of serving as a bourgeois agent of neocolonialism.

540. *Violencia y estado democrático de derecho.* Lima: CODEPP [Comisión de Defensa de los Derechos de la Persona y Construcción de la Paz], 1988.

CODEPP, the Comisión de Defensa de los Derechos de la Persona y Construcción de la Paz, consisting of some 40 distinguished Peruvians, has been searching for ways to gain full respect for human rights and seeking peace for the country. This volume is a product of that work. In a series of dialogues, the members of the Commission review human rights violations committed by members of the armed forces and police, the work of the special tribunals established to fight terrorism, and how violence affects the rule of law in a democratic state. The Commission finds a wide gap between the formal lawful state and Peruvian reality. There is considerable distortion between branches of government: the executive is much more powerful than the legislature, the military more powerful than civil government. Sendero and narcoterrorism will not be defeated, the commissioners declare, until the social problems that nurtured both are addressed on a national scale.

541. Bonner, Raymond. "Peru's War." *The New Yorker,* v.63, no.436 (January 1988): 31-58.

Possibly the best English-language summary on Sendero in the general press. Bonner, a journalist with extensive experience in Latin America, sketches the origins of the rebellion in Ayacucho, and the crucial role of Abimael Guzmán in radicalizing the teachers and students of the University of Huamanga. He gives particular prominence to the views of Manuel Jesús Granados, whose seminal article in *Socialismo y participación* linked the fate of Peru under Sendero to that of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, an analysis that caused considerable alarm among some elite circles in Lima. Bonner stresses the poverty, racism, and neglect that lie at the roots of the rebellion, and the schism that divides the society of the coast from that of the sierra in Peru. He touches on all aspects of the emergency--the government's counterinsurgency effort, community organizing and self-defense, the urban campaign of MRTA, the politics of Alán García's socialist administration, the cocaine connection, and American policy toward Sendero and the Peruvian government. Travel through parts of the highlands, along with interviews with a wide spectrum of Peruvians, allow Bonner to present an in-depth, detailed, and remarkably perceptive portrait of the rebellion. Although his conclusion refers to Alán García, it eerily presages the meteoric rise of Fujimori: "Faith, and perhaps even a messiah, may be what Peru needs these days."

542. Lévano, César. "Senderos que se bifurcan." *Sí,* v.47 (January 18-25 1988): 22-25.

"By the shining path of Mariátegui: there a slogan disproved by a thousand crimes and an inflammatory document." Lévano argues that the thought and spirit of José Carlos Mariátegui condemn Abimael Guzmán and Sendero. Sendero's "Bases of Discussion of the PCP" (published by *El Diario)* should convince us of the anti-Mariateguist, anti-Marxist, reactionary nature of the

movement. One man's pronouncements are elevated to holy writ in this document, which lacks principles, facts, or arguments. Lévano quotes from "Bases," producing statistics and counter-quotations from Mariátegui himself to refute Guzmán's *pronunciamiento*. Mariátegui, while revolutionary, rejected authoritarianism and terrorism, the antithesis of the egoism of "Presidente Gonzalo" and his Shining Path. Lévano recounts stories of Mariátegui's early days by surviving leftists who knew him in the 1920's, stressing his modesty, and his qualities as an educator and leader. Lévano also spoke with a classmate of Guzmán's at the Universidad de San Agustín, who discusses Guzmán's infatuation with the absolutist aspects of Heidegger's philosophy. He concludes "With his strange mixture of irrationality with ideological twistings, of Maoism which discredits Mao, his zeal to subject Peruvian reality to the iron model of the Chinese experience, Abimael Guzmán is the man who has most discredited the theory and practice of Marxism in Peru."

[Accompanying the article is an interesting photo that supposedly shows Mariátegui and Ho Chi Minh sitting next to each other at an International Communist Congress in 1925, although the Peruvian was in Lima at the time.]

543. Werlich, David. "Peru: García Loses His Charm." *Current History,* v.87, no.525 (January 1988): 13-16, 36-37.

For almost two years of his five-year term as president, Alán García was the pied piper of Peruvian politics, with approval ratings above 70%. Now the economy has soured, the business community is disenchanted, unions have staged a general strike, and there is dissent within his own APRA party. Werlich reviews the economic and political inheritance that Belaúnde left García as his government's legacy, and how García has handled the situation. Most important has been his controversial program for debt relief. However bold his administrative, fiscal, and agrarian reforms have been, with world commodity prices flat and Peru's credit rating abysmal, García does not have much room in which to maneuver. His campaign against Sendero has had mixed results. He has fired generals for human rights abuses and formulated development programs to address critical problems in the impoverished war zones. But Sendero has stepped up attacks, especially against APRA leaders, and widened its war to other areas of the country. The prison uprisings gave the administration a black eye, and the violation of university autonomy in search of guerrillas brought widespread protest. Werlich describes fiscal woes, a growing drug trafficking problem, and rumors of a military coup. He concludes that the beleaguered President may be lucky to finish his term of office.

544. González, Raúl. "MRTA: la historia desconocida." *Quehacer,* no.50 (January-February 1988): 33-44.

Long analysis of the origins and history of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). Its initial military actions surprised not only the security forces, but also United Left. When one of its leaders was shown to be an ex-*aprista,* the government was caught off guard as well. González compares MRTA to the FMLN of El Salvador, one extreme of a revolutionary spectrum that might also include Izquierda Unida at the legal and parliamentary end. He traces the group back to 1976, when a group of officers and civilians formed a political movement (the group included José Fernández Salvatecci and Eloy Villacrez; see no.163, 253, 333) This movement went through various incarnations, becoming a socialist revolutionary party (PSR, later PSR-ML), and eventually fracturing into still other factions. After 1982, the PSR-ML and MIR-EM joined forces, and out of this "convergence" MRTA was born. In contrast to Sendero, MRTA eschews terrorism. Its attacks are directed against targets representing native capitalism or North American imperialism. Unlike Sendero, it is at pains to explain its actions to the public. MRTA is relatively open, using the press, especially television, to gain attention, sympathy, and recruits. González analyzes MRTA's move into the eastern jungle area, its confrontations with Sendero, and how the two revolutionary movements are vying for popular support in universities, certain rural areas, and in Lima itself. Above all, MRTA rejects Shining Path's dogmatism and isolation, presenting itself as the romantic inheritor of a great Latin American revolutionary tradition, including the legendary Túpac Amaru and the guerrillas of 1965. Its Peruvian revolution will be nationalist and free of ties to any foreign power. MRTA seeks understanding, if not support, from progressive forces within Peru: "We do not recognize enemies on the left."

545. González, Raúl. "Sendero: los problemas del campo y de la ciudad...y además el MRTA." *Quehacer,* no.50 (January-February 1988): 47-62.

González examines some of Sendero's recent problems, including its clash with MRTA and the differences between rural and urban revolution. He begins with a sympathetic look at the Ayacuchan countryside, noting a rise of suicide among peasants, hitherto an almost unknown phenomenon. He attributes these desperate acts not to the customary poverty and misery of

campesino life, but to the depopulation of the countryside, repression from all sides, and the strain of being caught between the government and the guerrillas. González talks to peasants, who tell him of their experiences of enrolling in peasant militias, and of the pressure to abandon their lands and move to protected villages. Sendero has had difficulties in organizing, not only in the city, but even in the *campo;* Andahuaylas, for example, is not Ayacucho. González describes in detail the first plenary session of the PCP, which follows the fourth national congress, held in secret in 1986. The plenary session was marked on the one hand by triumphalism on the part of "President Gonzalo," who celebrated the shaking of the reactionary Peruvian state, and on the other hand by the most intense self-criticism. This intensive *autocrítica* reveals the internal disputes of the PCP over its most basic strategy for prosecuting the war, and for addressing the internal and external problems. The Party is encountering difficulties in organizing and incorporating the masses into distinctive organizations that will make up the "new power." It also discussed the important work of utilizing its cadre in the cities. Short but important sidebars explore the bitter Sendero-MRTA fight, the "popular committees" that will make up the Popular Republic of the New Democracy, and the crucial "bases of discussion" that emerged in September, 1987 from the Fourth Congress.

546. "Cambio de rumba." *Caretas,* no.991 (February 1 1988): 14-15, 70.

Sendero, pressured politically by IU and MRTA, and suffering from desertions and complaints at its bases, may be changing strategy. Sendero defines itself as a democratic revolution, with the peasantry as principal force, the proletariat as the directing force, and the small and middle bourgeoisie participating as the Party permits. The question is, how are the peasants and public servants whom Sendero has been assassinating really part of the upper bourgeoisie and imperialism, Sendero's professed enemies? The answer may lie in a new series of documents, published in *El Diario,* which *Caretas* summarizes. Edited by ex-*mirista* Rogger Mercado, the "Documento político-militar de Sendero" excuses the movement's recent defeats with a Maoist aphorism ("When the enemy advances, we retreat; when they stop, we harass them; when they tire, we attack; when they retreat, we pursue them"). Agrarian cooperative projects such as SAIS, CAPS, and PAIT are classified as "servile" forms of labor; Sendero pledges to confiscate all agricultural properties, associative or not, and distribute lands to individuals.

547. "La justicia de Pilato: jueces y terrorismo."*Caretas,* no.992 (February 8 1988): 36-39.

Once again, Comrade "Meche," Laura Zambrano Padilla, was acquitted in court on February 2. This is the third time that Zambrano has been freed by a court. In recent days members of *Socorro Popular,* a *senderista* support organization, have also been set free. *Caretas* examines what it considers a national disgrace: the inability of the judicial system to deal with terrorism. The article reviews the cases of a number of individuals freed by the courts for lack of evidence or sloppy prosecutorial work. The problems with the system are many. Judges are afraid for their lives, and not without good reason. The system tends to try people as individuals, and not as part of organized movements. The intellectual authors of an individual act of terrorism are still considered "social fighters," apologists, or supporters. There is also friction between the police and the judicial system. Judicial passivity is leading some policemen to dream of "martial courts," which *Caretas* fears would be but a short step away from extrajudicial killings.

548. "El temor de Sendero." *Caretas,* no.993 (February 15 1988): 14-15.

The Ministry of the Interior has been offering rewards for information leading to the capture of terrorists. This policy is working; the proof of this are the loud cries from *El Diario* and other organizations, which view terrorists as "social fighters." Sendero fears this kind of policy, which has proved effective in other countries plagued by terrorism. *Caretas* makes comparisons to similar campaigns in Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Malaysia (the largest sum ever offered appears to have been $250,000, offered in Malaysia in an exceptional case). In any country, says *Caretas,* fifteen thousand dollars is a lot of money. *Caretas* reproduces the reward poster for Sendero's top leadership, complete with photos, descriptions, cash sums (in Peruvian *soles),* and a telephone number for anonymous tips.

549. Puertas Meyer, Laura. "Lazos de sangre." *Caretas,* no.995 (February 29 1988): 32-34, 40.

The "clan *senderista"* contains a great many blood ties. One Emma Valiente Castillo, detained by the police for presumed participation in terrorist actions, turns out to be Haydeé Cáceres Hidalgo, assistant at the UNSCH, formerly married to Alejandro Durand, brother of Maximiliano Durand. The sister of Durand is married to Osmán Morote; the sister of Osmán is married Julio Casanova Rodríguez, leader of a confrontation in El Frontón in 1985, and so forth.

The article outlines (and illustrates with a chart) the incestuous relationships between top Sendero leaders and their families. The author points out that the horrific prison massacres of 1986 have left many bitter and grieving blood relatives, many of whom believe their relations to have been innocent.

550. Puertas Meyer, Laura. "Los niños de Guzmán." *Caretas,* no.997 (March 14 1988): 30-34.

The importance of young people in Sendero's movement is well known. A recent party document, published in *El Diario,* refers to *niños* actively participating in people's war and other tasks, "through which they can understand the necessity of changing the world..." Young people, some first recruited at the age of six, have been especially active in the "annihilation" or hit squads which are responsible for much of the movement's assassinations. *Caretas* examines one such case, that of Mirko Vélez de Villa Rojas, first detained at age fifteen for firebombing a store. He has been freed as a juvenile, and detained in a youth institution, where he is currently in custody. *Caretas* quotes from a letter he wrote to his brother, in which he refers to himself as proudly taking his place in the shining trench of combat. My spirit is that of a warrior, not a slave, he writes; the revolution is long and hard; it demands that communists redouble their efforts for the people. The article recounts his recruitment into the PCP, and his participation in various attacks. *Caretas* also looks at Peru's legal philosophy concerning minors, who are generally not held responsible for their actions. It suggests adopting the Spanish system, which gives the legal system more leeway in incarcerating young people, who are turned over to the adult legal system upon attaining majority.

551. Arroyo, Abilio. "El calvario de Sión." *Caretas,* no.998 (March 21 1988): 36-39.

Detailed report on a village under *senderista* control. Sión, in San Martín, had already formed itself into *rondas* to defend itself from Colombian *sicarios* (traffickers). A column of *miristas* was rejected by the townspeople, but Sendero was another matter. The *senderistas* forced the *sicarios* to surrender their weapons, and demanded that the town repudiate its authorities. A "Commission of Security," led by a *senderista* thug nicknamed "Conan the Barbarian," terrorized the town. Arroyo describes the tariffs Sendero charged on coca flights: $2,500 on planes arriving from Colombia: $1,000 on national flights; $500 on people who flew in only to exchange *intis* for dollars. Committees were formed to "educate" the people, organize the peasants (MCP) and the young (MJP); internal problems were handled by a delegate of the MFP (feminist movement). The population was terrorized into submission until counterinsurgency operatives infiltrated the town and arrested the guerrilla leaders. The army has since moved in; it has regulated the price of food and brought in medical personnel to win over the people. Arroyo concludes by cautioning that the army cannot abandon people who have cooperated with the government to Sendero's mercies.

552. Puertas Meyer, Laura, Abilio Arroyo and Jimmy Torres. "Terror en Andajes." *Caretas,* no.1002 (April 18 1988): 74-79.

After Sendero, which tried to hijack the CGTP's national strike of January 28, was repulsed, its central committee met to discuss the movement's latest problems. Desertions are up, and Soccoro Popular has had to convert itself from a logistical support organization into an armed group. According to sources, the top leadership is divided between hard-liners who demand more violent action and those who seek support from workers and barrio residents. The fact that 28 people have been assassinated in two weeks indicates that the radicals won. *Caretas's* reporters describe how Andajes, a town located in a strategically-vital mining area in the sierra, was attacked and its prominent citizens murdered in Sendero's latest wave of violence.

553. Yalowitz, Gerson. "Down From the Peruvian Hills." *U.S. News & World Report,* v.104, no.15 (April 18 1988): 55.

Brief note on Sendero's expansion of its rural guerrilla war to the cities. Yalowitz characterizes Sendero's strategy as "terrorizing have-nots into joining, or at least supporting, the Maoist cause." The guerrillas have promoted urban unrest in the belief that "their long-range goal of gaining power may be within striking distance" as a result of a deteriorating economy and García's declining support. "True?" asks *Newsweek.* "No way. The rebel's brutal acts of terror alienate most Peruvians. What's more, when Sendero leaders come down from the hills, they become easier targets for government antiterrorist forces. Actually taking power is a Sendero pipe dream."

554. "Consigna de sangre." *Caretas,* no.1003 (April 25 1988): 16-19, 76.

Report on a meeting held April 20 to study APRA's counterinsurgency strategy; present were the minister of defense, the PIP chief of intelligence, and parliamentary deputies. Whether in fact any strategy exists at all was a point of discussion; one official asserted that the economic aid for the affected areas, the reorganization of the police forces, the improvement of education, and the involvement of the armed forces in counterinsurgency warfare, all indicate that APRA is implementing its plan. *Caretas* reports on the ensuing discussion. Among the points underlined was the problem of abandonment of the *rondas campesinas* after a successful organizing start; they must be armed to succeed. (The military counterargued that too many weapons were lost by the patrols to Sendero.) In some areas peasants prefer to simply abandon their villages rather than form patrols or confront the guerrillas. The assassination of many *aprista* officials is forcing still others to collaborate with Sendero simply to survive. The problem of the *rondas* is termed by some a "debacle."

555. López, Laura. "Behind Bars With the Senderistas." *Time,* v.131, no.19 (May 9 1988): 57.

Cynthia McNamara, an anthropologist, was finishing a two-year journey in Latin America when she was arrested in Ayacucho and accused of killing two government officials in Vilcashuamán. The evidence was flimsy: two survivors said the attacks was led by a tall *gringa*--slang for any non-Indian from the coast. Both said McNamara was not the *senderista* leader, but she was interrogated and thrown into Canto Grande prison. *Time's* reporter visited the *senderista* cellblock, spoke with McNamara, and paints a vivid picture of life inside the prison. McNamara has been freed, but the Peruvian government has refused to comment on her case or explain why she was arrested. As she left Canto Grande, her fellow prisoners sang in Quechua, "I am going to fight for justice...for the peasants and the poor, armed with a gun and a flag...I will fight the fascists."

556. "Sendero en la aula." *Caretas,* no.1006 (May 16 1988): 24-29.

Report on how "terrorism" has infiltrated Peru's university; Sendero and MRTA operate freely and openly at the University of San Marcos, the oldest university in the Americas. For these groups, the university is merely a space for political propaganda; Sendero does not appear to be using the campus as a place of refuge or to store arms. Although Sendero does not participate in student "politics," it does maintain two organizations, the Frente Democrático Revolucionario for students, and the Frente Democrático de Docentes for instructors. *Caretas* analyzes Sendero's influence at the University, which is manifested through fear and silence on the part of the students. Professors are invited to "debate" issues, whereupon *senderista* sympathizers subject them to verbal abuse and propaganda. Numerous photos of red flags, slogans painted on classroom walls and on university buildings that accompany the story testify to Sendero's influence.

557. Puertas Meyer, Laura. "El Interior del Ministro." *Caretas,* no.1007 (May 23 1988): 28-32.

Interview with the new Interior Minister, retired admiral Juan Soria Díaz. The admiral disputes *Caretas 's* claim that Sendero has continued to grow in spite of the government's counterinsurgency strategy, contending that the armed forces have displaced the guerrillas from many zones. He concedes that the recent *senderista* march through Lima was permitted to take place without interference by the police, but he also accuses the press of exaggerating the movement's strength. He defends efforts at coordination of intelligence and the military's actions at El Frontón (a confrontation, he says, between two armed forces), but believes that excesses committed by members of the security forces should be punished. He also discusses rewards for information on terrorists, amnesty for surrendered *senderistas* who cooperate with the authorities, who should direct the counterinsurgency war, Sendero's strength and arms, its freedom from foreign ties and alliance with *narcos,* and his own (lack of) political affiliations.

558. Puertas Meyer, Laura. "Instruido para matar." *Caretas,* no.1008 (May 30 1988): 28-32.

Interview with captured *senderista* Isidoro Santiago Nunja García ("Enrique"), 34 years old. Nunja is a political commander in one small zone, planning attacks, ideological education, and mobilization. The jailed terrorist describes taking part in various attacks, and confirms that "anyone can participate in assassinations *(aniquilamientos).* Asked why he is destroying entities for development such as agrarian cooperatives, he replies that they are semifeudal, or tied through the IMF to imperialism. Sendero will take power, he declares, in two to three years. In spite of tough questions from his interviewer, he sticks to the Party line; the reporter's is that of the bourgeoisie;

his is that of the proletariat. The murders of peasants and popular leaders, he coldly states, is the "social cost" that must be paid. Asked if the bourgeoisie will it be liquidated if Sendero wins, he replies no, political education will be tried first; if that doesn't work, then the same methods you are applying to us will be used: dictatorship, jail, death. "The genocide that we accept, you will have to accept." He describes in detail the first party congress, which decided on the total demolition of the old state. Solid bases must be planted to take power, and the dangers of revisionism and opportunism which IU represents must be implacably resisted. APRA is nothing more than a living corpse. Nunja also excuses the alliance with *narcotraficantes,* explains social relationships within Sendero (marriages are performed by the *comisario*), and praises women comrades as having more character: "they are like gazelles running over the peaks, in the clouds..."

559. Shakespeare, Nicholas. "In Pursuit of Guzmán." *Granta,* no.23 (Spring 1988): 149-195.

Excellent, if highly impressionistic portrait of a country rent by war. Shakespeare went to Peru in pursuit of Guzmán, knowing that he would not encounter him, nor any of his followers. He starts with the tiny impoverished village of Chuschi, where strangers entered the town and burned the ballot boxes on May 18, 1980, the day of Peru's elections, and finishes with a talk with Dr. Efraín Morote Best, former rector at the University in Ayacucho, whose son Osmán was suspected of being high in Sendero's leadership, and whose daughter had just been captured after an arson attack in a Lima suburb. In between Shakespeare ruminates on Túpac Amaru and his legacy, on José Carlos Mariátegui's vision of Peru's past, and most of all on Abimael Guzmán, the bastard who dropped the "s" from his father's Old Testament name (Abismael) to assume the name of one of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. On his journeys to Arequipa (where Guzmán was born), to Ayacucho, to Huanta, to Lima, he seeks out people who knew the former philosophy professor. Each person reveals a little more about the mysterious, quiet, teetotaling autodidact who has brought such carnage to the country. Between these encounters, Shakespeare briefly sketches Sendero's war: the blackouts, the dead dogs hanging from lampposts, the "dirty war" in Ayacucho, the prison uprisings and massacres, the failures of Presidents Belaúnde and García. In Ayacucho the rumors about *pistacos* grow ever more wild and exaggerated. Priests describe to him the ritualistic savage killings by Sendero of minor town officials, their throats cut by teenage boys and girls, their blood used to paint slogans and their feet cut off and sewn on backwards so they cannot follow their killers. By the time Shakespeare finds the trail cold, he is indifferent; it doesn't matter whether Guzmán is alive or dead. The revolution he created now has a life and a logic of its own. A superb sketch that captures the eerie and didactic "unworldliness" of the *senderistas.*

560. "Coca: la realidad que se ignora." *Quehacer,* no.52 (May-June 1988): 44-50.

Despite the magnitude and importance of the coca phenomenon and its economic repercussions for Peru, successive governments have been either indifferent to or fixated on coca eradication, to the exclusion of any other consideration. Little attention has been paid to scientific studies of alternative uses for coca, or to development ideas formulated by agencies. Except for an interest in coca's role in traditional Andean society, universities, investigatory bodies and the government have concentrated on either repression or anthropology, preferring to ignore how central coca has become to many areas of Peru. *Quehacer* describes how coca cultivation has become the linchpin of society in places like the Alto Huallaga, and examines in detail the economics of coca, especially the enormous differential between profits earned in the United States and Europe from the sale of cocaine, and benefits to peasant producers in Peru. The article also analyzes the international effects of coca: the U.S. has demanded eradication at the plant's source, rather than concentrate efforts on its own domestic demand for drugs. Finally, *Quehacer* asks, what are the political and macroeconomic ramifications for Peru of a "coca economy"?

561. González, Raúl. "Policías, jueces y subversión." *Quehacer,* no.52 (May-June 1988): 33-39.

Comrade "Meche," Laura Padilla Zambrano, is publicly known to be a *senderista,* but due to loopholes in the law, has been acquitted by a judicial tribunal. González examines legislation, the judiciary, and terrorism in relation to the present crisis. He relates a story of the experience of individuals detained and questioned after a dynamite attack on a PIP post in Huaral. The unfortunate men were "scientifically" interrogated (i.e., tortured), confessed to the attack, and named other alleged Sendero leaders. More individuals were arrested and brought to trial, but a judge ultimately threw the case out of court because the state's evidence was flimsy and circumstantial (and because all the confessions in the case were obtained under extreme duress). But later it turns out that those arrested were indeed *senderistas,* and have since disappeared. González discusses how shoddy police work and reliance on coercive techniques for obtaining

confessions leave the judiciary with little option but to free suspects. Most persons arrested for anything other than petty crimes are imprisoned under special circumstances; i.e., they can be held for up to 15 days without the right of *habeas corpus*, which few judges will contest. Police complain that a myriad of laws block them from obtaining the intelligence they need in order to fight the terrorists (for example, tapping telephones is prohibited by the Constitution). However, many of their complaints are spurious, and have more to do with interdepartmental and interservice rivalries than with inconvenient laws. But they do have some justification for complaining: belonging to Sendero is legally still not a crime. Furthermore, judges in Peru are subject to many pressures; none have any sort of protection, from either Sendero or the police themselves. Another problem is that many of the arrested *senderista* suspects are minors, whose punishment under the legal system is different than that for adults. González urges a strategy to "moralize" the judiciary, stop police torture, and reduce the appeal the guerrillas can make to social injustice. In a short note preceding this article, "En honor de la verdad" (p.6), Marcial Rubio Correa, director of *Quehacer*, defends Raúl González, *Quehacer* 's resident Sendero expert, from charges that he is a *soplón*, an informant for DIRCOTE, or any other intelligence agency. Because González has been shown to be correct in his projections, based on serious information "obtained cleanly," he has suffered these smears and accusations. *Quehacer* recognizes the seriousness and importance of González's work; lies and [character] assassination are vile instruments incompatible with the building of a just society.

562. "La política del matamoscas." *Quehacer*, no.52 (May-June 1988): 40-42.

Discusses some philosophical problems that are central to the question of how to fight subversion and terrorism. Intelligence must go beyond the mere recruitment of informers *(soplones)*. Eight years into the struggle, there still is no strategy other than repression to fight the guerrillas. An alternate strategy for counterinsurgency is needed, but neither the Belaúnde nor the García governments seem to have the slightest idea of how to formulate one. Some Peruvians insist on harsher and harsher measures to fight the terrorists, but there is no evidence that such acts deter those who believe in armed struggle. Indiscriminate violence is not a solution to terrorism. The death penalty, special courts, or trying minors as adults will not in themselves solve the problem. A search for simple solutions only aids Sendero. A coherent and intelligent counterinsurgency policy can only help the democratization of Peruvian society.

563. Puertas, Laura, Abilio Arroyo, and Jimmy Torres. "Morote y su caída." *Caretas*, no.1011 (June 20 1988): 10-16, 75.

Osmán Morote Barrionuevo, 42 years old, son of the first rector of the University of Huamanga, and presumed second-in-command of Shining Path, has been captured after ten years underground. *Caretas* covers the circumstances of his capture, his purpose for being in Lima (he reportedly was in the capital to plan actions to commemorate the second anniversary of the prison massacres), the documents captured with him (20 notebooks, including one with a red flag and the inscription "First Congress of the Regional Northern Committee" on the cover), and a brief outline of his involvement with Sendero. The long and complex intelligence effort to identify and capture Morote finally paid off, not least because the authorities are now paying informants for information on Sendero. The article also details how the *senderista* leadership is constituted (there are northern, southern central, principal, northeast, and metropolitan regional committees), who controls which committee, how that leadership has changed over the course of the struggle (with Kawata expelled and Díaz Martínez killed in prison), and the possible impact of Morote's capture. Gustavo Gorriti (currently studying at Harvard) doesn't believe that Sendero really has a number two leader after Guzmán. A sidebar ("Cómo organizó el norte") examines the 30-40 support bases that Morote established in his region, and the strategy he carried out for people's war.

564. Puertas Meyer, Laura. "Los papeles de Morote." *Caretas*, no.1012 (June 27 1988): 10-17, 74.

Caretas cites, and reproduces, some of the documents that Morote was carrying when he was seized by the police. Two statistical tables reveal the number, occupation, and social origins of *senderistas* in the provinces of Huamachuco, Santiago de Chuco and Alcides Carrión; another, entitled "On the Party, III Campaign" reveals the makeup of cells, with directors, cadres, and militants. Most of the leaders appear to be from the petit bourgeoisie; a few are peasants, and none workers. Still another document details the number of combatants and supporters in the popular guerrilla army. Following the first piece is an interview with Luis Kawata Makabe, who, observes *Caretas*, appears to fear equally Sendero and the police. Kawata, now teaching at a small *barrio* school, did not want to be interviewed, and declined to confirm or deny that he is (or was) a member of Sendero. He prefers to forget about his time in El Frontón, but admits that he knows

Morote. The article then gives an account of Kawata's education, and his involvement in Shining Path's early political development at the UNSCH, where he was secretary general of the Frente Estudiantíl Revolucionario. Kawata led a strike in 1984 during which he asked "to take in our hands Comrade Mauser" (referring to firearms).

565. Haubrich, Walter. "'Sendero Luminoso': Of Violence and Poverty." *Encounter* (London), v.71 (June 1988): 68-71.

Two marine officers chat in a café in the elegant Lima suburb of Miraflores; one remarks, "They're sending me up to Huanta next week to kill Indians..." The officer's remark, Haubrich writes, does not indicate exceptional cynicism or personal cruelty; an assignment to Huanta is a trip to an alien, hostile world, high in the Andes, a world inhabited by quite different people. Haubrich characterizes the war in Peru as a vicious war of terror and repression (by both sides) of anonymous victims. Unlike Argentina and Uruguay, few of Peru's victims are white and middle-class; they do not describe their sufferings in eloquent and moving testimonies. Haubrich's articulate and sympathetic report concentrates on the people who are suffering at the hands of both guerrillas and the army. He summarizes Sendero's appeal, ideology, and psychology of rebellion, noting that "revolutionary violence" is apparently a universal remedy, to be applied indiscriminately. A Peru without the daily prospect of violence can only emerge, judges Haubrich, after radical structural changes--changes that will have to brought about by non-violent means.

566. "Peru: The Perils of Ungovernment." *The Economist,* v.308, no.7558 (July 9 1988): 47.

Belaúnde's last two years in office were known as *desgobierno*--ungovernment. The García administration is starting to feel the same way. Devaluation, inflation, bank nationalization, alienation between the government and the business community, and corruption have taken their toll. "Shining Path guerrillas believe they are nearer victory than ever before in the eight-year-old war against the government." Sendero is said to number 5,000 fighting men, against an army of 75,000. If violent enough, they believe they can trigger a coup, which will win support to their side. "A few spectacular assassinations, they hope, could rouse the army." Alán García has not played into the guerrillas's hands; he has reined in the army's predilection to commit human rights abuses. Although many officers are unhappy with these restrictions, and are worried about their declining standard of living, the military has no wish to take responsibility for the economy. The *Economist* also discusses the upcoming elections; IU has the best chance of winning, which might change the army's thinking about a coup.

567. Arce Borja, Luis. "La entrevista del siglo: habla el Presidente Gonzalo." *El Diario* (July 24 1988) (Entire issue).

One of the most important, and the most widely disseminated primary documents to emerge from Sendero Luminoso. Arce Borja, the editor of *El Diario,* widely considered the mouthpiece of Sendero, interviews Abimael Guzmán, in hiding somewhere in Peru. The result is a dense 47 page Marxist polemic, but one which provides valuable insight into the mind of *Presidente Gonzalo.* Guzmán declares Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, combined with the principles of José Carlos Mariátegui, to be the highest form of evolutionary political thought, and universal truth. He denies that a personality cult exists about him, but does not shrink from calling Sendero's philosophy "Gonzalo thought." Only revolutionary violence will bring about the changes he believes are needed to remake Peruvian society, but he denies that Sendero is practicing terror, insisting that terror is a tool of the forces of reaction. Regarding the future of Peru, Guzmán declares that new relations of production will be the outcome of a successful people's war. Land, collective work, and the re-organization of social life will constitute a "new reality," under the joint dictatorship of workers, peasants, and progressives. The goals of Sendero--the smashing of imperialist domination, semifeudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism--imply redistribution of land under Mao's slogan "the land to those who work it," and the confiscation of bureaucratic capital as crucial to the economic foundation of the New Power. In one area, Guzmán says, Sendero has already distributed 300,000 hectares and mobilized 150,000 peasants, undermining APRA's land reform program, which he declares a sham. At the conclusion of the twelve-hour interview, Arce Borja asked Guzmán some personal questions about his early life and intellectual development. He confirms that he spent time in China, and that he has been trained in guerrilla warfare, including the use of explosives. Everything in his life is related to politics, even his enjoyment of poetry and Shakespeare. Through his Marxism, he says, he is an optimist. He has no friends, but is proud of his comrades. The interview, although difficult to read, even in its various English translations, is a seminal document in the history of Shining Path's war.

568. "Como salvar a la democracia." *Caretas,* no.1016 (July 25 1988): 20-83.

Virtually the entire week's issue of *Caretas* is dedicated to the great crisis confronting the nation; "the best and the brightest" of Peru are given space to express their opinions. "Only democracy can save Peru," declares Alán García, president of the republic. Prominent Peruvians address the economic, social, and political crisis that grip the country. Francisco Morales Bermúdez says no to both coup and self-coup; Luis Alva Castro urges that the laws be changed to enable the government to better fight subversion. PIP General Reyes Roca ("Police Without Handcuffs") praises DIRCOTE, but wants general antiterrorist legislation, and changes to existing laws like Ley 24651, which allows legal membership in a subversive organization. Senator Roland Ames addresses the need to make pacification a municipal, as well as national task, praising the autonomous *rondas campesinas* that emerged from the needs of the people. Diego García Sayán, executive secretary of the Andean Commission of Jurists, urges that civilians command the emergency zones, rather than soldiers. A whole section ("Fuerza Armada") gives space to commentary by military officers, including General Sinesio Jarama, and another section carries opinions by eminent jurists and legal scholars. Still another section is dedicated to economics; Hernando de Soto discusses the informal economic sector in Peru. Other social questions covered include the church and democracy, local power, and the concept of a "Peruvian" identity.

569. González, Raúl. "El cambio de estrategia de Sendero y la captura de Morote." *Quehacer,* no.53 (July-August 1988): 16-22.

Interview with Isodoro Santiago Nunja García, a captured *senderista* fighter. She declares that Sendero has decided to proceed to the next step of people's war, "the insurgency in the city," and that the PCP is making its presence felt in student organizations and trade unions. González analyzes the practical and ideological difficulties of incorporating these new organisms into Sendero's scheme to create the "new power" and its strategy for people's war. He quotes at length from Nunja García's *Caretas* interview to demonstrate the dogmas and principles of *pensamiento Gonzalo.*

The capture of Osmán Morote Barrionuevo, effectively Sendero's number two leader, along with a considerable quantity of documents, will produce unforeseen consequences for the war against the guerrillas. How was Morote captured? Was he betrayed by his comrades? Was it good planning by the intelligence services? Was it merely luck? González examines the circumstances of his capture and its implications for the movement. (Morote seems to have been picked up by chance; he remained incognito until the head of DIRCOTE recognized him.) González predicts that the capture of Morote, and the wealth of information to be gleaned from the documents seized by the security forces, will force the "practical deactivation or forced retreat" of the PCP.

570. Ossio Acuña, Juan. "El poder en los Andes." *Debate,* no.38 (July-August 1988): 38-40.

Anthropological look at how power is viewed in native traditional society in the Andes. An inheritance of the pre-Hispanic period is the embodiment of power in a central individual--the Inca, and later the Spanish viceroy. Native traditions of personifying power in an individual have tended to make modern politics less accessible to peasants. Ossio Acuña examines the mechanisms (traditional, state-sanctioned, and political party-oriented) of power that function in the sierra and their relevance to peasant society. Ossio characterizes Sendero as another political movement for the peasants, one which confronts an order that lacks legitimacy, and one which some believe will dispossess the rich of their wealth. Ultimately, all these concepts of power are relevant to the degree that they accelerate or retard the integration of traditional peasant society into the wider Peruvian society at large.

571. "Subversión y lucha antisubversiva: las batallas más significativas las dará el pueblo. Entrevista exclusiva con en general Sinesio Jarama." *Quehacer,* no.53 (July-August 1988): 66-75.

Retired army general Sinesio Jarama has had the opportunity to reflect at length on political violence and subversion in Peru during his service in Washington as military attaché. *Quehacer* interviews the general, who differentiates between subversion and terrorism: the former is driven by a social and political ideology that rejects the legitimacy of the democratic system and seeks to destroy it in order to build a new version of society. Sendero, he warns, must not be underestimated. Asked pointblank who is winning the war, Sinesio Jarama defines Sendero as a war against Peruvian society and the entire nation; he replies it's not that Sendero is winning the war, but that we--all Peruvians--are losing it. He delineates the mistakes the government has made in its fight against the PCP, gives his recommendations for policy changes, and urges the creation

of a unified command under civil control to prosecute the war. Sinesio Jarama's analysis is an exceptionally perceptive examination of the failure of the state to defend and nurture its citizenry.

572. Decker-Molina, Carlos. "Sendero Luminoso: heredores del Inca y seguidores de Mao." *Ko'eyu latinoamericano,* v.9, no.48 (July-September 1988): 9-13.

Decker-Molina, a Bolivian journalist and Latin American reporter for national Swedish radio, recounts an ancient Quechua legend in which the mutilated body of the Inca will grow in the belly of Mother Earth *(pacha mama)* and rise again to free his people. This legend persists among the Quechua-speaking peasants of Peru, and Shining Path seems to have succeeded in adopting Maoism to Andean mythical reality. Decker-Molina reviews the history of Sendero, from its "academic cradle" to its "partisan cradle" and the history of its revolutionary struggle. Citing Andeanists Nathan Wachtel and Franklyn Pease, he discusses the traditional peasant beliefs and the way in which Sendero has used these belief systems and myths to win the allegiance of peasants. Sendero's "maximalist" Maoist ideology seeks to overturn the established order, a critical Indian concept that predates even the Spanish conquest. Decker-Molina uses the work of established Senderologists to present a compressed and focused analysis of Sendero.

573. Degregori, Carlos Iván and Raúl González. "Discurso previsto." *Caretas,* no.1017 (August 1 1988): 74-75.

Two of the country's most informed Senderologists discuss the notorious interview with "President Gonzalo" published in *El Diario.* Degregori believes the interview to be authentic; its appearance is possibly conditioned by Sendero's recent shift of emphasis from the countryside to the cities, and by the capture of Morote, which was a severe blow. The document reveals both ideological dogmatism, and a creativity and flexibility in military and organizational matters. Sendero's erroneous conception of Peru as a semifeudal country with a fascist government is not just a theory; it has led the movement to adopt the bloodiest and most extreme tactics and strategy to win. The move from a rural to an urban campaign is a departure from classic Maoist strategy and is definitely a shortcut to power. Because the government has shown its most repressive face in the peasant areas of Ayacucho and the Alto Huallaga, it is here that Sendero, although authoritarian itself, has posed as the peasantry's defender and where it has formed a social base. González reiterates that Guzmán broke his long silence because Sendero has skipped steps in classic Maoist people's war with its emphasis on the cities and its abandonment of the "lengthy and prolonged war." He further believes that Sendero is actually a small core movement that has created a number of larger peripheral organizations which are designed to carry on the struggle; the Local Forces and People's Guerrilla Army are two examples. Sendero has suffered a number of hard blows, but those setbacks are inversely proportional to its mobilizing capacity. For example, because there are more prisoners, the Committee of Families has grown; due to the deaths suffered in prison and combat, Socorro Popular has increased in size and importance. The shift from rural to urban warfare, and the evident desire to provoke a military coup, is a prescription for victory by 1990, not the prolonged people's war of Maoist China. This is not the Shining Path that said it would construct the Popular Republic of the New Democracy in the countryside; this is an abandonment of Maoist principles, and for this reason, the interview is an important document.

574. "Los proyectos antiterroristas." *Caretas,* no.1017 (August 1 1988): 14-15.

After eight years of terrorism, the government has finally passed laws to effectively fight the phenomenon. Law number 24700 modifies the criminal code: it decrees a sentence of not less than ten years for membership in a terrorist group, and penalizes the carrying of arms or explosives. *Caretas* publishes the articles of the law in full, and briefly discusses the changes to preexisting law.

Following this short article is a piece on the murder of Osmán Morote's defense lawyer ("Asesinato intencionado," pp.18-21, 73). Who committed this act? Was it Sendero itself? A police or military faction? Was it *miristas,* or *apristas?* Was it a shadowy new organization, the "Comando Democrático Rodrigo Franco"?

575. Andreas, Peter. "Operation Condor 6: The U.S. Drug War in Peru." *The Nation* v.247, no.4 (August 13-20 1988): 127-130.

In order to escalate the war on drugs, the Reagan administration has become entangled in South America's most intense and brutal counterinsurgency campaign. Operation Condor 6 is a U.S.-sponsored narcotics control operation in the Upper Huallaga Valley. The U.S. has supplied helicopters, aircraft, and pilots. The aerial elements are run by Evergreen Air, an alleged CIA front

that operated in Vietnam and is supplying *contras* in Honduras. American officials stress the distinction between anti-guerrilla and anti-narcotics operations, but privately admit that the line between the two is often indistinct. While the Peruvian government has promoted some development and alternative crop programs, the emphasis has been on controlling the insurgency: "Our first goal is pacification, then development." Andreas reviews the history of coca production in the area, noting that the Peruvian-U.S. campaign penalizes the peasant by labeling him a "narcotics trafficker" and a "terrorist" when he is really neither. Repression is actually spreading coca production to other areas, and helping Sendero, which defends the peasant producer from both trafficker and police. Andreas reminds readers that Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia (in which American troops participated) failed at the same mission; there is no reason to believe that Operation Condor 6 will do any better.

576. Torres, Jimmy. "Las diferencias." *Caretas,* no.1019 (August 15 1988): 73, 76.

Interview with journalist and MRTA leader Alberto Gálvez Olaechea, imprisoned in Canto Grande along with 41 fellow *miristas.* There is no "maximum leader" of MRTA, but a collective leadership. He denies that Victor Polay, "comandante" of MRTA, has fled to Colombia; rather, he was ordered to do so by the organization. Asked what relationship exists between *senderista* and *mirista* prisoners, he replies that they do not have bilateral relations. There have been armed confrontations between the two groups, because Sendero has tried to trespass on MRTA's territory. How is his group financed? By diverse methods, he replies. Does that include armed robberies? "There are recuperations," he replies. Relations with M-19 [of Colombia] are warmer; after the movement lost 70 *compañeros* at the Palace of Justice [in Bogotá], MRTA sent them a platoon as reinforcements. MRTA has infiltrated the police and armed forces, a delicate undertaking. Sendero's "guiding thought" he dismisses as a "folkloric version"; Sendero thinks that Peruvian society is semifeudal, but MRTA views it as capitalist. Sendero holds that only force will bring about the revolution; MRTA seeks alliances with the left.

577. Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru. "'On Marxism-Leninism-Maoism' & 'On Gonzalo Thought': Documents From the First Congress." *A World to Win,* no.11 (August 1988): 59-62, 76-79.

Translation of critical documents released by the PCP after its first party congress. "On Marxism-Leninism-Maoism" explains the party's fundamental ideology and aims (a "New Democratic People's Republic" based on a worker-peasant alliance), the three weapons with which the revolution will be won (party, army, and united front), and the need for people's war. A document on "Gonzalo thought" delineates how Mao and Mariátegui have been blended and refined ("forged in the two-line struggle") as an instrument for revolution.

578. "El camino de la revolución peruana: documentos del II C.C. del MRTA." *Cambio,* "edición especial," (August 1988): 1-84 (entire edition).

Cambio has returned to the streets to continue to fight for the popular interest. To this end it dedicates its entire issue to the recently-concluded second meeting of the Central Committee of MRTA. *Cambio* reprints the texts of documents approved by the Central Committee, a history of the struggles of the Peruvian people (MRTA's analysis of Peruvian history), an analysis of the contemporary socio-economic make-up of Peru ("Character of our society"), another analysis of the national political situation, and an examination of the Peruvian revolution. Especially valuable are primary documents on MRTA's program, party, statutes, rules and regulations, organization, and its *"línea de masas"* (line of the masses, or ideological party line). The documents stress that MRTA's revolution is a national and patriotic one. This differentiates them from Sendero, which has always emphasized the international character of its Maoist revolution, which is merely beginning in Ayacucho before spreading to the rest of the world.

579. González, Raúl. "El Huallaga, un año después: el retorno de lo reprimido." *Quehacer,* no.54 (August-September 1988): 40-47.

González describes what happened when a *senderista* column entered several small towns near the Río Biabo in the Huallaga valley. The guerrillas gathered the inhabitants, questioned them about their problems, and about their relations with a local farm which was a big coca producer. The landowner, it appeared, paid low wages and was disliked. The townspeople were told that their worries about the man were over; he would receive justice from the people. They proceeded to explain the party's objectives and reasons for the armed struggle. When the unpopular man returned, he was taken prisoner and publicly interrogated in the town plaza. The people were silent, except for a few bursts of applause. The man was sentenced to death; he pleaded for his life,

offering goods and money. He was conditionally freed, but placed on a sort of "probation," to be watched in future by guerrillas. González uses this incident to examine the economic and social structure of the "new coca *dorado*," where all the farms have turned to cultivating coca over the past two years. The reason is simple: coca earns more than any other product. The mafias have also entered the area, but even more grave is Sendero: the guerrillas offer the producers protection, attack the police, kill or drive out local authority and all personnel connected to coca elimination or substitution efforts. The vacuum of government authority in the area is compounded by military-police arguments over jurisdiction. While MRTA has been dealt severe blows locally by the security forces, Sendero and the *narcotraficantes* continue to operate almost without restriction. González again sees the re-establishment of state authority and presence as necessary to regaining the Huallaga.

580. González, Raúl and Carlos Iván Degregori. "Una larga agonía: conversando con Henri Favre." *Quehacer*, no.54 (August-September 1988): 49-58.

Peru's two leading senderologists interview French anthropologist Henri Favre, whose early seminal work deeply influenced perceptions of Sendero. Favre, a director at the French National Center for Scientific Investigations, is visiting Peru and comments on recent developments. He believes that the interview with Abimael Guzmán in *El Diario* is an important and authentic document, whether or not Arce Borja really interviewed Guzmán. The interview, he states, was designed to show that the party has foreseen all circumstances and occurrences (such as the massive repression by the security forces in 1983-84), which it quite clearly had not. The fact that Sendero has had to break its silence, to make propaganda and vindicate its actions, is significant. Favre discredits the idea that Sendero is an Andean, messianic movement; education and modernization have worked to "de-Indianize" the sierra in the preceding decades. The reforms and changes of these years have worked to destroy traditional structures, but the state failed to fill the vacuum with new ones. Favre also comments on Sendero's move into the cities (the PCP always rationalizes developments ideologically after they have taken place). The interview becomes a dialogue among the three *senderólogos*, in which they dissect Sendero's reactions to the government's counterinsurgency strategy, the differences between the PCP and some of its "generated organisms," Sendero as a quasi-religious movement, and its relationship with Peru's other leftist parties and movements. Favre cannot make predictions on what will happen, but he is certain that Peru's agony will continue indefinitely. An illuminating dialogue among the world's leading experts on Shining Path.

581. Rubio C., Marcial. "Jueces y terrorismo." *Quehacer*, no.54 (August-September 1988): 10-16.

Biting, bitter analysis of the dismaying performance of the judiciary in the fight against terrorism. The acquittal of Osmán Morote on the grounds that he was not directly involved in a terrorist act, even though it is conceded that he is one of Sendero's leaders, was a cowardly evasion of responsibility. Rubio reviews the details of the case, finding holes in the judges' reasoning. He suggests that fear of bloody retribution played a part in the acquittal, as did the fact that most judges are accustomed to dealing with common criminals as individuals, and ill-prepared to confront major organizations, be they composed of terrorists or *narcotraficantes*. More than ever, special tribunals are needed to deal with terrorism and narcotics trafficking (although Rubio has some reservations). He believes that existing constitutional law, properly utilized, can be a major weapon against terrorism. A sidebar sums up "the Morote case," in which 3 of 4 judges found insufficient evidence to tie Osmán Morote to various terrorist acts committed in Huancavelica, including the murder of several alleged *soplones* in Sacsamarca, the dynamiting of a bridge, and an attack on a Civil Guard post in Viña. Morote was judged an "intellectual," a director and coordinator of the seditious group Sendero Luminoso, but not personally responsible for the movement's particular acts of violence.

582. "Violencia y pacificación: un informe que debe ser escuchado." *Quehacer*, no.54 (August-September 1988): 18-27.

Summary of the report of the special commission on the causes of violence and alternatives for peace that was named by the senate and chaired by Senator Enrique Bernales Ballesteros. Despite its multiparty makeup, the Commission was able to unanimously make recommendations to these ends: the National Peace Accord, which all Peruvians desire, is linked with justice, social change, and the progressive redress of "structural violence." Among the Commission's recommendations are that the state's fight against subversive terror be subject to the legal norms of the Constitution and respect for human rights. The Commission also observed that the judicial branch is functioning inadequately, and has failed to use its powers to protect citizens.

The country's system of education is woefully inadequate, and is deeply stratified by geography and culture. Over a million young people have neither work nor school. Ayacucho is the poorest region and the department most victimized by violence in the country, both by guerrillas and the Political-Military Command, so much so that normal life is nearly impossible there. The Commission also addresses the problem of *narcoterrorismo,* the hope offered by the solidarity of self-defense patrols, *vaso de leche* ("glass of milk") programs, community organizations and *barrio* committees, the problem of corruption at all levels of the state, and the role the mass media can play in fighting violence. The Commission asks for nothing less than a re-establishment of a wider vision of a multiethnic and multicultural Peru; this vision is one of the most important elements in the pacification of the nation.

583. McClintock, Cynthia. "The War on Drugs: The Peruvian Case." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,* v.30, no.2&3 (Summer/Fall 1988): 127-142.

Succinct summary of the U.S.-Peruvian anti-narcotics effort. Peru is the world's leading exporter of coca to the U.S.; the Upper Huallaga Valley is one of the country's most fertile coca-producing areas. McClintock describes the nature, size, and composition of the coca-growing sector in the UHV. She also outlines the history of the joint anti-drug campaign, which began with local eradication, moved to interdiction of aerial drug transportation, and included the controversial "Spike" herbicidal spraying effort. McClintock concludes that a few victories have been won, but that overall both governments are losing the war. One crucial question raised by the Peruvian case is which campaign, the anti-drug or the counterinsurgency, should be given priority. The U.S. seems to prefer the latter. Ultimately, the effect of the anti-drug efforts has been to cement an alliance between the coca growers and Shining Path (McClintock terms the tactical alliance between narcotics traffickers and the guerrillas a "shotgun marriage"). As a consequence, between 1986 and 1988, Sendero has gained control of as much as 90% of Peru's *cocalandia.*

584. "La subversión: ¿Hija del velasquismo?" *Caretas,* no.1025 (September 26 1988): 62-64.

Are the reforms of the Velasco military government (1968-1976) responsible for Shining Path? One *doña* from Miraflores says, "Velasco made the *cholos* bold." But no less an authority than Alberto Flores Galindo declared that the reforms of Velasco "questioned the oligarchical order and lifted the taboo on talking about socialism, planning, and access to Marxist literature." *Caretas* asks three investigators about this idea. Degregori disagrees: he sees *velazquismo* as a response to the failures of the first Belaúnde government. Rodrigo Montoya sees a connection between Velasco and a guerrilla movement, but not Sendero; the failed insurrection of 1965 drove the generals to decide that security depended upon easing underdevelopment. Flores Galindo believes that the connection between the two movements is that terrorism has revived "racial distances": the image of the *senderista* is that of an Indian or poorly-dressed mestizo.

585. Rogers, Linda. "Danger in Peru." *World Press Review,* v.35, no.9 (September 1988): 45.

Summary of Latin American news reports. Rogers cites María Amparo Lasso in *Hoy* (Ecuador) and Simon Strong in the *Independent* (London). Amparo Lasso asserts that what began as a small clandestine force at a university has expanded throughout the country, infiltrating unions and other organizations. Sendero's military and terrorist actions have spread to every corner of Peru, so that it appears to have "changed its strategy...in its battle against everything representing the state." Strong believes that García's economic troubles and poor relations with the business community will most likely force him to bow to pressure from the generals, and grant the military greater legal protection. The military is frustrated by a judiciary that often lets suspected guerrillas go free for lack of evidence. Increased strikes and military clashes lead Strong to fear that a "dirty war" by the army and police is on the horizon. Also, the *Daily Gleaner* (Jamaica) reports in a Caribbean News Agency dispatch that U.S. advisors are "informally counseling Peruvian security forces on how to fight the guerrillas."

586. Lama, Abraham. "Peru: dificil sendero electoral." *Nueva sociedad,* no.97 (September-October 1988): 24-30.

The trouble with Peru, says Lama, is that at the moment it is really four countries: the "official" country, civil and democratic, with a social democratic party in internal crisis, whose administration is crippled by economic debacle; the insurgent country, in which Shining Path is in charge; the military country, which has existed since the birth of the republic, now strengthened due to the virtual civil war now raging; and the nation of *narcotráfico,* which has an economy of $3 billion a year, whose mercenary troops dominate some areas of the jungle, and which exercises

authority over the rest of the country through corruption and terror. Lama discusses each of these "nations," with special emphasis on the conjuncture between the crisis of the García regime, the threat of the guerrillas, and the possibilities of a military coup. Certain sectors of the military and Sendero share a desire for dictatorship, albeit for different reasons. But Peru is more likely to get a "Pinochet" regime than a revival of *velazquismo* if there is a *golpe*.

587. Dollfus, Olivier. "Le Pérou devient-il un chaos borné?" *Probl`emes d'Amérique latine*, no.90 (3e trimestre 1988): 109-122.

Dollfus reviews an economy in "rapid degradation," the triumph of an international and anti-state production (coca and cocaine), the campaign of Shining Path against the state and "bourgeois society," and the role of parties, institutions, and groups confronting crisis and disorder (including the army, the Church, and APRA and IU). It is apparent that the government cannot exercise sovereignty over large portions of its national territory, nor even maintain control of the economy. This chaos is "boundless"; Dollfus sees several possible scenarios. They include economic bankruptcy, the capacity to import falling to zero, and a breakdown in water and electricity facilities, adding to the misery of Lima's marginalized. Insecurity becomes widespread, with paramilitary groups and more terrorist pressure from Sendero, as well as open banditry from diverse groups simply trying to survive. Neighboring countries establish a "sanitary" cordon around Peru, and international aid disappears with the repatriation of foreigners.

588. Poupon, Henri and Yves Saint-Geours. "Les bifurcations du Sentier." *Probl`emes d'Amérique latine*, no.4 (3e trimestre 1988): 123-125.

In reaction to the recent murder of two young French agricultural advisors, Poupon and Saint-Geours hypothesize about Sendero's strategy. NGO's (of which there are some 400 in Peru) are an important part of Andean and agricultural development. They are ideologically diverse, some charity or church-affiliated, and many receive funding from transnational and international sources. The NGO to which the murdered Frenchmen belonged was the Center for International Cooperation for Agricultural Development (CICDA), which has worked in Apurímac and Arequipa. The authors discuss several other attacks against NGO personnel and projects. Sendero apparently does not hesitate to alienate the international intelligentsia through these actions, but these murders put at risk popular support inside Peru. The authors theorize that the arrest of Morote and other cadres may have meant the loss of party control over some of its troops, who may be acting on their own. It may also be possible that Sendero, realizing that it will never gain the loyalty of a majority of Peruvians, has decided to gain its objectives through brute terror.

589. Farnsworth, Elizabeth. "Peru: A Nation in Crisis." *World Policy Journal* v.5, no.4 (Fall 1988): 725-746.

Review of a nation that, in the words of an APRA senator, "has all the symptoms of a society in a pre-revolutionary stage." Farnsworth attributes the crisis mainly to deep fissures in Peru's social and economic structures, and not to any one administration in particular. However, much blame attaches to Alán García, mostly because of the high expectations his APRA government raised. Farnsworth reviews in detail Peru's economic and political woes. García's efforts to channel economic aid to the poverty-stricken highlands and curb human rights abuses by the military raised hopes that he might heal Peru's wounds. But Sendero's attacks have persisted, abuses are back to pre-1985 levels, and by calling for changes in the laws governing terrorism, García has acknowledged Sendero's increasing sway over national life in Peru. Farnsworth cites Degregori on Sendero's origins ("a political movement born of the massive frustration of modernization in the Andes"), and briefly summarizes its development. The bulk of the article deals with the 1990 elections, and Vargas Llosa's and Izquierda Unida's approaches to leading Peru out of its present perilous state.

590. "El otro terror." *Caretas*, no.1028 (October 17 1988): 40-41.

Report on the rise of right-wing terrorism. The slogans painted on walls may differ from those of Sendero, but the crimes are the same, says *Caretas*. (A photo shows a wall painted with the threat "For every dead patriot a terrorist will die.") The article describes several recent attacks attributed to the "Comando Rodrigo Franco," as well as the emergence of a mysterious "Comando Miguel Santana Chiri," named for an *aprista* mayor assassinated by Sendero in 1986. This group seems to have confined its terrorism to telephone threats against academics and members of IU. The Rodrigo Franco group has bombed the home of the president of the Frente de Defensa del Pueblo de Ayacucho and carried out several assassinations. Officials have so far discounted any ties

between these groups and the government, police, or military, but the experiences of other Latin American nations do not inspire optimism.

591. "Peru: The Shrinking of Alán García." *The Economist,* v.309, no.7573 (October 22 1988): 49.

"All the news from Peru is bad." Inflation is over 1,000%, there are general strikes, foreign reserves are shrinking. Alán García has scorned the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, but Peru badly needs outside aid. García is isolated at home and abroad; his own APRA party is rebelling. The opposition is fragmented; although Alfonso Barrantes of IU may be Peru's most popular politician, his party is split over whether violence is justified in politics. The army is not eager for a coup, but Sendero Luminoso's violence could bring one about. Sendero is said to have 10,000-12,000 supporters, half of them active in military operations. After eight years of guerrilla war in the countryside, they are switching to the cities. Their reputed second-in-command, Osmán Morote, has been captured, and Abimael Guzmán may be dead. Yet in September Sendero began a new offensive. Thirty-six of Peru's 181 provinces are emergency zones under martial law. The army claims to be killing 30-40 guerrillas for each dead soldier; the *Economist* 's reporter suspects indiscriminate shooting. People are said to be disappearing by the hundreds. Still, Peru is not Colombia; violence is less ingrained, and the drug traffickers less powerful. Peruvians are resilient people; so may be Alán García. A deft move toward the World Bank might reestablish control over APRA. "That might not win APRA the 1990 election, but it would at least remove the feeling that nobody governs Peru."

592. González, Raúl. "El no tan luminoso: sendero de la juventud." *Quehacer,* no.55 (October-November 1988): 55-63.

The path for Peru's youth today is not "so shining," as González finds after talking with a number of young people. Drugs, subversion, social pressures, all impact heavily on Peru's youth. Simply appearing to be a "provincial" person (i.e., Indian), will invite the suspicion of the police; equally, to be a student at any school is to be suspected of belonging to Sendero. González cites academic studies that document the expansion of educational opportunities for Peruvian youth, as well as the problems that enhanced expectations and diminished resources have brought. A sidebar features the confession of a 17-year-old *senderista* on how he came to take up arms.

593. Puertas Meyer, Laura. "Ministro Soria: En la turbulencia." *Caretas,* no.1034 (November 28 1988): 33-35.

Interview with the Interior Minister, Juan Soria. The minister concedes that violence is becoming generalized throughout Peru, blaming terrorists, *narcotraficantes,* and even unions in the cities, that are being infiltrated by subversive groups which provoke outbreaks of violence. Asked about right-wing death squads, he replies that Sendero and the CRF (Comando Rodrigo Franco) are both threats, and will be fought equally. The PIP has been directed to investigate the CRF and identify its members. But *Caretas's* correspondent presses Soria with tough questions: are APRA party members involved? Threatening letters against a French priest were based on information that only intelligence or the police could possess. Soria has boasted that Dircote's efficiency has diminished *senderista* violence in Lima. Why hasn't this same efficiency obtained results against the CRF? Soria is also questioned about cooperation with the Colombian authorities in fighting narcotics trafficking; his reply fixes part of the responsibility for the trade on the demand from cocaine-consuming nations.

594. Wiarda, Howard J. and Ieda Siqueira Wiarda. "Will Peru Return to the Western Fold?" *World & I,* v.3, no.11 (November 1988): 113-117.

General, if conservative, overview of the Peruvian situation. Alán García's promises to Peruvians raised greater expectations than could possibly be fulfilled. His brand of economic populism and international "America-baiting" is to be expected, given Peru's tradition of nationalism and anti-imperialism, and García's own *aprista* roots. However, alienation of the world financial community, inflation, and the threat from Shining Path may force García to change course. Newly-announced austerity measures and hints that García may ask the U.S. for help to combat the guerrillas are indications of these changes. Peru remains strategically important to the U.S., and most of the alternatives to García are even less friendly to America ("The real possibility of the communist mayor of Lima becoming the next president under a united front label cannot be welcome news in Washington"). Vargas Llosa is touted as a free-market and pro-U.S. alternative for Peru. The significant and pervasive Soviet military presence in Peru (instigated by America's refusal to sell Peru desired military equipment in the 1960's and 1980's) is one of a number of

reasons for the hostile state of U.S.-Peruvian relations. If García calls upon the U.S. government for help, the Wiardas ask, can this "spreading cancer" be eradicated without major human, strategic, and financial outlays by the U.S.? They conclude, "Meanwhile, García's...newly found appreciation for financial realities, and his realization of the heavy price to be paid for cheap anti-Americanism and anti-capitalism give hope that Peru's Crazy Horse may yet return to the Western stable."

595. Collett, Merrill. "The Voice of the Shining Path." *Columbia Journalism Review,* (November-December 1988): 14-18.

There are 15 daily papers in Lima, reflecting the voice of conservative businessmen, the government, various political parties, and the left. One, *El Diario,* which trumpets itself as "A Historical Necessity at the Service of the People," is testing the limits of press freedom. Although it says it has no links to Shining Path, it eulogizes Sendero's actions and consistently scoops the competition on guerrilla-related stories, although its newsroom doesn't even have a telephone. Its celebrated interview with Abimael Guzmán ("The Report of the Century") sold out two printings, but a third of 100,000 was confiscated by the police on the slim grounds that the paper didn't carry the name of the printer, a requirement never previously enforced. Four days later the paper's editor in chief, Luis Arce, was detained on charges of smuggling government-subsidized newsprint and illegally possessing a pistol. After protests from the Peruvian Journalists' Guild, he was released. *El Diario* was founded as a broadly leftist paper in 1970. As more radical factions gained control, its viewpoint shifted, and in March of 1987 it came out firmly in favor of Sendero. Some seven months later a bomb exploded in front of its offices. The editor fled to Canada, and Arce took over. The paper's headlines proclaim "Eight Years of Writing a New History in Blood" and "Homage to the Beginning of the Armed Struggle." Critics note that when an unarmed civil servant is murdered it is termed a guerrilla "execution," but when a *senderista* dies it is a police "assassination." *El Diario* carries no ads, but may sell as many as 100,000 copies (among its most avid readers are the government and foreign embassies). The paper claims that it is financed entirely from newsstand sales; the Interior Minister calls it "a declared spokesman for Shining Path," which the government claims subsidizes its printing. "It makes noxious propaganda," declares the Interior Minister, "but the law protects it." The García government has been reluctant to tamper with the press, but after the Guzmán interview it has demanded a law to punish "those who print, distribute, broadcast, or advocate anything that incites guerrilla violence."

596. Lombardi, Francisco, *et al.* "En la boca del lobo." *Debate,* no.53 (November-December 1988): 25-29.

Debate about the only feature film made to date on Shining Path. *En la boca del lobo* (In the Wolf's Mouth), directed by Francisco Lombardi, has had a deep impact upon Peru. Lombardi defends his film as a portrait of the nation's violence, designed to stir discussion and reflection. Sinesio Jarama attacks the movie, charging that it presents a distorted image of the role of the army in fighting Sendero, and exaggerates inhuman and irrational responses to terrorism. Several other critics more or less approve of the film, while criticizing certain aspects of the story. There is a general consensus that on the whole it is a powerful vehicle for expressing a nation's tragedy.

597. Isbell, Billie Jean. "The Emerging Patterns of Peasant Responses to Sendero Luminoso." Presentation, NYU-Columbia University Latin American Consortium, "Patterns of Change in the Andes." New York City, December 9 1988.

A question central to Sendero Luminoso's revolution is, does it have peasant support? Isbell looks at two localities that have been the focus of Shining Path's activities since the mid-1970's: the Río Pampas region of Cangallo province, in Ayacucho department, and two areas in Andahuaylas in the department of Apurímac. Her conclusions are based on research carried out intermittently in both regions from 1967 to 1975, and on interviews conducted among refugees who have fled to Lima. Chuschi, she believes, was deliberately chosen by Sendero because it lacked haciendas, was relatively isolated from market economies, and had strong communal structures and autonomy over its own resources. In doing so, they sought to avoid the mistakes made by Hugo Blanco and his guerrillas in 1965. Andahuaylas, in contrast, is a classic hacienda region with deep ties to an export market economy. After discussing the history of each region's development and experience of agrarian reform (or lack of both), Isbell asks, Why hasn't Sendero been more successful among peasant communities? In both regions Sendero met with initial success, as peasants supported popular schools, moralization campaigns, and the elimination of "public enemies." But as Sendero turned to terrorizing peasants to enforce a new idealized vision of society, one that clashed with local customs, reciprocal kinship relationships, and village and

moeity structures, it lost support. Sendero tried to draw peasants into a wider conflict that did not address their localized grievances; in addition, the *senderistas* fled and left the villages open to massive government repression when the army struck back against the guerrillas.

598. Fernández, Andrés and Israel Galván. "Sierra de fuego." *Caretas,* no.1037 (December 19 1988): 32-34, 80.

Reports from Huánuco and Huancayo. In Ambo, a *senderista* squad dynamited the hydroelectric plant, which had been built by the townspeople without any help from the central government whatsoever. The same day another 50 guerrillas entered the town of Dos de Mayo and killed a civil guardsman. Fernández describes how the guerrillas took the city, cut off all communications, trashed the city jail, and searched in vain for the mayor and microregion development chief. The *senderistas* assembled the townspeople, gave them a series of talks and left instructions on forming *senderista* cells. It is clear that Sendero's strategy is to dominate the most remote and defenseless villages with highly mobile forces. Fernández discusses this strategy and how it has been applied in Huánuco, as well as the limited counter-options available to the security forces. The last week in November Sendero also attacked four stations of the agricultural cooperative SAIS Cahuide. The *senderistas* slaughtered valuable livestock, stole a station's payroll, burned facilities, destroyed dairy products machinery, dynamited the medical post, and wrought $3-million worth of damage. SAIS Cahuide has 270,000 hectares of land, supports 5,000 families in 28 communities, and is the largest agricultural enterprise in Peru, making it a prime target for Sendero Luminoso. The formation of a self-defense organization would seem to be a necessary answer to this menace.

599. "Lima vulnerable." *Caretas,* no.1038 (December 26 1988): 28-33, 76.

Summary of developments of 1988, a year in which Sendero's strategy concentrated on sabotage of the country's means of production, indiscriminate massacres, and selective assassination. The derailment of trains, destruction of transmission lines, ambushes of police and military patrols, dynamite attacks against agricultural centers, industrial plants, and agrarian cooperatives--these were the hallmarks of Sendero's war. For the first time, foreigners connected to rural development projects were murdered. All this is related to a sinister plan, according to intelligence sources, to "surround Lima." Guzmán has returned to the old strategy of "from the countryside to the cities." Is Lima prepared? The Minister of Defense speaks of an "air bridge" in case of emergency. *Caretas* considers the vulnerability of the capital to strangulation; a map details the supplies furnished to Lima by various departments, and shows prominent places in the capital that the guerrillas might target (e.g., Palace of Government, airport, refinery, seaport, air force base, hospitals, etc.). A follow-up story ("Acoso natural") discusses the government's contingency plans to maintain essential services such as light and water in the face of natural or man-made disaster.

600. Waller, Douglas C. and Michael Smith. "Dueling Death Squads." *Newsweek,* v.112, no.26 (December 26 1988): 37.

A trio of Shining Path killers assassinated the Peruvian naval attaché in Bolivia in Sendero's first action outside Peru. Peru is becoming "one of the most ungovernable countries in South America." The ill-equipped and dispirited security forces are closing isolated outposts to defend more strategic areas of the country. Sendero is testing the military's combat readiness with ambushes and blackouts; it closed down all commerce in Ayacucho for a week. Sixty-five soldiers were killed in November, a record; meanwhile, the courts have convicted only 5% of suspected terrorists brought to trial. The right-wing Comando Rodrigo Franco has killed several *senderista* sympathizers, including the attorney for captured leader Osmán Morote. The death squad has threatened journalists, human-rights activists, and even the government's own investigator, Carlos Escobar. When Escobar began prosecuting policemen and soldiers for killing peasants, the government disbanded his commission. Meanwhile, Alán García is on his fourth finance minister in nine months. His "back-of-the-napkin economic policies have chased away international bankers, sent inflation to 1,900% a year and driven the nation into a deep recession." The military talks about a coup, but such talk is risky; the U.S. and European democracies "look for better than dueling death squads."

1989

601. Ambos, Kai. *Terrorismo y ley: análisis comparativo República Federal Alemán, Gran Bretaña, Perú y Colombia.* Lima: Comisión Andina de Juristas, 1989.

Comparison of anti-terrorist laws in Peru, Colombia, Great Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany, countries which have had to deal with serious urban and rural terrorist campaigns. Ambos analyzes the origins, causes, and actions of terrorism, and reviews in detail legislation passed in each nation to combat the threat. The Peruvian Constitution's Article 231 permits the suspension of constitutional guarantees of liberty and personal security in times of national emergency. In a state of emergency the armed forces assume control of internal order at the order of the President. Peru's Antiterrorist Law, which was passed on March 10, 1981 to deal with Shining Path, was modified by the García government in June, 1987. The creation of a political-military command to take control of emergency zones has had profound implications for civil and human rights. For example, in June, 1986 three Lima prisons were declared "restricted military zones," placing them under the jurisdiction of the joint military command, an action that had the effect of legalizing the massacres which followed. Ambos concludes that Peru and Colombia modeled their anti-terrorist laws on those of England and Germany, despite very different terrorist situations in Europe and Latin America. Ambos believes that given the negative effects of such legislation, criminal law should be employed against terrorism. But the opposite has occurred: despite the passage of severe anti-terrorist legislation, a "dirty war" based on the Argentine model has been espoused as the answer to the challenge of terrorism in Peru.

602. Americas Watch. *Peru: Human Rights in a State of Emergency.* New York: Americas Watch, 1989.

The past 18 months have seen a persistent rise in the gross abuse of human rights in Peru, as the government of Alán García enters its last year before the presidential elections of 1990. The torture, disappearance, and murder of thousands of Peruvians by government forces, combined with campaigns of assassination, sabotage, and attacks by guerrilla groups, have spread a pall of terror over much of the country. AW provides a summary of the steady decline in respect for human rights that has accompanied an increasingly encompassing series of emergency measures enacted to fight terrorism. Individual sections on disappearances, extrajudicial executions, mass killings by security forces, torture, and death squads give detailed accounts of abuses in many different departments of the country. The report also examines prisoners of conscience and the institutions of the state charged with protecting human rights or investigating abuses: the judiciary, the Public Ministry, and special parliamentary commissions. Civil courts have generally failed to protect the rights of detainees or to hold police and military accountable for criminal abuses. Jurisdiction over the security forces is claimed by military law *(fuero privativo militar).* Petitions of *amparo* (similar to *habeas corpus)* are often ignored by the security forces. Americas Watch provides a summary of the work of three special commissions: the Bernales, Cayara, and Accomarca Commissions, all of which investigated gross violations of human rights by military and police forces. All three have criticized the security forces for these abuses, but their work has had little or no impact.

603. Amnesty International. *Caught Between Two Fires.* New York: Amnesty International, 1989.

Over the past seven years Amnesty has documented the disappearances of over 3,000 prisoners held in government custody; at least this many have been killed by government forces in mass executions and selective assassinations. Torture, rape, disappearances and murder carried out on government authority, along with guerrilla action, have created a climate of terror throughout much of the country. The authorities have generally failed to act to protect the rights of detainees or bring to justice those responsible for torture and killings. In June, 1988 charges were dismissed against soldiers implicated in the murder of 13 civilians, including young children. Amnesty reproduces gruesome testimony from victims and relatives. Special sections report on violence against women, human rights defenders, trade unionists, and children.

604. Benavides, Gustavo. "Millennial Politics in Contemporary Peru." In *Religion and Political Power.* Edited by Gustavo Benavides and M.W. Daly. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989, pp.173-196.

Intriguing examination of the role of millenarianism in Peruvian history, with particular emphasis on its place in contemporary politics. The "sacralization" of political activities has a long history in Peru: Benavides shows how "[f]rom the beginning of the interaction between Europe and the Andean world, we find that conquest, millenarian hope, cultural and physical genocide, self-defense, consolidation of political power, and control were articulated to a lesser or greater extent in religious terms." Benavides traces the influence of millenarian themes throughout Peruvian colonial history. Jumping to the present, he examines the impact of liberation theology on modern politics. Of the many movements examined, Shining Path is the one whose millenarian component is the hardest to identify. Although he agrees with Degregori and Favre that Sendero is neither purely peasant nor millenarianist, Benavides nevertheless identifies some messianic tendencies in Sendero's appeal. Millenarian ideologies and their proponents arise in times of social transition; Sendero arose in the interstices of unrealized agrarian reform and educational renaissance (the reopening of the university in Ayacucho). "[T]he very fact that Guzmán was an intellectual, a professor of philosophy in a provincial university, where his students were mostly the sons and daughters of displaced provincial elites on the one hand and of peasants on the other, forces us to place him in the category of cultural mediator, a category from which leaders of millenarian movements have traditionally emerged." Guzmán's intellectual activities, his being neither Indian nor peasant, do not, in Benavides's opinion, move him away from millenarianism; on the contrary, these facts place him "in the structurally ambiguous position that enables him to articulate the ideology of a movement that emerges in periods of transition." Sendero may not explicitly identify itself as the harbinger of *pachacuti*, but floating meanings can be manipulated, transformed, and incorporated into a "scientific" ideology, very much as Christian myths and symbols were assimilated into the Andean rebellions of the eighteenth century. Just as Sendero's leaders could utilize traditional Andean symbols, so members of the movement could reinterpret Marx, Engels, Mao, and Mariátegui into "an ideological framework at least partially constituted by Andean traditions." In his conclusion Benavides reminds readers that "religion" is never simply "religious," but rather a component--at times central, at times subordinate--to the pursuit of political power.

605. Biondi Shaw, Juan and Eduardo Zapata S. *El discurso de Sendero Luminoso: contratexto educativo.* Lima: Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONCYTEC), 1989.

This is a book, declare its authors, about texts and their interpretation. The texts that Biondi Shaw and Zapata examine in their semiotic investigation, in terms of language, style, "sense," meaning, imagery, metaphor, analogy, etc., are *Desarrollemos la guerra de guerrillas; Desarrollar la G.P. sirviendo a la Revolución Mundial; Gloria al día de la Heroicidad.* A pedagogical strain of discourse, as between student and teacher, runs through Shining Path's political pronouncements. Quoting freely from scholars like Todorov, Barthes, and Eco, the authors deconstruct Sendero's texts for both abstract and concrete meanings, for linguistic and "codified iconographic messages." Even the movement's graffiti and slogans painted on walls, functioning as a public blackboard, are important sources for understanding Sendero. The authors remind their readers that Sendero has never lost its preoccupation with education in its struggle to win the allegiance of the masses.

606. Bourque, Susan and Kay B. Warren. "Democracy Without Peace: The Cultural Politics of Terror in Peru." *Latin American Research Review,* v.24, no.1 (1989): 7-34.

Unusual treatment of two distinct topics: government manipulation of "political memory" through successive civilian and military regimes, and "contested understandings" of terrorism and violence in the Peruvian mass media. Bourque and Warren examine how the military, Acción Popular, and APRA tried to create or retard the development of new political spaces and participation for Peruvians. They argue that political memory affects the way Sendero is interpreted, suggesting that just as APRA espoused violence and was outlawed in past decades, Sendero may someday find respectability on the political spectrum. They also examine terrorism and cultural meaning; the Peruvian media, from right to left, have presented images of violence and brutality (including peasant massacres, prison uprisings, and government repression) that have shocked the nation, and forced Peruvians into a frenzy of self-examination. Bourque and Warren are also left with a deep sense of ambiguity: should blame be apportioned among social, economic, and political structures and social processes for these failures? The authors conclude with a summary of the less than happy choices facing Peruvians, among them military coup, Sendero, APRA, leftist, or rightist government.

607. Brennan, Stephen Arthur. "Ethnicity as a Motivating Factor of the Sendero Luminoso Movement in Peru." MA thesis, University of Texas, 1989.

Ethnicity, Brennan proposes, may be as important a factor as class in an analysis of Peruvian social pluralism. Sendero, he argues, is perhaps another in a long history of Andean messianic movements, and "is in fact a revival of centuries-old Andean attitudes toward repression of an ethnic group in the guise of a relatively new Maoist phenomenon." He compares Sendero to such millenarian movements as *Taki Ongoy,* and Guzmán's cult of personality to the veneration of the Inca and Tápac Amaru II. Brennan also discusses the approach taken by Sendero's leadership in the rural Andes and urban coastal regions. The movement has tailored its message and methods to appeal to Indian peasants and their culture, and to provincial migrants in Lima. However, Brennan does recognize that Sendero makes scant reference to ethnicity as a factor in its own movement, defining the struggle in socio-economic rather than cultural or ethnic terms. He concludes by raising some interesting issues; e.g., if it is true that Sendero ignores the ethnic component of its own revolution, then the Indians of the highlands must decide whether the revolution's victory will mean that they risk losing their ethnic identity and solidarity.

608. Bustamante, Fernando. *La modernización de las FF.AA. latinoamericanas y las nuevas formas de violencia política de la década de los ochenta: el caso de los militares peruanos frente a Sendero Luminoso.* (Documento de trabajo/Programa FLASCO/Chile no.429) Santiago: FLASCO, 1989.

Dense, elliptical examination of the Peruvian armed forces's search for a mission and a doctrine in the 1980's. Utilizing recent scholarship on the socio-political role of the armed forces in Latin America, Bustamante examines the evolution of the region's militaries, from concentration on defense of the nation-state, to Cold War partnership with the United States, to waging anti-guerrilla war within their own borders. The old traditions of the armed forces as an integral part of the *patria* have taken on new meanings in their later role in fostering national development, the "civic action" function in which a military elite substitutes for a civilian elite that is absent or unable to carry out these functions. The Peruvian military, forced to confront Sendero, MRTA, and narcotics traffickers, has not responded with a clear, unified, coherent doctrine of counterinsurgent war. Bustamante examines the internal conflicts within the military that have precluded the emergence of a coherent doctrine for fighting the guerrillas. Particularly worrisome to some generals is IU's proposals to "democratize" the war by giving local militias more resources; some see this as a threat to the armed forces's privileged role in society. Bustamante sees a larger problem as well: an inability on the part of "officialdom" to reach a consensus on the political role of the military. Indeed, the war has only exacerbated relations between different factions within the military and inhibited the emergence of a "post-dogmatic" doctrine of civil-military relations.

609. Chávez de Paz, Dennis. *Juventud y terror: características sociales de los condenados por terrorismo y otros delitos.* Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1989.

Part of a Ford Foundation project investigating radicalization and political violence among young people of Lima's "popular classes," this extremely important report examines the social characteristics of the group from which Sendero draws most of its recruits. Chávez de Paz seeks to understand why young people join Sendero, and how the phenomenon of terrorism (which is how the state classifies the guerrilla war) is related to the expanding spectrum of violence in Peru, which includes rising rates of assault, robbery, kidnapping, and drug trafficking. By 1985, these crimes represented almost 75% of all the cases tried by courts in Peru. In detailed fashion, the author examines the social characteristics of people jailed for terrorism, by factors such as age, sex, martial status, geographical origins, provincial socio-economic development, level of education, educational institution, occupation, and monthly income. He paints a portrait of a class of prisoners who are predominantly young, unmarried and without children, with a significant percentage having some university-level education. Among the high percentage of women imprisoned there is an even higher level of education, in many cases to the post-graduate level. The majority of prisoners come from the poorest provinces of Peru, but the fact that many have some university experience indicates that their families were able at some point to assist them in their aspirations. Chávez de Paz suggests that we are dealing with a provincial elite (privileged in relation to their environment), whose expectations contrast strongly with their working-class or peasant backgrounds. Although not conclusive, his evidence strongly suggests that thwarted or unfulfilled expectations of social advancement may have played an important role in decisions to join Sendero. Yet another important group belongs to a strata consisting of workers, artisans, and street vendors, categories of work characterized by instability and low pay. Again, a gap between expectations and reality seems to have played a role in precipitating people into choosing the option of radicalism or political violence. An extremely important study of the background of those who became *senderistas.*

610. *Coca, cocaína y narcotráfico: laberinto en los Andes.* Edited by Diego García Sayán. Lima: Comisión Andina de Juristas, 1989.

A collection of wide-ranging essays on coca, narcotics trafficking, and violence in the Andes. Essays range from an examination of drug consumption in the West and its impact on Peru, traditional uses of coca in Andean society, the economic impact of coca cultivation on Peru and Bolivia, the development of "financial paradises" like Panama (where cocaine money can be laundered), the judicial system's response to drug trafficking, and the international impact of narcotics on U.S.-Latin American relations. Of particular interest is Michael Reid's "Una región amenazada por el narcotráfico," which looks at "ideologized violence" in the Andean countries, and José Gonzales's "Perú: Sendero Luminoso en el valle de la coca."

611. Comisión Especial del Senado Sobre las Causas de Violencia y Alternativas de Pacificación en el Perú. *Violencia y pacificación.* [Lima]: DESCO/Comisión Andina de Juristas, 1989.

Led by Senator Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, the eleven distinguished members of the Commission exhaustively explored the violence that has gripped their country for eight years, proposed solutions to end it, and alternatives to achieve a national consensus for peace. After a theoretical exploration of the themes of social, economic, and political violence, the Commission examines the historical roots of violence in Peru, as well as its more immediate causes (centralism, disintegration, lack of national integration, asymmetrical social structures, racism, etc.). Conditions of life for Peruvians, the status of children and adolescents, and the crisis in the nation's universities, were also objects of the Commission's scrutiny. They also looked at urban violence, especially that perpetrated by delinquents, violence linked to *narcotráfico*, and the two revolutionary movements fighting in Peru, the PCP Sendero Luminoso and MRTA. Finally, the Commission explored the role and function of the nation's counterinsurgency organizations: the police, the armed forces, and intelligence agencies, their activities during the course of the war, and antisubversive legislation that has been passed to fight terrorism. Their evaluation and conclusions are sobering. They urge the government to look for alternatives that would be more consistent with democratic norms and respect for human rights. The cost of the nation's explosion of violence has been heavy in human, social, and material terms. The war has put civil, constitutional government in severe jeopardy, killed more than 11,000 people, displaced tens of thousands more, caused more than 150,000 Peruvians to emigrate, and cost the country perhaps $10 billion in direct and indirect damage.

612. Comisión Investigadora de Grupos Paramilitares. *Una lucha cívica contra la impunidad. Presentación a la opinion pública del Informe de la oposición en la Comisión Investigadora de los asesinatos de los Señores Diputados Eriberto Arroyo Mio y Pablo Norberto Li Ormeño, así como de las actividades desarrolladas por el Grupo Terrorista que realiza acciones criminales incompatibles con la vida democrática del país y que indebidamente utiliza el nombre de un mártir.* Signed by Deputies Manuel Piqueras Luna, Gustavo Espinoza Montesinos, and Célso Sotomarino Chávez. Lima: s.n., October 26 1989.

Denunciation of paramilitary "death squads," particularly the group Rodrigo Franco, which has been linked to APRA. Included is a detailed chronicle of suspicious death threats, kidnappings, tortures, murders, and disappearances attributed to right-wing paramilitary groups. The commission reconstructs the structure and membership of the death squad, its ties to police and the Interior Ministry, and explores several recent murders. Its recommendations call for immediate steps by the government to prosecute those guilty of these crimes, and for the police and armed forces to respect human rights. The commission reminds the security forces that their mandate to fight terrorism has been given in defense of democracy and the rule of law.

613. Communist Party of Peru, Central Committee. *Interview to* [sic]*Chairman Gonzalo.* S.l.: Red Banner Editorial House, 1989.

English version of the Luis Arce interview with Abimael Guzmán in *El Diario*. The translation is extremely poor, making an already obtuse Marxist dialectic nearly incomprehensible. The 1991 *Interview with Chairman Gonzalo* (no.810) is a much better translation.

614. *Construir la paz: la violencia en la vida de los pobladores del Cono Norte de Lima.* Series: Estrategia Integral de Paz. Lima: Instituto Democracia y Socialismo; Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular, October 1989.

Report on the socio-economic impact of the country's violence on the popular sectors. While most of the work deals with "structural violence," violence within the family, the school, the

barrio, the report publishes results of polls on questions of violence, terrorism, state repression, the "disappeared," narcotics trafficking, abuse of power, drugs, hunger, poverty, racism, social injustice, etc., in Peru. Specific questions measure public support for curfews, states of emergency, the death penalty, and the roles the police and armed forces have played in the fight against Sendero. Short essays by Senators Enrique Bernales ("La violencia en el Perú") and Rolando Ames ("Estrategias de construcción de paz") deal directly with the challenge of Sendero. Both authors emphasize that marginalization gave birth to terrorism, and both stress the emergence of greater grass-roots and popular participation in civic life, and call for an elevation of democratic and civil means over military ones to fight subversive violence.

615. Degregori, Carlos Iván. *Que difícil es ser Díos: ideología y violencia política en Sendero Luminoso.* [Lima]: El Zorro de Abajo, 1989.

Short (29 pp.) essay by the dean of Peruvian senderologists. Degregori asks how a movement formed by a provincial university elite and an equally provincial Andean and mestizo student body could produce such a level of violence. What factors in Peruvian history and culture made this possible? Degregori reminds us that only a fraction of such people support Sendero; in spite of the nation's crisis and lack of political alternatives, the majority of the population has channeled its radicalism into more constructive and flexible paths. He probes the motivations of the young, who feel cheated of life's opportunities, and make war on those they feel have cheated them; Marxism-Leninism-Maoism supplies them with a rigid ideology that purports to be the one and only truth and gives them an absolute coherence. The other half of the equation are the intellectuals, for whom *pensamiento gonzalo* is a "divine cult of reason." To them the people are clay, to be modeled by the party and its idcology into an instrument to achieve total power. A wide-ranging essay that incorporates anthropology, philosophy, literature, and linguistics to examine the foundations of the true believer's faith.

616. *Entre el dolor y la esperanza.* Lima: Concilio Nacional Evangélico del Perú, Departamento de Acción y Servicios Sociales "Paz y Esperanza," 1989.

Contains testimony from persons in the emergency zones. Students, peasants, workers, all Pentecostal or evangelical Christians and identified only by their initials, testify to *senderista* raids on their meetings, the burning of prayer books and Bibles, and threats against their lives ("At this moment I felt the presence of the Holy Spirit in me and I was not afraid"). Other testimonies chronicle government repression, accusations of sympathy for the rebels, beatings, and the disappearance of church members without a trace. Some testimonies are translated from Quechua; others are from children whose fathers have vanished. An interesting note is the frequent (and disapproving) mention of the use of alcohol and coca at traditional Indian festivals. In essence apolitical, the central theme of the work is the sustaining power of faith in God in the face of clashing political forces.

617. *Guerra popular en el Perú: el pensamiento Gonzalo.* Compiled and edited by Luis Arce Borja. Brussels: LA Borja, 1989.

The Bible of Shining Path. Arce Borja, former editor of *El Diario* and Sendero's mouthpiece in Europe, has gathered the most important primary documents issued by the PCP in one volume, a work which must represent the "official line" of Sendero, particularly as some of the manifestoes appear with alterations from their original texts. Included in the volume are, "To Understand Mariátegui," "Develop Guerrilla Warfare," "Don't Vote: Instead, Widen Guerrilla War in Order to Conquer Power for the People," "Develop Popular War to Serve the World Revolution," and most significantly, the all-important "Bases of Discussion" (international line, democratic revolution, military line, line of construction of the three instruments of the revolution, and line of the masses). Also in the volume are an explanation of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, *pensamiento Gonzalo*, and the general program of democratic revolution. An absolutely indispensable collection of primary documents for understanding Sendero Luminoso's revolution.

618. Hertoghe, Alain and Alain Labrousse. *Le Sentier lumineux du Pérou: Un nouvel intégrisme dans le tiers monde.* Paris: Editions la Découverte, 1989.

French journalists Hertoghe and Labrousse ask a number of probing questions: in the name of what ideology is such a bloody and sectarian rebellion being waged, so extreme that no socialist movement in the world will recognize it? Is it a war for revenge fueled by five centuries of Indian hatred? Is it a return to the purity of the Maoism of the Chinese Cultural Revolution? Or

is there a certain revolutionary mystique resembling Muslim fundamentalism? The book is organized around a number of dramatic themes: The Coca War in the Amazon, the Long March in the Andes, The Great Leap Forward, etc. Hertoghe and Labrousse make good use of Senderologists like Favre, Montoya, Ansión, and Salcedo to present a portrait of an anachronistic, anti-progressive, but appealing group of revolutionaries who have at the same time both attracted and repulsed popular support. A great deal of attention is paid to the early "anthropological" explanations of Sendero's appeal to the Andean peasant. Is Sendero a new Khmer Rouge, they ask? Cambodia was a colony of France, and the Khmer Rouge espoused an extreme nationalism rooted in a mythical Angkor past, while Sendero is totally indifferent to Peru's Inca heritage. In addition, Cambodia was much less modernized and far more rural a society than is Peru. The authors also make a lengthy comparison between Sendero and Iran's Islamic revolution. In the end they concede that Sendero's revolution embodies a high degree of dogmatism, mysticism, and the necessity for complete faith by its adherents. Its apocalyptic solutions to Peru's and the world's ills bespeak an appeal to its young followers that transcends mere politics. The authors conclude that the process of economic integration of the First and Third Worlds, the migration of rural peoples into the cities, and the uprisings of ethnic and religious minorities may produce, "One, many Senderos in the Third World."

619. Johnson, Peter T. "The Consistency of a Revolutionary Movement: Peru's Sendero Luminoso and its Texts, 1965-1986." In *Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World.* Edited by Michael T. Martin and Terry R. Kandal. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 267-296.

Guerrilla movements are by definition clandestine and hidden organisms, with much of their information kept inaccessible. They present a special challenge to scholars; the collection of ephemera that may shed light on their origins and philosophies is an equally important objective for academic institutions. Sendero is a good example of over-reliance on secondary sources, and subsequent flawed interpretation in Latin American studies; documents that elaborate the foundations of Sendero's ideology were not unavailable to the diligent researcher. Johnson elucidates Sendero's texts, especially those issued in the years between 1960 and 1970, when internal ideological struggles broke the Peruvian Communist Party into irreconcilable factions. Through these texts Johnson shows how *pensamiento Gonzalo* developed as a combination of Mariateguist philosophy and Maoism. The movement's years as the *Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario* at the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho in the early 1970's are especially important. Johnson's excellent bibliography lists the primary sources that chronicle Sendero's ideological evolution.

620. Kay, Bruce H. "State, Regime, and Insurgency in Peru: Sendero Luminoso Since 1985." MA thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1989.

Thesis that examines the transformation in character which the author alleges has taken place in Sendero's conduct of the war since 1985. Using a number of political theories, Kay analyzes the nature and extent of peasant support for Sendero, looking particularly at the rise and decline of Sendero's "empathetic base." Kay criticizes political scientists for analyzing peasant rebellion under a "regional microscope," and for making broad generalizations about rural politics on that basis. These become less valuable as insurgency spreads to starkly dissimilar areas with different norms and structures. Powerful and repressive forces, dismissed as mere "exogenous variables" are given short shrift by many political scientists. But "in the longer term, a revolutionary movement's fate depends not on regional poverty, oppression, or the cultural norms of peasant communities. It depends on the behavior of the state, its responses to perceived security threats or threats to its economic interests. The range of alternatives open to the state spans from a series of development initiatives to a full-scale counterinsurgency war." Kay argues that transformations in Sendero's insurgency can no longer be explained by regionalist theories of peasant revolutions, but demand a broader, more state- and regime-centered focus.

621. Mauceri, Philip. *Militares: insurgencia y democratización en el Perú, 1980-1988.* Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1989.

Mauceri examines the role of the Peruvian military following the "restoration" of both Belaúnde and democracy in Peru after 1980. In particular, he is interested in the military's search for a new relationship with civilian government, the controls which civil authorities have tried to exercise over the armed forces, and the military's almost involuntary re-orientation towards counterinsurgency as a result of Sendero. Mauceri first examines the military's retreat from a direct role in government and the restoration of democracy following the *docenio* of military rule from

1968-1980. The military's response to Sendero has exacerbated civil-military tensions within Peru, because the military has insisted on monopolizing the decision-making process about counterinsurgency, and also because it has insisted on total political responsibility and absolute control in the emergency zones. This in spite of the armed forces's lack of training and resources, corruption, and difficulties with terrain, which characterized its response to Sendero in the period 1980-1982. Military brutality produced a flood of civilian casualties. While the decision to give the military control over the counterinsurgency effort was made by a civilian president in a civilian government, there is no institutional role for Congress, the judiciary, nor any other governmental authority to exercise control over counterinsurgency policy. Within the military itself there were tensions between the "developmentalist" counterinsurgency proponents, and those who stressed the military and ideological dimensions of the conflict. Mauceri concludes that real democratization must include greater civilian control (not just executive approval), increased public education about the armed forces, and dialogue between the two sides.

622. McClintock, Cynthia. "Peru's Sendero Luminoso Rebellion: Origins and Trajectory." In *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements.* Edited by Susan Eckstein. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, pp. 61-101.

Well-written overview of Sendero's origins and rise, influenced by McClintock's own research in the sierras. Despite is brutality, Sendero appears to enjoy the support of a majority of the people of Ayacucho. McClintock asks why this should be so. She draws on her own work in Lima, Huancayo, and Trujillo from 1980 to 1987, as well as the scholarship of Palmer and Degregori. In addition, McClintock has been carrying out research on an agrarian cooperative since 1973 and has gained the confidence of a number of people in the central sierra. From this research she identifies four factors crucial to the development of popular support for Sendero in the southern highlands prior to 1983: absolute economic decline and a real threat to subsistence, politicization of peasant groups in the 1970's which led more people to blame the government for their misery, shrewd organizational strategies by Sendero, and a weak and inappropriate response by the government. McClintock theorizes that Sendero may enjoy a special cultural resonance among the people of the southern sierra, and that the coca boom in Peru has also helped it gain support among peasant small-holders. McClintock also discusses the erosion of Sendero's base after 1983, which she attributes to the government's military offensive, Sendero's subsequent retreat, and a more legitimate and appropriate response by the state. Had the Belaúnde government taken more steps--military, economic, political--against Sendero in the early 1980's, it is doubtful that the guerrillas would have gained much strength: "...to date, no Latin American revolutionaries have succeeded in taking power from a responsive government...if the García government can keep its key promises, and the real social and economic grievances of many of Peru's people are gradually ameliorated, then Peru may achieve peace."

623. Noel Moral, Roberto C. *Ayacucho: testimonio de un soldado.* Lima: PUBLINOR, 1989.

Exculpatory memoirs of the man accused of unleashing the "dirty war" in Ayacucho. Retired general of the army Noel opens his work by expressing his personal thanks to each and every member of the military and security forces whom he had the honor to command, dedicating to them each word, speech, paragraph, and page for the patriotic task they undertook in providing peace, tranquillity, and the rule of law in the emergency zone. Noel saw his task as defending liberty under the laws of his country, which is the target of a permanent aggression by communist organizations intent on sowing chaos and subversion. The actions of each of his men to control and eliminate subversion was touched by the spirit of the constitution of the Peruvian state. Noel approvingly quotes remarks that attack both the press and political parties as "fellow travelers" of subversion ("Nothing prostitutes Peru more than the word...the pen is as much to blame as the sword."). The bulk of the work is a lengthy description of the genesis and development of Sendero (which Noel traces back to elements affiliated with APRA), the intervention of the armed forces in Ayacucho in 1983, his countersubversive operations in the emergency zones, and what he refers to as the "tragedy" of Uchuraccay. He places a great deal of the blame for the rebellion on a corrupt civil administration, sees collusion among political movements, professional organizations, the press, and Sendero, and views the massacre at Uchuraccay as the supreme opportunity for subversive elements and the media to blacken honorable institutions and destabilize the nation. In a brief epilogue, Noel concedes that the armed struggle by subversive groups is a direct consequence of long-standing problems rooted in socioeconomic and political relations of the people, but reiterates that sectarian forces intent on destabilization and communist parties in every nation are using these problems to advance their subversive agenda of achieving power.

624. Oviedo V., Carlos. *Prensa y subversión.* Lima: Mass Comunicación SRL, 1989.

Discussion of the role of the press in a period of mass violence. Oviedo asks three loaded questions: Why do the newspapers insist on publishing information about terrorist acts? In what way does this information contribute to the objectives of the terrorists? How is the message of the terrorists filtered to the public through the press? In analyzing Sendero and MRTA's use of propaganda, Oviedo compares how official government channels of communication, daily papers, and television differ in their use of language in reporting terrorist actions. He accuses the press of sensationalizing violence, and of involuntarily assisting the guerrillas's strategic objectives by disseminating reports that lack objectivity and balance. Rather than report facts, the Peruvian press inflames passions, fears, hopes, and prejudices. Such lack of judiciousness enforces the credibility of clandestine sources and discredits the authorities. However, Oviedo believes that muzzling, controlling, or censoring the press is not an alternative. Information, not silence, is the most effective counterattack, and the media should pressure the government to improve its dissemination of information. Both Sendero (through *El Diario*) and the government are now actively using the media to advance their cause. Oviedo critically discusses a failed anti-Sendero mass media blitz by the government, whose slogans ("Terrorism is a dirty war against Peru: what are we doing to stop it?" and "Mother, terrorism destroys your sons; denounce it") were turned around by some sectors of the press against the government. The state is now launching a campaign modeled on German and Italian anti-terrorist tactics, which identifies the heads of Sendero and MRTA, and stresses monetary rewards for their capture.

625. Palmer, David Scott. "Terrorism as a Revolutionary Strategy: Peru's *Sendero Luminoso.*" In *The Politics of Terrorism: Terror as a State and Revolutionary Strategy.* Edited by Barry Rubin. Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1989, pp. 129-152.

Peru has long been a country within which many different realities exist, sometimes individualistic and entrepreneurial, often communitarian and collective, frequently Indian. The challenge to Peru's modern development has been to meld these distinctive patterns and components in ways that enhance stability and improve access to economic and political resources, while protecting core national characteristics and values. But modernization has strained these elements to the limit; it is within this context and dynamic that the radical alternative of development by revolution, and in due course, revolution by terrorism, has emerged. Palmer traces the distinctive development of Sendero, stressing once again the nation's historical tension between core and periphery as a crucial element. He lays emphasis on the characteristics of Ayacucho as a poor, Indian department with a provincial university, elements that favored the emergence of a revolutionary movement with a ready and eager membership at hand. Palmer identifies one of Sendero's objectives as the restoration of "true" Indian communism to Peru; hence the need to eliminate or reform wealthy peasants and local petite bourgeois elements and redistribute their property to the community. A very low (20%) level of support for APRA in Ayacucho would suggest a frail legitimacy of the electoral process in Sendero's heartland, and its continued pervasive influence there in spite of its penchant for violence. Palmer concludes that in spite of high levels of violence, a reformist government should in principle be the best antidote to the terrorist or guerrilla threat. The participation of the Marxist left in elections should also help diffuse the insurgency. Still, "the paradox of contemporary Peru is that while the political system was opened and economic conditions temporarily improved, *Sendero* still managed to expand, other movements inaugurated guerrilla activities, and popular confidence in the government's capacity to control the situation has eroded."

626. Pareja Pflücker, Piedad and Eric Torres Montes. *Municipios y terrorismo: impacto de la violencia subversiva en los gobiernos locales.* With the collaboration of Ricardo Díaz. Lima: Centro de Estudios Peruanos, 1989.

Discusses the impact of Shining Path on local governments. After defining what they mean by local government, the authors conclude that the decentralization of power in Peru has never occurred. They contrast this objective, which in essence means placing power in the hands of the people, with the "people's war" of Sendero, which in theory desires the same end. Violence by the guerrillas is documented by province and department. The destruction of local authority has created a power vacuum, that has either been filled by Sendero itself or by the military, further weakening democratic institutions. The authors conclude that the war against subversion is destroying any chance for democracy in Peru, as leaders who are killed or scared into quitting their

offices by Sendero are replaced by soldiers. They plead for a counterinsurgency strategy that will sustain the legitimacy of the state and its judicial-political role.

627. Partido Comunista del Perú, Comité Central. *Entrevista al Presidente Gonzalo.* Lima: Ediciones Bandera Roja, 1989.

Text of the celebrated "Interview of the Century" of Abimael Guzmán, which appeared in the newspaper *El Diario*, reprinted here as a monograph.

628. *Puno hoy: tierra y violencia/Area de información y promoción de los derechos humanos.* Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal, 1989.

Sendero has made a major effort to control Puno, but it has not succeeded. This well-written and detailed study examines the reasons for this failure. Perhaps more than any other area of the country, Puno is a department with a large *campesino* organization, active NGO's, a socially-involved church with strong peasant support, human rights organizations, and leftist political movements. The study analyzes Puno's socio-economic and ethnic structure, highlighting extreme poverty and inequality of wealth. The percentage of land suitable for cultivation is very low, and hacienda expansion in the early decades of the century dispossessed many communities. Despite the formation of SAIS, CAP, and ERPS cooperatives, associative empresarial models did not satisfy community demands for land. These entities generated agricultural productivity, but only exacerbated income inequalities. The report shows that 44 different cooperatives benefited some 10,000 families, but left 100,000 more families with an average of only 4.7 hectares each on which to survive. Traditional conflicts between *haciendas* and communities were transformed into a new struggle between *comuneros* and those who belonged to the new agricultural enterprises. When Sendero began to infiltrate Puno in 1982, it confronted both the cooperatives and the *Federación Departmental de Campesinos de Puno.* Now the cooperatives hire paramilitary guards to attack the FDCP, peasants seize lands against the counsel of the union, which urges them to reject violence, the police and military kill peasants and unionists, while Sendero attacks everyone. The report carefully documents each period of the war. The recent proposal of the Interior Ministry to arm the employees of the agricultural enterprises will only inflame an already deeply divided region. Pastoral action by the church, organization by the Commission for the Defense of Human Rights, and proposed land division by the FDCP are all tactics to confront state and guerrilla violence and obtain justice for the peasants. Puno, the report concludes, constitutes the scene of a new type of struggle between Sendero, popular movements, the state, and local power. A chronology of violence in the department, 1980-1989, is appended.

629. *Sobre el volcán: diálogo frente a la subversión.* Edited by María del Pilar Tello. Lima: Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos, 1989.

Series of interviews with prominent Peruvian political figures and social scientists, including Rolando Ames ("Encontrar el camino de subversión democrática"), Javier Díez Canseco ("La subversión se justifica"), Sinesio Jarama ("¡Estamos perdiendo la guerra!"), and Héctor Béjar ("¡Esta es una guerra ideológica...!"). Other authors represented in the volume are Luis Cisneros Vizquerra, Enrique Chirinos Soto, César Hildebrandt, Luis Guillermo Lumbreras, Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, Luciano Metzinger, Luis Pásara, and Javier Valle Riestra. Most of the interviewees, to a greater or lesser degree, take a leftist position against Sendero, but equally condemn the government's brutal counterinsurgency response to terrorism. Béjar criticizes Sendero for substituting the dictatorship of the party for representative democracy. Ex-general Sinesio Jarama states that while Sendero may not be winning its war, the country is losing it; Sendero must be fought on a wide variety of fronts beyond the military. Metzinger, representing the Peruvian bishopric's social concerns commission, ascribes the country's subversion to 500 years of structural violence, injustice, and racism, for which the Church must accept a large share of the blame. Pásara, journalist and director of CEDYS (Centro de Estudios Democracia y Socialismo) believes that not one, but many civil wars have started in Peru. Penetrating and frank exchanges illuminate many different aspects of the war between Sendero and the state.

630. *Violencia política en el Perú, 1980-1988.* 2v. Lima: DESCO/Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo, 1989.

One of the most important documentary sources on Sendero. DESCO has undertaken an exhaustive study of political violence in Peru since the inception of Sendero's "people's war." Extensive graphs and charts document the growth of violence and killings since 1980, by type of

violent act and class of victim. A series of chronologies records principal actions by both Sendero and MRTA, as well as a log of attacks on police and security forces and a list of emergency decrees by the government. Selections from a wide spectrum of the Peruvian press illustrate how the country's intelligentsia reacted to the growing rebellion. Included are pronouncements and statements from the armed forces, the clergy, all political parties, and the national press, as well as an extensive bibliography. The two-volume work concludes with a 267-page chronology of political violence from May 18, 1980, when ballot boxes in Chuschi were burned, through the blowing up of an electrical substation on December 31, 1988. An exhaustive chronicle of a decade of political violence.

631. "Civiles en la danza." *Caretas*, no.1040 (January 16 1989): 34-37.

Report on recent developments in rural and urban counterinsurgency strategy. The Interior Minister and Vice-Minister, and representatives from the Councils of Ministers and National Defense, met with representatives from three agricultural enterprises (including SAIS Cahuide) as well as the president of the peasant cooperative center of Puno, to plan rural anti-terrorist campaigns for the central departments and Puno. These include strategically-located police barracks, and more important, coordinated planning with civilians for civic participation in counterinsurgency policy. Ayacuchan-style patrols will be extended to new areas, especially to the agricultural enterprises, and will be equipped with pistols and shotguns. They will also receive radios for communication with the security forces. At the same time, the government is looking for civilian participation in urban areas. An "organism of self-defense" will have a telephone network to report the presence of subversives. *Caretas* expands upon the idea of civil-military cooperation to confront Sendero, calling it "democracy in peace." One sidebar ("Estrategia urbana") looks at Villa El Salvador, a *pueblo joven* in Lima, as a prototype for the new policy; another, ("Estrategia rural"), looks at the *rondas* of Pichihuillca.

632. "Lid comunal." *Caretas*, no.1041 (January 23 1989): 32-36, 78.

Even more then military strategy, Sendero fears popular organizations. For this reason, there is a clear competition between the guerrillas and self-defense patrols in the countryside. Anthropologist, social worker, and *mariateguista* Manuel Soto Sullca, was on his way to a meeting in Chicche as director of CICEP (Centro de Investigación Campesina y Educación Popular) when he was kidnapped and murdered by Sendero. *Caretas* assesses the contribution of technical and social assistance to the SAIS agricultural enterprises, of which there are 44 in Puno alone. It also publishes Abilio Arroyo's interview with Soto, made just hours before his death. Sendero has managed to infiltrate peasant movements; Soto expects open confrontations soon between *senderistas* and peasants for control of the *campesino* federations. Federation directors have been threatened, and some peasants are now arming to defend themselves. More than 80% of the authorities in the valley of Mantaro, for example, have quit out of fear. Soto describes the structure of the peasant economy, and at least one community he knows of that has rejected Sendero, as well as several where Sendero has gained influence. The Universidad del Centro appears to be a haven for some *senderista* cadres.

633. Balk, Alfred. "Terrorism, Inflation, and Debt Threaten Democracy in Peru." (Interview with Enrique Zileri) *World Press Review*, v.36, no.1 (January 1989): 33-35.

Another interview with the editor of *Caretas*. Peru is facing simultaneous problems of terrorism, debt, inflation, drug trafficking, and population growth. Inflation is over 1,000%. The charismatic Alán García promised a new era of economic growth, but achieved it only by using the country's reserves to stimulate growth. Intransigence on the foreign debt and hostility to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have isolated Peru, which needs loans, especially to import food. García's nationalization of the banks has led to business and political opposition. Zileri discusses the presidential race in 1990, and the positions and chances of Vargas Llosa and the IU candidate, Alfonso Barrantes. He characterizes Sendero as "orphans of the Gang of Four," unredeemed Maoists, and "very fierce, very cruel, messianic, almost fundamentalist in their fervor." They are strongest in the very poor, remote, backward areas that are difficult to aid. The future of democracy in Latin America looks bleak: "if there is no real social and economic relief, democracy...will disintegrate." Debt relief, and perhaps a new Latin American Marshall Plan for better investment would help. Peru, Zileri says, despite its problems has fabulous economic opportunities and potential riches in fishing, mining, and export agriculture.

634. McClintock, Cynthia. "The Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in a 'Least Likely' Case: Peru." *Comparative Politics*, v.21, no.2 (January 1989): 127-148.

McClintock advances a novel thesis: that whereas guerrilla actions are commonly believed to threaten democracy, in certain circumstances such a war can actually consolidate it. In Peru's case key political actors, notably the military elite, have made a strategic decision that democracy is the only political system that will enable Peru to avoid civil war in the near future. McClintock examines four obstacles to democratic consolidation in Peru: the nation's dismal economy, subcultural cleavages and guerrilla violence, Peru's political structure (with poorly institutionalized and fragmented parties), and a lack of tangible U.S. support for Peruvian democracy. She concludes that despite previous coups and twelve years of military government, the Peruvian officers have decided that such an option is not realistic in the 1980's. The reasons why Peruvian officers differ from their Chilean, Uruguayan, and Argentine counterparts are many and complex. But social and ethnic cleavages are much more intense in Peru than in the rest of the southern cone, and the potential for civil war much greater. Changes in political mobilization and class structure since 1968 have led to wider support for democratic government; a coup would encounter massive opposition, not only from middle and lower classes, but from many in the economic elite as well. McClintock concedes, in her conclusion, that Peru's situation may well be unique and non-transferable to other Latin American societies.

635. "Financistas del terror." *Caretas*, no.1043 (February 6 1989): 38-41.

In exchange for security and protection, says *Caretas*, Sendero receives money and arms in the Alto Huallaga. Under the puerile slogan "poisoning the Yankees," Sendero has been charging $10,000 for every flight leaving the valley for Colombia, and there are estimates that an average of five flights leave each day. MRTA has reportedly moved three groups into the valley, and the two armed bands are locked into a struggle to dominate the region. The Interior Ministry's intelligence service estimates that 80% of the armed members of both groups are concentrated in the Huallaga. *Caretas* reviews the familiar, if dismal facts of life: why the peasants grow coca, how Sendero "protects" them from exploitation from the *traficantes*, how Sendero justifies this connection, the effects of the trade on the local economy and society, the ecological destruction which coca cultivation brings, etc. Last year some 5,000 hectares of coca were eradicated, but 200,000 hectares are under cultivation. The effectiveness of spraying herbicides is now being evaluated. The article also has two tables quantifying coca eradication, and seizures of coca leaves, drugs, arms, vehicles, airplanes, labs, arrests, etc., over the past four years. A photo of a hut painted with the slogans *"¡Viva el PCP!" "¡Viva Gonzalo!"* and *"¡Abajo la erradicación de la coca!"* ("Down with coca eradication!") accompanies the story.

636. "Polay confiesa." *Caretas*, no.1044 (February 13 1989): 78-81.

Caretas interviews captured *mirista* leader Victor Polay Campos, "Comandante Rolando." Polay denies that MRTA is a terrorist organization; his movement seeks the transformation of the country. Reminded that President Alán García is a friend and "correligionist," Polay heaps scorn on García, declaring that it is the APRA leader who has blood on his hands. Polay explains the transformation of APRA, which drove him further to the left and out of the party. He also details his differences with Sendero, which are profound, ideological, political, and methodological. Sendero seeks to destabilize popular organizations; MRTA to strengthen them. Sendero seeks a power vacuum to fill, favoring reaction rather than revolution. Polay also expands on the armed clashes that have taken place between MRTA and Sendero in the Huallaga. *Caretas* follows with a piece entitled "La novicia roja" (pp.82-83), which seeks to shock by profiling a nice, middle-class Lima girl who turned into a dedicated MRTA guerrilla.

637. Tutuy, Juan. "Violence Continues in Peru." *World Marxist Review*, v.32 (February 1989): 76-79.

Tutuy, a member of the Peruvian Communist Party *(Partido Comunista Peruano)*, analyzes Peru and Sendero from a different Marxist perspective. Tutuy reviews the dismal state of the economy, but notes that debt service payments and transnational export of capital still continue even in the midst of economic crisis. Even local entrepreneurs remit their profits abroad. Tutuy defines this as "structural violence"; it is not a temporary situation, but a profound phenomenon arising from oligarchic imperialist exploitation and three centuries of colonialism. It is this state of affairs which accounts for Sendero. He calls Sendero sectarian, messianic, and belligerently anti-socialist. Sendero declared war on the left as United Left *alcaldes* grew in popularity. These killings alienated the people, and Sendero lost support, even in Ayacucho. According to Tutuy, in

December 1982 Sendero was discredited as a political force. But the government decided to finish it off and ordered the army into action. Their crude means helped Sendero. Neither the right nor the government understood Sendero and what made it unique. These forces linked Sendero to IU, and so attacked the United Left: "The Right, by diagnosing the malaise incorrectly, proved incapable of curing it." Tutuy links the anti-Sendero campaign to a worldwide Doctrine of National Security formulated by the Pentagon. The dirty war, Tutuy writes, helps Sendero survive and grow. The counterinsurgency effort seeks to smash the popular movement in Peru and to destroy IU; it also seeks to weaken the CGTP's conversion into a virtual trade union center for Peruvian workers, the National Popular Assembly, People's Defense fronts, milk committees, the growth of liberation theology, the unification of peasants, etc. Only concerted action by the masses can defeat Sendero.

638. González, Rául. "Ayacucho: ¿Un rincón para vivir? Entrevista con Jaime Urrutia." *Quehacer*, no.57 (February-March 1989): 42-56.

Illuminating interview with Jaime Urrutia, anthropologist, ex-professor at the UNSCH, director of the Institute of Rural Studies "José María Arguedas," and IU lieutenant governor of Ayacucho; a man threatened by Sendero and detained and tortured by the police in 1983. Sendero has threatened many non-governmental organizations like his in the Andes, based on the threat they pose to its activities. Urrutia does not believe that Sendero recruits among the peasantry only through fear; no army can move soldiers by fear alone. The level of conviction is highest among the young. People are attracted to Sendero not because of its ideological purity, or its puritanical Maoism, but because it has pragmatically demonstrated force and action, divided up material goods for the people, etc. Parallel to this, the government has effectively ceased to exist in many areas of the countryside. Schools and medical clinics have been built, but they cannot be staffed, as Sendero scares off government functionaries. The famous "Andean trapezoid" of development proposed by the APRA government has collapsed, due to scarce resources and guerrilla pressures. At the same time, Urrutia rejects the explanation that violence has always been an important factor in Peruvian life. Three hundred years of colonial rule and another hundred of nationalism under a system of such oppression has not, in his opinion, generated as much violence as might have occurred; for example, the struggle of peasants for land has only arisen in the past few decades. González asks Urrutia about his prison experiences, and what solutions he feels might work against Sendero. Urrutia declares that, above all, the state must make the people feel as though they have a stake in a system that will improve their lives, that they not be treated as fifth-class citizens, i.e., that they be treated like human beings.

639. "Sin mandos en el sur." *Caretas*, no.1048 (March 13 1989): 34-37.

The capture of a number of *senderista* leaders in the south has left Sendero almost leaderless on that front. *Caretas* details the latest blows to the revolutionaries. It then shows how Sendero tried to hijack the peasant movement of Puno, only to be rejected by the *campesinos*. Leaders of the Confederación Campesina del Perú have been threatened by Sendero for years; in Azángaro and Melgar, the Sendero-Izquierda Unida clash has turned so violent that the Federation voted to hold a general strike beginning March 1, to demand that the authorities declare the entire agricultural zone in emergency, restructure the land-tenure system and liquidate the SAIS, grant regional autonomy, extend Agrarian Bank credits, and reorganize the *rondas campesinas*. Sendero then declared an armed strike for three days in Azángaro; a *senderista* communiqué admitted that the movement had been repulsed by the security forces back in 1983-84, but intended to recover its lost ground. It condemned IU as an accomplice of the government, and railed against the imperialism of European-financed agricultural projects, and "intellectuals who prostituted the peasant leadership," opportunism, revisionism, the *rondas*, etc. IU peasant supporters were also murdered, and some 20 villages were visited and ordered to support the strike. But on February 25, 200 delegates from 38 communities voted to boycott the *senderista* armed strike and to prepare their own collective action.

640. "Piedras de Sendero." *Caretas*, no.1049 (March 20 1989): 32-36.

Summary of the latest blows which Sendero has suffered, plus a review of the military situation by region: south, Ayacucho, east, Lima, and the Huallaga. The capture of Morote and other leaders has shaken the PCP; DIRCOTE believes that Guzmán has told troops to move to different zones and to restructure their cadres. *Caretas* names the individuals in command of each regional committee. However, a triumphalist attitude now would be not only premature, but suicidal. *Caretas* provides a chart detailing how Sendero is regionally organized, complete with photos of captured and at-large leaders.

641. García, Guy. "Lurching Towards Anarchy." *Time*, v.133, no. 13 (March 27 1989): 54.

Can a country cope with terrorism and a 10,000% rate of inflation, asks*Time?* García describes a guerrilla attack on SAIS Cahuide, a private cooperative in Junín department. A thriving agricultural concern with 130,000 head of livestock, 800 workers who sold 10,000 liters of milk daily, 170 administrators and technical advisors, the co-op was devastated by Sendero--the animals slaughtered or stolen, four administrators and executives killed, and tractors destroyed. Today the co-op is nearly deserted, its workers afraid to stay on, as requests for protection have been ignored by the authorities. García describes the confluence of economic crises that have brought Peru to the edge of bankruptcy. Last year 150,000 Peruvians emigrated, as violence officially took almost 800 lives. Sendero controls a third of the country, and intends to take Lima; Raúl González declares that "the city is now the critical spot to Sendero's future." Inflation is soaring, buying power is down by 50% from last year, two-thirds of the working population is unemployed or underemployed. Alán García's approval rating is down to a mere 13%. The dangers of a coup have eased, but the country is being polarized between left and right. As retired general Sinescio *[sic]* Jarama warns, "Sendero is not winning, we are losing."

642. González, Raúl. "Coca's Shining Path." *NACLA Report on the Americas*, v.22, no.6 (March 1989): 22-24.

The Huallaga Valley has become a *senderista* bastion. Prior to 1980, the area had already been the scene of a complex armed struggle between government anti-drug police, peasant growers, and *sicarios*, the traffickers' hired guns. The MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement) actually organized peasants first, to defend themselves from both traffickers and the government. Sendero arrived either in 1980 or 1982, depending upon which story one credits, and began to organize in areas in which the MRTA was not operating. Sendero not only defends the coca-growing peasants, but punishes abusive or exploitative growers and traffickers, and sternly enforces a puritanical morality, forbidding alcohol and prostitution, closing discoth`eques, brothels, and bars, and even killing homosexuals. Sendero is infiltrating MRTA, undermining its organizations and slowly replacing them. To this end, they sometimes ally themselves with the local *sicarios*, in one case working with the thugs to ambush MRTA guerrillas. Pitched battles with automatic weapons have taken place between gangsters, *senderistas*, and *tupacamiristas*. By 1987 Sendero had gained control of most towns, evicting the police (who had usually been bribed to work with the *narcos)* and installing themselves as authority. Sendero now can fix the prices paid by traffickers to coca producers. When the anti-drug police were sent in in large numbers, Sendero faded away; when they were pulled out after their campaign, the guerrillas returned. A driver in the region tells González that everyone, even the children in his town, sings the "Internationale," and he knows the eight commandments of the revolution. Sendero's "taxes" on the drug trade in the valley, now estimated at $600 to $800 million annually, are bringing them $30 to $40 million, far more than any other Peruvian political organization. González concludes, "Sooner than we think, we may discover the meaning of revolution."

A sidebar to the article explains that ironically, settlement in the area was the result of grand colonization schemes designed to develop vast, sparsely inhabited tracts of national territory. In the 1960's the Peruvian and Bolivian governments spent millions on technical assistance and credit for the experiments. But promises of credits for coffee, citrus, and cattle raising were largely unfulfilled. In the 1970's the settlers turned to a cash crop that was profitable without government assistance--coca. The insatiable market for the drug and its profits brought yet more waves of migrants to the area. Today the Huallaga is the world's largest coca-growing zone.

643. Denegri, Guillermo. "Entrevista al general (r) Sinesio Jarama." *Debate*, no.55 (March-May 1989): 8-15.

Debate asks the influential military man a series of direct, straightforward questions: Is pacification possible? Is Sendero growing? How should it be fought? Is the government's strategy effective? Is an "Argentine solution" to the threat of subversion viable? What about rumors of a coup? Sinesio Jarama believes that while Sendero may not be winning the war, the nation is losing it. Sendero is letting society destroy itself. To really fight subversion, it is essential to show that democracy is better than totalitarianism, that one lives better within the law than by bearing arms against it. The armed forces must create a coherent strategy of counterinsurgency, within political, ideological, psychological, social, and economic contexts. Such a strategy does not now exist. The general addresses the question of existing and potential antisubversion legislation, the military's legal role in fighting terrorism (concerning the vexing problem of human rights abuses), the guerrilla-*narcotraficante* link (he is against using the army to fight the coca trade), and the role of the military in a democratic Peru.

644. González, Raúl. "El voto y la subversión: las zonas con influencia subversiva y su implicancia en el próximo proceso elecional." *Debate*, no.55 (March-May 1989): 16-17.

Analysis of the potential vote in departments most affected by the war. González reminds readers that Sendero's political objectives in the countryside, in areas where it is establishing its bases of support for the "Republic of the New Democracy," transcend a simple boycott of elections; Sendero seeks to completely eliminate the presence of the state and substitute itself. It is unlikely that there will be any substantial voting at all in areas where the state cannot guarantee security; there will also be no local candidates who will dare to stand for election. (A sidebar shows the result of a recent poll: it indicates Vargas Llosa leads IU candidate Barrantes by 9 points nationally; IU is behind in Lima, ahead of Vargas Llosa in rural mountain areas, close but still trailing in urban mountain areas, and badly behind in the jungle.)

645. "Uchiza: ¡Nunca más!" *Caretas*, no.1051 (April 3 1989): 10-15, 84-85.

Long, passionate, angry story covering the attack on the police post in Uchiza. *Caretas* reconstructs in detail how a combined force of *senderistas* and *narcotraficantes* overcame the 57 men of the Uchiza garrison, how the police radioed for help and were told to hang on, how 11 of the policemen were captured, humiliated, tortured, and barbarously executed, how much of the town's population watched the attack in an almost festive mood, and how the promised assistance failed to arrive until the next morning. *Caretas's* moral tone of censure is clear throughout; one sidebar details how Uchiza was attacked in a similar fashion back in 1987, with six policemen murdered, and asks why the government was not prepared for a repeat of that assault. Another asks why after nine years of terrorism there are still not enough helicopters equipped to fly at night and insufficient night vision equipment available to the security forces. The article implies that some of the policemen in Uchiza were on the take from narcotics traffickers, or at best looked the other way, and it condemns the shortage of ammunition, poor training, and absolute lack of training and preparation of the police. Following is an interview by Luis Pásara of retired general Sinesio Jarama. The general, who believes that defeating Sendero could take 15 years, affirms that a counterinsurgency strategy now exists, but comments on the lack of coordination still displayed by the authorities, laments the scarcity of resources for economic development in the worst emergency zones, and states that arming the *rondas* indiscriminately can lead to internecine warfare. The patrols have to be under firm military control. He also wryly comments that the money spent on certain grand public projects in Lima could possibly fund a thousand small projects in a thousand small Andean communities. It is all, he implies, a question of priorities.

646. "Visión limitada." *Caretas*, no.1052 (April 10 1989): 36-36-38, 40-41, 94.

Excellent article dissecting the government's counterinsurgency strategy. The authorities have not made full use of small, specialized commando forces, instead relying on regular army units, which are poorly-trained and ill-equipped. They usually fall apart when ambushed. The use of special forces was well-demonstrated in Ayacucho back in 1983-84, when small units of 15-20 men, moved quickly by helicopter within the emergency zone, defeated Sendero. When the guerrillas fled those zones into other areas, absurd legal rules prevented the units from pursuing them. The regular army's strategy of establishing bases, with small-scale patrols, has shown its limitations. *Caretas* comments that scarcely any subversive movement has been defeated by military means alone; the battle has to take place in every school, street, office, shop, field, church, etc. None of these places escapes the terrorist's attention, and so must also be examined by the security forces. A smaller accompanying article, "Notables carencias," highlights the military's shortcomings: pay, even for officers, is low; soldiers sometimes get so hungry that they steal chickens from the peasants; there are not enough radios and night-vision devices to go around; equipment is so lacking that soldiers sometimes patrol in commandeered trucks; and there are not enough helicopters (of the 11 based in Tingo María, 8 belong to the DEA, and cannot be used for counterinsurgency operations).

647. "Guerra medrosa." *Caretas*, no.1053 (April 17 1989): 10-15.

Fallout continues from the Uchiza debacle; three retired generals have made their complaints known to the press. Although the three have different backgrounds and operational careers, all criticize the lack of a unified command, with social and economic components, and they believe that few in the military really understand subversive war. One calls for the creation of a specialized academy of "Senderology." The report details the bitter recriminations now flying about in Lima. *Caretas* raises many "inconvenient questions": Why is the Air Force buying 12 Mirage

2000 fighters, at a cost of millions of dollars each? Military expenditures now constitute 41% of the national budget. Where are the Mercedeses and BMW's imported at government expense every year going? No one thinks that officials should ride around on bicycles, but are we in an emergency or not? Why do oil companies have a dozen helicopters in the Alto Huallaga, while the Air Force stations only one "Huey"? Why buy a helicopter for $2-3 million, and not a night-vision device for $10,000, so that it can be flown after dark? Why are the 102 armored vehicles bought from Israel last year stuck in the Armored Division, and not employed in the Huallaga? Above all, why are the Armed Forces still focusing on a hypothetical war with Ecuador or Chile, while subversion gnaws away at the country? *Caretas* publishes a chart of the command structure of the counterinsurgency effort, criticizing the lack of a central command.

648. Contreras, Joseph. "With the Shining Path." *Newsweek*, v.113, no.17 (April 24 1989): 44-45.

Fascinating piece about a rare and dangerous encounter with Sendero. Contreras and photographer Bill Gentile ventured out of Tingo María, in the Upper Huallaga Valley to Ramal de Aspusna, where their reception from local *narcos* was decidedly hostile. After interrogation (to determine that they were not DEA agents), the pair was put on a boat down the Huallaga River, bound, and led to the guerrillas, where Contreras felt safer among people whose motivations were entirely political. The reporters were in an encampment of about 100 guerrillas, most under the age of 21 and from other parts of Peru, watching the guerrillas shout slogans and attend classes of political instruction. The People's Republic of the New Democracy, the guerrillas affirmed, would not repeat the mistakes of Castro (tying his country to the U.S.S.R.) nor those of the Sandinistas (not completely stamping out Nicaragua's middle class). To linguistically unite the country, only Spanish would be spoken; Quechua would be forbidden. Contreras spoke with a doctor who feared that the chemical Spike, dropped to wipe out coca plants, was harming babies in the Valley. There was some ambivalence about coca farming; the guerrillas denied they were *narcoterroristas* ("to us coca is a poison"). They said they were only protecting the right of the peasants to cultivate coca; they were, however, urging the *campesinos* to plant food crops as well, with mixed success. One guerrilla glumly admitted that the level of (political) consciousness among the peasants varied. The next day the pair was released, but asked a *senderista* guerrilla to accompany them into town; it was safer to be in the company of Shining Path than among drug traffickers!

649. " People's War Prepares New Stage." *A World to Win*, no.13 (April 1989): 4-7, 10-11, 79-80.

A World to Win interprets recent events in Peru: in the last year revolutionary base areas have flourished in the valleys and plateaus of the Andes and in the jungle; strikes and demonstrations supporting people's war led by the PCP have blossomed in the capital. Quoting from Comrade Chairman Gonzalo's *El Diario* interview, the article shows how Sendero is preparing for a new stage in the revolutionary struggle. Regional armed shutdowns *(paros armados regionales)* and intensified fighting in the Huallaga Valley demonstrate a widening and intensifying of people's war. In Lima, the People's Revolutionary Defense Movement, a mass organization of the PCP, led a march on International Women's Day (March 8). *A World to Win* also describes the travails of Luis Arce Borja, editor of *El Diario*, who has been forced to flee to Europe after his arrest for allegedly violating a new law that penalizes "apologists for terrorism." After describing the multiple failures of the García regime, the article ends with a series of observations from PCP Congress documents. "The prospects for full-fledged political power are coming into view," concludes the Congress.

650. "From *El Diario* : Armed Shutdown in the Jungle Hills: An Eyewitness Account; Class-conscious Shutdown in the Capital." *A World to Win*, no.13 (April 1989): 8-9.

Two excerpts from the Lima newspaper *El Diario* describe at first-hand armed strikes carried out in Lima and deep in the Huallaga Valley. The rural actions, in which about 5,000 people work feverishly to completely block the only highway into the area, are especially impressive: "We were there for almost eight hours, recording the peasant's hard night's work, lightened with great quantities of lemon soda and songs vigorously sung into our tape recorder. All this took place under the watchful eye of a strong guerrilla unit, who stood ready to fight in case of an attack."

651. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "La guerra del Comandante Huayhuaco: sendas peligrosas." *Quehacer*, no.58 (April-May 1989): 26-30.

"Give me 500 rifles and I will liberate Ayacucho in a year," declared Comandante Huayhuaco Ardilla, chief of the *ronderos* in the Río Apurímac, in a newspaper interview. This is an

unreal fantasy, writes Degregori, but a logical outcome of the dirty war now being waged in the sierra. This war, unleashed by General Noel, has had some success; it could hardly have failed to do so. But at what cost: Uchuraccay, destroyed communities and "disappearances," and a dispersion of Sendero to other parts of the sierra have been by-products of this policy. Degregori examines the dynamic of the peasant society of the Río Apurímac area, the development of the region's peasant federation, and its destruction at the hands of the security forces and Sendero. The federation's leader was kidnapped by marines and has not been seen since. Civil defense committees, in which membership is compulsory, have been substituted for the voluntary union, and the peasants have been resettled into "strategic hamlets." The naive and ignorant optimism of *Expreso*, which published the *rondero's* boast, reflects a lack of understanding of the complexity of peasant society and its regional differences, and also of the divisive effect of the patrols on the peasants themselves.

652. González, Raúl. "Recuperar el Huallaga: una estrategia posible." *Quehacer*, no.58 (April-May 1989): 14-19.

The attack on the police post at Uchiza shows that the state has ceased to exist as a legitimate entity for the population of the Upper Huallaga Valley. Since the 1970's, the production of coca has become the center of the region's economy. Since the economic mainstay of the area is illegal, it is necessary to fight (or laugh at) the police. It is clear that Shining Path counted on the support of the population before launching its attack; thus it is Sendero, not the Peruvian state, that is seen as the legitimate power in the valley. González examines the implications of the assault, and of the fierce army-police rivalry that impedes both anti-drug and the anti-guerrilla efforts. (For example, the U.S. DEA, afraid of the potential for army corruption, made it known that if the army were given responsibility for the anti-coca campaign, it would withdraw from the valley.) *Quehacer* believes that the recovery of the Huallaga is possible, but the government must show that it does not for one instant need the coca dollars the trade brings; it must also show the citizenry of the valley that it is not the enemy. To this end it should negotiate with the international community, especially with the U.S., to gain aid, support, and equipment to enforce an effective air blockade, and above all, secure money for alternative development. A sidebar asks "Why Uchiza?" *Quehacer* looks at the possibility that the assault on the police post was in retaliation for a pilot demonstration of the herbicide "Spike." *El Diario* has been publishing dire predictions of toxic gas warfare against the populace and the guerrilla movement. The attack may have been designed to bolster popular support for Sendero, and warn against a widened use of the herbicide.

653. "Política antisubversiva: ¿Algún cambio?" *Quehacer*, no.58 (April-May 1989): 20-24.

Quehacer interviews retired General Edgardo Mercado Jarrín and Senator Rolando Ames about possible changes in the government's counterinsurgency strategy. Mercado Jarrín analyzes the military situation in different areas of the country, stressing that there should be "no more Uchizas." The jurisdictional problem of who is responsible for combating Sendero (the Interior Ministry, and indirectly, the DEA, or the Defense Ministry) must be resolved. Three vital elements in fighting subversion are basic: intelligence, communications, and mobility. There was a failure of all three at Uchiza. The Senator attacks the APRA government's indecisiveness and confusion, which have led to recent disgraceful events. The government had better decide whether Sendero is a terrorist or a political movement, because the implications of how Shining Path is perceived are crucial for formulating an effective counterinsurgency policy. Ames attacks the state's inability to communicate democratically with the Andean peasantry, and treat its populace as full citizens. Only more democracy, he believes, can defeat the guerrillas: "Sendero will not win, but it is not this government who will defeat them."

654. "La guerra y la paz." *Caretas*, no.1055 (May 2 1989): 74-77.

As part of a long report on Ayacucho and its resources, *Caretas* asks three men about the situation in the department. General Howard Rodríguez Málaga, political-military commander of the emergency zone, believes the situation is more or less "controlled." Industry, work, education are all proceeding almost normally. The armed forces are not only responsible for eliminating subversion, but also for "pacifying" the education, information, and political sectors. How can the citizens participate more efficiently in the fight against subversion? By identifying with the democratic system, says the general. What about giving the civil authorities a leading role in the battle? This is a war, and war is fought by the military, he replies. Putting a civilian in charge of military operations is like asking a doctor to run a bakery. The general also describes political, psychological, and development committees aiding in the struggle. Richter Prada, Archbishop of

Ayacucho, talks about overcoming violence, "with a true conversion to Jesus Christ." He speaks of the need for reconciliation, and of his 120 missionaries preaching this message in 360 towns. The church's role in educating and feeding people, especially the young, is also paramount. The Church is running four soup kitchens in the department. Diego García Sayán, expert on human rights, disagrees with the general; there is little substantial progress on human rights. It is hard for civilians to participate in the fight when there still is no coherent, democratic antisubversive strategy. Above all, civil society must "recover" its space. [*Caretas* follows with an article entitled "And Tourism?"]

655. Arroyo, Abilio. "Poniendo el pecho." *Caretas*, no.1056 (May 8 1989): 34-37, 41.

Dramatic testimony from citizens on the front lines. "APC," from Pirato on the left bank of the Río Apurímac in the Ayacuchan jungle, is a member of the Antisubversive Civil Defense organization of the region. In late April he discovered that a *senderista* column under Comrade "Joel" was headed to attack his area. Other reports indicated that hundreds of guerrillas were concentrating for a probable offensive. Arroyo describes how the *ronderos* responded to this threat, their countermoves and firefights with the better-armed guerrillas, and the problems that the patrols are encountering, not the least of which is infiltration by Sendero. Coordination with the military in some cases appears to be non-existent. A sidebar describes how captured *senderistas* are tried by the Council of Justice of the *ronderos* themselves. Those judged most dangerous (the killers) are sent to the Marine base for disposition; those judged more readily reintegrated into society are given the opportunity to join the patrols. Previously, some of the latter were given "topknot" haircuts for easy identification, and carried out tasks under the supervision of *ronderos*. Arroyo spoke with two prisoners, and relates their personal histories.

656. Riding, Alan. "Peru Fights to Overcome Its Past." *New York Times Magazine*, (May 14 1989): 40-44, 100.

Excellent, well-written story of a nation in shambles, with inflation running 40% a month, mass unemployment, multiple bankruptcies, strikes disrupting public services, cocaine trafficking flourishing, and Sendero Luminoso and (MRTA) causing havoc in vast areas of countryside and mountains with little resistance from the armed forces. Alán García, once the nation's hope, sits isolated, lonely, and depressed in the presidential palace, hoping for a coup, condemned to serve out his term, hiding from the scorn and anger of his countrymen. Riding, a journalist with extensive experience in Latin America, does more than recount Peru's current woes; quoting anthropologists and other social scientists, he seeks the roots of the conflict. Unlike *mestizo* Mexico, "Peru was born divided," with deep racial, ethnic, cultural, economic, social, and political divisions. Racism, not seen as a problem by whites, is an ever-present tension for Indians and *cholos*. Sendero, however, never portrays its fight in racial terms, speaking only of class struggle. Riding describes Sendero as a movement founded by university professors claiming to represent Indians, mestizo peasants, and *cholo* migrants, and imposing its will on those who have always been "spectators of history." It seeks not just redistribution of wealth, but the destruction of all existing structures, "beyond Mao to Pol Pot." But in a time of acute economic hardship, Sendero is becoming a symbol of rebellion. Riding quotes anthropologist Rodrigo Montoya: "Those who are humiliated, angry, and resentful see it acting on their behalf. To say 'I'm a Senderista,' even if you are not, has become a general social threat. It's like saying, 'I'm going to get you.'" Riding discusses poverty, death squads, fears of a coup, and IU's chances in the 1990 elections. He concludes that Peru has not yet mobilized to save itself in a time of a national psychic depression. But he also suggests that painfully and bloodily, the country may be forging a new national identity.

657. Arroyo, Abilio. "Historia de Huayhuaco." *Caretas*, no.1057 (May 15 1989): 36-39.

In-depth description of the struggle for a rural community. "Huayhuaco," a 44 year-old teacher, describes how he trained as a dentist, opened an office in Rinconada Baja, how he was forced to treat guerrillas, and how Sendero infiltrated his community. The Marines rarely left their base, and the guerrillas roamed the countryside freely. The *dentista* relates how indecisive and hesitant the citizens became, afraid to chose between the guerrillas and the *ronderos*, how hard it was to convince the patrol commander of his true attitudes (he was suspected of being a *senderista* infiltrator), and how a *ronda* was gradually established in his community. A previous story ("Huancayo al susto") reports on a three-day armed strike called by Sendero in Huancayo, Pasco, and Huánuco, and evaluates Sendero's influence in the region, especially among the unionized miners. *Caretas* closely questions Moisés Palomino, president of the Federación Nacional de

Trabajadores Mineros y Metalúrgicos del Perú, who denies that there is any relation between his union and Sendero. "We don't see Sendero," he says. His strike and Sendero's are merely coincidental; he refuses to concede the government any right to impose order on the miners, and discounts absolutely any involvement of Sendero with his union.

658. Aguirre, Benjamín. "Perú: crisis desbordada." *Mensaje*, v.38, no.378 (May 1989): 153-156.

Peru will face municipal elections in November, and presidential elections in May of 1990. Aguirre outlines a pessimistic panorama of economic, social, and political realities that can be traced back to a process that began in 1968, when a revolution of expectations was raised, and remains substantially unmet. Aguirre, although conceding that Sendero is a distinct phenomenon, nevertheless links Shining Path to its antecedents, the guerrilla movements that arose under the first government of Belaúnde. Sendero, he says, is Maoist in origins, but has gone far beyond them; its goal is to reestablish the Inca empire which had its center in Peru; from there its projections will reach beyond Peru's borders. Sendero seeks not only social, political, and economic compensation, but the reconstruction of an empire through armed insurrection. Its actions are designed to capture not the ideologized masses of Lima, Trujillo, or Piura, but the peasantry, which speaks the native tongue. Since social justice is not Sendero's final goal, the odds of successfully fighting the insurrection through social and economic advancement are remote.

659. "Alcaldes: 45 muertos." *Caretas*, no.1062 (June 19 1989): 32-35.

With the murders this week of the mayors of Supe and Leoncio Prado, 45 *alcaldes* have been assassinated since 1985, most in towns in the emergency zones. In November, municipal elections will be held throughout the country, and Sendero is already participating in its own way. In the department of Huánuco alone, 70 district mayors, governors, lieutenant governors and others have already quit their posts out of fear. *Caretas* describes the situation in several regions: "Sendero's vote" is for the elimination of officials and candidates; the "blood vote" is intended to frustrate the elections. The sensation of threat is as important as the threat itself, and a vacuum of authority now exists in some areas.

660. "¿Condena el asesinato de los cooperantes franceses: sí o no?" *Quehacer*, no.59 (June-July 1989): 30-32.

On February 17, Luis Arce Borja, ex-editor of *El Diario*, held a press conference in Brussels. Various Belgian NGO's protested the meeting because of the murders of two French agricultural advisors in December, 1988. Arce Borja was asked whether he condemned the killings. *Quehacer* publishes a transcript of Arce Borja's reply, stating that the fragment speaks for itself. Arce Borja temporizes, replying that the PCP is not against the cooperatives, but that various foreigners are linked to bodies that are trying, on behalf of the APRA government, to infiltrate popular organizations. He implies that the dead agronomists may have been part of this sinister effort to undermine the revolution, and equivocates when asked point-blank, "Do you condemn the murders, yes or no?" The reporter may be working for the police; the moderator tries to cut the journalist off, saying that the question violates the spirit of the meeting. Arce Borja declaims, "I am not the voice of Shining Path."

661. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "1969: Un 'mayo" andino en junio. En los origenes de Sendero Luminoso." *Quehacer*, no.59 (June-July 1989): 25-28.

Dawn in Huamanga, June 21, 1969: a bespectacled, bulky young man in a gray suit is arrested by the police. Instead of being put straight on an airplane for Lima, the PIP stop at the town's main tourist hotel, and policemen and prisoner have breakfast together. One student member of the FER remembers that day: the arrested man was Abimael Guzmán Reynoso. Degregori reconstructs an important milestone in the evolution of Shining Path: the strikes and demonstrations that rocked Ayacucho in the spring of 1969. The nation was in excited turmoil; a revolutionary military *junta* had nationalized the petroleum industry and announced a radical plan of agrarian reform. But in remote mountain areas, peasant land invasions and riots were breaking out. Degregori explains how Ayacucho typified the contradictions of Peru: poverty, misery, feudal conditions, a region almost outside of the national society, and yet the site of a university that was educating a generation that demanded change. Sendero Luminoso stood aloof from these movements, even though it was the most important political movement in Ayacucho, especially in the university. Guzmán was caught up in the events of those days, when the sinchis came from Lima to occupy the city and crush the rebellion. Sendero and Guzmán learned valuable lessons

from the events of that June that they would use later, after they began their open war to destroy the state itself.

662. Mallon, Florencia. "La verdadera historia de Mayta." *Quehacer*, no.59 (June-July 1989): 33-34.

Short but moving reflection by a North American historian. Víctor Mayta, the *aprista alcalde* of Acolla, in Jauja province, was assassinated on April 21 by four *senderistas*, who then burned the municipal building. Mallon lived with Mayta and his family for more than a year a decade before, while doing research on peasant society and capitalist transition. Mayta was a carpenter, who had been militarized by repression during the Sánchez Cerro years, and operated a small shop selling soda and beer. Mallon became close to Doña Lydia Mayta, spending many hours in conversation, during which she grew to understand the migrant experience in the Andes, as well as the difficulties of keeping a family clothed and fed in a small, poor town. Don Víctor Mayta, Mallon writes, was not just a victim of circumstance, but a man who had been an activist for four decades, whose son had studied in Ayacucho, and some of whose roommates, the sons of poor peasants, had joined the guerrillas. Mayta took the position of mayor with his eyes open, and he died with his eyes open. His death is a tragedy for many reasons: chiefly because he died for a party that has abandoned people, who, like him, live in the mountains, and because there seems to be no recourse for migrant peasants who desire only to improve their lives and that of their families. People like Víctor Mayta are not enemies of the people; they are the people. Before and after Sendero, Victor Maytas deserve better luck. [Mellon deliberately contrasts the *aprista* peasant Mayta with the fictional militant in the Vargas Llosa novel, "The Real Life of Alejandro Mayta."]

663. Rosenberg, Mark B. "Life (and Death): An Andean Saga." *Hemisphere*, v.1, no.3 (Summer 1989): 4.

Wracked by violence and a bleak economy, Peru "stands as testimony to the perseverance and depravity of humankind in the last decade of the 20th century." This dichotomy is pervasive in the life and death of Bárbara D'Achille, a European refugee who fled the horrors of the Second World War only to die at the hands of Peruvian fanatics. D'Achille, an environmentalist and wildlife activist, campaigned to preserve Peru's wild ecology. She became the nation's ecological conscience, and a resource on Peru for international environmental organizations. On May 31, 1989, she and several companions were intercepted by *senderistas*. The Peruvians were released; D'Achille was ordered to interview the guerrillas. When she refused, she was murdered. For Peru, there is no happy end in sight; "we must celebrate those whose daily lives become heroic."

664. "Versiones encontrados." *Caretas*, no.1064 (July 3 1989): 82-84.

High police officials, testifying before a Congressional investigating committee, created an atmosphere of confusion around the right-wing death squad "Comando Rodrigo Franco." Just who is responsible for investigating this mysterious organization? It seems that no one, not Dircote, nor the Interior Ministry, nor the Defense Ministry, has been directed to do so. For some, it is as if it did not exist. *Caretas* reports on the obfuscation and evasion surrounding not only the CRF, but several other right-wing "Comandos" whose existence has been announced by violence recently. The article concludes with a list of 26 murders, bombings, threats, and other assaults carried out between July of 1988 and the present.

665. "La nueva guerra." *Caretas*, no.1066 (July 17 1989): 26-31, 84.

A recent series of official communiqués, notably different from the old laconic ones emanating from some emergency zones, give notice of a new counterinsurgency war in the Alto Huallaga and Huánuco. In less than 20 days 109 *senderistas* have been killed, with one army sergeant as casualty on the government's side. An increased use of helicopters is one reason for this change. Getting the army out of their barracks for more aggressive patrolling by air, land, and on the rivers is another. *Caretas* describes how the army's presence in one village gave the inhabitants the confidence to report on guerrilla movements, a training center, and a "popular school" in their area. This information led to a successful attack in which 39 guerrillas were killed. Sidebars include a report on the "Plan Arciniega," a short interview with the zone's new commander General Alberto Arciniega, who demands honor and obedience to the law from his soldiers, and "Nuevas medidas," which reports developments that should improve coordination and delineate more precisely the war's chain of command, as well as the acquisition of new equipment for fighting a counterinsurgency.

666. "Arrepentidos: versión directa.' *Caretas*, no.1067 (July 24 1989): 34-37.

Part of General Arciniega's new strategy for fighting both MRTA and Sendero is to offer secure refuge for defectors. *Caretas* publishes the accounts of two very young ex-guerrillas, who talk about how they were forcibly recruited, their indoctrination, life among the guerrillas, in what actions they took part, and how they decided to give themselves up and seek asylum. One 17-year old *senderista* now wears an army uniform, and wants to help the army track down the guerrillas who murdered his father. Like others, he serves a guide for the army in the Huallaga.

667. Gaupp, Peter. "Peru on the Downslide." *Neue Zürcher Zeitung. Swiss Review of World Affairs*, v.39, no.4 (July 1989): 21-24.

Five years after his previous report on Sendero, Gaupp can no longer be optimistic about Peru. The destruction of the Peruvian economy has produced empty schools, hordes of street peddlers, widespread petty crime, and reports of starvation in Lima's slums. Massive emigration is draining Peru of skilled workers and professionals, the government's emergency measures are failing, and apparently neither left nor right can lead Peru out of its crisis. Sendero's successful attack on the national police post in Uchiza in the Huallaga underlines the gravity of the war; "subversive influence" is now strongly felt in about one-third of the national territory, including the capital, Lima. Worse still, Sendero's theater of operations has extended to the coca-growing areas on the eastern edge of the Andes. The attack at Uchiza was evidently carried out by an alliance of guerrillas and drug lords. Ironically, Gaupp notes, the doctrinal purity of "the Peruvian disciples of Pol Pot" makes it impossible for them to work with any other Marxist party or sect, but they feel themselves uncontaminated by drug trafficking. He reports that Sendero's estimated strength is 3,000 fighters and some 30,000 sympathizers. A national commission recommended a number of extraordinary measures to bring together various sectors of the population to solve the nation's ills and smother the insurrection, but even if the country's social, economic, and political problems could be addressed, Sendero, MRTA, and the drug lords would continue to pursue their aims without regard to the state of Peruvian society. Gaupp believes that even a really extensive anti-subversion campaign, including extensive civilian measures, would work only if the military and police are properly equipped, paid, and led. That, he concludes, is the only way "to get rid of these masked murderers." Still, poor relations with the sierra's Indians, and the reluctance of the country's whites and mestizos to properly arm their anti-guerrilla patrols, continues to hamper anti-subversion efforts.

668. Bernales, Manuel and Roger Rumrrill. "Narcopoder, subversión y democracia en el Perú." *Nueva sociedad*, no.102 (July-August 1989): 162-168.

Examination of the impact of the narcotics traffic on Peru and speculation on future negative developments resulting from its expansion. Coca, never a problem when used within the context of native culture, becomes a destructive element when transformed into a lucrative and illegal international trade. A succession of economic crises in Peru has turned thousands of corn, rice, and bean-growing peasants into *cocaleros*, who are exploited and abused in turn by *narcotraficantes*, Sendero, and the state. The authors trace the route of cocaine from cultivation to sale in the United States, noting that Sendero takes from 4% to 10% of the crop's value as a tax, used to finance operations, outside support, and to buy arms. At the same time they argue that Peru cannot survive economically without the dollars generated by narcotics (*"...todos son dólar-adictos"*). The more cocaine cultivation expands in the eastern portion of the nation, the more Sendero extends its influence, a process the authors refer to as *senderización amazónica*. This will bring the United States and its anti-narcotics campaign, a campaign that will ultimately be indistinguishable from anti-subversion efforts, more deeply and intrusively into Peruvian affairs. The authors speculate that the right will prefer to form a tactical alliance with the *narcotraficantes* rather than accept a democratic socialist government in Peru.

669. Cavanagh, Jonathon. "Un norteamericano en el Sendero." *Nueva sociedad*, no.102 (July-August 1989): 166-168.

Sidebar report on the anti-narcotics campaign from the war zone. After cries of "Long life to Presidente Gonzalo" and assurances that his passengers were not DEA agents, Cavanagh's taxi driver obtained permission to cross into Sendero territory, where Cavanagh interviewed, among others, Guardia Civil members. Intensified efforts at drug eradication, helped by four new American helicopters, has forced traffickers to join forces with Sendero. Unofficially, a police source confirmed that Sendero supporters caught *in flagrante* in the area "do not survive." A helicopter pilot involved in antidrug operations states that government efforts were at least reducing the drug traffic. An American working in the Narcotics Assistance Unit believes that the *narcotraficantes*

and Sendero have a "marriage of convenience," not a true alliance. Cavanagh reports on the *cocaleros* of the Alta Huallaga valley: 12-13 "families" from Medellín, Colombia moved into the area to conduct the drug trade. After Sendero rebels spoke to the Colombians, they reduced the number of their countrymen and agreed to permit Peruvians to participate in the cocaine traffic. The Peruvian Maoists, observes Cavanagh, evidently have nationalist feelings, despite the professed internationalism of their revolution. A taxi driver tells Cavanagh that Sendero is "moral": they are prohibited from taking a needle or thread by force, molesting women, or maltreating prisoners, who may be persuaded to see the true path. The driver himself saw nothing strange in admitting that he had been caught by police transporting twelve kilograms of cocaine paste. The beating he received, he said, helped to reinforce his political convictions.

670. "Crimen y castigo." *Caretas*, no.1069 (August 7 1989): 34-35.

Shining Path has not merely a rigid ideology, but a rigid discipline as well. Punishment for infractions have been known to include death; lesser punishments include copying 100 times various phrases. Notebooks captured in the jungle give an insight into this aspect of the movement. Popular among *senderistas* are Mao's famous three cardinal rules of discipline and eight warnings. The rules are: Obey all orders; take nothing from the masses, not even a needle or thread; return everything captured. The warnings are: Speak courteously; pay honestly for everything you buy; return anything borrowed; make up for any object stolen; do not hit or injure people; don't expropriate crops; don't take liberties with women; do not maltreat prisoners. The "position of battle" requires the recruit to work for the interests of the people, to complete any task assigned by the party, and to shed blood on any field of battle: "I am subject to the orders and line of the Party. I do not fear death; I challenge death." Each militant has also to learn fifteen *saludos*, from "President Gonzalo" to "The luminous trenches of combat" of each site "conquered." "Gabriel," a commander in the Huallaga, noted in his books the various punishments meted out to cadres, including periods of seclusion, assignment to the cookhouse, exercises and guard duty, agricultural labor, and corporal punishment (blows and lashes).

Following (p.40) is a short piece on the price Peru is paying for the continual blackouts imposed by Sendero. Electrical rationing in Lima and other provinces is costing some 40 million dollars a day in lost production, commerce, and services. Because electricity is no longer dependable, the demand for and price of kerosene and gas is up. The blackouts have also cut water to certain parts of the city. One architect has proposed reservoirs on high ground to ensure that all sections of Lima continue to get water.

671. Razuvayev, Vladimir. "Whither Leads the Shining Path?" *New Times* (USSR), no.34 (August 22-28 1989): 19-20.

Precise and informed, if somewhat cynical summary and analysis of Sendero. Razuvayev tends to see guerrilla war in Latin America as part of an eternal cycle of competing political groups, left and right: "From time immemorial it has happened that when power in the capital passes to the 'wrong' government, then men take up arms and disappear into the forests and mountains. When a new government, one that suits them, takes over they return, and others become guerrillas." Razuvayev does concede that social discontent caused by economic troubles provided an excellent breeding ground for armed struggle. In Peru it is the Indians who are worst off; Guzmán set out to defend, in his own way, their interests. But "it can be said without exaggeration that the populations of the areas controlled by Shining Path are kept obedient by fear." The people, caught between the "selective" terror of the guerrillas and the "blind" terror of the army feel a sense of doom. And as long as the Peruvian economy continues to decline, it is hardly likely that public opinion will side with the existing regime, no matter how democratic. Razuvayev sees Sendero's war continuing for years. He goes on to make some generalizations about guerrilla experiences in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Colombia. Violence, he writes, has taken root in the political culture of some Latin American countries, and it will not be easily eradicated. "An armed struggle against the government, terrorism, refusal to make compromise does nothing to bring democracy and social justice any nearer, on the contrary, it moves them further away."

672. Hilton, Isabel. "Shining Path of Insurgency." *The Geographical Magazine*, v.61 (August 1989): 22-26.

Conventional review of the Peruvian situation in the monthly magazine of the Royal Geographical Society. The article stresses the failures of the Belaúnde and García administrations; Hilton declares that Alán García now rivals President Alfonsín of Argentina for the title of Latin America's most discredited president, and that the only beneficiary of his disgrace has been Abimael Guzmán. The article discusses the election of 1990, declaring that the outcome is

irrelevant to Shining Path, and that it is hard, short of a miracle, to envision Sendero's defeat. Hilton closes with a trenchant quote from a foreign military observer: "In all the classic texts on counter-insurgency warfare, there are a series of necessary conditions for success. The Peruvian state has none of them." An interesting sidebar by Neil McAllister entitled "Survival Guide for the Tourist" reviews the danger to tourists in some individual Peruvian provinces, and gives tips on traveling in the country.

673. Ranly, Ernest W. "A Christian Spirituality of Nonviolence." *America*, v.161, no.4 (August 12-19 1989): 110-111, 114, 123.

Ranly, who has done pastoral work in Peru for 15 years, examines the role of priests and church workers trying to carry out their spiritual and temporal duties in an atmosphere of violence. A February 1989 retreat among clergy resulted in a call for a new spirituality of nonviolence within an environment of total violence, and a redefining of the church's presence in areas of conflict--even if the spirituality of nonviolence leads to martyrdom. Ranly describes how men and women of the church have dealt with threats from guerrillas and soldiers alike, and how they must summon courage and prudence to survive. Remarkably, there was a consensus at the retreat that even though Sendero's presence brings a dictatorship of terror, people preferred to live under the discipline of the guerrillas than be exposed to the indiscriminate savagery of the security forces. Ranly discusses the theology of Christian nonviolence, and the cultural resiliency of the Andean people, who have a powerful faith and folk piety that provide both positive identity as a people, and a subtle yet strong protest against oppression. The retreat's participants were given an olive branch, and told to be messengers for peace, but the olive branch as a symbol is ambiguous: could it also be the crown of martyrdom?

674. Chuquimantari, Carlos. "La doble lucha de los mineros." *Quehacer*, no.60 (August-September 1989): 72-83.

Miners, whose exports provide 50% of the nation's hard currency, are under pressure from two fronts. A series of bitter strikes in 1988 and 1990 as well as attempts by Sendero to infiltrate the miners' unions have battered their movement. The Sociedad Nacional de Minería y Petróleo (SNMP) has decreed mining vital to the nation's interests, and hard-liners among them have accused miners of being terrorists; the mining communities have been declared emergency zones. Chuquimantari examines the hard life of the miners, their working and living conditions, recent battles over pay and conditions, and their long struggle to improve their lives. Not only do the miners now have to contend with the companies' attempts to coerce and spy on them, but right-wing paramilitary groups like the Comando Rodrigo Franco are also pressuring them. Sendero has launched attacks against mining installations, called for armed strikes, and killed miners' representatives. Chuquimantari chronicles the series of *paros armados* decreed by Sendero, and a list of slain union activists, murdered not only by the guerrillas but also by the death squads. The result has been a militarization of the unions, and a hardening of attitudes on all sides. The mining community is now living in an environment of daily structural violence.

675. Granda Oré, Juan. "Los tiempos del temor: cronología de la violencia en Ayacucho." *Quehacer*, no.60 (August-September 1989): 84-89.

Eight years ago, a rumor circulated in the *barrios* of Ayacucho that an *amaru*, a mythical serpent whose appearance signifies cataclysms, came from the hills surrounding the town. No one could foresee how Ayacucho would be transformed in the years that followed. Granda Oré summarizes the development of Sendero's war in Ayacucho, from the appearance in late 1979 of young people shouting "¡Viva la guerra popular y el PCP!" to the present. After clashing with leftist UDP (the predecessor of the PUM), the *senderistas* launched their first dynamite attacks, and sent their columns into villages to educate and propagandize the people. Granda Oré recounts the assault on the CRAS jail, the isolation of the town from the countryside, the intervention of the military, and the dirty war that followed ("When the night became our enemy"). The results were massacre at Uchuraccay, the splintering of the department as villages formed mutually hostile civil defense patrols, and the formation of "fundamentalist authoritarianism" in areas Sendero controlled. The nadir of this situation is the rebirth of the *nakaq* legend, or, as the author puts it, "when being white is a risk." Today Sendero, seeking to block municipal elections and enforce its armed strikes, seems to be repeating the old errors of its past. A very good, if compressed, summary of the war's progress in the department where it was born.

676. Manrique, Nelson. "Sierra central: la batalla decisiva. Sendero y los campesinos." *Quehacer*, no.60 (August-September 1989): 63-71.

Since Independence, the central sierra has been recognized as a central strategic area in Peru, the key to access to Lima. Even today the road that passes through Junín, Pasco, Huánuco and Huancavelica departments is an important transportation link. The central sierra is also a crucial part of the national economy; the Mantaro valley is Lima's breadbasket. Mining means the country's proletariat forms a bastion in the central sierra, and the region provides much of the nation's electrical energy from hydroelectric dams. So the central sierra is a crucial area for Sendero as well. Manrique examines the battle for the loyalties of peasants in this key territory. In the lower valley, small and medium producers have resisted Sendero, forming an armed patrol in response to its destruction of a milk processing plant. At higher elevations, the situation is more complex. Manrique looks at the liquidation of SAIS Cahuide in December, 1988, and the process by which a valley became a "liberated zone." The struggle between peasant unions and *cooperativistas* suggest that the legacy of agrarian reform from the 1970's is unfinished business in some parts of the countryside. Manrique also examines the political battle between Sendero and *Puka Llacta*, and what the building of "the Popular Republic of the New Democracy" means to peasants living in the sierra.

677. Schroth, Raymond A. "Has God Forgotten Peru? Poverty, Cocaine, and Terror." *Commonweal*, v.116, no.15 (September 8 1989): 459-461.

A strong, if impressionistic and fragmented, portrait of a nation undergoing, in the words of the justice minister, its worst crisis since the War of the Pacific a hundred years ago. Schroth spoke with a number of Catholics academics, reporters, and church workers. He examines the candidacy and suitability of Vargas Llosa for the presidency, and the expressed desire of the IU candidate Barrantes not to become another Salvador Allende. He found a church split among progressives, conservatives, *Opus Dei* "yuppies," Maryknollers, and reactionary sodalities hostile to liberation theology. He concludes by describing the squalid misery of a Lima shantytown, and his visit with a patient Canadian nun who tries to do what she can to alleviate the suffering of its inhabitants.

678. "Objectivo senderista." *Caretas*, no.1075 (September 18 1989): 36-37.

Short piece about *senderista* infiltration of trade unions in Lima. A captured fighter told Dircote about a series of armed actions planned for September, part of a program whose objective was to take Lima in "The Great Final Assault." Among the targets of this offensive are union officials, politicians, and police officers. In order to generalize violence and achieve equilibrium of forces, Sendero planned to infiltrate and win militants in various unions and then to launch indefinite generalized strikes with violent actions. If unions reject Sendero, then "classist" parallel organizations are to be formed, led by the Movimiento Revolucionario de Defensa del Pueblo (MRDP). Infiltrators have already been sent into the telecommunications and banking unions. The police, acting on this information, have captured a number of these guerrillas; *Caretas* publishes their names and photos, as well as a map of metropolitan Lima, with the industrial zones and *pueblos jóvenes* targeted by Sendero. Active in these zones are the MOTC, as well as other "Comités de Lucha de Obreros y Trabajadores Clasistas," one in the Avenida Argentina, and another in the Carretera Central.

679. Robbins, Carla Anne. "Cocaine, Communism, and Crisis in Peru." *U.S. News & World Report*, v.107, no.11 (September 18 1989): 45-49.

General summary of the Peruvian situation, prompted by President Bush's announcement last week that the U.S. was extending the war against drugs to Peru, in Robbins's words, "a nation of grinding poverty, crackpot economics, and an insular, isolated rebel movement straight out of a Maoist time warp." "Delegate Jorge," with whom Robbins spoke in cellblock 4-B of a Lima prison, is delighted at the prospect of U.S. military aid: "the more arms they send, the more arms we liberate." Robbins reviews the dismal economy, García's unpopularity, the dangers of a coup, the country's polarizing violence, and the 1990 electoral prospects of IU's Alfonso Barrantes and rightist Mario Vargas Llosa. "Jorge" rejects any negotiation with Alán García: " We will negotiate his surrender, nothing less," adding that when Sendero wins, both García and Barrantes will die. The military blames budget cuts and human rights restrictions for its inability to defeat the guerrillas. The army has established peasant self-defense patrols, but is afraid to arm them, fearing a parallel army; one general screams at a politician, "Do you want to turn this country into El

Salvador?" U.S. assistance, a coup, a leftist or rightist electoral victory, are all the same to Sendero: "They are all reactionaries. It can take 2 years or 30; any way, we will win." A sidebar, "Bloody Footprints on the Shining Path," summarizes the history of Sendero, stressing its isolation from the rest of the Marxist movement. Gustavo Gorriti is quoted to the effect that Sendero is not crazy or irrational; its violence is not random, but very focused. When the guerrillas kill a mayor, a wealthy peasant, or an aid worker, they are tearing down the structures of authority. He also relates the terrifying prospects of a guerrilla victory; Sendero talks of "crossing a river of blood," and has a victory hit list that ranges from 200,000 to 3 million.

680. Vicuña, Julia. "Las mujeres de Sendero." *VIVA*, v.4, no.16 (September 1989): 8-9.

Sendero is thought to be a movement that gives women a leading role in recognition of their merits. Vicuña argues the contrary: that women must become "masculinized" to become a more militant member, and end up in roles that marginalize them and discriminate against them. She quotes Carlos Iván Degregori, who believes that the oppression and exploitation of women in Peruvian society, especially peasant women, can convert them into *senderistas*. Vicuña briefly traces the role of women within Sendero, citing Augusta La Torre, Edith Lagos, and Laura Zambrano Padilla as examples of prominent female members. The employment of women as leaders of assassination squads gives them the opportunity to show themselves more *macho* than the men of the movement. Zambrano attacks feminism as a bourgeois concept based on sexual differences, rather than on the class struggle. Women in Sendero have additional "revolutionary tasks" as assigned by the party, one of which, relates Vicuña, is to be sexual partners to imprisoned male *senderistas*. (Anyone getting pregnant must have an abortion.) Women also have important roles in Sendero's front organizations, such as the Comités de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos and "Popular Assistance," which runs clandestine clinics, tends the wounded, and supports defense lawyers. Vicuña argues that these women are not representative of Peru, nor of its women. A Peruvian feminist congress voted to reject all forms of violence, explicitly condemned Sendero for its murder of popular, union, and peasant leaders, and reiterated its defense of life.

681. Favre, Henri. "Violencia y descomposición social." *Debate*, no.57 (September-October 1989): 31-33.

Favre finds a singular paradox on his visit to Peru: everyone, from the bourgeois of Monterrico to the worker of Callao, from the businessman to the union man, from the top to the bottom of the social pyramid, rejects Sendero, its methods, and its objectives. Nevertheless, in spite of unanimous condemnation, the movement continues to advance. Favre ponders two explanations for this contradiction, both true, and although opposites, complementary. One is that the state is extremely weak, literally collapsing. This state cannot administer justice, collect taxes, and has abandoned the countryside. The agrarian reforms of Velasco destroyed traditional rural society, but the government has not stepped in to fill the vacuum with new structures. Where public power is absent, a small band of determined individuals can do practically anything they want. The second explanation is more subtle: if all classes join in opposing Sendero, and yet cannot stop its relentless advance, it is because the social structure of Peru still excludes large numbers of people among whom Sendero can still find recruits. Favre analyzes Peruvian society in search of the reasons the guerrillas can still appeal to many of the disenfranchised. Sendero, he writes, offers a simple and coherent vision of the world that restores meaning to the useless life.

682. Lami, Lucio. "L'irrésistible ascension de 'Sentier lumineux.'" *Politique internationale*, no.45 (Autumn 1989): 223-232.

If Mario Vargas Llosa wins his bid to become Peru's next president, he will confront a two-headed monster: an economic crisis without precedent, and Sendero Luminoso. Lami reviews the evolution and history of Sendero from Mariátegui to Mao. He examines at length Mariátegui's philosophical roots, particularly what he calls the Italian influence of men like the literary critic Giovanni Papini, the futurist Filippo Marinetti, the influential Communist Antonio Gramsci, and the French socialist Henri Barbusse. Sendero pays homage to Mariátegui, but prefers in true Maoist fashion to stress class struggle over ethnicity. Lami describes Guzmán's early years (stressing his Jesuit training) and the evolution of Sendero out of the more orthodox PCP. Succinctly summarizing the decline of Peru under Alán García, Lami looks at the 1990 elections in the apocalyptic context of terrorism, "narco-dollars," bank nationalization, inflation, etc. Can Vargas Llosa and free-market gurus like Hernando de Soto *(El otro sendero)* pull off a miracle? Perhaps. The military would be well-disposed to such a new government. The public has stoically endured economic disaster and violence. The IMF and U.S. oil companies would be happy. The suppression

of the "kolkhozes" (associated agricultural enterprises) and land redistribution, together with technical assistance, would revive agriculture.

683. "El drama de las municipales." *Caretas*, no.1079 (October 16 1989): 30-32.

From May, 1987, to October 13 of this year, 63 mayors and 17 *regidores* have been murdered by the Shining Path. An additional 192 *alcaldes* and 248 *regidores* have quit their posts. Sendero's intent is to create "power vacuums" and boycott the municipal elections. *Caretas* summarizes the situation in each region of the country. Absenteeism at the polls, and numbers of spoiled and blank ballots are high in certain areas. Often only the immediate presence of armed forces at the polls guarantees the right to vote, but it is necessary to remember that in general this weakens democracy. In a sidebar, Senator Rolando Ames announces IU's call for popular mobilization to ensure that people retain their right to change Peru at the ballot box.

684. Mason, T. David and Janet Swartzfager. "Land Reform and the Rise of Sendero Luminoso in Peru." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, v.1, no.4 (October 1989): 516-538.

Sendero's rise in Peru seems to confound conventional wisdom about Third World revolutions: Sendero has gained strength among peasants in the aftermath of a sweeping land reform. Analysts have always viewed land reform programs as a means to preempt revolutionary movements. Mason and Swarftzfager argue that land reform itself disrupted existing client-patron relationships in the southern sierra in such a manner as to render certain classes of cultivators (indigenous peasant communities) more vulnerable to subsistence crises, and hence to Sendero's appeal. They begin by describing the pre-reform land tenure system, and the way in which land reform disrupted many of the existing "clientelist mechanisms," without creating alternatives capable of providing security against the risks of cultivation. Sendero has been able to build a base of support by filling the void left by policies intended precisely to neutralize its revolutionary appeal. The authors provide a detailed analysis of Peruvian land tenure systems, and the establishment of new agrarians structures, the CAP (agricultural producers' cooperatives) and SAIS (Agricultural Societies for Social Interest). Reform resulted in the abandonment of the sierra by the old *hacienda* elite, and Sendero has stepped into some areas to provide many of the services traditionally afforded peasants by the landed patrons. Mason and Swarftzfager agree with Favre that Sendero's ideological objectives are poorly understood or irrelevant to much of the peasantry; Sendero has provided them with relief from immediate conditions of economic distress.

685. Balbi, Carmen Rosa. "Senderos minados: Sendero y los sindicatos." *Quehacer*, no.61 (October-November 1989): 49-57.

Although people's war has always focused primarily on the countryside, the cities have recently become more important. *Senderista* infiltration and cooption of unions is growing. The MRDP *(Movimiento Revolucionario de Defensa del Pueblo)*, a broad front of "self-generated organisms" or *senderista* fronts, is the instrument with which this campaign is carried out. Of particular importance is the MOTC *(Movimiento Obrero de Trabajadores Clasistas)*, the PCP's labor front. All these organizations are semi-clandestine links between the party and the masses. Balbi describes the travails of Peru's unions, which in this period of tremendous economic stress are caught between government repression and guerrilla penetration. The CGTP*(Congreso General de Trabajadores Peruanos)*, the nation's largest labor confederation, is Sendero's number one enemy. Balbi chronicles the strikes, takeovers, internal struggles, and ideological battles of the union movement, and the coercion it is undergoing as the battleground shifts from the countryside to the cities prior to the 1990 elections.

686. González, Raúl. "Escalada senderista: fuerza o debilidad." *Quehacer*, no.61 (October-November 1989): 10-15.

Sendero has escalated attacks on civil authorities, especially mayors, council members, and candidates for municipal office, which has not only precipitated the resignation or withdrawal of dozens of officials and candidates, but has also frightened the population at large into begging for security "no matter the cost." If Sendero is not winning its war by these tactics, at the least it is winning a moral victory, and that, says González, is enough. A sort of collective psychosis is setting in as result of the guerrilla campaign, which is in accord with its political objectives: to separate the citizens from the state. González looks at the latest *senderista* campaign, and analyzes how it fits into the PCP's documented strategy to encircle the cities and take power, examining the

relationships between the party and the various "generated organisms" (mass front organizations) it has formed to assist it in reaching its objectives.

687. González, Raúl. "La confusa guerra de coca. El Huallaga: ¿Y ahora que?" *Quehacer*, no.61 (October-November 1989): 59-64.

Special report on *narcotráfico* and the Huallaga Valley. The assassination of presidential candidate Galán in Colombia, and the meeting of the Presidents of the U.S., Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru to coordinate the war on narcotics has put coca once again in the spotlight. González examines first the situation in Colombia, and then in the Huallaga. While cocaine is a scarce and valuable commodity in the U.S. (a kilo of coke can fetch up to $30,000 in some places), the price of basic coca paste (PBC) has dropped to $600 a kilo. It is being warehoused in the Valley; the only reason it doesn't spoil is because PBC doesn't rot. The labs where the PBC is made into cocaine may be transferred in the future from Colombia to Peru itself, specifically to the Peruvian Amazon. Technical problems that will have to be solved in order to facilitate this include getting around obstacles to the legal importation of chemicals like ether and acetone, necessary for the process, and obtaining enough aircraft to move the end product. Corruption, violence, and destabilization of the political and judicial processes will come to Peru as they have to Colombia. The Peruvian economy is already becoming dangerously dependent on the narcotics dollars of the parallel market. The solution, declares González, must begin in the Valley, where not coincidentally Sendero has for all practical purposes expelled the Peruvian state and formed an alliance of convenience with the coca producers and traffickers. The army's strategy now is to concentrate on Sendero, and leave anti-drug operations aside. But they are poorly-equipped for such a campaign (e.g., a lack of working helicopters). The U.S. DEA's relations with the army are very poor; they prefer to work with the national police. One solution is for the police to reenter the fight against the guerrillas, and begin again to operate in zones under army control. González ends by asking, does Peru have the resources to take on both tasks at the same time? The answer is no, he regretably concludes. The problem, once a police matter, has been converted by the *narco-senderista* alliance into a deadly political-military problem.

688. "El gran perdedor." *Caretas*, no.1084 (November 20 1989): 30-34.

The successful elections of November 12 mark a new step in the struggle against terrorism, says *Caretas*. Now is the time for a counteroffensive. Even in Ayacucho, birthplace of Shining Path, elections were disrupted in only three of eleven provinces. The article reviews Sendero's announced strategy to establish the Popular Republic of the New Democracy. Paramount is the establishment of support bases, through popular schools, centers for training and indoctrination. Sendero's confidence and triumphalism in its ability to expand these bases at the national level seemed limitless. Although absenteeism in certain areas was high, the response of the masses, who clearly preferred peaceful to violent change, is a rebuff to Sendero's blueprint for revolution. Edgardo Mercado Jarrín ("Pautas y tácticas") makes a number of suggestions for a counter-offensive, including the creation of a national advisory commission, reporting to the President, on coordination of counterinsurgency policy. Attached to the commission would be a number of subgroups, integrating civilian and military experts on revolutionary war. The political parties and social institutions should help design such a policy. The Andean region should be top priority for economic development. Psychological warfare, educational policy, formulation of a national "code of ethics" for the media, so that it does not exalt or apologize for violence, inclusion of the Church as an active partner, streamlining the judicial system, improving military mobility and intelligence, and promoting pacification groups in the emergency zones, are other suggestions.

689. "¿Qué vio Smith?" *Caretas*, no.1085 (November 27 1989): 30-32, 86.

Todd Smith, correspondent for the *Tampa Tribune*, was determined to investigate terrorism and *narcotráfico* in the Huallaga Valley, even though his newspaper denied his request to cover that ultra-dangerous area. Smith took vacation time and traveled to the Alto Huallaga; he disappeared outside Uchiza in mid-November. His body, cruelly tortured, was discovered with a note that read "Thus die North American spies tied to the Pentagon who are developing an antisubversion plan in Latin America, especially in Peru. Death to North American imperialism. *Viva el Partido Comunista. Viva la guerra popular.*" Smith had been strangled, and was disfigured, his ribs broken. Strangely, this style of execution is not common among the *narcos*. Apparently whoever kidnapped Smith wanted information, but given military control throughout Uchiza, Sendero stays separate and takes little interest in what a reporter might have seen or

photographed there. *Caretas* speculates on who is responsible for this murder, and gives a thumbnail sketch of Smith and his career. He was well known as a free-lancer in Central and South America. A colleague paid tribute to Smith's determination to become a journalist of the first rank covering Third World danger spots. Following is a brief article on the murder of a Peruvian journalist, Hugo Bustíos, with a list of other Peruvian reporters who have been killed covering Sendero, either by the guerrillas or presumably by the security forces.

690. "The 'War on Drugs' is a War on the People." *A World to Win*, no.14 (November 1989): 60-68.

Attack on U.S. anti-narcotics policy in general, and American participation in the anti-coca effort in the Huallaga valley in particular. In both Colombia and Peru, the main target of American attacks is not drug trafficking, but the masses of people in both nations. *A World to Win* links repression and control over minority and poor neighborhoods in the U.S. to similar campaigns abroad, tracing American government involvement in narcotics trafficking from the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War to implication in the heroin trade conducted by Afghan guerrilla groups. The main thesis of this article is that the coca eradication campaign of the DEA and U.S. military is only a cover for U.S. intervention in the war against the PCP. The article goes on to recount the history of American involvement in Colombia and its crackdown on black communities within the U.S. While drugs are a real problem "which pull the masses down into a deadly morass of addiction and suffering along with petty crime against other masses to pay for it," imperialism can never solve the problem; it profits from the drugs and creates the conditions that drive the masses to use them.

691. Angel S., Oscar Emilio. "Terrorismo en cinco grupos latinoamericanos." *Revista javeriana*, v.57, no.560 (November-December 1989): 339-343.

Terrorism is a term often loosely defined and indiscriminately employed in Latin America, according to the author, who looks at terrorism as part of a revolutionary strategy in the operations of the Tupamaros of Uruguay, Alfaro Vive of Ecuador, the FALN of Venezuela, the FARC of Colombia, and the Shining Path of Peru. Angel, using the work of scholars on terrorism, discriminates between terror, per se, and its employment for political ends. Angel notes that Sendero's extremism has given rise to its being labeled as insane or demented; he rejects this thesis, proposing instead that the cold and calculated rationality of Sendero's violence is calculated to close democratic spaces and polarize society. After a thumbnail sketch of each group's history, he speculates on the use of deliberate terror as an extension of traditional, if conventional revolutionary war, almost as an "instrument of support," to heighten contradictions within society, to achieve anarchy, and to militarize government response. He concludes by noting the phenomenon of international links among terrorist groups, and their growing connections to narcotics trafficking. Is terrorism, he asks, a degeneration, or passing phase of guerrilla groups?

692. "Drogas y terror." *Caretas*, no. 1086 (December 1989): 25, 72.

Some 130 journalists, mainly European, assembled in Lima to attend a conference on terrorism and drugs in the Andes. Organized by the College of Peruvian Journalists, the forum assembled the "heavy artillery" of international and domestic experts to aid journalists in interpreting the thorny issues of coca and *senderismo*, said the forum's organizer. The internationalism of the drug trade was a theme of the conference, since drug trafficking encompasses all the Andean nations as well as the U.S. and Europe. The consuming nations came in for some criticism; one United Nations official pointed out that for every 100 persons arrested on drug charges in the U.S., 10 came before a judge and only one wound up in jail. One hundred and thirty participants traveled to Uchiza, where they were received by almost 30,000 coca-growing peasants assembled by General Arciniega. They were there to drive home the point that the counterinsurgency war must be tied to an efficient promotion of alternative crops and economic development in the zone. However, the National Police and DEA oppose this philosophy, preferring to concentrate on the immediate eradication of coca cultivation.

693. "¿Vivo o muerto?" *Caretas*, no. 1086 (December 1989): 32-36.

Is Abimael Guzmán alive or dead? There are rumors that he was killed in combat in Vilcashuamán in August, 1982. However, intelligence services believe he is still alive. *Caretas* reviews the facts as they are known about the man who, if he is alive, turned 55 on December 3. Guzman's entire medical history--renal problems, psoriasis, etc.--plus all manner of informed and uninformed rumors are rehashed. Experts also give differing opinions on whether the July 1988 *El Diario* interview is authentic or not. More interesting is a two-page spread of virtually all known

photographs of Guzmán, from his student days in the early 1950's to the picture that accompanied the *El Diario* interview.

694. Arias Quincot, César. "Sendero, el estalinismo y la sombra de Bujarín." *Socialismo y participación*, no.48 (December 1989): 1-13.

A somewhat politically esoteric discussion of Sendero and authoritarianism, beginning with a review of Bukharin's persecution by Stalin in the late 1930s, and his subsequent posthumous rehabilitation under Gorbachev. Its connection to Sendero lies in Abimael Guzmán's defense of purges, his serene acceptance of forced collectivization resulting in the possible death of millions, and his support for a cult of personality. In other words, the author declares that Guzmán assumes the basic elements of Stalinism: a centralized state with an all-powerful and divine leader, one party, one union, the submission of the state to the party, the employment of secret police, state terror, and bloody purges as normal methods of government. The fact that Sendero declares itself to be Maoist does not, in the author's view, significantly alter Sendero's Stalinist nature. Totalitarianism, he writes, involves not merely controlling the state, but all of society, and this is Sendero's goal. An interesting essay that touches on a wide range of European intellectual theories.

695. Manrique, Nelson. "La década de la violencia." *Márgenes*, año 3, no.5-6 (December 1989): 137-182.

Long and detailed analysis of "the decade of violence." Manrique sees Sendero as creating, through the use of terror, a power vacuum in areas where it is operating; by destroying the presence of the state, Sendero can build its own organs of power ("The New Democratic State"). Added to this rising tide of violence are Peru's multiple political and economic crises, problems that Sendero is happy to heighten and that sharpen conflicts between classes and groups in Peru. Sendero has survived in the face of fierce repression and has built a solid base and network of support, drawing new recruits and members from Peru's widening pool of displaced and impoverished people. Manrique closely examines Sendero's social base, differentiating between its success in different regions, such as the Alto Huallaga and the central sierra (the key to Lima). The case of Junín, where Sendero attacked and destroyed SAIS Cahuide and other cooperatives and haciendas, highlighted stark differences between peasants and the bitter legacy of an incomplete land reform. He describes the "new power" and how it functions in liberated zones. Despite following the "shining path of Mariátegui," it is uninterested in Peru's ethnic problems, analyzing Peru strictly in class terms. Still, one cannot deny the element of ethnicity in Sendero's violence, legitimized by an ideological substrata of racism that permeates Peruvian society. Manrique ponders both Sendero's authoritarianism, and the "senderization" of Peru, in which the increasing inhumanity of the war and political polarization are destroying the left and popular movements, and wiping out the democratic advances of the past decade. He concludes by summarizing the times in which Peruvians are living with a Quechua phrase: *manchay tiempo*, the time of fear. The only solution to the violence and authoritarianism that threaten to devour Peru is popular organization. An extremely rich and imaginative essay that explores the entire spectrum of the current Peruvian crisis. Following Manrique's essay are responses and commentary by Eduardo Cáceres, Carlos Iván Degregori, Rodrigo Montoya, and César Rodríguez Rabanal, with a reply by Manrique.

696. Salazar, Hugo. "El teatro peruano de los 80." *Márgenes*, año 3, no.5-6 (December 1989): 63-83.

Interesting discussion of the effects a "culture of social violence" has had on Peruvian intellectual life in general, and on the emergence of new social drama in particular, a drama that does not have to conform to conventional ideas about the theater. Sendero's "theater" is obviously not performed in public, but rather clandestinely and in spaces where the movement has a presence and control: jails, "red zones," liberated towns, *pueblos jóvenes*, and eventually in universities. But this kind of theater doesn't even conform to traditional ideas about *teatro popular*, peasant theater, or even "revolutionary" theater. It can be synthesized out of other art forms, such as music, dance, and mimicry, divorced from bourgeois concepts like the division between stage and audience. The first *senderista* theater groups were formed in El Frontón prison in 1985, and performed short pieces of 20-40 minutes on Sundays for the visiting families of prisoners. These works were in the purest tradition of agitation and propaganda theater, and were based on Chinese models of "revolutionary opera," although Peruvian native musical and folkloric elements were added. Salazar describes some of these works, such as "Toma de tierras" (seizing land), and "Matrimonio senderista" (Sendero wedding). A common element in *senderista* theater is the direct invitation to the audience to join in and become part of the revolutionary struggle.

697. "Sendero Luminoso, Peruvian Terrorist Group." *U.S. Department of State Bulletin,* v.89, no.2153 (December 1989): 49-52.

Fact sheet and chronology prepared by the State Department's Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism. Sendero is characterized as an extremely dangerous and unpredictable terrorist and insurgency group: "Its declared aim is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with an Indian-based peasant revolutionary regime, inspired in part by Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution in China." The factual and balanced summary covers Sendero's background, ideology, strategy and tactics (including economic sabotage), and the "coca connection." A "partial incident chronology" follows.

698. Salazar del Alcázar, Hugo. "La otredad de Sendero: una entrevista con Saúl Peña..." *Quehacer*, no.62 (December 1989-January 1990): 44-50.

It is a rigorous exercise to look at "the other," to try to understand it without necessarily identifying with it. Psychoanalyst Saúl Peña takes a psychoanalytical and linguistic look at Shining Path, as metaphor, dream, and reality. For example, Peña believes that those who are violent are reenacting the violence to which they were subjected in their childhood. "President Gonzalo" may represent the "super-ego" of Sendero, a symbolic image of the father ideal. With specific reference to the final questions of the notorious "interview of the century," Peña is struck by the narcissist tendencies which Guzmán displays, the almost proud assertion that he (Guzmán) has comrades rather than friends. He speculates on Guzmán/Gonzalo's dreams, wondering whether he has taken his *nom de guerre* in a subconscious tribute to Peruvian *conquistador* Gonzalo Pizarro.

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699. Ansión, Juan. "Sendero Luminoso: la política como religión." *Cristianismo y sociedad,* v.28, 3a época, no.106 (1990): 115-129.

Fascinating article exploring a highly controverial thesis: Sendero is a political organization that shares some traits in common with religion. Sendero is marked by an adhesion among its members to a faith and a morality that totally encompass their lives. Like some fundamentalist religions, *senderistas* are characterized by their closed and exclusivist attitudes, their unequivocal and intolerant interpretation of sacred texts (in this case *"marxismoleninismomaoísmo"* and *"pensamiento de Gonzalo"),* their fanatical insensibility to reality, their rigid and hierarchical leadership, and their blind faith in their *líder máximo.* Sendero rejects all gods; their militant materialism insists that all power comes from the barrel of a gun, but in reality their gods are the masses, the party, and their own Gonzalo, converted into a figure that more and more resembles a deity. Ansión traces the evolution of Sendero's philosophy, which began as the guiding thought of Mariátegui, and has been transformed step by step into Gonzalo thought. In analyzing the movement's texts, he shows how it has deviated from orthodox Maoism. The power of the Party resembles magic, and President Gonzalo possesses the correct formulas for applying it efficiently. The Party, incapable of error, converts each setback into a triumph of the revolution, and the armed struggle changes "black fire" into "red fire." Thus the rebellion and slaughter of hundreds of faithful militants in the Lima jails is transubstantiated by the "logic of sacrifice" into a grand moral, political, and military triumph for the Party. Ansión also analyzes the iconography of the movement, in which the Party's leadership is represented by sun and fire. President Gonzalo, the "fourth sword of Marxism," is a god of war; the hammer and sickle wielded by peasants shine in the midst of the radiant sun, clearly guiding thought converted into Gonzalo thought. In the struggle's early days, Guzmán used the pseudonym *Puka Inti.* His ideology, appearing as the sun, illuminates, gives life and order, and establishes the rules for society. Sendero utilizes the dualism of Andean culture, in which *pachakuti* will reverse the order of the world. The movement combines Andean, Chinese, and Jacobean traditions, along with traditional Catholic eschatology (doctrine of ultimates). Ansión concludes by asserting that Sendero's power does not come from force of arms, but from having incorporated a fundamentalist religious vision within a political party organized in accordance with cold rationalized calculations; a union, he writes, of reason and passion.

700. Barbiere-Sofaly, Sophie. "Sendero Luminoso: Modern Manifestation of an Ancient Phenomenon." MA thesis, San Diego State University, 1990.

Barbiere-Sofaly stresses the millenarianist aspects of Sendero, tracing such movements throughout Peruvian history, and specifically tying Shining Path to this phenomenon: "Like previous millenarian movements, Sendero Luminoso, through its Marxist rhetoric, is proclaiming the destruction of the oppressive white man system and the creation of a new Indian order. In many ways, Sendero Luminoso is simply the latest descendant of Taki Onquoy...Despite its Marxist rhetoric, Sendero Luminoso has shown itself to be a specific Andean phenomenon, whose composition and ideology have been completely molded by the Indian experience." Sendero, writes Barbiere-Sofaly, is but the symptom of a crisis reflecting the maladjustment of the Andean world; it is the circumstantial, not the essential part of the problem. Since change must be structural, more water and light for Ayacucho will not resolve it; nor can counterinsurgency efforts eradicate Sendero, for liquidating a few activists is liquidating the effect, not the cause. The solution, she says, is nothing less than economic and social integration of the Andean world into Peruvian society. "Sendero Luminoso might be crushed by the government as previous millenarian uprisings throughout the course of history, but if the conditions that caused the violence remain, the spirit of rebellion will survive..."

701. Biondi Shaw, Juan and Eduardo Zapata Saldaña. *El estado no soy yo y la subversión.* Lima: CONCYTEC, 1990.

The authors, professors of linguistics and literature. propose to explore, through semiotics, the phenomenon of subversion in contemporary Peru. Subversion, in their view, takes many forms: political-military subversion (the war against Sendero), economic, social, and even governmental subversion. In their words, "Subversion is not a rifle, but a system, and as such we must learn about it and deal with it." A complex and extremely esoteric essay that reduces the state-guerrilla struggle to a reading of meanings, texts, and signs. One-third of the work is given over to an extensive series of questions asked of young people about their attitudes towards social inequality, the role of violence, and the political system in Peru.

702. Brown, Cynthia G. *In Desperate Straits: Human Rights in Peru After a Decade of Democracy and Insurgency.* New York: Americas Watch, August 1990.

At the end of a painful decade, weakened on all fronts, Peruvian democracy has resorted to desperate measures in order to survive. A new government (that of dark horse candidate Alberto Fujimori), elected largely as a protest against traditional leadership, economic stagnation, and military stalemate, is about to inherit this crisis. The elected leadership of Peru, faced with an unparalleled economic crisis, has been unable or unwilling to carry out reforms that might undermine the economic, racial, cultural, and regional divisions that have fed the insurgency. It has been unable to curb corruption, and after promising to address human rights abuses, has ceded authority to the military to fight Sendero as it sees fit. Added to terrorism has been the criminality and violence of drug trafficking. Paramount is the need for the state to legitimize itself in the battle against Sendero, by directly addressing the needs of its citizens. Americas Watch provides an overview of the sources and scope of violence in Peru, an accounting of deaths and disappearances, and sections on the judiciary, penal conditions, and human rights abuses by the security forces, the guerrillas, self-defense patrols, and right-wing death squads. AW also examines the role of the United States, especially in the fight against the coca trade. AW concludes its report with an expression of hope that the new Fujimori government will work to create a national consensus on the issues of security and human rights, re-examine the counterinsurgency strategy of the Belaúnde and García regimes, and seriously explore non-violent means of fortifying the Peruvian state.

703. Chirinos Arrieta, Carlos. *Terrorismo y delito.* Lima: Editorial Colmillo Blanco, [1990].

Explores the relationship between antiterrorist legislation and judicial norms. The author seeks to examine neither the criminology of terrorism nor the various philosophies that make up an effective counter-terrorist strategy. Rather, it is his goal to compare the elements of Peru's anti-subversive laws (as codified in the Law 24,953, passed on December 7, 1988), with the existing penal law. The author traces the history of this legislation, defines its various aspects (including the controversial penalties for participation in, support for, or complicity with terrorism), discusses offenses against the public good, the question of the participation of minors in such crimes, offenses against public services, acts of terrorism that result in the death or injury of persons, and ends with some important reflections on liberty of association and the new crime of "apology" for terrorism. Although extremely dry and theoretical in tone, this book highlights the extraordinary

degree to which judicial norms were altered in order to give the government a virtual free hand in combating whatever it chose to label subversive.

704. Comisión Andina de Juristas. *Una guerra desesperada: los derechos humanos en el Perú después de una década de democracia y violencia.* (Informe de Americas Watch) Lima: La Comisión, 1990.

Sixth annual review of the human rights situation in Peru. Covering the period up to the assumption of power by President Alberto Fujimori, the report highlights what it terms a hopeless war against innocent civilians, documenting assassinations, disappearances, and the steady erosion of the power of the judiciary in Peru to protect citizens. The passage of powerful anti-terrorism legislation under the García government has been especially disheartening. Even the feeble guarantees of citizen rights under Law 24,700, for example, have not been enforced. Several particularly stark cases of military impunity are described. Prison conditions remain disastrously wretched. Congress has investigated gross violations of human rights in Cayara, and the activities of the Comando Rodrigo Franco death squad. In both cases the commissions have called on the government to hold those committing abuses responsible, without result. One chapter examines the human rights violations of the guerrillas, Sendero and MRTA; another the disturbing persecution of human rights activists themselves, who are being attacked for monitoring both security forces and the guerrillas. The proposed military assistance of the United States is particularly disturbing, focusing as it does on a joint anti-narcotics and anti-guerrilla strategy that the Commission believes will result in further violations of human rights.

705. *Las condiciones de la violencia en Perú y Bolivia.* Edited by Carlos F. Toranzo Roca. La Paz: ILDIS, [1990].

An important collection of 14 essays on parallel conditions of violence in Peru and Bolivia. The essays are grouped around themes: historical, political, economic and social conditions of Peruvian violence (with "reflections on Bolivia"); Sendero Luminoso and anti-subversive strategy (Neocolonialism and peasant violence in Bolivia); forms of Sendero actions and their relations with the peasantry (Manifestations of violence in Bolivia); and the Upper Huallaga and Sendero (manifestations of violence in Chapare). As befits the product of as seminar (held in La Paz in February, 1990), each group of essays is followed by a discussion among the participants. Among the notable contributions are Juan Granda Oré's "Condiciones históricas, políticas, económicas y sociales en Ayacucho," Xavier Albó's "Formas de violencia en el sector rural," Carlos Tapia's "Sendero Luminoso y la estrategia antisubversiva," Nelson Manrique's "Formas de acción de Sendero y su relación con el campesinado," and Raúl Gonzáles's "El Alto Huallaga y Sendero Luminoso." A number of essays focus on the potential for violence among the peasantry of Chapare, Bolivia, where coca cultivation has increased dramatically over the past decade, despite the government's prohibition of the free commercialization of coca leaf.

706. Degregori, Carlos Iván. *El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso: Ayacucho 1969-1979.* Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1990.

One of the two most important monographs on Shining Path (the other being Gorriti's *Sendero Luminoso: historia de una guerra milenaria).* Degregori traces the movement's crucial years at the Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga (UNSCH) in Ayacucho, before it began armed struggle. Sendero, Degregori asserts, cannot be understood apart from the environment out of which it emerged. The university, which was reopened in 1959 as an instrument of regional development, became the social, political, and economic center of the department. It was here that Guzmán and his fellow professors fought their ideological battles, swayed a generation of poor, aspiring, Indian and mestizo students, and recruited their political cadre for the struggle ahead. By the late 1960's Abimael Guzmán, professor of Kantian logic, and director of personnel for the University, controlled the campus, through hiring and denying tenure to faculty with whom he disagreed politically. (He and his fellow Marxists began a campaign of agitation that drove David Scott Palmer and other American instructors out.) UNSCH graduates, particularly those from the Teacher's College and Nurse's School, were sent out into the countryside, where they laid the foundations for Sendero's revolution. Degregori examines in depth the socioeconomic makeup of Ayacucho, and describes how *campesino*, popular, and women's organizations developed. The battles and strikes over the government's "reforms" in June, 1969, (which abolished free education), underline the crucial role of education as an avenue of social advancement for those who would leave the ranks of the peasantry. The final part of the book describes how Guzmán, placed in charge of *Juventud Comunista* (Communist Youth) of the PCP-Bandera Roja, began his insurrection, first against Saturnino Paredes, leader of PCP-BR, then against the other leftist

groups at the University, and finally against Peruvian society itself. Degregori's book is the most detailed and comprehensive study of the formative years of the "Andean Yenan" at the UNSCH.

707. Degregori, Carlos Iván and José López Ricci. "Los hijos de la guerra: jóvenes andinos y criollos frente a la violencia política." In *Tiempos de ira y amor.* Edited by Carlos Iván Degregori, *et al.* Lima: DESCO, 1990, pp.183-220.

A series of consecutive testimonies tells the story of two youths, one *criollo* and one *andino*, Nicario and Pancho, whose lives were interlinked by violence in Ayacucho. Nicario was born in Cangallo province, Ayacucho department, and worked as a common laborer, doing whatever he could, including helping coca growers. He relates how he became aware of Sendero. Three or four young students lived in his community, but few people paid them any attention, or else laughed at them. He was invited to a meeting with *senderistas*, where he was lectured on Mao, and his political education began. All the ills of Peru were attributed to bureaucracy, to corruption; Sendero, it was promised, would solve these problems. And Nicario believed. Pancho was born in Callao, on the coast, worked during the day and went to school at night. He joined the Marines, and describes his training, and how patriotism and the mission to defend *la patria* were drummed into the recruits. Both youths, the authors write, were seduced by the paraphernalia of power: weapons, the voice of authority, a uniform. Both the Marines and Sendero were seen as paths of social mobility. Nicario tells of attacks, of establishing the new authority in liberated areas; Pancho describes being ordered to Ayacucho, the patrols, questioning and arresting suspicious peasants, his first combat, ambushes in the *selva*, etc. He found he respected his enemy, who was ready to die for his ideas. Both youths became disillusioned by the war; Nicario quit Sendero, his life ever at risk because of this act. Pancho deserted from the Marines, frustrated, his chances of promotion blocked he felt, by the *"gringos"* above him. The "backwards" Indian Pancho, possessing a traditional social structure, has some hope for the future. The "creole" mestizo Nicario has less, because Europeanized urban life has robbed him of a corresponding framework.

708. Dietz, Henry. "Revolutionary Organization in the Countryside: Peru." In *Revolution and Political Change in the Third World.* Edited by Barry M. Schultz and Robert O. Slater. Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1990, pp. 117-139.

Dietz's essay is one in a volume examining revolutions in Africa, the Middle East, the Philippines, and Central America. It benefits from a number of preceding historical and theoretical chapters, that lay the groundwork for considering Sendero in comparative perspective. While Dietz considers Sendero as having unique features (its proclamations of total independence, its extreme violence, and its disdain for any political process), it is comparable to other rural or peasant-based revolutionary movements. Existing massive social inequalities in the form of maldistributions in wealth, income, land, power, make political violence likely, especially when exacerbated by ethnic or racial divisions. In fact, the greater the disparities, the more potential for a revolutionary movement to take root; it was no accident that Ayacucho was Sendero's birthplace. Still, Sendero's ideology seems to have been extraneous to its ability to take root in Ayacucho; it is probably vital as a belief system to those who hold to it, but irrelevant or incomprehensible to those who do not understand it, and repugnant to those who do, but reject it. In fact, the more rigid and doctrinaire a movement's ideology, the more it may succeed in binding the group together. However, as in the eclecticism of resurgent Islam, Sendero synthesizes the modernizing tenants of Maoism with the traditional image of a mythic Indian past. Its leadership and tight organizational discipline outclass those of the government, whose brutal response has produced extreme resentment, alienation, and distrust among the peasantry. The peasant is caught in the middle: "It is perhaps these choices that are most predictable; after all, they have been forced on the poor wherever revolutionary violence has arisen, and there seems to be no way to avoid them."

709. Drevillon, Elizabeth. *Dans l'enfer du Pérou.* Paris: Tsuru, 1990.

In the "hell of Peru" from the Amazon to the sierra, Drevillon, a journalist, seeks to find the Maoist guerrillas of the Shining Path. She recounts her adventures with her cameraman, as she moves in a series of vivid and impressionistic chapters from the University of San Marcos in Lima (where a pretty girl exhorts her comrades to fight the "fascist" government), to a Lima shanty-town, where she watches an "armed strike," to Ayacucho, the cradle of the rebellion, and to other highland communities that have suffered both from the guerrillas and from the government's security forces. In a continuing series of striking conversations, Drevillon talks in each place with guerrillas, guerrilla sympathizers, and ordinary people, as she seeks to paint a portrait of a nation torn between revolution and repression.

710. García-Sayán, Diego. "Terrorismo y pacificación en el Perú." In *Jacque a la democracia: orden internacional y violencia política en América Latina.* Edited by Augusto Varas. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Latinoamericano, 1990, pp.229-244.

Sometimes it seems as if the *senderista* violence and cruel repression it has engendered have emerged from Peruvian society itself, which has produced the germ of its own destruction. García-Sayán points out that Peru's long history of political violence has traditionally been negated or minimized in the nation's historiography: dictatorial governments, unions, and political movements (such as APRA in the 1930's and 1940's) have often resorted to violence in pursuit of their aims in the past. Not only has liberal democracy never gained much of a foothold in Peru, but its institutionalization has scant legitimacy in the eyes of many large sectors of the population. García-Sayán analyzes Sendero's violent trajectory, rejecting suggestions that it is "demented" or "irrational"; its employment of violence suggests a cold and calculating rationality. It is designed to "heighten the contradictions" and bring about the polarization and chaos the movement seeks. The government's response to Sendero's terror, ranging from blaming it on an international communist conspiracy or "foreign priests" to wide-ranging repression, has only served to alienate greater and greater portions of the population. In the end, García-Sayán suggests that only a strengthened "civil society," and an "official society" in which judicial and political institutions function as they are supposed to, can defeat subversion.

711. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. *Sendero: historia de la guerra milenaria en el Perú.* v.1. Lima: Editorial Apoyo, 1990.

The most detailed and readable history of Sendero Luminoso yet written. If Carlos Iván Degregori is acknowledged as the leading authority on the origins and rise of Shining Path, then Gorriti can justly claim to be its chronicler. As a reporter for *Caretas,* Gorriti covered Sendero from late 1980 in many issues of the Peruvian weekly. In a series of compelling, dramatic chapters, Gorriti lays bare the complete failure of the Peruvian government to comprehend the nature of the threat that Sendero posed, and makes crystal clear the uncompromising and fanatical devotion to the bloody transformation of Peruvian society that the movement represents. He begins with the almost incidental arrest of Abimael Guzmán during a national strike (in which Sendero had no participation or even sympathy) in January 1979. (He was quickly released, the last time anyone saw him for a decade.) He ends with President Fernando Belaúnde conceding that the police cannot snuff out the insurgency in Ayacucho, and sending in the army at the end of December, 1982. In the chapter "Mohammed, Mao, Macbeth," Gorriti recounts a series of crucial *senderista* meetings between March and May of 1980, including the second plenary session of the party's Central Committee, and its first military seminar ("I Escuela Militar"). In the plenary session the *senderista* leadership made the decision to launch the phase of armed combat (ILA). Gorriti shows how every step of Sendero's revolution has been preceded by the most intense political discussion and debate; this not only ensured unanimity (through the "two-line struggle"), but also kept a check on dissent. Criticism and self-criticism, a Stalinist tactic perfected by Mao, enabled Guzmán to control rival elements in the party leadership. Gorriti reminds us that Sendero (more properly called the PCP) has always been a supremely political movement, with each military and political action subject to ideological critique. He cites Mao, just as the *senderistas* have: "When the Party's line is correct, we have everything: if we lack guns we will get them, and if we don't have power we will conquer it. If the line is incorrect, we will lose everything we have obtained." At the conclusion of the meetings, Guzmán held a series of dramatic readings from his favorite literary works. He read from "Julius Caesar" and "Macbeth," to show how dissenting conspiracy can ruin the most carefully-laid plans; and from Washington Irving's "Life of Mohammed" to drive home the point that a small band of people, armed with determination and driven by a burning cause, can change the world. In another chapter, "The Quota," Gorriti shows how indifferent the *senderista* leadership was to spilling blood, whether that of their enemies or their own supporters. He writes: "Without blood, the insurrectional strategy of Sendero had no content. Without hate it could not achieve the energy necessary for the immense work of material and moral destruction and reconstruction of an alternative world that it projected." Throughout, Gorriti switches from describing Sendero's actions to detailing the government's feeble counter-actions. He shows how a great deal of information reached the intelligence services on the projected insurrection, even before the burning of ballot boxes in Chuschi on May 17, 1980; all of it was down-graded and discounted. (The military's entire intelligence archives were "evacuated" when civilian rule was re-established, and never turned over to the police.) Poor equipment, training, and morale problems hampered police forces which squabbled constantly with one another, and with the military over jurisdiction and tactics. This fighting merely mirrored the confusion, petty infighting, and lack of direction exhibited at the highest levels of the Belaúnde government. Throughout, Gorriti displays a flair for biting prose, an ability to succinctly summarize complicated events, and considerable

benefit of hindsight. A superb book, this was intended to be the first of a three-volume work chronicling the entire course of the war. Sadly, the seizure of Gorriti's materials by security forces during the Fujimori *autogolpe* seems to have disrupted these plans, and no new volumes have appeared.

712. Greene, James M. "Peru's Sendero Luminoso: Ideology and Practice." Honors paper, Department of Political Science, United States Naval Academy, 1990.

Examination of the relationship between Sendero's ideology and its political practice. Greene posits that no full description of Sendero's ideology exists; his thesis seeks to fill that gap. Greene divides his work in two halves: the first examines the theories of Mao, Mariátegui, and Guzmán himself; the second looks at how the movement's ideology has been operationalized. Greene utilizes political science literature to place Sendero and *pensamiento Gonzalo* within a broader context of revolutionary models; in particular he uses the work of Charles Tilly on mobilization models (interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action) to analyze Sendero's ideology and praxis. Greene uses Guzmán's two bachelor theses at the University of Arequipa to summarize his early thought, before moving on to primary texts like the *Bases de discusión* and the *El Diario* interview. He concludes with a projection of Sendero's plans for Peru in the event they take power: the destruction of existing government (probably very violently), the seizure of most industry down to a very low level, nationalization of foreign property, default on Peru's debt, and the immediate progression from democratic revolution to socialist revolution. This would probably entail the reeducation of the bourgeoisie (rather than its liquidation), and possibly a Great Leap Forward in industrialization. Sendero, Greene believes, would probably close down the drug trade. Its foreign policy might seek to develop party-to-party relations with Third World countries. Greene closely reads Guzmán's comments for clues to future policies; these might even entail the development of nuclear weapons. Greene concludes that "...given the critical condition of Peru's government and society, the prospect of a Sendero-controlled 'People's Republic of Peru' cannot be ruled out."

713. *Guerra e ideología: debate entre el PUM y Sendero.* Edited by Raúl A. Wiener. Lima: Ediciones Amauta, 1990.

Collection of articles that appeared in 1989 in the influential literary and social criticism journal *Amauta,* which ironically was founded and edited in 1926 by José Carlos Mariátegui [the title page of this volume reads "Senderismo vs. mariateguismo (El debate entre *Amauta* y *El Diario)* "]. The tone of the work is set by the very first article, which is entitled "How to combat Sendero." *Senderismo* is labeled an ultraleftist dogma, the ideological and spiritual heir to the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and *pensamiento Gonzalo* caricatures Mao in his most sectarian and ultraleft phase. Other selections attack the pro-Sendero paper *El Diario* over general strikes and the masses, Sendero's strategy and tactics, the electoral boycott it called for and enforced through terror, and even its conception of "revolutionary culture." *Amauta,* which considers itself the true heir of Mariátegui, is revolutionary and socialist, but differs bitterly with the PCP's path of armed struggle.

714. Lázaro, Juan. "Women and Political Violence in Contemporary Peru." *Dialectical Anthropology,* v.15 (1990): 233-247.

In Latin America, Catholicism, feudalism, and semi-feudalism have denied women the possibility of active participation in the construction of their own lives; the dominant classes have reinforced the authority of the male in socioeconomic, political, cultural, and domestic spheres of society. Lázaro analyzes the evolution of women's empowerment in Peru in historical perspective, from the pre-Inca period to the present, when women make up approximately 35% of Sendero's military leadership. Women occupied positions of leadership in pre-Hispanic *ayllus* (extended families or clans). After the Spanish conquest, women were subordinated to European social structures that emphasized a purely domestic and familial role. Capitalist development in Peru has merely reinforced patriarchy and the oppression of women, who have been subordinated to male power in the family nucleus. By the 1970's, women in Peru were typically presented and treated by the national mass media as "passive, apolitical, childlike, extremely sexual creatures able to achieve their highest fulfillment as mothers and wives." Lázaro marshals statistics to show how the capitalist market has brought more women into the work force, but has led to urban and rural proletarianization. He shows how discussions among the students who formed the Student Revolutionary Front (FER) in Huamanga in the early 1960's led to a split between those who stressed women's liberation based on a sexual division of labor, and those who insisted that women's emancipation was an integral part of the class struggle. Since the PCP-SL's formation,

education among peasant women in the sierra has been a priority. Sierran women are the nation's most deprived and oppressed underclass, and thus possess one of the highest potentials for class struggle. Women have been in the forefront of Sendero's struggle; by 1987, some 1,000 women had been detained as "subversives." Three prisoners, Laura Zambrano ("Camarada Meche"), Fiorella Montaño ("Lucia"), and Margie Clavo Peralta, were members of the Lima Political Bureau. Guzmán's wife, Augusta de la Torre, is said to be the organizer of *Socorro Popular*, a group that helps the families of imprisoned *senderistas*. Lázaro concludes that the historical heritage of struggle among Andean women has facilitated women's incorporation into the armed struggle; furthermore, the prominent role of women in Sendero has stimulated feminist activity in all sectors of Peruvian society.

715. López, Sinesio. "El Perú de los 80: sociedad y estado en el fin de una época." In *Estado y sociedad: relaciones peligrosas.* Lima: DESCO, October 1990, pp.181-205.

One of a number of essays on the Peruvian state and society. López discusses what he calls a country in crisis. Part of the problem is that populist sentiment has come to a dead end; the failures of APRA led directly to the ascendancy of Fujimori. Even the left has failed to unite behind a program to heal the nation. Politics have become militarized, thanks to Sendero Luminoso and MRTA. At the same time, the militarized guerrillas have become more "political"; Sendero has moved from relying solely on armed struggle to building mass organizations in the cities to further its revolution. It has also infiltrated popular groups and unions, and utilized the press *(El Diario).* López reviews briefly each phase of the guerrilla war, and its growing negative impact on civil institutions and life, in what he calls the weakening of civil society. Is Peru a viable country, he asks. Economic and technological changes threaten to move the nation from the Third to the Fourth World. It will take fundamental changes to be able to answer in the affirmative.

716. Lynch, Nicolás. *Los jóvenes rojos de San Marcos.* Lima: Zorro de Abajo, 1990.

Complementary to the study of Sendero, Lynch looks at the history of student politics at the University of San Marcos. The university was known, not without a degree of pride, as a "temple of Mao Tse-Tung." One faction's aim was to destroy the university and to reconstruct it in the liberated zones. What happened to San Marcos in the 1970's was not just political activity, but a "hyper-ideologization of politics," where clichés replaced reality, and where a visceral and almost spiritual radicalization transformed politics into a religion and a rite. The rise of this Marxist faith was aided in San Marcos by an influx of students from rural areas, and by the absence of any other path for political participation. Lynch finishes his short study by examining the careers of some of the university's student political leaders, nearly all of whom became Peruvian social scientists. A good study of the environment out of which Sendero arose.

717. McClintock, Cynthia. "Peru." In *Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary Record.* Edited by James M. Malloy and Eduardo A. Gamarra. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990. v.7, 1987-88, pp.B154-B176.

Annual review of socio-economic developments. Three years into the administration of Alán García, the high hopes of Peruvians have been dashed. The war is more widespread and grisly than ever, the economy is in collapse, and rumors of a coup are circulating. Peruvians tend to blame Alán García, once highly regarded as enthusiastic and bold, now vilified as inexperienced and imprudent. McClintock reviews at length the economic policies of the government (including García's controversial bank takeover bid), and the dismal state of the economy. This catastrophe benefits Shining Path, which has advanced on several fronts in 1988. It has established control over the coca-producing areas of the Huallaga Valley and eastern Andean highlands, and gained influence in key labor federations. The government has been unable to establish any kind of new and credible counterinsurgency strategy, and the trajectory of violence continues to rise. Sendero's strength in Junín advances its strategy to surround and isolate Lima, and its base in the Upper Huallaga nets it around $30 million per year in cocaine profits, more money than any Peruvian political organization possesses. Its infiltration of urban grass-roots and urban popular organizations, such as soup kitchens, mother's clubs, and teachers' and miners' unions, appears designed to undermine Izquierda Unida, and to "blend with the working class and obtain social cover." Appended to the essay is a primary document (pp.C317-C327) entitled "Bases for Discussion. The PCP calls on the Masses to Struggle for Power. The Thinking of Gonzalo and the Workers."

718. McCormick, Gordon H. *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru.* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1990.

Second in a series of RAND analyses by one of the most influential U.S. senderologists. Three trends have brought Peru to a state of compound crisis: the collapse of the modern economic sector, the slow radicalization of Peruvian politics, and the escalating threat of Shining Path. Sendero's influence on Peruvian society has been synergistic; i.e., although not responsible for the dismal economic state of the country, the rebellion has made a bad economic situation worse. Sendero has forced a diversion of scarce national resources, disrupted the rural economy, and contributed to the general decline in popular confidence in the nation's future. The García regime's inability to contain the escalating level of violence, along with its gross mismanagement of the economy, has contributed to its declining fortunes and the corresponding growth in political unrest. These problems have by now become mutually reinforcing. Peru's disintegration has provided Sendero with new opportunities, new recruits, new issues, and a climate of discontent. McCormick analyzes the chances that the military will preempt the electoral process with another coup. Given the history of civil-military relations in Peru, the real question is not whether there will be a coup, but when. Such a move, McCormick believes, would be an act of necessity rather than choice. Although the military would receive a measure of reluctant popular support from the country's beleaguered middle classes and elite, such a move would unleash widespread protest, which in turn would generate further repression. The country would be locked into a cycle of violence, and support for Sendero would increase from many sectors of society. To crush the insurgency, the army would have to kill or incarcerate SL members and sympathizers at a faster rate than the movement could generate them. "Such a campaign, whatever its ethical objections, is probably beyond the army's ability to carry out." Sendero has proven to be a resilient organization; although its losses would be high in a government crackdown, it will survive, says McCormick, as long as its organizational structure is intact, its core leadership survives, and it retains its rural base. A counterterror campaign could conceivably push enough people into Sendero's ranks to result in a guerrilla victory. Even if they were defeated, an event of this nature could push Peru into a crisis slide from which it might take many years to recover.

719. Orellana, Miguel, *et al.* *Cajatambo: experiencia de un desarrollo posible.* Compiled by César Franco. Lima: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación, 1990.

Chronicles the experience of a small town with government-assisted development and the guerrillas. Cajatambo is a sierra city of some 4,000 persons located in the Department of Lima at 3,350 meters. Its inhabitants are mostly Quechua- and Spanish-speaking farmers and sheep- and cattle-herders. Cajatambo itself has electricity 3-4 hours per day, and transportation links to the outside "when the driver of the Lima bus was in a good mood." Its outlying and associated villages had no electricity, water, or sewers. Literacy was 10%; the average agricultural wage was $1.50 per day. Government presence was nonexistent until technical and social programs sponsored by Lima arrived in the 1970s. Agricultural assistance and education, reforestation, the development of a small dairy and a women's dyeing cooperative established the presence of the state for the first time in the region. Small-scale infiltration of Sendero in 1984-85 was followed by sabotage of the development projects and the establishment of a "committee of vigilance" in an outlying settlement. Police sent in to counter the guerrillas abused their powers as well as the peasantry. Sendero compelled young men to join their ranks and stepped up its activities, attacking a civil guard position, disrupting village schools, and forcing peasants to renounce the civil authorities. People were caught between two fires. Some were sympathetic to Sendero; many chose to leave. By 1988 murders and sabotage forced the development agency, CEDEP, to pull its personnel out; in 1989 the provincial federation president was assassinated.

720. Ossio Acuña, Juan. *Violencia estructural en el Perú: antropología.* Series: "Violencia estructural," no.4. Lima: Asociación Peruana de Estudios e Investigación para la Paz (APEP), 1990.

Ossio Acuña traces subversive and messianic movements (linking the two) back to their pre-Hispanic roots. The invocation of a return to the past did not entirely disappear when more political movements arose in the 20th century. Looking at Huamanga and Abimael Guzmán, he stresses that Sendero originated neither among the Indians nor the poor. It is, on the contrary, "anti-Andean," its founders provincial urban middle-class academics. Ossio Acuña examines the link between the Sendero and messianic beliefs. How has such a cold-blooded Maoist movement inspired so many to die for it? He describes the history of a parallel messianic movement in Peru, the Evangelic Association of the Israelite Mission of the New Universal Pact, that also began to expand in 1980. While one promotes world salvation before the threat of an apocalypse, the other seeks to accelerate the destruction of the old world in order to create the Republic of the New Democracy. Both have in common a sense of belonging to a privileged order. Members perceive in the PCP and *pensamiento Gonzalo,* which is an all-encompassing framework for understanding the

world, the answers to all their questions. The faith and fervor of the organization gives them the strength to make sacrifices, including their lives. The strength of Sendero's appeal is a testament to the power of development to change the old order in the Andes. Ossio Acuña concludes that Peru has long suffered a lack of socio-cultural cohesion, worsened by modernization that began after 1940. The confrontation between sierra communities and new economic and social realities was brutal, producing frustration and dissatisfaction. Groups espousing violence capitalized on this anger. Sendero has shown itself to be a "pure" and highly moral movement, free from the corruption that taints all the government's efforts. To get people to sacrifice their lives for such a movement, Sendero has developed a messianic ideology, but one that unfortunately espouses only destruction, and has little to say about the construction of a better world.

721. Pedraglio, Santiago. *Armas para la paz: seguridad democrática integral.* Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal, 1990.

An exploration of the violence in Peru and alternatives for achieving peace. Pedraglio examines the historical roots of violence, the "political logic" of Sendero, and the manner in which the security forces of the nation are fighting the insurgency. His conclusions discredit the military's solution of fighting revolutionary terror with counter-revolutionary violence. "Neither Algeria nor Malaysia," he writes, rejecting both French and British counterinsurgency models, both of which are based upon colonial scenarios and assumptions. He calls for an immediate and radical transformation of representative democracy, declaring that the government has proved itself inefficient, authoritarian, divorced from the nation, a civil dictatorship renewed every 5 years. Among his proposed solutions to the challenge of *senderista* and state violence are participatory democracy, a professionalized military, decentralization and a strengthening of regional government, a pact with the peasantry for social development and political power, a rejection of U.S. intervention and militarization of the fight against narcotics trafficking, organizing workers and citizens in favor of democracy, and above all, dialogue with all strata of Peruvian society. Sendero is not only or even principally a band of killers, however barbarous its methods may be; it is today a considerable political force with a national structure and presence in diverse sectors of the population. The government cannot continue to treat Sendero as it did in 1980-81, i.e., as if the tremendous errors in conception and application of counterinsurgency doctrine by Belaúnde and García have not had horrendous consequences. Pedraglio sees his model of democratic alternatives as part of a grander concept of an autonomous South America as a zone of peace, divorced from East-West confrontations.

722. *Perú 1989: en la espiral de violencia.* Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL), 1990.

Detailed report on the continuing spiral of violence in Peru. The IDL, as in previous years, reviews the progress of the war in key areas of the country: Puno, the Alto Huallaga, Junín. Also covered are paramilitary groups and their actions in 1989, the *rondas armadas* as part of civil defense, and legislation passed to fight terrorism. The report pays special attention to Sendero's assault on NGO's and their personnel; the cases of a number of murdered activists, including Manuel Soto and Víctor Lozano of Junín, both members of peasant confederations independent of Sendero, and Saúl Cantoral, secretary general of the miners' federation, are covered in detail. Shining Path is putting heavy pressure on peasant organizations and other non-governmental organizations, that play a key role in development and education in the country's poorest urban and rural zones. The report describes threats against personnel, bombings of offices, and assaults on NGO facilities. At the same time these very groups are suffering repression from the security forces, accused of links to the guerrillas. The universities are especially suspect of being centers for terrorism. The IDL also summarizes Sendero's campaign to enforce a boycott of the elections, and the state's efforts to ensure that they take place. The report concludes with a description of "efforts in defense of life and peace," including the campaign "Peru, Life and Peace," organized by academics, human rights workers, artists and intellectuals, church people, NGO's, National Mobilization for Peace (undertaken by the Pontifical Catholic University), and congresses of various human rights organizations, including the Federation of Latin American Associations of Families of the Detained and the Disappeared.

723. *Perú 1990 encrucijada: entre los senderos de muerte y los caminos de paz.* Series: Estrategia integral de paz. Lima: Instituto Democracia y Socialismo (IDS), 1990.

Analysis of the widening spiral of terror in a nation "crucified" by violence, right and left. The IDS summarizes Sendero's actions in each of the eight zones into which it has divided the country. For example, in Ayacucho, despite assassinations and intimidation, Sendero has not been able to fully block the municipal elections, despite the zone being the "principal theater" of

senderista operations. In Lima, Sendero has concentrated on sabotage, selective assassination of policemen, union members, and municipal candidates, as well as the armed strike *(paro armado).* In response, IU mobilized a "march for peace" in which unions, political parties, Church groups, and popular organizations participated. Sendero has struck particularly hard at the left in Lima, with murders and infiltration of community groups designed to undermine an independent left. It has also worked persistently at propaganda, mainly through the clandestine distribution of *El Diario.* The IDS also summarizes the activities of MRTA and the right-wing death squads Comandos "Rodrigo Franco" and "Gerónimo Cafferatta." A detailed series of charts and maps chronicles violence in each area. The second part of the work, "The state and political violence," examines the state's counterinsurgency strategies: total war, arming the civil population, militarization of justice and the restriction of law, and widespread repression. A third section, "Society and political violence," looks at responses to revolutionary and state violence, including social organization by parties, unions, NGO's, popular community, student, and religious groups, and peasant and labor movements. These, the report concludes, hold the key to "campaigns in favor of peace."

724. *Perú 1990: la oportunidad perdida.* Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal, 1990.

The "lost opportunity" to which this study refers is the chance that was perceived to have existed in 1990 to reverse the tide of violence that has engulfed Peru. The IDL provides a detailed and informative summary of political, economic, and social developments over the past year. The final months of Alán García's administration were a nightmare for the country: inflation reached 4,649%, public services were virtually in a state of breakdown, and the image of the "political class" in Peru was abysmally low, thanks in large part to García's demagogic style, corruption, and incapacity for governing. Violence spread to new areas of the country, and reached dramatic new highs; human rights abuses, particularly by paramilitary organizations, increased. García virtually abdicated any role in directing a strategy for pacification; left in the hands of the armed forces, the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign continued to be strictly military. The IDL gives figures for deaths and disappearances for the first six months of 1990, and graphically charts the course of violence since 1990 (deaths in 1990 have almost reached the highs of 1984). Nevertheless, in spite of growing violence, Sendero Luminoso has met with some setbacks. It failed for the third time to disrupt elections throughout Peru; in spite of ten years of armed struggle, the majority of Peruvians still prefer peaceful alternatives to violence for political change. The guerrillas have also met with growing resistance in rural areas, as peasants volunteer to form Civil Defense Committees. Still, the best lines of defense against terrorism have been popular organizations, unions, *et al.*, that the government and certain business sectors have myopically been attacking. The IDL's report also discusses paramilitary human rights abuses, Sendero's urban strategy, MRTA's activities, the growing problem of drug-related violence in the Upper Huallaga Valley, the struggle between *rondas* and guerrillas in Ayacucho and other rural areas, the disgraceful state of Peruvian jails, and the new Fujimori government's approach to fighting terrorism. Appended is a chronology of violence, from January through December, 1989.

725. Radu, Michael and Vladimir Tismaneanu. "Peru." In *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods.* Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1990, pp.307-345.

Intending their book to serve as a reference work, Radu and Tismaneanu have compiled a detailed account of virtually every modern Latin American revolutionary movement. They succinctly trace the origins of Sendero Luminoso, describe where it operates in Peru, discuss its front organizations, its membership and leadership, its ideology, military structure, training, recruitment, logistics and equipment, evaluate its performance, degree of popular support, factionalism, and assess its chances of success. They conclude that its chances of taking power seem negligible in the long term. However, the inept, half-hearted and often contradictory policies of the Belaúnde and García governments toward the insurgency, and the mediocre performance of the military and police, almost guarantee continued guerrilla activity. In the short and medium term, the movement will grow bolder, expand its members and areas of activity, and inflict heavier damage on the economy. Sendero's ability to bring down the elected government should not be underestimated, although that will result in a military coup, followed by Sendero's probable extinction. An excellent reference source for a compressed and well-balanced assessment of all aspects of the PCP. Shorter entries on MRTA, and the 1960's movements FIR, MIR, ELN, and VR, share the Peruvian section along with Shining Path.

726. Rodríguez G., Yolanda. *Violencia política en la selva central.* Lima: Area de Promoción e Información de los Derechos Humanos, Instituto de Defensa Legal, 1990.

The central jungle has been an area totally convulsed by violence over the last two years. Sendero has launched an offensive to win control of certain areas in Junín; it already has virtual control of some valleys, and of the cocaine trade carried on there. The presence of Sendero and MRTA is due in degree to the success of the security forces in displacing them from Ayacucho and the Alto Huallaga. The key players in this situation, however, are the Ashaninka Indians, caught between settlers, guerrillas, and security forces. The Instituto has assembled a report on this bitter struggle. It describes Indian political organizing and legislation introduced to formalize native communities and protect their lands. Violence increasingly broke out between *narcotraficantes,* guerrillas, Indians, and police and soldiers in the 1980's. The assassination of Indian leaders brought about an immediate native uprising to "clean the zone of MRTA." The report recounts in detail the fight of various Ashaninka communities against MRTA and Sendero, which considers control of Junín to be essential to its strategy; the zone supplies food and electrical power to the capital, and is furthermore the "entrance port" to the eastern jungle. Sendero has murdered local officials, including native political leaders, and kidnapped Indian youths for forcible recruitment. The Instituto spells out, zone by zone, how the guerrillas are fighting for control of the *selva,* as well as the counterinsurgency strategy of the government, that has resulted in the usual disappearances and accusations of human rights abuses. Nevertheless, the key to government strategy is the formation of native *rondas,* that have often been armed only in a rudimentary manner by the army, Marines, or sinchis. Unfortunately, the militarization of the region has resulted in a vicious cycle of violence among local communities, exacerbating old tensions and rivalries, and exposing a lack of coordination among *rondas,* police, and army.

727. Roldán, Julio. *"Gonzalo" el mito: apuntes para una interpretación del PCP.* Lima: Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, 1990.

An essay exploring the nature of Sendero through its almost-mythical leader, Abimael Guzmán, better known as *Presidente Gonzalo.* The "myth" of Gonzalo has been linked to other Peruvian myths, such as that of Inkarri. Gonzalo has become almost an abstraction, synonymous with the revolution; *senderistas* say that "the party lives, fights, and will triumph; Gonzalo Thought guarantees all of this." Roldán's most absorbing chapters are "dates, symbols, and rites," and "Gonzalo the myth." Here he shows how the party has consciously set out to manipulate symbols to link its struggle with wider and more resonant themes. Festivals celebrate notable revolutionary events; the movement's iconography and music utilize the symbolism of sun and flame to divide the dark from the light. As for Gonzalo, Roldán, (who admits that he was detained in 1981 for twelve days by DIRCOTE under "suspicion of supporting acts of terrorism"), traces his early life, using previously-published press reports to highlight interesting tidbits (one friend described Guzmán as "religious without God," but having a "spiritual religiosity"). Roldán shows how Gonzalo has been converted into a phantasm. In Apurímac, for example, there is a local myth about four brothers, one of whom is said to be all-powerful; he has been converted into "the fourth sword" (of Marxism), powerful, invincible, directing the revolution. In Cuzco and Ayacucho President Gonzalo is the reincarnation of the Inca king, who will put the world into reverse; i.e. *Pachacútec,* or he who will bring *pachakuti.* Apart from the conjunction of Andean myth and politics, Roldán points out that even in party documents Guzmán is glorified as the greatest living Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, and that his thought guarantees the triumph of national and world revolution. The testimony of imprisoned *senderistas* shows that Guzmán incarnates for party members progress, the future, the emergence of a new man and a new world--a veritable utopia.

728. Rubio Correa, Marcial. "The Perception of the Subversive Threat in Peru." In *The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America.* Edited by Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S.R. Mendelson, and Juan Rial. Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, 1990, pp.107-122.

Examination of civil-military relations in Peru within the framework of the present insurgent challenge. Throughout most of Peru's history, writes Rubio Correa, the government has been in the hands of the military; the nation has no political, economic, or socio-democratic tradition. It is ironic that terrorism has arisen as a serious threat just as Peru reentered the democratic-constitutional current circulating in Latin America in 1980. Rubio Correa examines the role of the armed forces in Peru, particularly in the aftermath of the Velasco military government of the 1960's and 1970's. The transformation of the military from supporter of the entrenched oligarchy to institutional modernizer left a strengthened armed forces holding a position of power within the state. The National Defense Board, National Defense System, and Joint Command of the Armed Forces are institutions that allow the military an enhanced role within Peruvian society, including a political role. The establishment of joint political-military commands in emergency zones allow the armed forces to exercise broad judicial authority in threatened areas, an authority they insist is necessary in fighting subversion. Rubio Correa also analyzes the military's

perception of Sendero. It is clear that civil, social, and political groups are widely split on an effective counterinsurgency strategy. The military has chosen a repressive option, but does seem aware that a political response (in the form of economic development programs) is necessary as well. He delineates some of the civil-military problems that the insurgency has exacerbated, and concludes that Shining Path's strategy (which is to drive a wedge between civilians and the military) has succeeded in the medium run; internal bickering between the government and the armed forces over doctrines, resources, and human rights has prevented a consistent counter-guerrilla strategy from being formulated and applied.

729. Salazar de Alcazar, Hugo. *Teatro y violencia: una aproximación al teatro peruano de los 80'.* Lima: Centro de Documentación y Video Teatral, 1990.

Exploration of how Peruvian theater has responded to the violence and chaos of the decade. New groups like Yuyachkani, Cuatrotablas, and Telba have reformulated their aesthetic presuppositions and concepts to try and fit the new social realities into the theater. Salazar discusses examples of new work that reflect the violence and disorder of society. Sendero itself has utilized symbolism in its revolution; Salazar cites Juan Ansión's interpretation of Sendero's black-outs of Lima as a symbolic blinding of European, white Peru. Sendero uses informal spaces in which to present its guerrilla theater: jails, "red zones," liberated villages, etc. Stripped of bourgeois artifice, the Sendero guerrilla theater incorporates music, poetry, mimicry, and dance into a form of direct communication, masses to masses. Short pieces of agitation and propaganda were first presented in the jails; their form owed much to the drama of China's Cultural Revolution. By 1987 longer pieces like "Taking land" and "*Senderista* marriage" were being presented in other venues. In the latter, an Andean couple, after completing a mission for the Party, is married in front of a mural depicting Abimael Guzmán. A peasant fiesta follows, in which *senderista* versions of traditional songs are sung. Salazar analyzes how this and other works fit into traditional folkloric and theatrical forms. Sendero's guerrilla theater is above all functional in form, designed for propagandizing and agitating urban and rural masses.

730. *Sendero de violencia: testimonios periodísticos, 1980-1989.* Compiled by Alvaro Rojas Samanez. Lima: Ediciones de Actualidad-Colegio de Periodistas del Perú, 1990.

A wide-ranging collection of articles from the Peruvian press on Sendero. This volume captures chronologically a broad spectrum of opinion and analysis on the struggle, including reports on the origins of Sendero in the 1960's. Notable are several articles from *Debate* by Raúl González, as well as editorials and "op-ed" pieces from daily newspapers like *La República* and *El Comercio,* and journals like *Quehacer, Oiga,* and *Caretas.* An excellent primary source for examining how the Peruvian press has reported on the progressive breakdown of democratic society over the course of a decade, as Sendero's threat grew beyond Ayacucho and MRTA and narcoterrorism also began to menace the state. Appended is a translation of Everette Larson's 1986 bibliography on Sendero.

731. *El Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path) in Context: An Annotated Bibliography of Monographs in the OSU Libraries.* Compiled, annotated, and introduced by John M. Bennett. Columbus: The Ohio State University Libraries, 1990.

Annotated bibliography of books on Sendero and the Andean situation in the libraries of Ohio State University. Most of the 227 entries are not on Sendero itself, but cover general reference works and bibliography on Peru, politics, agrarian reform, José Carlos Mariátegui, APRA and Haya de la Torre, the military regime of 1968-1980, and other leftist groups, including the 1965 guerrilla movement. The last 48 works cover Sendero's history, development, and intellectual foundation. Especially interesting is a short section on Sendero in literature. The annotations are brief, but succinct. Although limited to OSU's holdings, the bibliography nevertheless provides a good foundation for the study of *senderismo* 's background.

732. Tarazona-Sevillano, Gabriela and John B. Reuter. *Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism.* Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. (The Washington papers, 144) New York: Praeger, 1990.

Basic summary of the movement, written by a former criminal affairs prosecutor of the Public Ministry in the Peruvian judicial system from 1984 to 1986. Using mostly journalism sources (to the virtually total exclusion of sociological materials), Tarazona-Sevillano recounts the history and development of Shining Path from Mariátegui's philosophy, through Guzmán and the Huamanga University period. Particularly interesting is an examination of the movement's rather

vague goals: in a section entitled "Vision of Utopia: A New Democratic Republic," Tarazona-Sevillano looks at the state structure Mao Tse-Tung built in China under the name "New Democracy," using it as a possible blueprint for a society ruled by Sendero. Tarazona-Sevillano also details the movement's popular fronts, and gives mini-biographies of its leadership, apart from Guzmán. Her best section is a detailed analysis of how the Peruvian judicial system has tried to meet the challenge of terrorism in Peru. From the start ethical questions about preserving constitutional rights and freedoms, and arguments about viewing terrorism as ordinary crime or treason, dominated the debate. The first anti-terrorist legislation viewed terrorist acts as ordinary, not political crimes. This hampered police efforts to fight Sendero (as typified by the case of Osmán Morote, who although well-known as a *senderista* leader, could not be prosecuted for lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt). The result was jails overcrowded with suspects who were either ignored in their prolonged incarceration, or released for lack of evidence, which enormously frustrated the security forces. The Special Tribunals set up in June, 1987, were dedicated exclusively to deal with terrorism cases. These failed to function because their judges feared for their lives, as the state made no special effort to protect them. Most of the tribunals have been dissolved. Tarazona-Sevillano provides a useful table outlining anti-terrorist legislation and its provisions. She concludes with a section on narco-terrorism, which she sees as a powerful and dangerous alliance that gives the guerrillas access to enormous funds, a regional power base ("a state within a state") that could threaten neighboring countries, and international links to unlimited amounts of money and weapons. Sendero, she writes, "seeks to unify the entire 'Andean nation' (an entity it defines vaguely in terms of a shared racial and cultural heritage) against existing exploitative and divisive state structures." Bolivia and Ecuador may be its next theaters of operation.

733. Wilson, Michael G. *A Challenge for the U.S. in an Unstable Peru.* (Backgrounder, no.800) Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, December 19 1990.

The stakes in Peru are considerable for the U.S., writes Wilson for the conservative Heritage Foundation. Increased political and economic chaos could become infectious, causing instability throughout the region at a time when democracy and free-market economics seem to be taking hold. A breakdown in order in Peru could lead to terrorist activity in Bolivia, Chile, and Colombia; Peru is also the key battlefield in the war on drugs. Washington can help Peru in the war against drugs and "help Peru promote a free-market economy which will strengthen democracy and human rights." The Bush Administration should certify Peru as having "cooperated fully" in the drug war, grant Peru increased economic aid, encourage Fujimori to appoint a "drug czar," help promote free market-oriented programs to wean farmers from coca cultivation, install radar facilities in the highlands, establish additional DEA command posts in the Huallaga, and expand cooperation with security forces to defeat terrorist groups. The U.S. should also negotiate a U.S.-Peruvian free trade agreement, open up new markets for the U.S., and promote Peruvian economic growth.

734. "Crímenes selectivos. " *Caretas,* no.1091 (January 15 1990): 18-19.

Caretas publishes the photos of ten individuals who were the target of terrorist hit squads, with the dates and details of their murders (a few survived their attacks). The ten include the director of El Frontón prison, high-level officials in Belaúnde's Popular Action Party, and high-ranking military officers, including a vice-admiral. A short paragraph suggests that analyzing the terrorists' methodology can save one's own life, and that Sendero generally utilizes women in its ambush teams, women who often administer the *"coup de grace."*

Following (pp.22-23) is a short piece ("Sólo bandas armadas") that discusses voting patterns. Is sedition winning over democracy? asks *Caretas.* No more, it says. A table shows that absenteeism at the polls was highest in 1983 (35%). In 1985 it was 8.85%; in 1980, before Sendero even existed, it was much higher at 18%. *Caretas* marshals these statistics to show that people continue to chose the ballot box over the gun as an engine of change; Sendero and MRTA can clearly be seen, according to *Caretas,* as minuscule organizations in demographic terms. [However, the piece leads off by reporting that municipal elections in Huamanga should be annulled, because 2/3 of all ballots were ruined or blank.]

735. "Substuir ahora." *Caretas,* no.1092 (January 22 1990): 37.

The spectacular fall in the price of coca leaf (due in part to pressure on *narcos* by governments as part of their "War on Drugs") makes the cultivation of coffee or cacao economically feasible. A table from a Unaited Nations report shows that with adequate technical

assistance, the prices per kilo of crops such as coffee, cacao, or *achiote* could be higher than that of coca leaf.

736. Davis, Robert B. "Sendero Luminoso and Peru's Struggle for Survival." *Military Review,* v.70, no.1 (January 1990): 79-88.

Davis, an analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency, stresses Sendero's unique nature; "SL," he writes, "has been extremely sophisticated in manipulating primitive superstitions and myths evolving from the centuries-old struggle between dark-skinned descendants of the Incas and white-skinned descendants of their Spanish conquerors." Davis presents a trajectory of *senderista* success, followed by decline as their terror tactics alienated many villagers. However, the military's "dirty war" response, and the Vietnam-style "strategic hamlet" program, (which relocated many communities and placed a severe strain on local resources, aggravating poverty and hunger), allowed Sendero to recapture the initiative. Sendero, after failing to win in key areas like Pasco and Junín, has been forced to reexamine its strategy. Facing competition from MRTA and IU, Sendero decided to shed its sectarian image and emphasize political organizing in Lima and other urban areas. It has infiltrated important unions and organizations, and may be reformulating its approach, trying to forge a united front with Marxist and progressive sectors. SL, Davis believes, is embracing a more traditional form of guerrilla warfare. This has apparently led to internal strife within Sendero. He concludes that García cannot merely wait for SL to self-destruct, but must integrate his egalitarian political philosophy with a more sophisticated counterinsurgency strategy, and seek military and economic aid from industrialized countries and sister Latin American democracies.

737. Palmer, David Scott. "Peru's Persistent Problems." *Current History,* v.89, no.543 (January 1990): 5-8, 31-34.

Many records, Palmer writes, were set in Peru in 1988: inflation, emigration, and the production of cocaine paste skyrocketed, the economy contracted, and terrorist incidents and the number of security forces killed went up. Peru became the only Latin American nation at risk of expulsion for arrears on its debt to the IMF, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank. Palmer describes the nation's dismal outlook, reviewing in detail the steady erosion of the Peruvian economy under García. He also reviews the multiple guerrilla threats to Peru's fragile democracy. Over the past 18 months MRTA and the Rodrigo Franco Front have accounted for about 20% of terrorist incidents. However, Shining Path remains the dominant threat to Peru. Palmer succinctly summarizes Sendero as a Maoist vanguard of peasants and workers whose intentions are left deliberately obscure: "The New Democracy, which would be established after the revolution, is left somewhat vague, but official references suggest it would be patterned after the original Chinese model of collective agriculture and industry, self-sufficiency, a dominant state meeting basic needs and constant internal self-criticism to avoid the danger of creating a new bureaucratic elite. Gestures of respect for reformed private property and religious beliefs are probably tactical rhetoric." No compromise is possible with a group prepared for a 50-year struggle. Sendero's ideological and organizational coherence, Palmer notes, are insufficient to ensure success; also needed are substantial support among the populace and an unpopular government that becomes less legitimate over time. It is clear that the group at least enjoys acquiescence in some parts of Peru. Still, support shown for the electoral process in the 1985 presidential elections show that most Peruvians still prefer a non-violent road to change. Palmer concludes that modest economic gains in 1989, better military equipment and a more offensive posture by the security forces, multiple political alternatives at the popular level, and a more active posture by Alán García indicate that Peru may be poised to climb back from the edge of the abyss.

738. Erulkar, Eliab S. "The Shining Paradox." *Harvard International Review,* v.12, no.2 (Winter 1990): 43-45.

Compressed summary of Sendero, since its origins in 1962 "as a group of several pro-peasant, disaffected intellectuals." Erulkar traces Shining Path back to the "National University at Huamanga, in the Andahuaylas mountainous department in south-central Peru...[a] chapter of the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army) was formed at the University to champion the cause of poor peasants; it was led by philosophy professor Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, who would later assume the nom de guerre of Gonzalo." Despite some glaring factual errors, Erulkar gives a compact history of the course of the war, stressing Sendero's ability to isolate Lima from the rest of the country, paralyze central Peru through the calling of "armed strikes," and the ceding of most of noncoastal Peru to the guerrillas by the army. Sendero's war chest is filled with thirty million dollars in extortion money from Colombian drug lords, and many

believe that the Maoists are poised to lay siege to the economically depressed capital with impunity. The paradox to which Erulkar refers is that Senderist violence has resulted in a galvanization of the Peruvian political system. Neither the military nor any of the four leading parties can or will mount a coup; nor has Sendero been able, despite murder and intimidation, to disrupt the municipal elections of November 12. Still, the real test of democracy's resiliency will come with the presidential elections of April.

739. "La promesa de Huallaga." *Caretas,* no.1095 (February 12 1990): 34-35.

Can the Huallaga be weaned away from coca cultivation? This article suggests that it can, but only under certain conditions. The coca growing peasant receives very little of the $800 million that narcotics activity generates. Still, a lack of credit, poor soils, low productivity, and above all, an inefficient system of commercial distribution are serious impediments to change, as is violence from Sendero and MRTA. U.S. AID studies have traced the fall in acreage devoted to coffee and other crops. Whether the *cocalero* will continue to be viewed as a *narcotraficante,* as some North American authorities insist, or be treated as a victim of the market's snares, remains to be seen.

740. Shifter, Michael. "Human Rights: Peruvian Responses." *Hemisphere*, v.2, no.2 (Winter-Spring 1990): 6-9.

Since the early 1980's NGO's have monitored government human rights abuses. Yet the Peruvian situation is anything but conventional. Both the Belaúnde and García governments were democratically elected civilian regimes, in contrast to Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina in the 1970's. Human rights organizations, following a traditional approach, have pressured both governments to honor their legal and political commitments. Now, however, the situation is changing. The growing strength of Sendero, and the consequent weakening of the Peruvian state (which is unable to protect its own citizens) are leading NGO's to abandon their legalistic approach, and try new measures to safeguard human rights, including strengthening a nonviolent democratic center, stressing education and training of key civilian sectors, and focusing on the guerrillas' abuses as well as those of the government. Shifter analyzes the new approaches taken by Peruvian NGO's, and reviews the work of the Red Peruana de Educación en Derechos Humanos, which oversees six organizations: the Escuela de Derechos Humanos del Instituto de Defensa Legal, the Comisión Andina de Juristas, the Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social, the Centro de Estudios y Acción para la Paz, the Instituto Peruano de Educación en Derechos Humanos y la Paz, and the Centro Amazónico de Antropología y Aplicación Popular. The Red is intensifying its efforts to form ties to church, labor, youth, and community groups. While under attack themselves from guerrillas and security forces, the NGO's are attempting to buttress a fragile political democracy in the midst of civil war.

741. Massing, Michael. "In the Cocaine War, the Jungle is Winning." *The New York Times Magazine* (March 4 1990): 26-27, 88-92.

Well-written account of the escalating war on drugs in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV). Massing visits the newly-constructed base in Santa Lucía, where DEA agents, pilots and mechanics, ex-Special Forces operatives, and 120 Peruvian police man what is surely the most dangerous anti-narcotics post in the world. The Bush Administration has budgeted $2.2 billion in aid over a five year period for the Andean region, with $600 million going to Peru alone. Corah, the Control and Eradication of Coca in the Upper Huallaga program, has razed many acres of coca plants, but has alienated many farmers. Since 1982, 40 Corah workers have been murdered, most by Sendero. The program has been suspended and its workers evacuated to Santa Lucia, where they have nothing to do. Massing rides a helicopter to see a raided cocaine lab. The UHV is three times the size of El Salvador, and the U.S. has only 8 Vietnam-era Huey choppers to patrol it. In 1988 the DEA destroyed 75 labs and seized 5,900 kilos of coca base, impressive figures until measured against the estimated output of the UHV: one million kilos of base. The U.S. is now pinning its hopes on the Peruvian military, whose generals are reluctant to become involved in the anti-coca campaign, seeing it as a diversion from the real fight against Sendero. The police, hopelessly corrupt and inept, cannot do the job. The U.S. is pressuring the military to join the fight, but Massing, visiting General Arciniega, sees that it is not quite as simple as that. The general has defended coca-growing peasants, and has been accused of being in the pay of *cocaleros.* Arciniega says that Corah comes and cuts down a peasant's plants, leaving him nothing. And who protects him? he asks. Sendero! Massing concludes that coca is so important to the valley's and the nation's economy that the battle against it will probably be futile (there are millions of coca dollars on the

streets of Lima, the nation's true banking system). But the U.S. has plans for more bases like Santa Lucía. "The bottom line," says a State Department official, "is we're going to have to escalate."

742. "Planes de marzo." *Caretas,* no.1098 (March 5 1990): 24.

Five months ago, in the Mantaro Valley, a *"Comité Ampliado"* of Sendero met to plan a campaign named "March, a bloody pre-electoral step." At this meeting priority was given to the tactic of selective assassination. According to intelligence sources, 30 top *senderista* leaders conceded that the campaign "From the countryside to the cities" announced last year has failed, because of the desertion of a number of combatants and the corruption of some mid-level commanders. Desertion has been highest in the Alto Huallaga, where some "traitors" have quit to become "lumpen;" i.e., full-time drug-runners. Some of the leaders who broke the eight rules of conduct (such as rape or abuse of peasants) have been executed. The Party also admits that the *rondas* have been a problem. In Lima Sendero has failed to infiltrate worker and popular organizations. This has been due largely to the success of the leftist parties in organizing among the working class. The Party sees the necessity of moving up "reserves cadres" to the capital.

743. "Albúm inedito." *Caretas,* no.1099 (March 12 1990): 38-41.

The recent capture of two *miristas* by agents of DIRCOTE's Dirección de Investigaciones Especiales has yielded an intelligence bonanza. Police found documents and photographs at the home of one of the arrested guerrillas. The photos identified MRTA fighters in the jungle; the documents included an account of actions undertaken there and a chart of the guerrilla organization, communications referring to the police strike of May, 1987, reports from supposed infiltrators of the Air Force, Navy, and Army, manuscripts from captured *miristas* inside Canto Grande, manuals on the preparation of explosives and urban guerrilla warfare (edited by the Chinese resistance militias), police radio codes, a map of Lima with designated guerrilla zones of command, and a bi-monthly bulletin from a French documentation center entitled *"Llarecc Ch'aska"* ("Morning Star").

744. Walsh, John. "In Peru, Even Potato Research is High Risk." *Science,* v.247, no.4948 (March 16 1990): 1286-1287.

Report on the activities of the International Potato Center [CIP in Spanish]. The Center's security chief was murdered by Sendero in 1988, and in December, 1989, part of the CIP's field station in Huancayo was bombed and burned. Fortunately, no scientists or personnel were harmed. But the message from the guerrillas was clear. and all international staff have been pulled out of the area and the station put on complete standby. Why attack the CIP? It is not associated with the Peruvian government, but is actually one of 13 international centers making up the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, which is sponsored by the UN and funded internationally. But Sendero doesn't make fine distinctions in its campaign to destabilize the government. The remainder of the article discusses the work of the CIP, which concentrates on preserving genetic materials as wild varieties of potatoes disappear, improving disease and pest resistance, and raising crop yields. The CIP emphasizes helping poor farmers, but revolutionary violence, a 2,000% inflation rate, and high crime in places like Lima make its mission difficult to carry out in Peru. Much of the key work conducted in Huancayo, where the potato originated and was first cultivated, has been transferred to Quito, and the Huancayo staff pulled back to Lima. Can the CIP continue to operate in Peru? Its director denies rumors of leaving, stating that too much is at stake.

745. "Una cura de armas tomar." *Caretas,* no.1101 (March 26 1990): 78-79.

With "bullet-proof" courage, Franciscan missionary Mariano Gagnon has returned to his mission in Cutivireni in spite of death threats from Sendero, after spending the last three weeks somewhere in the jungles of Vilcabamba. His report details the extent of the massacres in the Río Ene, the will to resist on the part of the natives, and the urgent necessity they have of arms, medicines, and supplies. Sendero has murdered some 25 natives and wounded eight others, and has moved by force native families to their bases to be "reeducated" and guarded. *Caretas* compares Sendero's actions to those of the genocidal Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. The Indians have struck back, killing a number of guerrillas. At the end of January representatives of 200 Ashaninka communities met with a sinchi general in Mazamari. Their testimony told of Sendero's efforts to build a fortified area in the jungles of Junín in the last six months. Authorities promised the natives schools and a road, but the Indians told them, "We don't want schools or a road. We want weapons to expel Sendero from our territory." In the past decade, the Río Ene, *Caretas* points out,

has seen the arrival of thousands of immigrants in search of a better future; it has also become an important transportation corridor for narcotics.

746. Marks, Tom. "Corner of the Dead." *Soldier of Fortune,* v.15, no. 3 (March 1990): 44-51, 83-85.

Marks, a journalist and former army officer, was able to spend time with the Peruvian army in Ayacucho, normally off-limits to the press [his connection to the right-wing *Soldier of Fortune* may have helped]. Marks finds that the army, described in Lima as lacking in unit cohesion, training, and non-commissioned officers, is of much higher caliber than generally believed, and deployed in a manner best suited to its limited numbers and logistical support. The soldiers appeared robust, weapons were clean and well-maintained, barracks immaculate, and discipline tight. Marks infers that the "hearts and minds" campaigns is making headway due to the number of *campesinos* joining the *rondas*. Frequently maligned, the *rondas* are, according to Marks, the linchpin of effective counterinsurgency, although they frighten urban bureaucrats and there are constant debates as to the wisdom of arming them. The Peruvian army is turning to a combination of regular unit patrolling, militia static defense, civic action, and special Ranger-type companies to defeat the guerrillas. The army in Ayacucho, he writes, has grasped that counterinsurgency must be more than a military campaign; "what is needed is for Lima to underwrite the effort by undertaking the task of national reform." Marks's firsthand observations on the army in Ayacucho are valuable; however, his introductory mini-analysis of Sendero's origins contains a number of factual errors as well as flippant and facile political observations. Marks's 1992 chapter in Palmer's *Sendero Luminoso* (see no.935) is excellent and dispenses with the glib tone of parts of this article.

747. Deriuguin, Serguéi and Alexander Sliñkó. "Perú en el umbral de los años 90: ¿existe salida de la crisis?" *América Latina* (USSR), no.3 (March 1990): 37-48, 75.

Soviet Latin Americanists' analysis of the Peruvian crisis. Although they approve of the radical approach of the APRA government in restructuring the economy, its strategy has collapsed, leaving the economy worse than under Belaúnde; García's experiments have taken the country back some 30 years. Despite García's repeated phrase that Peru is not Lebanon, nor is Lima Beirut, the war has intensified since APRA took power. Since 1987 Sendero has changed tactics to infiltrate legal worker organizations in order to gradually win its political objectives. Little by little the movement is legalizing itself; the *Diario de la Marca* is its voice. It is also expanding from a predominantly rural to an urban base. Important proof of its partial legitimization is its first congress, celebrated in Lima in December 1987. The proceedings of the congress, as well as a discourse of Abimael Guzmán, were subsequently published in the *Diario.* But much of Sendero's success is due to the fiasco of government efforts to fight the insurgency. Deriguin and Sliñkó discuss Sendero's ideology (which extols Mao and condemns the USSR), and is based mostly on violence. They also survey at length the difficulties of the APRA government, its relations with the Peruvian left and right, and the existence of a "Peruvian" model, one in which Sendero's terrorism serves as a pretext for repressing democratic liberties and the "action of the proletariat." The Peruvian grand bourgeoisie, in their analysis, needs "Pinochetism without Pinochet"; the actions of Sendero may allow them to achieve such a goal--a military dictatorship with a democratic image.

748. "¿Un mito y nada más?" *América Latina* (USSR), no.3 (March 1990): 49-53.

Interview with the Izquierda Unida *alcalde* (mayor) of Ayacucho, Fermín Darío Aparrent Taipe. *América Latina* questions Aparrent Taipe on Sendero's philosophy, its social base, the sectors from which it draws it support, its ties (or lack thereof) to the Peruvian left, his opinion on MRTA, Indian support for Sendero, and what kind of society he forsees if Sendero wins. Basically he proposes development as a way to rob Sendero of its support. He condemns it as a terrorist movement, citing Andrés Mateo's opinion that Sendero is a tool of the CIA designed to justify repression against liberation movements. Sendero's base, in his opinion, is among poor students, with a limited following among the peasantry. Generally peasants collaborate with Sendero out of fear; they fear the government's forces more than the *senderistas*. Although IU and Sendero are enemies, the movement seems to have some sort of overseas leftist support, as *senderistas* visit Paris, Copenhagen, Oslo, collect money, and send it back to Peru. In Paris there are some *senderista* cells. Suppose Sendero came to power, he is asked. What kind of society would result? Anarchy, he replies. The ranks of the movement are filled with militants who know only how to follow orders. Sendero has few qualified supporters, and he doubts that they could form an effective government. "They have a myth, nothing more," he answers. The journal notes that Fermín Darío Aparrent Taipe was subsequently shot and killed in the garden of his home.

749. Ballón Aguirre, Francisco. "La rebelión de los Ashaninkas." *Quehacer,* no.63 (March-April 1990): 56-61.

In December, 1989, a hit squad of MRTA guerrillas assassinated the chief *(Pinkatzari)* of the Ashaninka Indians, in retaliation for his having helped the army in the killing of a guerrilla leader in 1965. The Indians, led by the *Pinkatzari's* son, rose in anger, and armed with bows and arrows, began to attack MRTA. In light of this struggle, and of recent insinuations that the army is again using the Indians against MRTA and Sendero, Francisco Ballón reviews the recent history of the Ashaninkas, and examines their interaction with the Peruvian state and the two movements that are fighting to overthrow it. As in the case of another murder of a native leader by Sendero, the Ashaninkas did not initiate hostilities; they respond only when their self-determination is infringed on by outside forces. Ballón points out that the Yanesha of the Río Palcazú and the Shipibos of the Ucayali have kept their political distance from MRTA, and have not had any hostile interaction with them. In fact, the usual reaction of native groups when they clash with outside forces is to abandon their villages and flee into the forests. Still, Ballón reminds us that native groups are not homogeneous societies; their religion, leadership, language, family structure, occupations, vary greatly from group to group. What seems certain is that the objectives of those in armed rebellion in Peru and those of native societies are very different. Ballón examines the dichotomies between what Indians want for themselves and what outsiders feel is best for them, whether this means revolutionary struggle, economic and political integration into European society, or a "perestroika" that will give the native peoples everywhere the freedom they need to decide their destinies for themselves.

750. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Insurgencia y democracia." *Debate,* no.59 (March-April 1990): 49-51.

How, Gorriti asks, can a weak and fragile democracy defend itself from an insurgency as well organized as Shining Path? It is said that a guerrilla insurrection has never overthrown a democratic government, but this is only partially true. Generally, democratic regimes are overthrown by militaries that consider them obstacles in fighting the insurgencies. Gorriti considers the relationship between guerrilla insurgencies and democracies in Latin America; while no Cuban-style revolution managed to take power in any Latin American society, the effect of these insurgencies was to destroy democracy in countries like Uruguay. For nations like Peru, Colombia, and the Philippines, the greatest challenge is how to confront a major insurgent challenge without resorting to non-democratic methods. Gorriti outlines what he considers some of the most common errors made by countries fighting subversion. French and British counterinsurgency doctrines, the most popular, were formulated in colonial situations that may be inapplicable to independent nations. Ultimately, Gorriti points to an examination of civilian institutions that mirror the weaknesses of societies like Peru as a whole; only a mass, organized, and democratic base of support can defend as legitimate democratic government.

751. Shifter, Michael. "Los derechos humanos en el Perú: entre dos fuegos." *Debate,* no.59 (March-April 1990): 43-49.

According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Peru has been first in the world in the number of disappearances for the third year in a row. Organizations like Americas Watch and Amnesty International have documented the use of torture and extrajudicial executions committed by security forces. Something like half the population of the country lives under a state of emergency. Shifter examines how NGO's in Peru have responded to this dire situation, noting that unlike Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, successive governments in Peru since 1980 have been democratic and elected regimes. In recent years, two factors have complicated this situation. The first is Sendero itself, which dismisses all such notions as "bourgeois" and rejects any attempts to negotiate an end to the war. The other is the growing weakness of civilian government and institutions in Peru. Accordingly, many NGO's have concluded that conventional methods of defending human rights, such as putting pressure on the government, are no longer adequate. As violence has grown, so has the sophistication of NGO's in attempts to educate and activate the public; Shifter discusses the network of civil and church groups that has developed to organize, on a local and provincial level, the work of defending human rights. These groups themselves have come under fire and even under attack from other Peruvian sectors that object to their work. Still, they struggle valiantly on with their work, and hope the new government will be more receptive to their criticisms and suggestions. A sidebar quotes at length from the U.S. State Department's report on human rights in Peru.

752. "Cisma en Sendero." *Caretas,* no.1102 (April 2 1990): 58-61.

Guards in Canto Grande were surprised to hear the normally unified and disciplined prisoners shouting slogans at each other! There appears to be a split inside the jail between two factions. One, led by Osmán Morote, questions the party's leadership in giving priority to actions of pure terror this close to the elections, sacrificing the party's hardest cadres. Apparently a minority within Sendero disagrees with the policy of sabotage and selected attacks, and believes that efforts should be directed to strengthen the Popular Guerrilla Army. A sidebar ("Microbuses: ¿Y el 8 de abril?") looks at recent actions designed to disrupt urban transportation by destroying buses or intimidating their owners into leaving them in their garages. A *senderista* flyer slipped under the door of the headquarters of the 162 cooperative enterprises that make up the Federación de Choferes was enough to make the point.

753. "La pelea." *Caretas,* no.1103 (April 10 1990): 54-57.

More details on the schism inside Sendero. Some believe that too many good fighters have been sacrificed in a useless campaign to derail the elections; their replacement from areas outside Lima has not improved the situation. The article names those on the Metropolitan Committee who have dissented. They were not expelled, but had to perform "self-criticism" and swear allegiance anew to Abimael Guzmán. *Caretas* also discusses the plans of front organizations like the MRDP and other "classist" movements to help disrupt the elections. The article names the recently-captured *senderistas* who have supplied information on the Lima leadership.

754. "Sendero y Fujimori." *Caretas,* no.1104 (April 16 1990): 52-55.

Report on the presidential elections of April 8. In sixty days, says *Caretas,* Fujimori has gained almost 3 million votes, while in ten years, Guzmán has caused 17,000 deaths. Absenteeism appears to have been about 20% nationally. It was higher in Huamanga: 44.9%. Still, this is not much higher than in previous elections. *Caretas* sees the elections as a rebuff of Guzmán and everything he stands for. Even in the emergency zones, people voted for change. In Junín, Fujimori received 68% of the votes. In, Huancavelica, he got 45%; in the entire Central Zone Cambio 90 [Fujimori's political movement] received 40%. In Puno, he got 26%, 10% more than his closest competitor. All this shows that the "Republic of the New Democracy" that Guzmán plans to build in Peru over a lake of blood, is far from the wishes of the people. A map displays Cambio 90's support in different departments. A sidebar ("Nada concreto") reports that Cambio 90 and Fujimori do not appear to have any special strategy ready to fight Sendero. But he has pledged not to dialogue with Sendero, and he concedes that poverty, unemployment, hunger, and lack of opportunity have had something to do with Sendero's success. He also says that the police and armed forces should act within the constitution, and not violate human rights.

755. Woy-Hazelton, Sandra and William A. Hazelton. "Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy." *Third World Quarterly,* v.12, no. 2 (April 1990): 21-35.

Good, if reiterative summary of Shining Path's challenge. The Woy-Hazeltons stress that Sendero's persistence is due in part to the failure of two democratic governments to implement viable socio-economic reforms and an effective counterinsurgency strategy. Equally important has been Sendero's surprising ability to be more adaptive and influential than was expected. The PCP has modified its agenda and structure, and absorbed new followers to sustain its strategy to take power. Sendero targeted territorial and institutional expansion in areas where state competition has been weakest, enhancing their relative strength *vis-`a-vis* the government. Sendero's success in escalating the use of violence "threatens to undermine the rules of the democratic game in Peru." Their influence on the 1990 elections is likely to be significant, due as much to popular perceptions and interpretations of recent activities than to any real progress in overthrowing the government. The authors conclude that Sendero has had a profound impact on the Peruvian political system, not least for provoking an unprecedented level of violence in a nation that had known military government, but not mass terror. Its "ability to expand geographically and numerically in ten years is more a reflection of the failure to integrate vast areas of the Andean highlands than any real appeal of the Senderista message. Sendero's gains are directly related to the inefficiency of political institutions and the collapse of the Peruvian economy..." Sendero may be in a position to gain by the elections, regardless of a victory by either Vargas Llosa or IU.

756. García-Sayán, Diego. "Terrorismo y pacificación en el Perú." *Estudios internacionales,* año 23, no.90 (April-June 1990): 221-239.

García-Sayán analyzes the characteristics of violence as perpetrated by both guerrillas and the state. Sendero's relationship with its followers is overwhelmingly authoritarian. It imposes its authority over communities, and forcibly recruits combatants. Sendero's actions seem to focus on the military; its lack of political and social alliances makes its reliance on terror all the more noticeable. Its bloodiness is not, however, as some believe, demented or irrational. To Sendero, this course of action is cold and calculated; it is designed to "heighten the contradictions" and bring about the polarization and chaos the movement seeks. García-Sayán also points to the lack of opportunities young people and women face in Peru, as evidenced by Sendero's appeal to these sectors of society. Turning to the government's response, García-Sayán finds that it is just as violent as Sendero's; instead of trying to win legitimacy with the population for whose loyalty it is competing, the Belaúnde regime simply relied on a militarist and militarized response. Nor has García's APRA government, despite good initial intentions, been able to reverse this course. The emergency zones remain states inside of the Peruvian state, areas in which civil and judicial norms do not exist. García-Sayán proposes democratic institutionalization as a way back to the re-establishment of civil society, with respect for civil and human rights and a reversal of the state's role in promoting violence as a response to revolution.

757. "Ayuda militar." *Caretas,* no.1108 (May 14 1990): 30-34.

Arduous negotiations are being carried on at this moment between representatives of the United States government and the Defense and Foreign Relations Ministries. The U.S. is offering Peru $35 million in military aid. The Peruvian government would like economic aid as well for development in areas like the Alto Huallaga. The U.S. is also offering to send Green Berets to train the Peruvians, but the government is reluctant to accept the advisors. The military aid includes complete uniforms for soldiers (from head to toe), radios, M-16 rifles and grenade launchers, jeeps, trucks, tents, field hospitals, medical equipment and medicines, and field rations. The government position is that this equipment is well-known to its army, and its use requires no special instruction. As far as counterinsurgency strategy, local officers know the terrain and enemy far better than foreigners. Furthermore, permitting foreign soldiers into the country would allow Guzmán to raise the banner of "anti-imperialism."

758. "De senderismo a rondero." *Caretas,* no.1108 (May 14 1990): 36-37, 72.

Elíseo Gavilán, known as "Compañero Lucas," was recruited into Sendero while a student at the Colegio Gonzales Vigil in 1983, through the Movimiento Juvenil Clasista. Charged with collecting Sendero's "war taxes," he was captured on February 18 by an army patrol in a *barrio* of Accoscca. In April he and other captured *senderistas* paraded before the organized *comuneros* of Cangari and asked to be inducted into the community's *ronda. Caretas* talks to Gavilán about his recruitment into and service with Sendero, and his conversion after capture. Sendero is losing support in Huanta, and the army's policy of encouraging defections is paying off. Integrating those defectors into the counterinsurgency forces and giving them weapons is part of an ambitious civil defense strategy that the article describes.

759. "No más leña al fuego." *Caretas,* no.1108 (May 14 1990): 34-35, 88.

Interview with Diego García-Sayán, executive director of the Andean Commission of Jurists, about the North American aid package. García-Sayán agrees with his interviewer that the aid package embodies a contradiction: the American Congress has authorized funds for Peru; at the same time it has laid down strict requirements for respecting human rights as part of the conditions for receiving the aid. García Sayán believes that the presence of North American advisors will disturb the population in the Huallaga, already unhappy about the DEA's anti-drug operations. He also addresses the question of the pacification of the Huallaga, the possibilities for crop-substitution, and the Caratgena accord on the anti-drug war.

760. "Why Are We in Peru?" *The Nation,* v.250, no.19 (May 14 1990): 653.

Editorial comparing American military intervention in Peru, "which is now underway," with the U.S. invasion of Cambodia 20 years ago. Both appear to be sideshows to real U.S. interests, but this impression is misleading. The 1970 invasion was designed to extend American military power throughout Indochina; in Peru our buildup, with Green Berets, weapons, and training, is designed to project an American presence into the Andes. The rationale in Cambodia was to interdict North Vietnamese on the Ho Chi Minh Trail; in Peru, to interrupt the coca trade and suppress Shining Path guerrillas who are thought to abet it. The *Nation* believes that the raw projection of power remains as an ultimate rationale surpassing all the rhetoric of such actions.

Cambodia brought Kent State and galvanized the Khmer Rouge, with bloody results. Where, the *Nation* asks, is the opposition to Peru? Congress is silent, and there are no protests, so "for now it must be left to the Peruvians to expel the Yankee invaders. And who doubts that this is only the beginnings of another disaster in the history of criminal intervention?"

761. Anderson, Harry. "The Next Nasty War." *Newsweek*, v.115, no.21 (May 21 1990): 36-37.

A new war is emerging out of Washington's crusade on drugs. The U.S. is prepared to send $36 million to help a brutal and often corrupt military fight its half-hearted drug war. Altogether some $500 million in aid is earmarked for Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia, which will buy helicopters, small arms, mortars, trucks, light attack aircraft, uniforms, and first-aid kits. Extensive U.S. military training is also part of the package--but on a small scale; in Peru, no more than 24 Green Berets and a dozen support personnel are to be sent. There will be no base built in the heart of the Upper Huallaga Valley. President García prefers money to persuade peasants to grow crops other than coca, but the military will probably force the new president to accept the package. Anderson describes the Peruvian military's miserable counterinsurgency and human rights efforts so far. The army is so poor and corrupt that its commitment to fighting the drug war is in doubt. One successful guerrilla fighter, General Alberto Arciniega, suspended the anti-drug campaign to win the support of the area's peasants, and concentrated on attacking Sendero, to heavy criticism from the DEA in Washington. Anderson concludes that there are many ominous parallels to El Salvador. One U.S. military official said, "We're going back to what we know best...how to fight the commies." There is every danger that the U.S. will be sucked into another nasty little war it is unable to control.

762. Marks, Tom. "The Guerrilla Myth: Turning Campesinos Into Killers." *Soldier of Fortune*, v.15, no.5 (May 1990): 56-59, 65-68.

The second in a series of reports on Shining Path. Marks asks, How can a brutal and Maoist insurgency gain support? He argues that the Viet Cong, for instance, were selective in their use of terror, tying their bombings and assassinations to causes people could support, and by doing so maintained popular support. Terror can serve as an instrument of vengeance for pent-up popular frustrations. Sendero is ruthless, practicing this type of terror, and yet has established a popular base of support. Marks, comparing Peru with Vietnam, believes that intelligence about one's enemy is the most important element in defeating an insurgency. Sendero is neither peasant nor Indian; it has been killing *campesinos*, driving them into the government militias. One analyst told Marks that Sendero consists mainly of landless, disenfranchised, former middle class youth: "Frequently the youth who joins Sendero will have university training, be 20-25 years old; his father held land." Sendero may be able to recruit from disenfranchised peasants, but at least 50% of those in its columns come from a middle class whose parents were landowners...."it is not certain that there was ever a real link between Sendero and the landless, illiterate peasants of the mountains." Sendero's columns field a large proportion of elite membership. Marks also outlines in detail the political and military structure of Sendero's support bases and sectoral organizations, and its conduct of operations. He concludes that Sendero does have a social base in Ayacucho that allows it to survive, and that this base is maintained by a combination of terror, coercion, and indoctrination. However, in terms of its waging a genuine popular war, he quotes a Peruvian analyst as flatly stating "The Inca's Last Rebellion explanation is bullshit."

763. González, Raúl. "Sendero: duro desgaste y crisis estratégica." *Quehacer*, no.64 (May-June 1990): 8-15.

Despite prognostications to the contrary in 1980, Sendero has completed ten years of uninterrupted activity, and Peru has suffered a decade of violence. How to evaluate Sendero? In one sphere, it cannot be denied that the country's political life revolves, in large measure, around what Sendero does or does not do. It operates in nearly every area of the country, and has created a national infrastructure. It is a group that maintains that, "Except for power, all is illusion"; to what degree, then, has it achieved its strategic objectives? One of its aims is to destroy the present order of society; the other is to construct a new one in the countryside. To do this Sendero must achieve "strategic equilibrium," in which there will exist two equal "social orders" in Peru. González reviews Sendero's progress toward this goal. All of its actions (sabotage, assassinations, etc.) are political in nature, especially in the cities, where Sendero's activities force the government to expend more and more of its scarce economic resources on repression, lowering the quality of life for all. In the countryside, Sendero is forming the vital "support bases" that will constitute the basis for the "Republic of the New Democracy"-- the new order it seeks to create. González concludes that if the new government cannot implement a more effective counterinsurgency policy

that will take advantage of some of Sendero's weaknesses and problems, democracy will be seriously weakened.

764. "El cuartel de Guzmán." *Caretas,* no.1111 (June 5 1990): 18-19.

Police raided the house at number 459 on Calle 2 in the suburb of Monterico Norte last week, uncovering documents and evidence that the house was until recently the domicile of Abimael Guzmán. In what the police assume was Chairman Gonzalo's room, they found clothing, medicine, mentholated cigarettes (brandname: "Eve"), and many books. Also found were manuscripts with notes from recent plenary sessions of the PCP, and a copy of the "interview of the century" autographed by Guzmán himself.

765. "Secretos del cuartel." *Caretas,* no.1112 (June 12 1990): 34-40.

Caretas publishes photos of more materials from the raid on party headquarters. In an envelope are dried flowers and a note dedicated to Guzmán; also seized were *retablos* dedicated to the struggle, a model of El Frontón prison, portraits of Guzmán leading the masses, pictures of the three "swords of Marxism" (Marx, Lenin, Mao), a clock marking five years of armed struggle given to President Gonzalo as a gift, symbols of the PCP's Popular Guerrilla Army, etc. From the documents seized in the raid police have been piecing together information on how the Party communicates with its cells, and how it conceives and orders terrorist actions carried out. Among the documents were an archive of letters of self-criticism, notes of "subjection" and fealty to Guzmán, a list of the support organizations to which a member in need should turn in case of trouble, detailed notes on the habits of people (policemen, judges, lawyers, soldiers) presumed to be targets for assassination, and the acts of the first party congress in 1988. A number of people have been arrested as a result of the first raid; among them is Sybila Arredondo.

766. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "The War of the Philosopher-King." *The New Republic,* v.202, no. 25 (June 18 1990): 15-22.

Extremely valuable article focusing on Abimael Guzmán as philosopher-king of the movement. Rather than being known as *comandante* like other Latin American revolutionaries, Guzmán preferred the title "Doctor 'Puka Inti'"-- Red Sun in Quechua. His nickname at university was Shampoo, because he could wash your brains. Gorriti reminds us that Guzmán is always portrayed (hagiographically) as a leader carrying a book, never in uniform or with a gun. A Sendero pamphlet on guerrilla war stated: "To wage war it is necessary to be a philosopher. Comrade Gonzalo's battle plans are political, not technical." Gorriti reviews Guzmán's formal education, especially the influence of professor Miguel Angel Rodríguez Rivas and social-realist painter Carlos de la Riva in his philosophical development. From the latter he absorbed a devotion to orthodox communism as epitomized first by Stalin, and later by Mao. From the former he learned a Kantian and uncompromising faith in sacred Reason, as well as intensity in study and research, tenacious dedication to an objective, and asceticism. Gorriti traces the development of Guzmán's political and philosophical movement at Huamanga, especially his use of the university as a base through which to recruit, organize, and subsidize the growth of Marxist cadres. The two decades of preparatory work, thought, discussion, and factional infighting that preceded the inauguration of "people's war" in December 1980 are crucial to an understanding of Sendero. Gorriti sees indefinite war ahead for Peru. While most doubt that Sendero can overthrow the government in two or three years, its strength is due as much to its own hard-won skills as to the weaknesses of the Peruvian state and the shortcomings of Peru's elites, whose learning curve Gorriti characterizes as flat. There is also a danger of the war's spread to Bolivia, which has similar social and cultural structures: "Puka Inti just might be able to plunge South America into the warring era that his ideological enemy Che Guevara only dreamed about."

767. Rosenberg, Tina. "Guerrilla Tourism." *The New Republic,* v.202, no.25 (June 18 1990): 23-25.

Superb piece capturing the many contradictions of Sendero's revolution. "The Shining Path threw a square dance any mother could love," begins Rosenberg, as she attends a party in a squalid Lima *barrio.* "Inside was all light and laughter, good clean fun--except that the band's lyrics were a hymn to People's War, and among the young dancers were people who attached bombs to dogs and slit policemen's throats." Rosenberg talks with "Javier," who has been a fighter for almost ten years, and is one of the few survivors of the 1986 massacre in El Frontón. He plots to get his estranged girlfriend back, asks Rosenberg to bring him Reeboks from Chile, and is studying law to please his mother--but he also parrots *senderista* slogans, and can mechanically recite 20-minute speeches of President Gonzalo. Rosenberg also visits the women's block in Canto

Grande, and is entertained and fed by the true believers who have built The People's Republic of the New Democracy inside their jail. She leaves thinking them less like the Viet Cong, and more like Hezbollah; the forces of history, they believe fervently, are really on their side.

768. Dietz, H. "Peru's Sendero Luminoso as a Revolutionary Movement." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology,* v.18, no.1 (Summer 1990): 123-150.

Dietz considers Sendero in the context of revolutionary violence and its probable outcome. From the outset, he proposes that the probability that such violence will bring a group to power is historically very low. But Sendero has caused a great deal of bloodshed, as well as concern within and without Peru. Dietz extracts some general propositions and hypotheses from the literature dealing with revolutionary violence and its ties to social inequality and ethnic and/or racial divisions. He then focuses on eight areas: the movement's history, preconditions that aided its emergence, ideology, leadership, organization, global connections, governmental responses to its actions, and Sendero's goals and chances for achieving them. Dietz concedes that Sendero is largely a unique movement, but argues that certain features and interactions with the state can be generalized: many revolutionary groups have tried to take advantage of existing massive social and economic inequalities; poverty and inequality (and racial and ethnic divisions), are the norm in much of the Third World. What distinguishes Sendero from other revolutionary movements becomes the focus of Dietz's analysis. He concludes that Ayacucho was an ideal breeding ground for revolution, and Sendero was able to take advantage of its generalized circumstances of economic disruption and dislocation after establishing its base at the UNSCH. Its belief system may appear opaque and irrelevant to outsiders, but the more rigid and doctrinaire a movement's ideology, the more it may succeed in binding the group together, and the less it may readily attract the uncommitted. As far as the government's response, Dietz faults successive regimes for ignoring, and then handing the situation over to the military, which has produced alienation, dislocation, widespread fear, and escalating violence on both sides. The peasants are then caught between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary terror: "It is perhaps the choices that are the most predictable; after all they have been forced upon the poor wherever revolutionary violence has arisen, and there seems to be no way to avoid them." Dietz's analysis makes especially good use of the comparative literature of military sociology.

769. Klarén, Peter F. "Peru's Great Divide." *Wilson Quarterly,* v.14, no.3 (Summer 1990): 23-32.

Klarén, who has written several books on development, modernization, and *aprismo* in Latin America, analyzes the "great divide" between European and Indian in Peru. Conquest, disease, economic exploitation and discrimination have created a "dualistic" society in which Lima and its Spanish elite have dominated the impoverished, largely Indian, remainder of the country. But Klarén argues that this manichean division is simplistic, as is Sendero's analysis of and remedy for Peru's ills. Peru, he asserts, besides being a predominantly urban and industrializing nation, is fast becoming a mestizo country, and the mestizos, who once denied their Indian past in order to fit a more Hispanicized notion of Peruvian identity, are increasingly disposed to embrace it. Sendero, like other groups in Peruvian history, has cynically exploited the Indian. But it would probably not even exist if not for four centuries of oppression. Still, while Sendero has capitalized on the Indian question, its larger message is aimed at the impoverished mestizo underclass of Lima and other cities. In the past two decades the great *desborde popular* (overflowing of the masses) has radically redrawn the ethnic and social map of the country. Even as the Indian majority gives way to a new mestizo one, Lima and other urban areas are increasingly "Indianized" as more migrants arrive from the sierra. Klarén believes that there is no longer any Indian question; the great divide in Peru between creoles and Indians, city and country, coast and highland is disappearing. The growing development of the "informal" economic sector and the meteoric ascent of the non-European Fujimori and his two mestizo running mates testifies to a new and emerging Peru.

770. Wheat, Andrew. "Shining Path's 'Fourth Sword' Ideology." *Journal of Military and Political Sociology,* v.18, no.1 (Summer 1990): 41-55.

What is Sendero Luminoso? What do its militants believe? What kind of society would they like to erect "over the cinders of today's Peru"? Despite a ballooning literature, Wheat asserts that these questions have not been satisfactorily answered. Researchers' fears of visiting Peru and a paucity of primary documentation results in "much rehashed print: Without access to Sendero, writers recycle one another's work and frequently portray Sendero's ideology as a bizarre blend of Incan superstition and Chairman Mao's Little Red Book." Wheat traces Sendero's roots to its origins in the Chinese Communist Party and the ideas of Mariátegui. He compares Sendero's

ideology with that of Mao, and explores the problems associated with applying Mariátegui's sixty-year-old analysis to contemporary Peru. Sendero seems reluctant to update this now obsolete analysis, and equally reluctant to abandon its exclusivist rigidity that has kept its appeal and base narrow. Perhaps they fear a Deng Xiaoping-style counterrevolution; they certainly charge that the Mexican, Bolivian, and Guatemalan revolutions were derailed by the petty bourgeoisie. Sendero realizes that few Peruvians desire a government modeled on China's during the Cultural Revolution. Accordingly, they emphasize the evils of Peru's current government and society, rather than detailing their own plans for Peru's future. Their immediate aim is to force a military coup that would eliminate the political center and polarize the nation between two extremes.

771. "Año de purgas." *Caretas,* no.1115 (July 2 1990): 38-40.

In this "year of purges," Sendero Luminoso, which *Caretas* characterizes as plagued by mutual recriminations, desertions, and internal disputes, has launched a new campaign of "rectification," whose objective is to liquidate internal dissension. The article reproduces the text of a letter of self-criticism from "Aldo," who subjects himself fully and unconditionally to President Gonzalo, *jefe* of the Party and the Revolution, and to the PCP, organized vanguard of the Peruvian proletariat. "Aldo" is identified as Carlos Hermes Ramírez Morales, captured June 2, and until 1989 secretary general of a textile factory union. The rectification campaign has as its objectives to strengthen and develop the Party in order to conquer power. The campaign must utilize as its guide the Party Congress, Party documentation, and the two-line struggle. A chart detailing the PCP's supposed organization, from the Central Committee down to the fighter's cell, is included.

772. Díaz, Oscar. "El general y su laberinto." *Caretas,* no.1116 (July 9 1990): 28-31.

Interview with retired general Adrián Huamán Centeno, military chief of the Ayacucho emergency zone from January to September of 1984. General Huamán criticized the central government, and tried to reorient the security forces toward a new strategy of engaging the people, even though many massacres were perpetrated during his command. The Quechua-speaking son of peasants has been for the last two years advisor to the Frente Popular Agrícola del Perú, a peasant organization headed by the messianic sect leader Azequiel Ataucusi. *Caretas's* reporter asks the general about his anti-guerrilla experiences in the 1960's, his assessment of Velasco's agrarian reforms (a disaster, because it was directed from Lima, without an understanding of the countryside's realities), and his opinion of the technocrat Fujimori's probable impact on the countryside. Huamán believes that neither Belaúnde nor García ever had a counterinsurgency strategy; the military was both denied the resources needed to fight the war. Huamán also disagrees with the organization of the *rondas ;* the peasant don't need to be armed, he says, because there is an army that, with some restructuring and retraining, could provide security for them. He also clarifies having called Peru's subversives "learners"; if they had had a real strategy, he declares, they would have taken power by now.

773. "El túnel." *Caretas,* no.1117 (July 16 1990): 26-37.

Series of linked articles on an embarrassing fiasco for the government: after digging a long tunnel, 48 *mirista* prisoners, including Víctor Polay, made their escape from Canto Grande on July 9. The spectacular jailbreak demonstrates not only MRTA's audacity, but also the negligence of the Security Police who are in charge of the prisons. *Caretas* details the chronology of the escape, publishes a drawing of the prison and tunnel, and relates how Polay managed to pass through seven supposedly locked doors to reach the tunnel from his cell. One follow-up piece ("Quienes deben caer") names the police officials who should "take the fall" for the scandalous breach of security; another ("Veníase venir") criticizes security at Canto Grande as lax, and describes the chaos and indecisiveness inside the penal system's bureaucracy. Training for guards has been cut to almost nothing, and too many employees are hired for their *aprista* political affiliations. Lessons that should have been learned after the 1986 massacres have been ignored.

774. "Grupo secreto." *Caretas,* no.1118 (July 23 1990): 36-39.

Caretas has been allowed to visit and photograph the training of secret elite police units, under the command of the Dirección de Operaciones Especiales (DIROES). These elite units are trained in intelligence, hostage rescue, dignitary protection, anti-hijacking, and urban assault. The units have dramatic names: Eagle, Falcon, *Pahuacc* (roadrunner in Quechua), Delta. The article describes their training, which is intensive (instructors include foreign nationals), equipment, and

weaponry. In the short time they have been active, the units have had successes (the capture of *senderistas* in Puno), and failures: a number of casualties due to insufficiently-armored vehicles.

775. Daniels, Anthony. "Dirty War in Peru." *Spectator,* v.265, no.8455 (July 28 1990): 10-11.

Daniels reports from Ayacucho on a province devastated by war. Sendero kills "humble folk" with uncommon brutality and cruelty. They use *niño-bombas,* children loaded with dynamite, in suicide attacks. A Catholic priest tells Daniels that Sendero teaches children of six to kill chickens to accustom them to blood, and by age nine they are able to smash skulls with stones. Children and adolescents are recruited because they are still uncontaminated by bourgeois notions of morality, and are virtually impervious to infiltration by government agents. Sendero's ideology "would be laughable had it not led to such misery and brutality." Guzmán has convinced himself that Ayacucho, far from being a remote and backward corner of Peru, is actually the center of world revolution: "What Ayacucho was to Peru, Peru was to the world." The government is no better: "The army has responded to Sendero in precisely the manner which anyone who had been longer than five minutes in Latin America would expect: it has pillaged, raped, despoiled, and killed. Miserably underfunded, it cannot even feed itself." The army scarcely goes on patrol, recruits are interested only in surviving their military service, there are few helicopters, poor communications, and "the officers are probably more interested in their pockets than the war." They force peasants into *rondas,* and then give them only sharpened stakes with which to defend themselves. When Daniels told a colonel that he was interested in the psychology of the *delincuentes subversivos,* the officer asked him: "But why do you want to interview the prisoners? Just speak to anyone in Ayacucho. They're all Senderistas."

776. Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru. "Honour and Glory to the Proletariat and People of Peru." *A World to Win,* no.15 (July 1990), pp.56-57.

On the tenth anniversary of the people's war, the PCP's Central Committee salutes with revolutionary reverence the proletariat and people of Peru, especially the peasants, and principally the poor peasants. Without their unparalleled help there would be no people's war. It is the masses that make history; it is the proletariat and people whose hunger and blood have been ennobled and transfigured into the ardent, unquenchable flames of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and whose actions sustain and advance the struggle against counterrevolutionary revisionism (led by Deng and Gorbachev) and imperialism...The PCP salutes the people, the masses, because with their tireless, strong hands of creativity and combat they have given rise to the three tools of the revolution: the PCP, the People's Guerrilla Army, and the New Political Power, the joint dictatorship based on the worker-peasant alliance led by the proletariat through the Party...

777. Chairman Gonzalo [Abimael Guzmán]. "In Celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Chinese Revolution." *A World to Win,* no.15 (July 1990), pp.52-55.

In a recent speech on the 40th anniversary of the 1949 victory of the Chinese revolutionary war, Chairman Gonzalo analyzes the importance of Maoism for the people's war being led by his party in Peru. He reiterates that ideology and political line decides everything, and that proletarian ideology develops by leaps and stages: through Marxism, Leninism, and its third and highest stage, Maoism. Maoism is the commander and guide of the world revolution. On the role of the church in Peru, he makes clear the distinction between the class interests of the church hierarchy and the religious feelings of the people. He also denounces the church's Community in Action charity scheme administered by Caritas as part of an effort to stop the revolution and to traffic in the masses' hunger. Finally, he summarizes the international situation from his perspective: Latin America, together with Africa and Asia, is undergoing a severe economic, political, and ideological crisis in population and growth rates. He exposes Bush's drug war as a campaign really aimed at people's war and the PCP. [Interestingly, Guzmán mentions Brazil's demand for an outlet to the Pacific through southern Peruvian ports and Peru's policy to distance itself from Bolivia and move closer to Chile.]

778. Marks, Tom. "Peru's Fatal Distraction." *Soldier of Fortune,* v.15, no. 7 (July 1990): 30-33.

In his third article, Marks interviews a senior Peruvian intelligence officer, identified only as "Pablo," who voices concerns over the counterinsurgency program. Even at this date in the war, he says, government officials are still remarkably ignorant about the nature of Sendero, its background, history, or strategy. They can parrot some Sendero thoughts, but do not understand them, so that the insurgency is being fought the wrong way: a conventional approach with revolutionary war rhetoric. This is, he says, an administrative war; whoever can eliminate the

enemy's administrative framework will win. The military remains misguided by its victory in the 1965 guerrilla campaign, and even more so by the Argentine example of the 1970's, which is too dissimilar to Peru's situation. Sendero's plan is to split the country along the sierra, then cut off Lima from its food supplies. It has spread along the mountains and continues to grow. "Pablo" estimates that it is about a year and a half from achieving its objectives. He also projects that a victorious Sendero would subject Peru to several cultural revolutions; it believes, he says, that Mao did not go far enough in China. He denies that this war is Che's "foco" theory run amok: "Talking to the Senderistas is like reading Mao. Before the first shot was fired, there were years and years of careful political work, of organization, of sending cadre to live in the countryside, of forming organizations to give life to the revolutionary episode." The government, in contrast, has no real counterinsurgency plan, and is just reacting to Sendero. It needs, he says, to be autocritical, to look for the enemy within. Above all, a strategic vision is needed. Peru is not a nation-state, but a meeting of regions. Greater national integration, in economic and social, as well as in counterinsurgency terms, is necessary.

779. "Message of the Committee of the RIM to the Communist Party of Peru (PCP)." *A World to Win,* no.15 (July 1990): 55-56.

Short message of support and congratulations from the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement to the PCP, reviewing the history of the Party (founded by Mariátegui in 1928 as part of the Third International), explaining the course of people's war (rousing the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat party), and extolling the primacy of Maoism as the instrument with which to defeat imperialism and reaction.

780. González, Raúl. "Subversión: nueve puntos para la agenda." *Quehacer,* no.65 (July-August 1990): 39-42.

The path the new government will have to take to pacify the country will be a long one, writes González. He outlines factors that will have to be taken into account, whoever takes power in Peru . One is that Sendero, which initiated the violence Peru has been plunged into, is no longer the sole factor that prolongs it. The "forces of order" have done more than their share to perpetuate the epidemic of violence; other left- and right-wing organizations that have appeared also contribute to the disorder and violence. A "culture of violence" has arisen, warping a whole generation of young Peruvians who have known no other state of affairs. González offers a few suggestions on what to do to address this epidemic: the whole government must demonstrate the political will to fight subversion. The emergency zones must pass back to civilian control, to repair the breach opened between security forces and the populace. The role of civil society must be emphasized and strengthened, with true citizen participation in the struggle against violence. Decentralization and democratization are essential, human rights must be respected, and the state must address the narcotics traffic in the Upper Huallaga with policies that will not drive the peasant producers into the arms of Sendero.

781. Díaz, Oscar. "Gorriti y la guerra." *Caretas,* no.1120 (August 6 1990): 38-43, 96.

Interview with Sendero's chronicler on the occasion of the publication of his *Sendero: historia de la guerra milenaria en el Perú. Caretas* gives a brief biographical sketch of Gorriti, and questions him about his book's theses. Gorriti reiterates that Sendero's revolution is basically a mixture of millenarianism and orthodox Marxist ideology. He discounts poverty as being primarily responsible for Sendero. He declines to fix blame for terrorism on either Belaúnde or García, reminding his interviewer that Sendero did not start from zero, but rather planned its revolution in a disciplined and organized manner. But Gorriti calls the lack of cooperation between the outgoing military government and Belaúnde's incoming AP movement tantamount to deliberate sabotage. Had the new government been better informed, Sendero could not have grown as fast as it did. Gorriti also discusses the approaches the AP and APRA governments took in fighting Sendero, and expresses his disapproval of the enormous power granted the military in the fight against terrorism.

782. Kirk, Robin. "Students and Academics in Peru Are Targets of Political Violence." *The Chronicle of Higher Education,* (August 15 1990): A29.

A wave of intimidation has struck the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho. After flyers threatened his life, the university's rector, Pedro Villena Hidalgo, fled the city. A biology professor and the school's legal advisor were also named in the flyer; both were assassinated last month. Bombings at the UNSCH caused an estimated $100,000 in damage. The

source of the flyers was said to be the Peruvian Communist Party--Base Committee, an organization linked to Sendero. But they were distributed in the center of Ayacucho, which is patrolled by the army, rather than in the guerrilla-controlled slums. Graffiti in the city center threatened university officials and students. The flyers and the markings have been attributed to the right-wing death squad Rodrigo Franco Front, linked to the Ayacucho Political-Military Command and to a former interior minister, Augustín Mantilla.

783. Grant, Gregory."The Real War in Peru." *World & I,* v.5, no.8 (August 1990): 94-99.

Grant, a policy analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., summarizes the successive phases of the war since 1980. Two years of indifference under Belaúnde was replaced by brutality and "dirty war." Under García, economic assistance, selective amnesty, pardons for minors, and a call for open dialogue with the guerrillas have been part of the counterinsurgency strategy. However, overall, "the Peruvian government has vacillated between a repressive military response to Sendero and social, economic, and political initiatives pursued halfheartedly since 1985." Grant focuses the second half of his article on military strategy and tactics of the Peruvian security forces, that now include more aggressive patrolling, the acquisition of helicopters for rapid response, and the formation of elite special operations units. Israeli, South African, and U.S. advisors are reportedly training police commandos, although the presence of foreign advisors is officially denied. Recent captures of guerrilla leaders indicate better intelligence capabilities by the security forces, and the new Fujimori administration has again called for dialogue. Nevertheless, "Sendero continues to flourish following the most democratic decade in Peruvian history. Peru has not yet reached the level of violence and instability of a Lebanon, but there are ominous signs that conditions in some of the country's regions come dangerously close to resembling those in that conflict-ridden nation."

784. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "La revolución de los manuales: la expansión del marxismo-leninismo en las ciencias sociales y la génesis de Sendero Luminoso." *Revista peruana de ciencias sociales,* v.2, no.3 (September-December 1990): 103-125.

The "revolution of the manuals," was, according to Degregori, an invasion of materials dealing with historical and dialectical materialism and political economy that flowed from the Soviet Union's Academy of Sciences during the 1960's, and that were incorporated into the teaching of social sciences in Peru. Their impact was deep and far-reaching, shaping intellectual currents in Peru for years to come. They contributed to a widespread belief in a closed system of universal truths, in which one could appeal to a "principle of authority" for legitimacy, and to a consideration of politics as fundamentally confrontational and manichean. Degregori believes that this atmosphere contributed to the formation of a nucleus of young scholars and students that would later be the basis of Sendero's leadership cadres. Degregori traces the evolution of the Peruvian academy through several political and ideological changes. The expansion and radicalization of the nation's universities coincided with a massive dissemination of written materials from the USSR. The result was a generation of dogmatic graduates who would find Shining Path's radicalism and certitude attractive.

785. Daniels, Anthony. "No Light, No Law." *National Review,* v.42, no.21 (November 5 1990), pp.30-32.

Powerful, almost savage description of a society on the verge of collapse. Daniels quotes from two Peruvian writers: González Prado compared Peru at the turn of the century to an abscess, and 300 years ago Poma de Ayala declared, "To write [of Peru] is to weep." Daniels describes the horrible economy (1,000,000% inflation last year), García's demagogic government, and Lima, the "City of Kings," as a foul mess, with the stench of decomposition, physical and moral, everywhere. Crime is rampant, tanks guard ministries, and even wealthy Miraflores has daily black-outs. Despite a million laws, Peruvians say,*"no hay justicia,"* there is no justice. A visit to Lurigancho, which no longer has any political prisoners, is a metaphor for the country--a literal stinking hell, lawless, anarchic, filthy, operating solely on violence and bribery. "The prison is exactly what any Peruvian would expect it to be: it merely copies the ruling principles of Peruvian society over into the penal system. One begins to understand how an intellectual's thoughts might turn to violence." That is, until one encounters the violence unleashed by intellectuals. Daniels recounts Sendero's brutality, matched by that of the miserable, starved, underpaid army. The strategic hamlets are a joke, with peasants given unsharpened stakes with which to defend themselves. Ironically, the U.S. has done its best to promote Shining Path by defoliating the Upper Huallaga Valley, which permits Sendero to pose as the peasant's friend. Daniels ends with Poma de Ayala's words: "There is no end to this evil."

786. "Morote: 20 años." *Caretas,* no.1135 (November 19 1990): 18-19.

In the same week that the brutal murder of a Lima magistrate is described and condemned, *Caretas* reports that Osmán Morote Barrionuevo has been given a prison sentence of twenty years. Because many of his crimes were committed before 1983, Morote cannot apply time already served, nor ask for conditional liberty or pardon. The condemned man remained defiant throughout the proceedings. In the same issue (pp.50-51, 92), "Propuesta peligrosa" examines the "Fujimori Doctrine" against drugs, a policy *Caretas* terms "Narcoliberalism." The article criticizes the policy for ignoring security aspects of the problem, seeing the coca trade as purely a problem of development, for excessive accommodation to the wishes of the United States, for ignoring international law and the United Nation's 1988 convention on drugs, that should be the cornerstone of its policy. Fujimori seems to believe that capitalism and free markets are the answer to the problems of the coca-growing peasants of the Huallaga.

787. Cornell, Angela and Kenneth Roberts. "Democracy, Counterinsurgency, and Human Rights: The Case of Peru." *Human Rights Quarterly,* v.12, no.4 (November 1990): 529-553.

Explores a recent common Latin American dilemma: redemocratization and the reconstitution of legal and judicial institutions has not automatically meant the restoration of human and civil rights. In Peru, constitutional safeguards have been rendered inoperative. Civilian, judicial, political, and administrative authority has been abdicated to the executive and military. Cornell and Roberts examine Peru in the broad context of Latin American civil-military relations. Balancing democratic norms with counterinsurgency needs when the state is threatened is a complex, if urgent process. Alán García repealed Law 24,700 in July 1988, and redefined terrorism to indict anyone who even expresses sympathy for a group that advocates, let alone carries out, violence. Investigative power has been taken from the public prosecutors and given to police, and a death squad *(El Comando Rodrigo Franco)* has threatened lawyers, prosecutors, human rights workers, and even congressmen. A commission created to investigate disappearances was closed by the government for "lack of funds" after it recommended the prosecution of a general for a peasant massacre. Several other instances of cover-ups and threatening tactics against human rights organizations and commissions are given. Cornell and Roberts conclude that legal power has been taken from civilian, and given to military courts, existing constitutional rights are not respected, no military officers have been made to account for abuses, congress is unwilling to legislate stricter legal protections or sanction officials for violations, and government ministries have failed to press for prosecutions, accountability, or investigations of human rights abuses.

788. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Terror in the Andes." *The New York Times Magazine,* (December 2 1990):

Excellent account of the Ashaninka's war in the jungles against Shining Path. Gorriti illuminates the plight of the natives, who have been under pressure from colonists, *cocaleros,* and Sendero all at once. Usually omitted from stories on the Ene Valley are rifts within the Ashaninkas (some of the Indians, a minority, have joined Sendero), and Father Gagnon's impetuous and headstrong personality, that contributed to antagonisms among the missionary, the American military and anti-narcotics effort in the Huallaga, and the Franciscan order itself. Apart from Sendero's determination to forcibly recruit the Ashaninka for labor and fighters, Gagnon's presence itself became a focal point for Sendero and the Indians; to some degree the struggle became a personal one between guerrillas and priest. The Americans, determined to continue their anti-coca campaign, decided Gagnon wanted them to arm the Indians and support them with helicopters, which they were reluctant to do. The Franciscan order is concerned that Gagnon's militancy imperils other missionaries throughout Peru; it also feels that he has become too attached to his charges. In the end, with many Ashaninkas under Sendero's control, the remaining, who were starving and sick, were evacuated in a near-miraculous airlift across the Andes to uninhabited territory. But after 22 years, Father Gagnon is leaving for good; the Indians will henceforth be under the care of the Dominicans. Gorriti's account leaves the reader with a feeling of sadness for this expulsion of the Ashaninka from their Eden.

789. "Cómo ganarla." *Caretas,* no. 1137 (December 3 1990): 26-32.

Report on the counterinsurgency strategy planned by the Joint Command. The fundamental objective of the plan is to gain the loyalty of the population by emphasizing the role of the military in public works for communities; i.e., civic- action programs. Experiments with this kind of project have already taken place in four communities in Lima and Ayacucho. President Fujimori has proposed a broadly-based joint committee with wide powers throughout Peru to combat subversion. The master plan will emphasize respect for human rights, regard narcotics as

part of the national security threat (owing to the revenue it generates for the terrorists), and seek to convince the people that the armed forces are with and not against them. Soldiers should serve in their home zones. The counterinsurgency war must be fought on offensive, not defensive lines. The article describes in detail the major components of the new strategy. One sidebar ("Apuntes para la guerra") by Gustavo Gorriti calls for the government to declare a state of internal war. The defeat of *senderismo* must be nothing less than the nation's top priority. Another sidebar ("DD.HH. en cifras") graphically charts Sendero and MRTA attacks from 1980 to 1990, as well as the number of "disappeared" between 1984 and 1989.

790. Rosenau, William. "Poor Peru." *The American Spectator*, v.23 (December 1990): 16-18.

Somber, mordantly biting portrait of Peru, Sendero and the drug problem. Coca-growing, per se, doesn't much bother the Peruvians, says Rosenau, but the Yankee dollar tends to concentrate their minds wonderfully on the issue. A visit to the Santa Lucía antidrug base in the Huallaga, and talks with Peruvian and U.S. officials convinces him that naive *gringo* notions about eliminating coca-growing from the Valley are just that. Rosenau discusses the ruined economy, Sendero's rise, its domination of the Huallaga, and General Arciniega's highly controversial approach to subversion and coca cultivation. Rosenau paints a picture of a nation devastated by inflation, worried about food shortages, and terrified by Shining Path, which sometimes chops off the heads of collaborators and then sews them on backwards. A hard-hitting, if extremely pessimistic report from the war zone.

791. Andreas, Carol. "Women at War." *NACLA Report on the Americas*, v.24, no.4 (December/January 1990/91): 20-27.

An examination of the liberation that Sendero is bringing to Andean women, by a Western academic who does not hide her sympathy for Shining Path. Peru's legal left, Andreas claims, is male-dominated and has failed to help marginalized and disenfranchised women. Sendero's leadership, on the other hand, has made special efforts to put women into positions of responsibility. In terms of ideology, Andreas writes that "the party's consistent adherence to the idea that all existing governing structures must be destroyed in order to rebuild society from the grassroots up seems to have special appeal for women." Andreas cites women's predominance on "people's committees," that concentrate, she says, on redistributing land, promoting collective planting and harvesting; these have put an end to delinquency, prostitution, drug addiction, and domestic violence, according to Andreas. "Widows and the elderly receive necessary assistance from the community. Education is made available to everyone. Barter replaces buying and selling in local markets, and ancient rituals connected with the cycles of life are observed by the entire community." Through criticism and self-criticism, Sendero encourages villagers to regain confidence in communal values.

One-third of Peruvian families are now headed by women, and this is much higher in most rural areas. Women are crucial in agriculture and as part of the "informal economy." Neither the government nor major unions have helped women in these roles. "Many poor women, therefore, tend to be skeptical about the possibilities for real change short of rebuilding social and economic life literally 'from the ground up.' Shining Path provides them with a vehicle for pursuing a radical vision and has welcomed women's leadership in the process." Andreas attributes women's involvement in Sendero not only to ideology, but also to a long-standing tradition of social independence in the sierra, dating back to pre-Hispanic times. She asked a female Sendero leader how she could submit herself blindly to the authority of a powerful individual, and a man. Sendero cadres see the centralization of political authority in "Presidente Gonzalo" as a guarantee that grassroots power will not be subverted. Although the carrying out of *ajusticiamientos* by execution against those considered to be enemies, spies, and traitors to the movement (including men accused of rape), has attracted much media attention, Andreas found that women, who have more accounts to settle than do men, do not find this disturbing. She has heard women find ways to justify these actions, by declaring that the reports are false or expressing confidence that those who committed errors or excesses will be brought to judgment by the party. "They know they will not be raped by a Shining Path soldier; they will not be humiliated and degraded for being poor, for being Indian, or for being female. Lack of formal education will not be held against them, and their interests will not be compromised for personal gain."

792. Balbi, Carmen Rosa and Juan Carlos Vargas. "Estabilización y ajuste: el sindicalismo en la encrucijada." *Quehacer*, no.68 (December 1990-January 1991): 12-19.

The economic impact of the new Fujimori government's policies, on top of the major losses in earning power suffered under the APRA government, have been especially hard on

workers. The CGTP called a national strike that sadly, was not a success. Thus the labor movement is caught between the government's hard line and the guerrillas, who cannot tolerate any other organization representing the workers. This article discusses at length the dilemma of organized labor in Peru today. The growing authoritarian tendencies of Fujimori's administration enable it to carry out its economic program by fiat. A sidebar examines Sendero's activities in the factories, where the Movimiento Obrero de Trabajadores Clasistas is Sendero's "popular organization," designed to capture the labor movement. The Carretera Central, one of Lima's most important industrial zones (with 300 factories and some 60,000 workers), is a crucial battleground. There Sendero is trying to form the Committee of Struggle of Class Workers. More than 20 industrial relations personnel and managers have been assassinated so far. Sendero's tactics are to discourage any bargaining with management in labor disputes, to call "armed strikes," erect street barricades, burn vehicles, sabotage property, and punish "exploiters and traitors." Sendero is happy to see labor violence rather than negotiation; its aim is to radicalize the workers and to see indefinite strikes in the union factories.

793. Burt, Jo-Marie. "Counterinsurgency=Impunity." *NACLA Report on the Americas,* v.24, no.4 (December/January 1990/91): 30-31.

Concentrates on the counterinsurgency strategy of the armed forces. By 1989 the military had won almost total autonomy in carrying out its war; anti-terrorist laws superseded the legal structure, journalists were banned from areas under emergency status, and human rights workers were detained and "disappeared." Security forces operate with near-total impunity, despite evidence of abuses and massacres. Ominously, the brief overview suggests that "Peruvian public opinion, tired of the violence and yearning for some semblance of order, has begun to see human rights abuses committed by the security forces as a necessary evil if the insurgent groups are to be defeated."

794. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "A Dwarf Star." *NACLA Report on the Americas,* v.24, no.4 (December/January 1990/91): 10-16.

One of the most important articles on the origins of Sendero in English. For those who cannot read Degregori's longer analyses in Spanish, this brief but succinct overview of Sendero's ethos is critical. The "dwarf star" to which Degregori refers is Sendero itself: a small, cohesive body whose powerful effect is disproportionate to its size. Degregori traces the origins of Sendero in a department, Ayacucho, where the principal social movement between 1960 and 1980 was organized not over land, but in defense of free education, which the military government cut in 1968. Education has always been a key factor in Sendero's calculations: it recruited extensively among the students and faculty at the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga. Degregori emphasizes the dogmatism and isolation that differentiates Sendero from other sectors of the Peruvian left. While other sectors of the left were leaving the university to participate in the great social movements that followed the military coup of 1968, Sendero was moving in the opposite direction. The professors and students in Ayacucho devoted themselves "to systematizing a coherent and all-encompassing discourse following the strictest of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy."

Sendero compensated for its withdrawal from the Peruvian political arena by building a well-organized body of cadres steeped in ideology. While the Peruvian left worked with labor unions and campesino organizations to increase its influence, SL created "generated organisms": nuclei of ideologically rigid organizers that operated as factions within other mass organizations, such as teachers' unions and the People's Defense Front. In Sendero's view peasants and the proletariat lacked the initiative to organize themselves; Sendero would act as the vanguard. While the left became a mass political force for the first time in Peru's history, Sendero stood aloof, rejecting the primacy of politics in favor of the primacy of violence. Between 1977 and 1988 there were nine general strikes in Peru; millions of people took part in the most significant mobilizations in modern Peruvian history. Sendero's stance varied between indifference and outright opposition. Degregori characterizes Sendero's actions as "a classic retreat forward"; political will, detailed organization, and ideological rigidity were combined to produce a fundamentalism that maximized and glorified violence, quite unlike any other Latin American revolutionary movement. Degregori rejects messianism or millerarianism as explanations for Sendero's emergence, noting that its leadership is *misti*, or small-town mestizo rather than Indian. Sendero, in fact, ignores ethnicity and rejects Andean cultural reemergence as folklore or bourgeois manipulation. Nevertheless, he concedes that Sendero's vision, while pretending to be a rigorous and scientific truth, has a very emotional, near-religious appeal. "Sendero's epic," he writes, "is a cosmic one. Its leaders are intellectual warriors in the service of a most exact science that regulates the universe like a limitless cosmic ballet. They must put everything in order according to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, overcoming or destroying whatever resists its ineluctable laws...Gods

of a belligerently monotheistic religion, they don't let anyone else onto their Olympus: They must be the only force that brings order to the rural world."

795. Fokkema, Anita. "'There is No Other Way': An Interview with Luis Arce Borja." *NACLA Reportson the Americas,* v.24, no.4 (December/January 1990/91): 23-25.

Arce Borja former editor of *El Diario,* is living in exile in Belgium. He says he is not a member of Sendero, but that his political convictions coincide with those of the PCP, the Communist Party of Peru. Closely questioned on Sendero's violence against peasants, trade unionists, and leftist politicians, Arce Borja denies that Sendero practices terror, but at the same time justifies such acts by explaining that those associated with the United Left (IU) helped bring García and Fujimori to power. He rejects the suggestion that the failure of socialism in Eastern Europe or Nicaragua in any way negates Sendero's quest for revolution in Peru, and declares that only the complete destruction of the old state and the installation of a new one under the leadership of the working class and peasants will succeed in changing Peru.

796. Manrique, Nelson. "Time of Fear." *NACLA Report on the Americas,* v.24, no. 4 (December/January 1990/91): 28-38.

Excellent analysis of Sendero's effect on peasant communities in selected areas. Manrique makes his own position on Sendero clear, calling it "an inflexible authoritarian organization that lashes out at the poor, displays utter contempt for the organizations the poor have built, and seeks to impose a new society from above while ignoring the opinion of its supposed beneficiaries." But he asks how a terrorist organization that "kills with cruelty bordering on the pathological" has managed not only to survive repression, but to grow and expand its influence? Peruvian intellectuals long assumed that such a violent movement could not possibly garner popular support. But Sendero has proved them wrong. Manrique examines the experiences of the Mantaro and Canipaco Valleys in the central highlands. Following the expropriation of haciendas by the military government in 1971, a state-controlled cooperative (SAIS Cahuide) was formed. This did not satisfy peasant demands for land, and the SAIS was soon embroiled in conflict with the Peasant Confederation of Peru (CCP). When Sendero arrived in the area, it considered both the SAIS and the CCP its opponents. CCP leaders were murdered, and an hacienda was destroyed, its equipment and pedigree livestock distributed among its workers. Sendero ordered the peasants to make immediate use of their windfall; the result was that expensive breeding stock was slaughtered for food. Several hundred workers from the hacienda were ordered by Sendero to return to their communities. Sendero "dismantled" several other haciendas in the area in the same manner.

Manrique asserts that Sendero's goal is to isolate the countryside, eliminating not only all government presence, but that of all NGO's as well, leaving only itself and the peasants. When counterinsurgency forces arrived, Sendero assured the people that the soldiers were peasants, and would not fire on them, neglecting to mention that the majority of army recruits are from the coast or the jungle, and feel no kinship with highland Indians. Yet Manrique believes that although Sendero disdains and maltreats the ordinary *comuneros*, they have accepted its authoritarian paternalism, its intervention in domestic and community problems, because it also offers some degree of security: "Exchanging freedom in return for security might seem inequitable, but the freedom to be enjoyed in Peru today does not amount to much either, particularly if one is poor and Indian." Manrique also observes that Sendero totally ignores ethnic segregation and domination in Peruvian society, despite the fact that most *senderistas* are provincial mestizos, whose families were recently peasants. Underlying Sendero's rhetoric are three basic assumptions: that the majority of the people can be cowed by terror, that a revolution that neither addresses the needs of the masses nor avails itself of the nation's other advanced political sectors can be arbitrarily imposed, and that its revolution is infallible, because of its application of the universal truths of Marxism.

797. Rénique, José Luis. "The Revolution Behind Bars." *NACLA Report on the Americas,* v.24, no. 4 (December/January 1990/91): 17-19.

Visit to the *terucos* (terrorists) in Lima's Canto Grande prison. Some of those with whom Rénique spoke are sons of the Lima elite. They parrot the Maoist line, not only on the war in Peru, but in relation to world events. A tour of the prison reveals a well-organized "university" where ideological education and support for Sendero are reinforced. Maoist slogans, mural paintings of and quotations from "Presidente Gonzalo" cover the walls. The article contains good human interest detail on prison life, where ordinary human interaction contrasts starkly with rigid leftist indoctrination.

1991

798. Americas Watch. *Into the Quagmire: Human Rights and U.S. Policy in Peru.* New York: Americas Watch, 1991.

Report on the state of human rights in Peru, with particular emphasis on U.S. aid and policies. Americas Watch finds that executions, disappearances, and torture are carried out by uniformed and nonuniformed members of the Peruvian state so frequently that they are an integral part of counterinsurgency strategy. AW sympathizes with Peru and its government over the continued threat posed by Sendero Luminoso. It acknowledges that the present government inherited the failed policies of its predecessors. But abuses cannot be glossed over. While Fujimori is not directly involved in these abuses, he has tolerated them, retreating from campaign promises and allying himself with the military. The State Department certification of improvements in the human rights situation is ambiguously worded and therefore misleading. AW recommends no military aid for Peru until military officers responsible are punished and civil officials who cover up abuses or disappearances are dismissed. It also recommends more money and political support for prosecutors investigating abuses; the creation of a central registry of detentions for relatives, lawyers, human rights monitors and the press; access to all detainees by the Red Cross; the conversion of village paramilitary patrols to defensive volunteer forces; an end to intimidation of the press and human rights monitors; unrestricted access to areas of conflict and sites of investigations.

799. Amnesty International. *Peru: Human Rights in a Climate of Terror.* New York: Amnesty International USA, 1991.

President Alberto Fujimori inherited an eight-year legacy of gross human rights violations and widespread armed insurgency in a country where large areas are effectively under the administrative and effective political control of the armed forces. Although Fujimori pledged at his inauguration to respect and promote human rights, this has not been the case. Between July 1990 and July 1991, 179 cases of disappearances and 58 extrajudicial executions were documented by Amnesty, and the actual figures are certainly much higher. Victims have nowhere to appeal, as the judiciary is virtually immobilized by fear, complacency, and a lack of resources and political support. In February 1991 one of the few cases of *habeas corpus* petitions in a disappearance case to be upheld since 1983 was annulled by the Supreme Court. The military has formulated a theory of collective responsibility and applied it in the emergency zones; the presumption that entire communities may be considered collectively responsible for Sendero actions has been invoked to justify indiscriminate killing. In July 1991 a secret document, Directive No. 01-CCFFAA-JICS, was leaked to the media; it contained orders that permitted troops to carry out clandestine killings and instructed them not to take prisoners during counterinsurgency operations. The Ministry of Defense admitted that such a document existed, but claimed it was written by an unnamed officer who had acted in error. As independent human rights monitors and investigators have been forced out of the emergency zones by threats, the true toll of human rights violations in Peru is becoming increasingly difficult to uncover. The report documents specific instances of disappearances, killings, massacres, "an anthology of impunity," and the workings of courts and committees of inquiry. Peru's international obligations under the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Amnesty's recommendations are appended.

800. Biondi S., Juan and Virgilio Roel. *Cultura andina y manifestaciones subversivas en el Perú.* Lima: Universidad de Lima, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, 1991.

Presentations from a seminar held at the University of Lima on October 21, 1990. Participants explored a number of diverse philosophical topics, ranging from the impact of literacy on Andean culture to the interaction of education and Shining Path. The emphasis throughout is on interpretations of "subversion"; one speaker reminded participants that Sendero is not the only "subversive" manifestation at work in Peru. Narcotics trafficking, the economic destruction of the country (which has produced enormous marginalization and clandestinity), and the absence of the state (as opposed to the presence of an official bureaucracy) are cited as other manifestations of subversion. Society's focus upon the political-military manifestations of subversion should not obscure other forces that are undermining the social order in Peru. Other participants examined the "Indian-ness" of Sendero, its redemptive possibilities for a better society, and the epistemological roots of "terrorism," "subversion," and "violence."

801. Bond, Rosana. *Sendero Luminoso: fogo nos Andes.* Goiâna: Edições Ruptura, 1991.

Journalist Bond reports on what appears to be the reincarnation of the mythic god Inkarri, who, decapitated by the Spanish crown, will be reborn to descend and bring the world to an end in the final judgment. There are historians who say that the war of Sendero Luminoso confirms these predictions. The fact is that Sendero, composed basically of Indian peasants, has kindled a surprising war in the Andes. Who, asks Bond, is this guerrilla group, the most radical, the most sectarian, and the most incomprehensible in all the history of Latin America? Bond reconstitutes the history of Shining Path through secondary and primary sources and a series of interviews with Peruvian activists and journalists. The result is an eclectic and impressionistic portrait of the war, with *senderista* poetry juxtaposed with political analysis, the voices of guerrillas and soldiers, politicians and old revolutionaries. Bond reproduces the *El Diario* interview with Presidente Gonzalo, as well as a number of Sendero documents, including Guzmán's address to the cadres at the conclusion of the Party's first military course.

802. Conklin, Curt. "Sendero Luminoso as Peasant Revolution and Political Party: Building on the First Decade of Scholarship With the Aid of Peasant Studies." MA thesis, Temple University, 1991.

Conklin surveys a number of major rural revolutions in search of factors that might help explain Sendero's emergence, successes, and failures. Conklin's thesis is that the first decade of scholarship on Shining Path is limited in terms of comparative analysis, and hampered by the difficulties and dangers of primary research in Peru. Conklin looks to other factors--comparative peasant studies, Peru's long-range national development and uneven regional development, widespread social differentiation rooted in ethnic and class factors--to help in understanding Sendero.

803. Contreras Ivarcena, Eduardo. *La violencia política en Apurímac: su impacto social y económico.* (Trabajos del Colegio Andino, 4) Cusco: Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos Bartolomé de las Casas, 1991.

An examination of political violence in Apurímac, and its economic and social impact on the people of the department. Apurímac's geography, population (which declined steadily in the 1970's), educational structure, and agricultural productivity are analyzed. Although Apurímac is a poor, rural, agricultural department, education is important as a means of social and economic advancement, and illiteracy was reduced by half in the last two decades. The report sketches the economic development of Apurímac, especially in regard to the parallel development of adjacent departments, and the rise of new social groups tied to pre- and post-Conquest development. Fertile lands became large agricultural properties, and mining became crucial in non-farming areas. Apurímac is still the most deprived area of the country; data suggest a net loss of caloric intake, a rise in malnutrition (especially among children), and a fall in agricultural productivity. Sendero carried out its first actions in Andahuaylas and Chincheros in 1983-84. The government's response was the same as in Ayacucho, and peasants were caught between two poles of violence. Sendero seems to have made a withdrawal in 1984-85; whether this was due to military repression or a change in strategy that shifted priority to other areas is uncertain. Andahuaylas's peasantry was already highly politicized and Chincheros's peasants had seized land in 1974; furthermore, the *campesino* sector was deeply tied into a regional and national market network. These factors may have led Sendero to shift its axis of operations to other provinces, like Aymares, Antabamba, and Grau after 1985, areas where the peasants were not as politicized, organized, or integrated into the commercial sector. For these provinces, the second half of the decade has been miserable. Sendero's recruitment of cadres, enforced isolation, and the government's repression have helped to depopulate these areas. Tables in the report's second half detail extensive migration from the department.

804. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "How Difficult it is to be God." *Critique of Anthropology,* v.11, no.3 (1991): 233-250.

Challenging anthropological essay on the meaning of Shining Path. Degregori uses myth and history from the Peruvian past to show that "the word" (education) has always had a central role in control of the Andean people. Rebellion against that control has historically taken two extremes: a rejection of the West and an inward turn of Andean culture upon itself, or an appropriation of the conquerors' instruments of domination. In the 20th century, that culture has sought, through education, to appropriate for itself the instruments of power of the dominating classes: "To wrest from the *mistis* [mestizos] their monopoly of knowledge is equivalent to the gesture of Prometheus in stealing fire from the gods." Degregori believes that the impulse for

education is even stronger among the Andean people than among the creoles of Peru. But further: the Indians seek not just knowledge, but "the truth," a coherence, a world-view that will substitute for the traditional Andean one that they no longer share and that has been diminished by modernity. Thus it is no surprise that the hierarchical, quasi-religious scientism of Sendero Luminoso appealed to so many so powerfully. *Pensamiento Gonzalo* claims not only to be scientific truth, but the end-product of the evolution of all progressive thought. Degregori cannot agree with those who interpret Sendero as a messianic or millenarian movement rooted in pre-Hispanic tradition. The *senderista* vision is a quasi-religious faith, but one that styles itself "a divine cult of reason," a hyper-rationalist philosophy that still engages in tremendously emotional terms, and a credo that offers its members a strong, almost religious, fundamentalist identity. This monotheistic faith rejects all other ideologies and movements; thus popular organizations and other leftist parties are anathema to Sendero. Degregori concludes: "For SL we are, then, a kind of clay, a mud that has to be modeled by the party and its all-powerful ideology, in its image and in its likeness."

805. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "Jóvenes y campesinos ante la violencia política: Ayacucho 1980-1983." In *Poder y violencia en los Andes.* Compiled by Henrique Urbano; edited by Mirko Lauer. Cusco: Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos Bartolomé de las Casas, [1991], pp.395-417.

Between 1977 and 1978 Sendero began to send cadres to rural zones in Ayacucho, but in 1980 they were far from having established a significant presence among the peasantry. Yet by the time the military took control of the emergency zones in late 1982, Sendero had "semi-liberated" approximately 80% of the rural areas of northern Ayacucho and was preparing to encircle Huamanga. How is it possible, asks Degregori, for Sendero to develop so rapidly in scarcely two and a half years? His essay seeks to understand peasants' response to the *senderista* presence in their communities, based on testimony gathered from peasants, small commercial owners, teachers, and secondary students in a dozen communities from Cangallo, Vilcashuamán, Sucre, Huancasancos, Huanta, and La Mar provinces. Several of his interviewees belonged briefly to Sendero. He admits that the situation of violence in the region has hampered systematic gathering of data. The nexus, he writes, between the rural communities and Shining Path, is the rural youth, who are secondary students and sons of the community. He reproduces the testimony of "Nicario," a 17-year-old student who belonged for two years to a *senderista* militia. Degregori juxtaposes Nicario's experience with that of another young man, "Arturo," who never belonged to Sendero, but rather to a leftist group linked to Izquierda Unida. Significant in the accounts is a generation gap between the young and their elders that Sendero used. Membership in Sendero conferred a sense of power, of belonging to a privileged elite, even of glamour. Degregori illustrates his findings with a diagram of the "*senderista* pyramid," (with peasantry as the base, rural youth and university youth at the next levels, and the leadership nucleus on top), that shows the links between levels of participation and mechanisms of conviction and integration. Those at the top have the power of ideas; those in between the idea of power (and its symbols--guns, dynamite, loudspeakers). They all exercise the force of power over those at the bottom (the peasants), who must choose between submission and accompaniment. Degregori labels those at the bottom "a Greek chorus" for this tragedy. A second chart diagrams peasant reactions to the guerrillas--from fatalistic adaptation (from fatalism, for family reasons, for utopian hopes), to adaptation/resistance, and to open rebellion, ranging from aid to the armed forces to membership in *rondas.*

806. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "Violencia política y respuestas: desde la sociedad y desde el estado: el caso peruano." Conference paper no.48. Presented at the research conference "Violence and Democracy in Colombia and Peru," held at Columbia University, 30 November to 1 December 1990. New York: Columbia University-New York University Consortium, [1991].

Degregori explores how society and the state have responded to Sendero's political violence. He summarizes Sendero's expansion since 1980, and shows how the movement's concept of "strategic defense" differs with "strategic equilibrium," outlining in a table the social, military, political, and urban components of both. He also examines the response of the peasantry and the state to Sendero. In many areas the entrance of Sendero, followed by invasion by the military, led to massive migration. One theory of "adaptation in resistance" has the peasants who stayed accepting Sendero as a new *patrón* who enforced morality by punishing miscreants, an idea conforming to the authoritarian Andean tradition that yearns for an "orderly" world. But the logic of the peasants and the logic of Sendero soon diverged; Degregori gives instances where Sendero's actions were resented as heavy-handed. *Senderistas* tended to view the peasants through the distorting lense of their Maoist ideology, without taking into account the long traditions of reciprocity that bound a series of interconnected ecosystems into a complex kinship structure. When Sendero tried to reorganize production along the lines of 1930's China, peasants rebelled.

Sendero also counted on worsening conditions in the country to produce political polarization. Just the opposite happened: the majority of people sought the political center. Poll results showed that this happened even in the "Andean trapezoid" (Huancavelica, Ayacucho, Apurímac, Cuzco, and Puno), where Fujimori received 67% of the votes. Degregori amends the old Maoist dictum about the guerrilla as the fish in the sea of the people: "The fish grows, it returns ever stronger and more elusive, but it cannot find enough water in which to swim"; i.e., Sendero's cadre grows, especially among intellectuals and the young, but it cannot find sufficient support among the general population. As for the state, Degregori finds that after a decade it still lacks a democratic strategy of pacification. The successive failure of two civilian governments to formulate an effective counterinsurgency strategy has much to do with the failure of the political system, which is fragmented and unable to achieve consensus. Degregori concludes by reiterating that what Peruvians want is political representation, a democratic state in place of an oligarchic state.

807. Espinoza Montesinos, Gustavo. *Democracia, violencia y derechos humanos: documentos de trabajo.* Los derechos humanos en el Perú '85-'90. Lima: "Owl logo" Editores, 1991.

A collection of documents pertaining to the revolution in Peru and human rights. Included are several essays on "dirty war" and fascism, a minority report of the Commission of Justice and Human Rights that protests planned changes in the penal code dealing with "crimes of illicit association and terrorism," and a report on the activities of paramilitary death squads in Peru that was sent to the German press for publicity. Also included are several leftist addresses on violence and democracy to Peruvian professional and labor associations.

808. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Latin America's Internal Wars." *Terrorism, Violence, and Insurgency Report,* v.10, no.3 (1991): 38-44.

Comparison of Sendero and guerrilla wars in Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala. The end of the Cold War has resulted in a decline in concern about insurgencies throughout Latin America. Gorriti believes that optimism about the situation is unwarranted. Although the number of insurgencies has declined, as has the super-power rivalry that exacerbated them, those that continue are stronger, because they are independent of international pressures and different from those that were inspired by the Cuban Revolution of 1959. They are extremely violent and have considerable staying power. With regard to Sendero, he believes that there is ample opportunity to forge a broad anti-Sendero consensus, because Sendero has attacked both democracy and the legal left in Peru with the same unconditional ferocity. Inspiring leadership, together with a minimally capable class of civilian administrators is vital to the anti-guerrilla effort, as is a policy of self-restraint, lawful measures, and generous amnesty. When such a policy is attacked as too soft and wrong-headed, he writes, only strong and persuasive personalities can stay the course. Although wary of transnational counterinsurgency strategies, Gorriti suggests linking bilateral and multilateral aid to preserving democracy and respect for human rights, and military assistance counterbalanced by civilian assistance, especially to the police and judiciary. Gorriti strongly advocates what he terms "democratic internal defense" to defeat insurgencies that threaten democracy. Society must be democratized during the emergency; declaring martial law is the wrong solution. A democratic revolution is needed at the grass-roots level, so that the people commit themselves to keeping democratic society viable. Gorriti has strongly opposed President Fujimori's emergency decrees, arguing that greater, not lesser democracy will defeat Sendero.

809. Hesse, Jorge. "The Peruvian Naval Forces in the Struggle Against Subversion and Drug Trafficking in the Amazon Region of the Ucayal." *Terrorism, Violence, and Insurgency Report,* v.10, no.3 (1991): 30-38.

Hesse, an admiral in the Peruvian navy, summarizes the counterinsurgency and anti-narcotics struggle being waged in the Peruvian Amazon. Pressure from the army, police, and DEA have caused traffickers to migrate from the Huallaga Valley to new areas, deeper into the remote Ucayali region. Hesse describes the economics and manufacture of WBP (washed basic cocaine paste), noting that although production of coca and WBP is not high in the Ucayali region, trafficking is up because of anti-narcotics activity in the Huallaga. The clandestine industry represents an annual income of some $700 million, although only about $100 million of that amount remains in the Ucayali area, affecting every aspect of the economy and society in the region. Clandestine or illegal wealth is enormous, but must be concealed or disguised through "dollar-laundering." The overall effects are negative: "The drug-based economy hinders the process of legitimate creation and distribution of wealth among the different strata of society." Hesse reviews the makeup of Peruvian naval, marine infantry, and intelligence resources. The Peruvian navy (MGP) "understands that the battle against subversion and drug related terrorism must

comprise...military, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions carried out by the government or its representatives to defeat these scourges in the country." He details the MGP's antisubversion, civic action, and intelligence activities and tactics against Sendero and drugs. The MGP operates in a "hand/fist" manner, simultaneously supporting civic activities and military action. Hesse is, however, well aware that economic and political realities militate against the success of this strategy as long as resources with which to carry them out are limited.

810. *Interview with Chairman Gonzalo: Interview with the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru.* Conducted by the editors of *El Diario* Newspaper. Berkeley: Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru, 1991.

One of the most important documents to emerge from Sendero. The interview, reprinted in English from *El Diario* (see no.567), illuminates Guzmán's concept of people's war and his plans for the future of Peru. It also provides a few tantalizing glimpses into the personality of Presidente Gonzalo himself. This English text is far superior to the 1989 translation of the interview (see no.613).

811. Isbell, Billie Jean. "The Texts and Contexts of Terror in Peru." (Conference paper, no.42) New York: Columbia University-New York University Consortium, 1991.

Isbell examines violence through a close reading of texts, in this case through testimony she gathered from peasant communities in the Río Pampas and San Francisco valley areas of Ayacucho: "One cannot escape the authority of their voices on the tapes as they recount their experiences." Isbell asks a series of questions: How do these people explain the cataclysmic events that have disrupted their lives? How does Protestantism figure in the construction of explanations for the massive violence that has been inflicted on them? How have the violent events of the past decade affected the political identity of the peasants she interviewed? As she listens to the tapes, Isbell is struck by a number of observations. There is little chronological reckoning of violent events; they are placed in epochs of power and control, rather than in specific dates. The violence by soldiers is perpetrated by outsiders, foreigners who don't speak Quechua--people from *el otro lado* (the other side). Sendero, on the other hand, has become the new *naqaq,* the flesh-eating monsters of the past. The peasants are caught between the *naqaq* and the foreigners "who know no fear, who are more savage than Peruvians" (in this context, Indians). The appeal of evangelical Protestantism is more problematic. Some claim that the army generally respects the Protestants; others claim that their daily prayers for peace and calm have diminished the violence. Since Sendero seems to concentrate its attacks on communities with civil defense patrols, some villages have refused to form them, preferring to flee from any strangers. Isbell also found that the violence has not resulted in any new political awareness or sense of shared identity; on the contrary, it has reinforced separateness: "People identified with their own locale and the less they knew or identified with others, the better."

812. Kirk, Robin. *The Decade of Chaqwa: Peru's Internal Refugees.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1991.

"Chaqwa" is a Quechua term, referring to something confused, disorganized, without order: the literal dismantling of the universal order between two diametrically opposed forces. Kirk reports on some 200,000 people who have been forced to flee from their homes in the emergency zones and are now displaced *(desplazados)* in regional capitals and Lima. Entire communities have been abandoned, leaving ghost towns throughout the sierra. More than 50% of these internal refugees are under children under 18; they suffer high levels of malnutrition, disease, and psychological trauma. Many are living under conditions of poverty extreme even for Peru. *Los desplazados* are neither recognized nor counted by the government; with the exception of OXFAM-UK and the International Committee of the Red Cross, no international organization has come to their aid. They are caught between government security forces and Sendero, both of which consider them either potential enemies or allies. In the cities they are concentrated in sprawling shanty-towns, where they encounter prejudice and high unemployment. Families survive by banding together in communal soup kitchens and regional confederations. Three successive civil governments have met this crisis with ignorance and inaction, downplaying the social cost of the war and making the internally-displaced invisible in their own country. Kirk, who worked in Peru from April to December, 1990 documents several waves of *desplazados,* and the experiences of specific refugee camps. She also examines the sociology of displaced settlements, which come to mirror the societies that the refugees abandoned. She concludes with a number of recommendations: that the government acknowledge the refugee problem and render aid to the displaced; that the military protect refugees in their settlements; that the government conduct a census of the urban

displaced as a basis for mobilizing a humanitarian response. Incorporating, rather than isolating the refugees, will form the basis of reintegration into society. The government should also improve access by the Red Cross to the emergency zones. Religious and international aid groups should concentrate their energies on building and strengthening existing grassroots organizations of *desplazados*, such as soup kitchens, health clinics, and other services.

813. Kruijt, Dirk. *Perú, entre Sendero y los militares, seguridad y relaciones cívico-militares, 1950-1990.* Lima: D. Kruijt, 1991.

Kruijt reviews the history of Peruvian civil-military relations, with an emphasis on the last four decades. He notes that while the last three civil governments have all dedicated themselves to "fighting against terrorism," and have declared more and more territory in a state of emergency, the majority of generals occupying key posts between 1983 and 1991 have asked for "more reforms and fewer bullets." Kruijt connects this attitude with the thesis elaborated by General Marín at CAEM during the 1950's, that linked security and development. Nevertheless, the road to the presidency in Peru has often been through the ranks of the military, and Kruijt goes back to Peru's disastrous experience in the War of the Pacific to review the development of Peruvian military philosophy, highlighting the importance of CAEM in the thinking of more recent officers. The greater part of Kruijt's analysis deals with the reform junta of 1968 and its successor, the more conservative military government that left power in 1980. He also examines the triangle of Sendero, civilian government, and the armed forces, interviewing a number of Peruvian officers, including Generals Sinesio Jarama and Huamán, on Sendero's strategy for victory. He includes a 10-point strategic analysis of the war, covering recruitment, ideological doctrine, coordination among the armed forces, the creation of a Ministry of Defense, promotion, civil-military relations, the intelligence apparatus (SIN), army-police relations, the appearance of private armies, and who comprises the predominant force in the counterinsurgency war.

814. Lakos, Amos. *Terrorism, 1980-1990: a Bibliography*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.

Extensive bibliography (unannotated) on worldwide terrorist movements, including theoretical, psychological and social aspects of terrorism, its strategies and tactics, countermeasures, domestic and international laws relating to terrorism, and its relationship to the media. In the geographical subdivisions, the Latin American section is impressive, even though the entire bibliography is limited to works in English. There are 35 entries on Sendero, including works by Tarazona-Sevillano, Gorriti, McClintock, Palmer, McCormick, Anderson, and Taylor. An extremely thorough subject index is included.

815. Lizárraga, José. "Sendero Luminoso: Struggle for Utopia?" *Terrorism, Violence, and Insurgency Report* v.10, no.3 (1991): 28-29.

Lizárraga reviews Abimael Guzmán's plans for a People's Republic of the New Democracy (PRND) after Sendero's victory. The three instruments of Sendero's revolution are the militarized party, surrounded by the popular army, which in its turn is surrounded by the "one front"--all of society, that is to be militarized as a whole. There will be no interim period of limited private enterprise and property ownership; the transition to pure communism will be swift and total. All land and means of production will be nationalized to eliminate class differences. All material possessions will be common property, with wealth equally distributed. Any individuals retaining cultural or ideological differences will be assimilated through "popular education." The bourgeois virus will be eradicated. Lizarraga links Sendero to the Khmer Rouge, stating that its goals are self-sufficiency and the eradication of western culture in Peru. He calls for improved economic conditions to delegitimize Sendero as an alternative.

816. Manwaring, Max G. and John T. Fishel. "Strategic Vision and Insurgency in El Salvador and Peru." In *Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict*. Edited by Max G. Manwaring. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, pp.31-43.

Arresting if brief analysis of what the authors term "uncomfortable wars"--low intensity conflicts in which the United States is likely to be involved. Manwaring and Fishel have both served in or advised the U.S. Southern Command directorate in Panama. After summarizing both armed conflicts, they assert that "the primary center of gravity in Peru--as in El Salvador--continues to be legitimacy." Insurgencies and revolutionary wars are wars for moral legitimacy. "Nations whose governments have achieved moral legitimacy are relatively invulnerable to insurgent movement. By contrast, a nation whose government is or has been perceived as lacking in moral correctness is a prime target for Marxist-Leninist 'revolution' and its moralistic egalitarian

doctrine." Political, economic, and social discrimination give revolutionary forces the moral "high ground" with which to attack governmental legitimacy, and it is here, the authors contend, that any response must begin: "A campaign that fails to understand this and responds only to 'enemy' military forces is likely to fail." They also cite Peruvian General Edgardo Mercado Jarrín, who recognized and wrote on this very theme as early as 1967.

817. Manwaring, Max G., Courtney E. Prisk, and John T. Fishel. "Other Actions That Make a Difference: The Case of Peru." In *Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict.* Edited by Max G. Manwaring. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, pp.93-101.

The authors establish two levels of counterinsurgency activities needed to win a low-intensity conflict. The first is strategic, involving the necessary organization to ensure unity of effort, operationalization of will, and the umbrella of legitimacy. The second is tactical, involving various military and operational factors, including guerrilla war, anti-subversion warfare, and "the war to limit support for the insurgency." The two must be balanced in order to achieve victory. Having established these paradigms, the authors criticize the Peruvian government for its inadequacies. The García regime and its predecessors have tended to ignore political, economic, social, and moral aspects of the threat, viewing Sendero as a strictly military problem. Even in military terms, the armed forces remain oriented toward the conventional and low-probability threat from Chile and Ecuador. Strategically, they have displayed little understanding of the necessary political and psychological needs of counterinsurgency warfare. Tactically, their operations have been ineffective, and their frankly racist tendency to kill large numbers of people in the hopes of destroying a few terrorists has been counterproductive. Counterinsurgency training must "be far more than technically proficient. It must also establish an understanding of the nonmilitary aspects of violence, an appreciation of human rights, a belief in the correctness of the cause, a confidence in ultimate victory, and a willingness to accept hardship in pursuit of clearly defined and just ends. These are not easy tasks, but they are necessary if the armed forces 'are to become part of the solution, not part of the problem.'"

818. Masterson, Daniel M. *Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru From Sánchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso.* (Contributions in Military Studies, no.111) New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.

Extensive study of the development of the Peruvian military and its long search to identify a clear professional rationale. Masterson's excellent introduction summarizes a number of themes of his work. One important argument is that the Peruvian military, like many Latin American armies lacking any tradition of their own, adopted French or German traditions along with their military philosophies and technical training. The results were often a misunderstanding or misapplication of foreign thinking. The Peruvians were strongly influenced by the French military "colonial school" after the arrival of the first French military mission in 1896. One French theorist saw colonialism as "a fraternal union between two peoples to vanquish poverty and misery." Although France's Moroccan and Tonkin experiences failed to live up to this vision, its influence on Peruvian military thinkers is evident in the 1968 progressive military government of Velasco. Masterson traces the army's evolution, through its many *caudillo* regimes, its hatred of--and for some, attraction to--APRA, its 1965 counterinsurgency experience (which Masterson suggests had less to do with army competence and more to do with guerrilla incompetence and division), and the *docenio,* the twelve years of military rule between 1968 and 1980. The Peruvian military, in his view, has yet to demonstrate the capacity to defeat the insurgency. That such a goal is primarily a social, not a military task, is clearly recognized by veterans of the Ayacucho campaign in other branches of the armed forces. Yet officers who espouse such views run the risk of being ostracized for their social consciousness. The Velasco years have produced a backlash against officers who voice progressive views; they are seen as politically ambitious by their colleagues, and as threatening by civilian politicians. The "national defense activism" of the Velasco years has given way to a Maginot Line mentality of border defense. The army's journals rarely run articles on counterinsurgency, and no substantive discussion of Sendero is evident. Military intelligence has proved disgracefully inadequate during the insurgency; the services are reluctant to share information among themselves or even within their own branch. Just as Sendero has exploited weaknesses in Peruvian society, so it has exposed vulnerabilities in the armed forces. Enlisted personnel are still underpaid draftees, and poorly-equipped, -clothed, and -fed. There are language difficulties between Quechua-speaking conscripts and Spanish-speaking officers, and a lack of experienced non-commissioned officers to train the raw recruits. There is strong evidence of some *senderista* infiltration among the rank and file, just as APRA suborned soldiers in the 1930's and 1940's. Masterson concludes that the military's search for a mission continues; successive periods of French, Soviet, and U.S. training and doctrine have muddled the army's sense of self-identity. Peru, more than ever, needs a stable and progressive armed forces to defeat

Shining Path and help rebuild the nation's shattered infrastructure once the war is over. Not since 1879 (the War of the Pacific) has the Peruvian military faced as great a challenge it does today.

819. Mauceri, Philip. "Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,* v.33 (1991): 83-109.

Study of the Peruvian military after ten years of war against the Shining Path. The war has renewed the military's role in Peruvian politics; thanks to emergency decrees they now rule directly over half the country. The armed forces have devised and implemented counterinsurgency strategy, largely pushing aside civilian influence over how Sendero is to be defeated. More important, the military has remained largely unaccountable for how it is fighting the war; despite accusations of widespread human rights abuses, there is still no civilian oversight or alternative strategies. Mauceri argues, however, that this monopoly on counter-guerrilla policy has not resulted in consistent or national counterinsurgency strategies. In fact, conflicts and contradictions within the military have been apparent in its approach to fighting Sendero. These conflicts can be traced back to the early 1970's and the debate over the role of the military in Peruvian society. Deep divisions within the armed forces over their role in politics and the significance of Sendero's challenge have produced differing approaches to counterinsurgency; these have also created internal tensions within the armed forces as well as external ones with civilian institutions. Mauceri notes the important role of the military war college *(Centro de Altos Estudios Militares,* or CAEM) and the Army Intelligence School in formulating a new role for the military--fostering economic and social development. The withdrawal of the military from politics after conservative officers displaced General Velasco marked a fundamental realignment and a transition back to civilian rule. But the basic cleavages within the armed forces persisted; this explains both the military's reluctance to enter the fight against Sendero, and the continued divisions over their role in Peruvian politics. These divisions are reflected in a lack of consensus over a counterinsurgency strategy that will defeat the guerrillas. Mauceri reviews the changes in that strategy, from General Noel's "internal war" strategy (which identifies an enemy and seeks to eliminate him), to General Huamán's emphasis on the root causes of the insurgency, poverty and neglect in the rural highlands. But the developmentalist approach sounded too much like interference in social and economic policy, and so Huamán was dismissed. In any case, the APRA government lacked the resources to implement such a strategy, and García's *Trapecio Andino* program collapsed. Since 1988, the military's approach to insurgency has been fragmented, with a strengthened role for local commanders and an increasing reliance on civilian defense forces. Ironically, local commanders, as *jefes-políticos-militares,* have a great deal of political power, but their one-year periods in command mandate rapid turnover and prevent any coherent long-term strategies from being implemented. Neither Sendero nor the military currently possess enough strength to defeat each other; stalemate seems to be the most likely outcome.

820. Meyer, Christina. *Underground Voices: Insurgent Propaganda in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Peru.* Santa Monica: RAND, 1991.

In a study for the Defense Department project, "Low-Intensity Warfare in the Year 2000," Meyer compares guerrilla use of propaganda in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Peru. Propaganda grants authority to its makers; it is necessary in the early stages of a guerrilla movement to alert people to its existence. Later on it can be used to convince people of the moral legitimacy of the movement, and that the war's instability and economic turmoil are not their fault, but that of the government; ultimately this chaos will bring about beneficial change. Meyer analyzes the FMLN's extensive and successful use of radio propaganda in El Salvador, as well as the failure of the Contras in Nicaragua to properly use propaganda to advance their cause. Characteristics of guerrilla propaganda correspond to the groups that use them. The FMLN in El Salvador seeks to win the support of as many people as possible and uses a wide spectrum of information, including its own radio station, "Radio Venceremos." Sendero does not, and its use of propaganda is more narrowly focused. The PCP uses radio only sporadically; it will occasionally capture a station and use it to broadcast a message. Sendero believes in "direct propaganda" in remote highland villages, focusing on the education of children and indoctrination by people from the community who have become *senderistas.* It also places great emphasis on "propaganda of the deed"--trials and executions of enemies of the people, and dynamiting power lines in order to black out Lima. Since 1986 Sendero has broadened its base of support by infiltrating once-scorned labor, student, and community organizations. Its use of the newspaper *El Diario* is consistent with its interest in only selected segments of the population. Since buying and reading *El Diario* requires some effort (it is available only through newsstands to protect readers' identities), it tends to influence those who have become sympathetic to its aims. Bonds between *senderistas* are reinforced when all members are able to keep up with party developments through the paper. For example, *El Diario's* accounts of the 1988 party congress promoted a sense of solidarity among party guerrillas, "by keeping all

its members, from Ayacucho to Puno to San Martín, abreast of the Congress's discussions." After all, "Sendero's newspaper...is not intended to persuade the general population to join the movement, but rather to inform its members and supporters and to reinforce their loyalty."

821. Mitchell, William P. *Peasants on the Edge: Crop, Cult, and Crisis in the Andes.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991.

Extensive interdisciplinary study of a small peasant village, Quinua, located 34 kilometers northeast of Ayacucho city. Mitchell has observed Quinua since 1966, and charts the demographic, economic, and social changes that have transformed traditional village life over the past decades. Migration and the diminishing role of agriculture have led to family dispersion and alterations in peasant political structures, which have changed in function and declined in importance. Evangelical Protestantism has made inroads among the village's Catholics. Violence by the Shining Path and government repression has increased pressures on a community already buffeted by ecological and economic changes. Quinua serves as a regional military post; perhaps for that reason peasants refused to establish a self-defense patrol, claiming the large police post is sufficient. Many believe that the *rondas* serve less as a defense against guerrillas, and more as vigilante groups exacting revenge for old quarrels and land disputes. Many *quinueños* have been killed; the peasants say that the victims were mostly innocents caught up in forces beyond their control, murdered by guerrillas, security forces, bandits, narcotics gangs, and other peasant militias. The belief in *pistacos* is widespread in Quinua, says Mitchell, but the villagers blame the military, especially the sinchis, for the majority of the killings. Many peasants have fled to Lima or Ayacucho. Mitchell documents a process of transformation whose origins and ramifications are independent of the struggle between the state and Shining Path; he argues that in a peasant society materialist influences can outweigh ideological causes in social change.

822. *Mujeres, violencia y derechos humanos.* Compiled by Narda Henríquez and Rosa María Alfaro. Lima: Calandria/IEPALA, 1991.

Collection of essays on women caught up in the struggle between Sendero and the state. Violence, as well as severe economic and social dislocation, has dramatically altered human relations in sociocultural and psychological ways; women have borne the brunt of these changes in Peru in the last decades. Among the essays in this volume is Rosa María Alfaro's "Comunicar entre violencias: una estrategia de paz," that examines how women, individually and collectively, can work to reduce daily violence, and to enlarge their political role. Isabel Coral Cordero, in "La mujer en el contexto de violencia política," looks at a decade of violence and economic distress and its alarming effects on the population: an explosion of sexual violence against women, alcoholism, family disintegration, abandonment and abasement of children, all of which have created greater stress for women and the family. Coral examines women in their communities, as a political force, and the role they play in the economy; she concludes that the war and its ramifications have produced a revolution in women's social roles in the country, changes that are irreversible. Other essays in the book look at the psychological effects of violence among women, the judicial aspects of women's specifically and human rights in general, as well as "popular organizations" and their role in the midst of crisis. Tables at the book's end document violence, casualties, disappearances, and detainees after a decade of struggle.

823. Peru. Congreso. Senado. Comisión Especial Sobre las Causas de la Violencia y Alternativas de Pacificación Nacional. *Violencia y pacificación en 1991.* Lima: Centro de Investigación Legislativo del Senado, January, 1992.

Annual report from the Senate's special commission on the causes of violence and possible alternatives for the country. The report contains a great deal of information (much of it in graphs and tables) chronicling the economic and social costs of the violence to Peru, reports on the disappeared, legislative proposals to strengthen protection of human rights, modifications of some of the more draconian anti-terrorist laws, *rondas campesinas* and civil defense committees, legal penalties for convicted terrorists, etc. The Commission concludes that violence has become endemic, and claims about 3,000 lives per year. It has spread from rural to urban zones, and seriously interferes in the economic development of the country. An alliance between terrorists and narcotics traffickers has been established, and the state's presence in many parts of Peru has become precarious or irregular. Furthermore, the state's response to subversion has been basically military. Attacks have slightly subsided over the past two years, owing principally to improved counterinsurgency techniques, intelligence, and the employment of peasant and civil defense patrols. But the Commission advises against any optimistic conclusions. The work of the self-defense patrols does not relieve the government of its responsibilities to protect the lives of its

citizens; nor is sporadic military action a substitute for strong local government and a protective military and police presence in the community. Sendero is basically intact as an organization, the Commission warns; furthermore, the supporting organizations generated by Sendero constitute a new political front for the guerrillas. These legal, popular, and youth networks are competing for influence with already existing popular organizations. Extreme poverty, unemployment, recession, and inflation give subversion opportunities to grow. Pacification is the primary national task, and will require the help of all branches of government, social and civil institutions, all means of social communication, and the organized participation of the population.

824. *Our Red Flag is Flying in Peru.* S.l., s.n., [April 1991].

Reprint of a long discourse on the revolution in Peru, originally published in *A World to Win.* The publication's bibliography is prefaced by the statement, "This article drew upon the major May 1990 pamphlet published by the PCP Central Committee, *Elections No, People's War Yes.* It is not yet available in English. Many of the quotes come from the document *Bases of Discussion* prepared for the PCP's 1988 First Congress." The text summarizes the course of people's war, and explains how the New Democracy is being established by People's Committees in the countryside. There is also a detailed explanation of how the economy and production are being managed, and how justice and civil affairs are being administered. It concludes with an analysis of the 1990 elections. The bibliography lists virtually all the PCP documents that have been published in English.

825. Poole, Deborah and Gerardo Rénique. "The New Chroniclers of Peru: US Scholars and Their 'Shining Path' of Peasant Rebellion." *Bulletin of Latin American Research,* 10, no. 2 (1991): 133-191.

One of the most controversial articles written in the literature of Sendero. Leftist progressives Poole and Rénique analyze not so much Shining Path itself, but senderology, the study of Sendero as a political and social phenomenon. In doing so, they launch a frontal attack on the scholarship of Cynthia McClintock and David Scott Palmer, two of the earliest and most prominent senderologists. Both are criticized for imposing their preconceived theories on a Peruvian and an Ayacuchan reality that Poole and Rénique believe is markedly different from that outlined by the two scholars. Both are accused of ignoring or discounting *senderista* primary sources and Peruvian secondary scholarship in order to build a fallacious peasant rebellion model of center-periphery antagonism. In doing so, Poole and Rénique say Palmer and McClintock serve to reinforce a racist and brutal post-Cold War "New World Order" counterinsurgency paradigm. McClintock's thesis is that Sendero is a popular peasant movement arising from a subsistence crisis in Ayacucho. Palmer's writings postulate a series of center-periphery, traditional-modern, Spanish-Indian, rural-urban, and coast-highlands dichotomies that have given birth to a fringe movement comprised of equal parts of Maoism and Mariátegui messianism. Both scholars, Poole and Rénique assert, have established manichean poles of legitimacy and violence, overlooking regional differences and complexities and the role of other sectors in Peru, including the non-violent left and NGO's. Poole and Rénique accuse Palmer and McClintock of sloppy, even dishonest scholarship. Both, they say, have constructed a model of a mysterious, irrational, remote, messianic, Indian peasant guerrilla movement in order to validate current American political policies, and thus elide or minimize the role of "authoritarianism, violence, racism, and intimidation in the legitimation and reproduction of the hegemonic political culture which has sustained both elected and non-elected governments in twentieth-century Peru." Poole and Rénique go on to critique and criticize other North American senderologists for sweeping generalizations, ignorance of Peruvian scholarship, failure to consider Sendero as a rational and logical, if violent and extreme, political movement, and faithfulness to preconceived political models and "restricting paradigms of outmoded theory." These senderologists have constructed convenient and marketable models as "product...customized to fit the emerging ideological and political needs of...post-Cold War consumers." This xenophobic image of the barbarian siege allows academics and governments "to insert Sendero into the essentialised demonology of 'international terrorism'" and the deadly new scourge of worldwide narcoterrorism. Poole and Rénique assert that in doing so, these senderologists are following a long tradition in Latin America of tailoring investigation and reporting to serve the interests of political, social, and economic elites. This scholarly imperialism of "truth produced by outsiders" has produced a "normalising discourse" that is complicit with certain forms of political power. Poole and Rénique conclude by giving their own conclusions on Sendero Luminoso as a political and military movement, which they assert are firmly rooted in a Peruvian historical, political, and sociological context.

826. Rénique, José Luis. "La batalla por Puno: violencia política en la Sierra del Puno." Consortium papers, 38. New York: Columbia University-New York University Consortium, [1991].

From a distance, says Rénique, the situation in Peru would appear to be reducible to a violent confrontation between the "establishment" and Sendero Luminoso, particularly grave in rural areas where traditions of exploitation and injustice would explain the sympathy of the peasantry for the *senderista* guerrillas. By this logic, region after region should have fallen in a spiral of violence generated by the implacable hostility of a landed order opposed to any form of peasant participation. But the reality is far different: regional, ethnic, cultural, and partisan political dimensions make for a far more complex situation. Rénique's goal is to explore that complexity in the case of Puno department, examining the diverse political forces at work in Puno since 1985 and the ecological and economical diversity of the department. A growing international demand for beef in the 19th century led to an expansion of cattle-raising haciendas, setting the stage for conflict between peasant communities and haciendas. Rénique traces the development of peasant politicization and radicalization throughout the 1960's and 1970's, and the impact of the military's reforms on departments such as Puno. The creation of agrarian enterprises such as CAPS, SAIS, and ERPS did not resolve land conflicts, but rather created a new privileged class, further exacerbating communal tensions. But Puno was also the target of development projects, and NGO's worked with peasants to form collectives and build an educational and political infrastructure. By the beginning of the 1980's, peasants were ready for a second agrarian reform to "restructure" the agrarian enterprises. The struggle between the "pro-*comunero*" and "directorial" blocs was directly exploited by the entrance of *senderistas* in the late 1970's. Rénique traces Sendero's trajectory from the establishment of "popular schools" to growing dynamite attacks and assassinations by mid-decade. Sendero's targets were less often security forces and government officials than members of rival leftist organizations like the PUM and FDCP (peasant federation). To make matters worse, after 1986 those same sectors were the target of repression by *apristas* now in power, and the situation truly became one of civil war. Rénique describes in detail the complex political and military situation throughout the years of APRA power; as the economic situation worsened, García's grand scheme to develop the "Andean trapezoid" faded. Sendero, which had been forced to retreat, reentered Puno with renewed ferocity. It virtually declared war on the PUM-peasant alliance, destroying a venerable rural education center. The security forces also attacked Puno's progressive sectors, which are still besieged by both sides. Rénique concludes that Sendero has wrecked many of the department's agrarian enterprises, and that its presence has caused a multi-sided struggle among populist organizations (including peasant and church groups), political movements like the PUM, government bureaucrats, and empresarial and commercial sectors. Instead of allying to fight Sendero, Puno's fragmented social sectors have fought each other. In the process, Puno has become a militarized society.

827. Rosenberg, Tina. "Dialectic." In *Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America.* New York: William Morrow, 1991, pp.145-215.

"Dialectic" is a chapter on Peru in a work that examines many aspects of violence in Latin America: the *guerra sucia* in Argentina, years of struggle in El Salvador, relentless drug violence in Colombia, etc. In "Dialectic" Rosenberg convincingly and movingly paints a portrait of a society rent by violence, and drowning in an ocean of poverty, misery, indifference, bureaucracy, and corruption. Her wide cast of characters includes Javier, the *senderista* who survived the massacre in El Frontón and works in a stockbroker's office during the day, dedicates his free time to People's War, and is studying law to please his mother; Gloria, whose ignorance, poverty, and hopelessness symbolize *los de abajo;* a government clerk in the lowest court, whose function appears to be to prevent any progress being made in any lawsuit; and *curanderas* (women folk healers), Catholic aid workers and priests, high government officials, underpaid teachers, and Indians whose lot in life seems to be to suffer. In between these encounters, Rosenberg ably sketches the history of Sendero, and of Peruvian society's inability to come to terms with its own past. The sheer weight of sloth, corruption, incompetence, and meaningless legalism seems to guarantee the failure of any reform or initiative in what may be the world's most bureaucratic society. The worse things get, the more cheerful Javier becomes: "A million percent inflation, garbage piling up, no jobs, no water, no electricity. The forces of history are really on our side." But the *leitmotif* running through Rosenberg's narrative is the story of Gloria, the unwed mother of two, fired from her lowly waitressing job, cheated out of her money from a land sale, enmeshed in a hopeless court case that will never be resolved, abandoned by the men in her life, and too poor to get proper treatment for her tuberculosis. Rosenberg makes her point subtly, but powerfully: for many people in Peru, life is so awful that they ask themselves, how bad can Sendero Luminoso be?

828. Schiappa-Pietra, Oscar. *Apuntes sobre el desplazamiento violento de poblaciones en el Perú, 1980-1990.* (Serie Exodos en América Latina. Area de Promoción y Asistencia a ONG; Programa para Refugiados, Repatriados y Desplazados, 1) San José: Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, 1991.

Examination of refugees displaced by internal violence in Peru during a decade of subversive war. Schiappa-Pietra shows that internal migration from rural to urban areas in the decades preceding the war, as well as explosive population growth, had already exacerbated social relations throughout the country. In the decade following the initiation of armed struggle first by Sendero, and then MRTA, some 16,000 people have been killed, according to DESCO figures. Populations have abandoned the countryside because of "structural violence" (restrictions on free movement in the *campo* by both guerrillas and security forces, the collapse of local economies, the disintegration of local services by the state), and because of direct threat of or actual violence by Sendero or police and army. The author shows how the counterinsurgency campaign encourages displacement of persons, and the effects of that displacement on local populations and urban areas where people tend to migrate. He concludes by describing an experiment in "re-immigration" of displaced persons in the province of Vilcashuamán, in Ayacucho department. The experiment was only partially successful due to continued guerrilla violence. To be viable, Schiappa-Pietra declares, such efforts will need more support from the state .

829. Smith, Michael L. "Taking the High Ground: Shining Path and the Andes." *Terrorism, Violence, and Insurgency Report,* v.10, no.3 (1991): 1-10.

Detailed and insightful analysis of Sendero's strategy in Peru, based on fieldwork in the country. He asks how this insurgency has been so successful in such an ethnically, culturally, and politically heterogeneous and fragmented society. He advances, and then discusses a number of propositions. 1) Sendero bases its strategy on an understanding of the interplay among Andean society, politics, geography, and ecology. Andean society is formed by a series of complex ecological zones, that require long-term strategies, organization, discipline. 2) In practical terms, Sendero works within a local or regional setting. Despite its reputation for ideological dogmatism and fanaticism, Sendero can tailor its tactics to the demands of Andean eco-politics. Sendero calls this current phase "The War of Little Wars." 3) Sendero exploits friction between urban and rural worlds. Racial and ethnic hatreds, class and generational differences, lack of employment prospects, land and water scarcity, state corruption, and the inequalities of the capitalist market are among the elements that Sendero can utilize in furthering its revolution. 4) Sendero's taste for violence is a necessary element in Andean eco-politics. For them, violence is a constant dynamic of history, since, in Guzmán's words, the capitalist system condemns 60,000 infants a year to death before the age of one, the "quota of blood" necessary for the success of the revolution is a small price to pay for a more egalitarian system. Sendero's use of force both demonstrates its existence as an alternative source of power and weds the peasant community to it through acts of violence. 5) Sendero's aim is to disorganize politics. All alternatives to its revolution, such as catechists, grass-roots leaders, soup-kitchen organizers, or teachers are harassed, neutralized, or killed. 6) Sendero fills a political vacuum with three elements: a militarized party, armed violence, and an iron-clad ideology. Its rigid adherence to orthodox Maoism is both a source of weakness and its most formidable strength. 7) Sendero's dogmatism is belied by a utilitarian approach. The pedagogical formula that Guzmán developed in his Ayacucho days has allowed Sendero to spread from the sierras to the urban centers. Its message is coherent, simple to understand, and "exhaustive in explaining a wide universe of experience." Compared to the dysfunctional state of Peruvian state education, it is extremely effective, forming the basis of a "revolutionary apprenticeship" prior to participation in the armed struggle.

830. Spalding, Hobart. *Peru: A Country in Crisis. A Report on the Social Sciences and and Social Science Research Centres.* Stockholm: SAREC (Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries), October 1991.

Report on a mission to Peru to evaluate some 33 social sciences research centers, including government, university, independent research, and "umbrella group" centers. Hobart sketches out the social, political, and economic disasters now confronting Peru, including an economy in ruins and increasing terrorist violence. The work of Peruvian social scientists reporting, evaluating, and making recommendations on a nation in crisis is crucial to finding solutions to the country's problems. Individual reports on institutions such as DESCO and the IEP underline how much of our knowledge of Sendero, agrarian and urban society, and Peru's multiple crises has emerged from these valuable centers.

831. Starn, Orin. "Missing the Revolution: Anthropologists and the War in Peru." *Cultural Anthropology,* v.6, no.1 (1991): 63-91.

An extremely important essay critiquing anthropologists for a number of sins, including short-sightedness, romantic "Andeanism," and academic overspecialization that caused them to "miss the revolution." Andean studies is a thriving regional subspeciality; why then, Starn asks, did virtually everyone fail to realize that a major insurgency was about to detonate in the highlands of Peru? This lack of foresight raises important questions: "...after all, anthropologists...positioned themselves as the 'good' outsiders who truly understood the interests and aspirations of Andean people." Although Sendero's roots as a fanatical Maoist cult are bizarre enough to excuse a lack of clairvoyancy, Starn believes that most anthropologists were remarkably unattuned to the conditions that made Sendero's rise possible. They tended to ignore the growing linkages between the countryside and the cities, villages, and shantytowns. They also overlooked the growing unrest (attested to by protests and land invasions) that was manifest throughout the *campo.* Starn attributes much of this myopia to several factors. The concept of Andeanism, which tends to romanticize native life as timeless, unchanging, and deeply rooted in tradition, has affected not only novelists, politicians, travelers, artists, but anthropologists as well. In addition, the growing importance of ecological and symbolic analysis in anthropological theory has produced an intense preoccupation with issues of adaptation, ritual, and cosmology, to the exclusion of more obvious factors of sheer poverty and political discontent. Starn compares two important works on the highlands, Isbell's *To Defend Ourselves* and Díaz Martínez's *Ayacucho, hambre y esperanza,* to illustrate his point. He sees Isbell's, as well as other works, rooted in Andeanism, similar to Said's Orientalism, an emphasis on dichotomizing between the Western, coastal, urban, mestizo, and the non-Western, rural, highland, and indigenous worlds. Thus to speak of *lo andino,* the Andean world view or Andean mind, is to ignore the mixture, change, and interlinkages between the two worlds. Isbell stresses continuity and tradition. Díaz Martínez, on the other hand, saw (and partially disparaged) a process of continual acculturation and modernization, in which men from highlands villages spoke two or three languages, spent half their year farming and half working in Lima, and were thoroughly conversant with modern life. Anthropologists, Starn notes, have also concentrated on southern Peru, which is more "traditional" and "nativist" than the northern highlands, where rural communities are largely Spanish-speaking and more acculturated: "The virtual elision of northern Peru from the ethnographic records helped maintain the image of the Andean countryside as the province of ayllus and speakers of native languages, a place little changed from the ancient past." Peasants, in Isbell's view, struggled to keep tradition intact; in Díaz Martínez's opinion, they wanted change, and were ready to support anyone who promised it. Starn ends with a plea for anthropologists to dismantle the binary logic of Andeanism/Europeanism, indigenous/Western, traditional/modern, and to recognize that the peasants of Peru are not living in the past; rather, they have lived nearly half a millennium under colonial and republican rule. He also believes that the pendulum of "senderology" has swung too far to the view of the movement as peopled by middle-class intellectuals or aspiring *cholo* ex-students; there is plenty of evidence of peasant support for Sendero in many highland communities.

832. Stater, Timothy. "Sendero Luminoso's Relentless War." *Terrorism, Violence, and Insurgency (TVI) Report,* v.10, no.3 (1991): 18-23.

Succinct, if conventional, analysis of the war. Stater recounts the basics of Senderology: the movement's Maoist philosophy and *líder máximo,* "President Gonzalo," its Chinese strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside, its brutality, fanaticism, rural- and urban-based cadres, crude tactics and sophisticated strategy, domination of the cocaine trade in the UHV, alienation from other Marxist nations, and the government's ineffective response. Although the outlook is grim, Stater points out several of Sendero's limitations. After a decade of struggle, and despite the country's misery, it has yet to win over significant portions of the populace. Although it enjoys free rein in many areas of the countryside, ruling through brutality and terror, its brutality alienates potential supporters. Sendero lacks the prerequisites of a Sandinista-style victory: an effective urban campaign, popular support (especially from moderate leftists), and foreign assistance. "To significantly expand and possibly win, SL will have to transform itself from a predominantly rural-based group with a limited manpower to a force that, while retaining rural strength, incorporates a popular urban front with a less doctrinaire message. This conversion, however, is unlikely in the decade ahead." He concludes that although Sendero's prospects of replacing the government are not good, its odds of provoking a military coup are higher.

833. Stevenson, Sharon. "With Impunity and Injustice for All: The Heart of Peru's Human Rights Problem." *Terrorism, Violence, and Insurgency Report,* v.10, no.3 (1991): 23-28.

Examining the dilemma of a judicial system in ruins, Stevenson asks, for what rule of law is the war being waged? Peru, she says, has no rule of law; after 20,000 terrorist acts and 9,000 dead, the justice system has prosecuted only 357 acts of terrorism. Thirteen people captured in a raid on a Sendero safe-house in January of 1991 were turned over by DIRCOTE to the courts; twelve were released or absolved. One man who signed an eight-page confession, had in his possession medallions bearing Guzmán's likeness, appeared in Sendero videos confiscated in the raid, and was named in Party documents, was released by a judge on "conditional liberty," and has since fled. One marine with whom Stevenson spoke asked, "Why bother capturing Sendero suspects? It doesn't do any good to bring them all the way back to Lima with the evidence. They just let them go." She says the real human rights tragedy in Peru is the hideous injustice of its judicial system: "You cannot fight subversion with an impunishable, corrupt police and military." Human rights abusers are never called to account, and bribery is an acceptable way to receive justice in one's favor. Fujimori has attacked corrupt judges as "jackals," kicking out or sanctioning 325 judges or court personnel and 625 police between January and August, 1991. Still, these efforts are insufficient to bring change. Belonging to Sendero is still not a crime in Peru. There is no bail under Peruvian law, only conditional or unconditional liberty. Under the Napoleonic code, there are no trials by jury, and legal precedent as a guide is virtually unknown. Since plea bargains do not exist, the courts are jammed, and prisons are full of untried prisoners; 90 people in Lurigancho jail had waited 10 years without being sentenced! Stevenson criticizes an Amnesty International report of November, 1991, saying AI ignores the real problems of prosecuting terrorists, and overlooks the fact that the system works for no one. There is no protection for judges, prosecutors, attorneys, and witnesses. Ominously, some police and soldiers are reluctant to sign depositions or appear in court, since they and their families cannot be safe from Sendero vengeance. U.S. aid should focus less on military solutions, and help to strengthen the judicial system, starting with an increase in the miserly AID Administration of Justice program, whose total funding is only $1.5 million.

834. Tammen, Melanie S. *The Drug War vs. Land Reform in Peru.* (Policy analysis no.156) Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1991.

Examination of the anti-narcotics strategy of Peru and the United States. Tammen condemns current policies as total failures, especially policies rooted in state-directed agricultural control in Peru. She applauds a new course by President Fujimori that stresses empowerment of farmers through land ownership, deregulation of markets for substitute crops (which have been stifled by state collectivist control), and better interdiction of narcotics trafficking. (The last, she predicts, will undoubtedly fail.) Tammen sketches a "descent into nationalized agriculture" that she says has made private land tenure shaky and coca cultivation more profitable than farming other crops. The removal of burdensome Peruvian regulations and U.S. import barriers can assist Peruvian farmers. Tammen also reviews the growing influence of Sendero over the cocaine business, and the efforts to control coca production in the Upper Huallaga Valley, which have reinforced guerrilla influence and created an intractable military-police conflict. She also proposes that the U.S. legalize drugs. Removing the profit and the crime from the narcotics trade will restore order to America's streets and school yards, and allow Lima to combat the Sendero Luminoso insurgency, by disengaging insurgents from coca growers.

835. Tello, María del Pilar. *Perú: el precio de la paz.* Lima: Ediciones Petroperú, 1991.

An essay on the high cost of peace. In the first part of Tello's book she reviews a violent decade, with headings such as "From a map of poverty to that of violence," "The *aprista* promise," "Peace by commission," "The inevitable frustration," and "The Fujimori hope?" The second part of her work is a series of interviews with prominent Peruvians and social scientists, with the title of each dialogue capturing its essence. Among those interviewed are Enrique Bernales ("60,000 dead in the next decade"), Julio Cotler ("We don't have the capacity to negotiate"), Carlos Iván Degregori ("The point of departure is a national accord"), Gustavo Gorriti ("How does a democracy defend itself from an insurrection?"), Rodrigo Montoya ("The Andean rage arrives in Lima and multiplies"), Francisco Morales Bermúdez ("Counter-arrest subversion on the field of legality"), and Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller ("The crux of peace is the elimination of structural violence"). In a statistical appendix are tables detailing attacks, the economic and social costs of the war, and victims in each year since 1980.

836. "Impunidad oficial." *Caretas,* no.1141 (January 7 1991): 30-32.

Decree No.171-90, published in *El Peruano* on December 23, 1990, declared that all crimes committed by members of the armed forces or police in areas designated to be in a state of emergency will be tried under military law. *Caretas* attacks this declaration of official impunity (a throwback to the Spanish colonial *fuero militar)* as antithetical to democracy. The law contains a phrase that excludes crimes not connected to military or police service, but since soldiers and policemen in emergency areas are considered to be on duty 24 hours a day, the law in effect grants them total immunity from prosecution, making them untouchable. A follow-up piece ("Voces en contra") carries the arguments of several senators, the President of the Supreme Court, and the attorney general against the new decree.

837. Vogel, Tom. "The Karate Kid Meets the Shining Path." *Commonweal,* v.118, no.1 (January 11 1991): 9-11.

Peru's problems include an "economy in shambles, endemic poverty, isolation from the international financial community, cruel violence mounted by Shining Path guerrillas, a military of questionable loyalty with low regard for human rights, and pressures from the United States to adopt a more repressive antidrug policy." Vogel visits San Juan de Lurigancho shantytown near Lima, where 80% of the inhabitants depend on the government's Social Emergency Program (PES) for a daily meal. PES is in turn dependent on foreign contributions to meet the needs of the poor, and is running out of money. President Fujimori has given some hope to embattled Peruvians by fearlessly attacking corruption and ineptitude in the military, bureaucracy, and unions, and getting inflation under control through an economic shock program. But he seems to be giving the security forces free rein to fight the guerrillas in their own brutal way, by overlooking human rights abuses. Vogel describes instances of bodies dumped by helicopters in remote jungle areas, and investigations by the Episcopal Social Action Commission (CEAS) into disappearances. But Sendero is also very brutal. A 70-year old nun in a small town in eastern Peru is accused of the following: helping distribute emergency food, diverting peasants from the revolution, working with Indians hostile to Sendero, speaking of peace, distracting children with home-made candies, and cooperating with the local office of the state development agency. For these "crimes" she is shot in the head by a 16-year-old girl who shouts, "Now we are killing you. Tomorrow we will kill your god." Shining Path ignored clergy for many years, but because church social relief organizations comprise the only infrastructure left in many areas of Peru, they are becoming targets.

838. Starn, Orin. "Noches de ronda: Por las serranía del norte, con las auténticas rondas campesinas." *Quehacer,* no.69 (January-February 1991): 76-92.

Extensive report by anthropologist Starn on the peasant patrols that originated in Peru's north to defend communities against cattle thieves, robbers, violence, and corruption. Starn differentiates between patrols established spontaneously "from below," by the peasants themselves, and those created "from above" by the government, to combat subversion. The former reflect a growing movement for peasant autonomy; the latter have been implicated in several horrendous massacres. Press reports within Peru and official government proclamations have helped to spread confusion about the *rondas,* conflating the original *rondas* with the anti-guerrilla patrols. Starn describes the origin and purpose of the *rondas,* which now number 3,455 in seven northern departments as of 1990. As the *rondas* spread, they began to diversify. Some were *rondas pacíficas,* stressing cooperation with the police and authorities. After 1985 some were linked to APRA, militantly against both "communist terrorists" and Patria Roja. As the *rondas* have grown, so have their functions expanded, undertaking small-scale public works (like cleaning irrigation canals) and local construction; others fulfilled the need for local organization (scarcer in the north). While they generally do not act as local government, they do have an important function in the areas of self-defense, human rights, feminism, and sports. Their most extraordinary development has been in the administration of popular justice, in petty disputes and in cases involving land and water. After long hours of discussion, decisions are mutually reached that may include the imposition of fines or even punishment by administration of lashes. Almost all litigants agree to submit themselves to the *ronda's* authority, and some *rondas* have become very formal in this regard, with commissions, stamps, law books, etc. Starn also examines official reaction to the patrols, which has varied from sympathy to repression, as well as their political ties to or estrangement from APRA, IU, or PUM. However, recently it seems that their most important role has been as an obstacle to the expansion of Sendero into the northern departments; Starn describes particular cases where *ronda* communities have rejected Sendero's call to join the armed struggle. In some places Sendero's response has been to infiltrate the *rondas;* in others to terrorize the members into switching allegiance; in still other cases, the guerrillas have murdered *ronderos.*

839. "Guzmán los lazos secretos." *Caretas,* no.1146 (February 11 1991): 26-33.

A raid on a house at No.459, calle 2, Ramón Castilla in Monterrico has yielded a spectacular treasure: a video tape that proves conclusively that the legendary "Presidente Gonzalo," Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, is indeed alive. The video, broadcast (not without some controversy) on Peruvian television, reveal the strengths and weaknesses of Shining Path's leader. The first part shows Guzmán receiving respectful, almost worshipful greetings and salutations from his followers. *Caretas* comments with some asperity that a number of presumably prominent members of Sendero Luminoso, some of whom have been freed by the courts for lack of evidence, appear in the videos. The second part was evidently filmed at a party, perhaps celebrating a birthday. In this section Guzmán appears to be inebriated; he dances with his arms over his head, snapping his fingers like a Peruvian "Zorba the Greek." The last part appears to be a wake. A woman's body lies on a sofa, covered with a hammer-and-sickle red flag. Guzmán kisses the dead woman, and eulogizes her as a fighter who "accompanied us and was in the struggle from the beginning." Although her face is not clearly seen, it is presumed that this woman is none other than "Comrade Norah," Guzmán's wife, Augusta La Torre. Martha Huatay, leader of the Association of Democratic Lawyers, is seen in this section of the video. The article speculates on why the video was made (as an historical document?), why Guzmán's security has grown so lax (he may be depressed after his wife's death, or drinking too much, or a combination of the two), and on the split in Sendero between Guzmán and other leaders. A short follow-up piece on the future of Sendero examines the Morote-Guzmán division, and the gulf between the urban terrorists under Guzmán and the jungle and provincial guerrillas under Julio César Mezzich. The split was exacerbated by the 1985 "second campaign of developing the great leap," that resulted in a campaign of "rectification" and a division between urban and rural movements. Leading the story are photos and thumbnail bios of 14 persons who are seen in the tape, connected to Guzmán, or leaders in the PCP.

840. "Armando el rompecabezas." *Caretas,* no.1147 (February 18 1991): 26-333.

Follow-up on the intelligence break that the raid in Monterrico represents. The article names people identified in the videotape and discusses their history. Another piece, "El disco duro," discloses that the hard-drive of a computer found in the house, along with 22 confiscated diskettes, has revealed many secrets. Among the files are letters of submission to Guzmán, government reports on counterinsurgency efforts, a copy of a plan of the Uchiza police base, directives from Guzmán to various regional leaders, and a list of "enemies": citizens, policemen, military officers, with names, addresses, family members, and other personal information. Also found were tapes of discussions among regional leaders and the central committee of Sendero. One contains a eulogy of "Comrade Norah," Guzmán's late wife.

841. Torres, Jimmy. "Callejón sin salida." *Caretas,* no.1147 (February 18 1991): 34-37.

While the police are generally held in low regard by much of the country's citizenry, in some places efforts are being made to change that perception. Torres reports on such an experiment, in Huaraz and Callejón de Huaylas, where the Minister of the Interior has appointed officials and police native to the area. The peasant federation of Ancash and *rondas campesinas* declared the new police commander a "colonel of the poor," complete with diploma. After taking command, the policeman visited many villages accompanied by a small team that brought a doctor, first-aid kits, and cameras (for documentation). He listened to the villagers, and for a change explained to them the necessity of forming self-defense patrols. The *ronderos* have been given medical supplies and the services of police doctors. The results have been dramatic: informants and guides helping the security forces, a complete cessation of power blackouts, the creation of new *rondas,* the repair of roads destroyed by the guerrillas, and the capture of terrorists. In fact, so tranquil has the area been that half the security forces have been withdrawn and assigned to other areas. Torres concludes with a few observations on the efficacy of this new style of counterinsurgency.

842. "Secretos del congreso." *Caretas,* no.1148 (February 25 1991): 30-35.

Thanks to cassette tapes seized in the police raid, the authorities are able to reconstruct the proceedings of Sendero's first and only congress, which consisted of three sessions held between January 28, 1988 and June 29, 1989. The article discusses the sessions, which focused on ideology, reports from regional commanders, and analysis of the plan to develop base areas. A detailed description of the revolution's progress in each area follows. The second session was convened between August 27 and September 16, 1988. Again, each phase of Sendero's strategy was

analyzed and debated. The article also describes the central committee of Sendero as made up of 19 members, with three alternates. The party pseudonyms of the members are given: Gonzalo, Miriam, Feliciano, Germán, etc.

843. Werlich, David P. "Fujimori and the 'Disaster' in Peru." *Current History*, v.90, no.553 (February 1991): 61-64, 81-83.

Alberto Keinya Fujimori was inaugurated president of Peru on July 28, 1990, declaring in his inaugural address that he had inherited a "disaster" from his predecessor Alán García. With an economy in ruins, Shining Path beginning its second decade of struggle with unabated fanaticism, and a booming cocaine trade having corrupted the nation's security forces, Fujimori has little room for error. Werlich summarizes the economic and political problems that Fujimori has inherited from APRA, and describes the 1990 elections, a race that included a discredited leftist party (APRA), a socialist academic (IU), the darling of the elites (Vargas Llosa), and a little-known son of Japanese immigrants. Fujimori's "Cambio '90 movement," supported by professionals, small businessmen, and evangelical Christians, occupied the center ideologically. His critics said he had no concrete plans to restore prosperity, only the empty campaign slogan "Honesty, Hard Work, and Technology." Fujimori's ancestry worked for and against him; while some sneered that he was not truly Peruvian, others, who were convinced by Japan's economic prosperity that he might save Peru, praised *El Chinito* (the little Chinaman). Werlich describes Fujimori's policies to date, which include "Fujishock," the removal of price controls and subsidies. The new government stresses long-range development as the answer to Sendero, and proposes to turn the Huallaga Valley into the nation's breadbasket, substituting food crops for coca, and building transportation links to the valley, in order to move products to market. Fujimori has backed the military over the police as principal architects of counterinsurgency, and emphasized the fight against Sendero over the battle against narcotics. In September, 1990, he rejected $36 million in U.S. military aid for the war on drugs as money solely earmarked for repression; he indicated he preferred funding for peaceful programs to wean peasants away from coca raising.

844. "Las caras del terror." *Caretas*, no.1149 (March 4 1991): 32-33.

Detailed description of Sendero's leadership structure. Of the 58 party members who attended the first military school prior to ILA, five are now members of the central committee; their names are listed. Ten have either defected or are in exile. Sendero is subdivided into a central department and regional departments. The central department has the organization's archives. It also coordinates the Grupo Intelectual Popular (GIP), Socorro Popular, and Trabajo en el Extranjero. All work with the propaganda department and the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo and the Movimiento de Obreros y Trabajadores Populares. Another department is the Political Bureau, headed by Ostap Morote, brother of the jailed Osmán. The Political Bureau works directly with regional committees (Metropolitan, North, Huallaga, Center, and South). The Departamento de Apoyo Organizativo (DAO), Apoyo Logístico, and Grupo de Apoyo (GAP), and the recently-created "Trabajo en la línea de trinchera de combate" are still other departments for support, logistics, and liaison with fighters. The names of their department heads are published, as are pictures of the members of the Central Committee. Following (pp.34-36) is an interview with the general who headed the Interior Ministry during the transition from military to civilian government. Retired General Pedro Richter has broken eleven years of silence in an interview with Oscar Díaz. Did the military know about Sendero before Belaúnde assumed the presidency in 1980? Absolutely, he answers. Then why wasn't something done to stop them? Richter replies that the *senderistas* were only carrying out ideological activity, which wasn't a crime. He defends the junta against charges that they downplayed this threat to the civilians, and denies that the military intelligence archives were hidden. The Belaúnde government, he says, declared that Sendero Luminoso was formed to oppose dictatorship; with a democratic government, it would disappear by itself! Richter also comments on the recently enacted law to hold soldiers responsible only to military law, the chances of a coup, and charges of narcotics trafficking by the military. On page 37 *Caretas* publishes a blurry photo of Abimael Guzmán, evidently taken from the infamous video. "Wanted for crimes of terrorism" is printed underneath; the reward offered is 10,000 million *intis*.

845. Burgos, Hernando. "Senderas de democracia: entrevistas con Carlos Tapia y Santiago Pedraglio." *Quehacer*, no.70 (March-April 1991): 46-53.

Burgos interviews Carlos Tapia of Izquierda Unida, and Santiago Pedraglio of Izquierda Socialista, about how, in their view, the war against Sendero is going, and what alternatives to

continued violence seem possible. Tapia points out that there are actually two wars, with different objectives, Sendero's and the government's. The latter seeks to annihilate the guerrillas; the former to create a power vacuum and construct a new order to fill it. He concedes that Sendero has spread effectively throughout the country, but denies that they are able to strategically consolidate themselves. Instead of the current policy to militarize the war, Tapia believes it would be more effective to politicize and democratize it, by stressing development, constructing a new socio-economic accord with the people, democratizing rural areas, and emphasizing community organization over repression. This includes the *rondas* in "hot zones." Pedraglio says much the same thing, characterizing the present counterinsurgency policy as antidemocratic and inefficient; only democratizing power (through popular organizations) will win the war.

846. Zapati, Toni. "Los espejuelos chinos: jóvenes mirando el video de Gonzalo." *Quehacer,* no.70 (March-April 1991): 56-59.

A conversation with five young people, all students, about the mythical Abimael Guzmán, notorious most recently for his "Zorba the Greek" dance captured on a guerrilla videotape (a dance suddenly catching on in Lima discos!). The passage of Abimael from myth to reality, from feared ogre to visible celebrant has diminished the awe and fear in which he has been held. The sight of Guzmán, seemingly drunk and dancing, has made him not a little ridiculous in the eyes of some; the leftists seek some mitigation, some explanation that can save their image of the revolution. But something has irrevocably changed: the moral stoic has been glimpsed as a sensual, perhaps passionate human being, a person who can still coldly order the murder of innocents. In a sidebar ("Una chica especial"), Zapata talks with a young woman, a committed leftist in sympathy with Sendero, who describes her attraction to the movement, unshaken by the sight of Presidente Gonzalo acting human.

847. McClintock. Cynthia. "Political Violence in Peru: A Comparative Perspective With Special Reference to El Salvador." Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association, April 4-6, 1991.

In a draft presentation of research in progress [cited with permission of the author], McClintock explores what is unique and what is universal about political violence in Peru. In particular, she compares Peru with El Salvador, which was also wracked by insurgency for a decade. McClintock contends that systematic exclusion by force from the political process was a major reason for the expansion of revolutionary movements in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia, but that such exclusion was not a factor in the emergence of Shining Path. While political inclusion has long been denied leftists in many Latin American nations, the participation since 1980 of Marxist groups in the electoral process in Peru made such demands irrelevant. However, the inability of the electoral process to give rise to a state that was perceived as sympathetic to popular needs opened political space to Sendero. McClintock compares the political process in Peru and El Salvador, contrasting intimidation and repression of the left in the latter with the relative freedom given the left in Peru to participate in electoral politics. However, McClintock also documents Peru's unprecedented economic decline and the consequent degree to which Peruvians, rightly or wrongly, have blamed the state for their misfortunes. She concludes that building political peace in Peru will be very difficult precisely because the guerrillas are demanding more. In El Salvador and other nations, the state need only take the relatively "passive" step to open the political system; by contrast, Peru has already taken that "easy" step. To build political peace will require dramatic, active programs to develop trust and collaboration between the state and civilians, and to improve living standards and opportunities for Peru's popular sector.

848. "El tercer hombre." *Caretas,* no.1154 (April 8 1991): 20.

The police have identified "Comrade Feliciano," considered number three in Sendero Luminoso, as Oscar Alberto Ramírez Durand, graduate of the first military school. Durand appears in the video, always close to Guzmán; he is identifiable by his limp and thick glasses. After the video was shown on television, an anonymous caller tipped off police that the man was Ramírez Durand. He is from Arequipa, and has been linked to Guzmán since the first "popular schools" opened in Ayacucho 18 years ago. Some brief biographical details about his life before he went underground are given. He is the son of a retired army general. [With Abimael Guzmán in jail, Durand now heads what is left of Sendero Luminoso's guerrilla army.]

849. "La conexión internacional." *Caretas,* no.1155 (April 15 1991): 36-41, 94-95.

In 1980 thirteen Marxist-Leninist movements met in France to consider a grave ideological crisis; out of this conference was born the "Revolutionary International Movement." Although Sendero did not participate, Guzmán heard of it; by May, 1992, Maximiliano Durand Araujo [see above] was installed in Paris as Sendero's representative abroad and ambassador to the RIM. *Caretas* describes Sendero's activities outside of Peru, and its network of support organizations in Europe and the United States. The report describes the relations between pro-*senderistas* and other leftist Peruvians in exile, gives the names of upper-class citizens who now head groups like "Sol Perú" and "Comité Franco Peruano Contra la Represión," and details the activities of organizations in Sweden, Mexico, Bolivia, and Germany (where they are said to have been possibly linked to the now-defunct Stasi).

850. Kirk, Robin. "The Shining Path is Gaining in Peru." *The Nation,* v.252, no.16 (April 29 1991): 552-556.

First-hand report from Peru. Shining Path, Kirk writes, has had the genius to exploit a class no one took seriously, young provincial mestizos, who make up the majority of the Peruvian population, yet face the darkest future. Sendero is tapping into the resentment and frustration of the *cholos,* who are at the bottom of Peru's rigidly hierarchical society, yet were told that they could invert the social pyramid and rule the country if they applied Guzmán's formula. Kirk visits various parts of Peru, including the women's prison in Lima. She talks with a nurse named Flor who was recruited into Sendero by a teacher, and arrested after carrying out several bombings. Flor was raped and tortured by the police after her arrest, but she considers such treatment (common in Peru) as part of a cadre's training. The cadre must agree to *la cuota* -- the blood price; i.e., to give their lives to the cause. The notorious video showing Guzmán dancing and possibly inebriated was shown on orders from Fujimori to arouse scorn for the movement's leader; it had another effect on the cadres, however: "We not only saw our dear President Gonzalo alive and well," says one *senderista,* "but we saw it for free." Newer cadres to the cause have come directly from high school; Guzmán complained in a captured document that new recruits, while enthusiastic, are increasingly illiterate. Kirk recounts Sendero's efforts in the jungles of Junín, as well as its increasingly important urban campaign. Sendero must take Lima to gain victory. Huaycán is a *pueblo jóven* east of Lima, on the strategic central highway that controls the flow of food into the capital. Sendero is trying to infiltrate Huaycán, marching in the streets at night, carrying out daylight attacks, and winning control of several neighborhood associations. Guzmán has always planned to provoke the state into savage repression; "in his baroque imagery, this meant crossing a 'river of blood' to victory." The state has played into Sendero's hands through its unrestricted dirty war. Fujimori has given the security forces impunity; they will be safe from facing charges of human rights abuses. This is the kind of move that serves to fuel hated, and therefore Shining Path. Peru, Kirk concludes, faces another decade of violence and counterviolence, with no one in control: "In the end, that is what Guzmán wants--for there to be nothing, and in that nothing, to rule."

851. "Our Red Flag is Flying in Peru." *A World to Win,* no.16 (April 1991): 52-72.

In-depth report on the war from the Maoist perspective. The poor and downtrodden of Peru, under the leadership of the PCP, are standing up. They have set up revolutionary political power in rural areas comprising a third of the population, inflicted important defeats on the government and its troops, and have now issued the call to organize and prepare for the seizure of power. "Like a baby in its mother's womb, the people's republic of Peru is taking shape, building nerves, bones, and flesh, gathering strength and preparing to be born amidst struggle." The article recounts the history of that struggle to the present, with a special emphasis on the battle to defend the Huallaga Valley and its peasants. This includes a mention of the People's Guerrilla Army attack on the Yankee base at Santa Lucía (the first large-scale combat between U.S. forces and the opposing PGA, and not likely to be the last). The PGA is working with the peasants to enable them to protect their land and lives, and helping them shift over to subsistence farming, "building up the revolutionary strength necessary to do away with the whole system, including drugs, which are not used in the revolutionary base areas." On the contrary; it is the Fujimori regime that has shown that its survival depends on drugs to keep the import-addicted economy afloat. "The revolution cannot completely liberate the peasants from dependence on growing coca leaves at one blow before countrywide political power is in its hands. But the people's war has spelled its doom. Nothing less than revolution could put an end to it." The article also states that it is mainly through the PGA that the party conducts its mass work, including organizing political power in the countryside and developing mass organizations that serve people's war. What follows is a description of how PGA units operate, their importance in the struggle, and the economic, political, and social structure of the new democracy in liberated areas.

852. "Yankee Go Home! Call by the Committee of the RIM for a World-Wide Campaign." *A World to Win,* no.16 (April 1991): 73.

The very success of the Peruvian revolution has set it on a collision course with the United States. The Yankee rulers, although fearful of another Vietnam, cannot allow the People's Republic of Peru to be born without a fight. With a Maoist revolution, Yankee power would begin to unravel. The U.S. armed forces and CIA have secretly been fighting in Peru since the start of the war in 1980; now the American government is openly sending Green Beret "advisors," pilots, helicopter gunships, jet bombers, and river patrol boats to Peru. Under the pretext of a war on drugs, Pentagon planners are drawing up charts for future large-scale moves, as well as preparing public opinion for the possibility of massive intervention directly by U.S. forces or through American-commanded armed forces of a neighboring country. The RIM has declared an international year of solidarity with people's war, starting December 26, 1990, and called for campaigns worldwide to oppose U.S. intervention in Peru. The Yankee imperialists can and will be stopped!

853. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Terrorism, Research, and Public Policy; an Experience, Some Thoughts." *Terrorism and Political Violence,* v.3 (Spring 1991): 103-116.

Gorriti, having covered Sendero for *Caretas* for a decade, argues that academic researchers may be able to learn from the ethical and practical problems faced by journalists who report on war and revolution. Gorriti informally describes his own experiences covering Shining Path. *Caretas* is a liberal, center-of-the road journal that has been closed on a number of occasions by Peruvian governments. Gorriti feels that in order to support democracy in Peru, the government needs all the help it can get. Despite 10 years of conflict, themilitary still has a very clouded understanding of the war and the nature of Sendero's strategic and tactical aims. "[I]n practical terms," states Gorriti, "the Peruvian government is in dire need of useful advice to stem the growth of the insurgency and to defeat it. As a struggling democracy, Peru's government has a moral right to ask for help, and all the more so if the alternatives seem to be nothing short of social disaster a bloody coup and/or civil war." Gorriti and his colleagues tried to divide editorializing from reporting. They covered human rights abuses, and kept the pressure on the government to act against the perpetrators of abuse. They tried to critique counterinsurgency policy by writing about the Malaysian and Philippine Huk experiences, to little avail; the military already had its own set of ideas, much influenced by the Argentine experience. Gorriti concludes by criticizing himself and fellow reporters for not being tougher on the government from the beginning. He believes that critical, independent journalism, like its academic counterpart, is ultimately to the benefit of democratic government in fighting an insurgency.

854. "Once años de sangre." *Caretas,* no.1159 (May 13 1991): 36-38.

May 17 will mark eleven years of war waged in Peru; time enough, declares *Caretas,* for the government, armed forces, police, and political parties to recognize that only joint action will defeat this bloody insanity. The article, which includes an excellent schematic chart of Shining Path and its regional committees and front organizations, reviews Sendero's plans to build a new society through these "popular" movements. In addition to the well-known MCP, MOTC, MJP and MFP, Sendero has added the Popular Intellectual Movement (MIP) and the Classist Barrio Movement (MCB) to recruit among the inhabitants of the *pueblos jóvenes,* while the Popular Artists Movement (MAP) produces art as banal as the epic operas of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. What next, asks *Caretas,* the Movimiento Popular Bancario (Popular Bankers Movement)? All these groups form the "Centers of Resistance," whose function is to support armed strikes and in general the work of agit-prop. *Caretas* hopes that these organizations will be the target of a determined counterinsurgency effort by the government.

855. González, Raúl. "El Huallaga: todos los conflictos." *Quehacer,* no.71 (May-June 1991): 46-52.

A multi-sided conflict is raging in the Huallaga department of San Martín, between Sendero, MRTA, the army, the national police, and popular organizations like FASMA (Federación Agraria "Selva Maestra") and FEDISAM (Frente de Defensa de San Martín). González tries to make sense of this complicated struggle. The popular groups actually consider themselves allies of MRTA; the security forces regard them as little more than fronts for the guerrillas. Sendero's attack on the Uchiza police post shocked and alarmed Lima; General Arciniega was sent in to take command of the security forces in the UHV. Arciniega considered Sendero, not the coca trade, to be the gravest threat. He concentrated on fighting Sendero, not MRTA or the popular organizations linked with the *miristas.* Arciniega considered these organizations to be legitimate

expressions of peasant solidarity; since his task was to gain the hearts and minds of the population, he needed their support as well. As a result FASMA and FEDISAM have been able to obtain higher prices for rice and corn for the peasants, and to some extent, block the expansion of Sendero. Arciniega has "decriminalized" the small coca-growing peasant. This runs counter to U.S. anti-narcotics doctrine, which is to break the first link in the cocaine chain by attacking the coca cultivator. But in 1990 Arciniega was replaced; his three successors have been careful not to annoy the DEA, and have again attacked MRTA, which has given Sendero a chance to recuperate. FEDISAM is favored to win regional elections, and has reserved the right to declare itself a regional government. González analyzes the political implications of these events, and the difficult position in which the Peru-U.S. anti-drug agreement has put the government, the anti-guerrilla effort, and the people who live in the valley.

856. Obando, Enrique. "La burocracia antisubversiva." *Quehacer*, no.71 (May-June 1991): 54-57.

Despite eleven years of war, 19,215 dead and 4,736 disappeared, succeeding governments of Peru can produce little more than a tragicomedy of irresponsibility and wrong choices in regard to a strategy to fight subversion. Obando examines the "bureaucracy of counterinsurgency," beginning with the Secretary of Defense's October 1981 directive on the "hypothesis of subversion." In 1982 interministerial committees began to formulate more specific economic, political, and psycho-social plans. But bureaucratic politics soon retarded such efforts; for example the economic affairs committee never functioned, because it was not convened by the economics minister, Ulloa, who was probably reluctant to commit any money for an antisubversion plan while trying to stabilize the economy. Progress was painfully slow; it took two more years for the respective ministries' plans to advance to the cabinet level. Since 1985 saw a change in administration, no decisions could be made at all that year. In 1986 a "directive of counter-subversion" was promulgated, and approved the following year, by which time the García government had decided to consolidate defense functions in a new ministry; the resulting administrative chaos effectively delayed any consideration of strategy for another two years. And still the government, now planing to create a Unified Pacification Command, has done nothing but produce a mountain of paper and nothing concrete. Even if they had carried out any of their intentions, writes Obando, they would have encountered a final obstacle: a lack of financial resources to carry out any recommendations. The Fujimori regime now intends to create such a unified command, but to incorporate such dissimilar bodies as political parties, the business community, and the Catholic Church into such an effort is probably impractical and impossible.

857. Starn, Orin. "Congreso rondero: nuevos caminos de las rondas." *Quehacer*, no.71 (May-June 1991): 58-60.

Report on the second Congress of *Rondas Campesinas* of Hualgayoc, which is trying to unify all the province's peasant self-defense patrols under an independent central command. Thanks to the 190 *ronda* committees throughout Hualgayoc, the banditry of the 1970's is only a bad memory. In fact, the *ronda* assemblies have replaced the court at Banbamarca as the preferred jurisdiction for resolving disputes. "Here," a police official confessed to Starn, "the *rondas* control the countryside." But serious disputes divide the many *rondas;* some are linked to APRA and others to Izquierda Unida. Within the IU *Frente Unico* there is rivalry between adherents of PUM and PCP-"Patria Roja." Arguments over financial support, political power, community loyalties, and even religion plague the patrols. Still, while most peasants are weary of the eternal enmity between APRA and IU, there is a definite leftist influence over the assembly; *"compañero"* is the preferred term of address among the *ronderos,* and one hears the concepts of "autonomy" and "popular democracy" referred to often.

858. "Paro desarmado." *Caretas,* no.1162 (June 3 1991): 36-41.

Report on the armed strike that Sendero called for May 29. Guzmán's intention was clear and explicit: to create an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty through ambushes, selective assassinations, and sabotage. Sendero declared the period between May 17 *(inicio de lucha armada)* and June 19 *(día de la heroicidad),* to be "red month." The article describes how Sendero's cadres set out to sow chaos in the Lima area, as well as the countermeasures taken by the authorities to block them. Pickets of *senderistas* began painting wall slogans and passing out leaflets to warn citizens to respect the strike, warning that the Party would sanction anyone not complying. An omnibus was burned and its driver wounded for not heeding the threat. More bombs and power blackouts followed. Police patrols in certain areas were intensified. Many of the microbuses stayed off the roads, and workers had to find alternate ways to travel. Most stores stayed open, and *Caretas* declares the strike "disarmed." It also reports that the MRDP was

assigned responsibility for enforcing the strike. This has been the third armed strike declared in Lima; the first was July 20, 1989, and the second March 28, 1990. A panoramic map shows the zones in the Lima metropolitan area where clashes occurred.

859. "Fase suicida." *Caretas,* no.1165 (June 24 1991): 34-39.

Slogans declaring the new stage of people's war, the establishment of the "People's Republic of Peru"*(República Popular del Perú)* have begun appearing on posters and walls. Hammers and sickles burning in the hills above Lima proclaim the RPP, replacing the "Republic of the New Democracy" that has been on the lips of *senderistas* for many years. This is part of the "third campaign" whose objective is to "develop bases with the aim of conquest of a new model of society," the RPP. Abimael Guzmán, once known as Comrade Gonzalo, has changed his nomenclature to President Gonzalo--president of the Popular Republic of Peru. A recent incident in which several *senderistas* accidentally blew themselves up with their own bomb reveals the high price Sendero is paying for its stepped-up campaign. The dead may have been members of one of *bases de apoyo,* not regular trained fighters. Sendero's urban campaign evidently calls for small groups of guerrillas moving rapidly from place to place, sowing fear through ambushes and bombings. Meanwhile, infiltration of unions by the *"trabajadores clasistas"* and reinforcement of the MOTC continues. A sidebar describes a terrorist campaign against the textile factory "La Unión." Someone drew on the wall with red crayon, "Death to the exploiters; there is no revolution without blood; injustice will not go unavenged, and we will kill all squealers." Two days later the plant's managing director was murdered. Interestingly, in this case Sendero's MOTC clashed directly with another organization, the UDP, said to be the legal arm of MRTA.

860. Rospigliosi, Fernando. "El último año." *Caretas,* no.1166 (July 1 1991): 40D-43.

Interview with Gustavo Gorriti, in which he analyzes how the war is going. Does the Fujimori government really have a counterinsurgency strategy, as it claims? Gorriti avers that there have been important changes. Arming the *rondas* is an important one. It shows some degree of trust in the people, but only patrols that have clearly shown their opposition to Sendero, either though concrete action or through having suffered, have been so armed. Is the government's "counteroffensive" against Sendero real? In certain areas, Gorriti replies, such as Junín, the military has been more aggressive. But there is a negative side to this new spirit: human rights abuses have increased in these areas. Gorriti addresses the questions of human rights and the armed forces, the government's intelligence capabilities, Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimori's "Rasputin," the effectiveness of the *rondas,* and Sendero's goal of "strategic equilibrium," which he believes it will really be achieved in one to two years if matters continue as they are now. In a sidebar to the interview, Gorriti evaluates Fujimori's overall counterinsurgency strategy. While he believes the arming of the *rondas* indicates a more aggressive attitude, he laments the government's rejection of dialog. Dialog with Sendero is impossible, but MRTA is another matter, and Fujimori could certainly reach out to the Peruvian left, particularly as the leftist parties are fiercely opposed to Sendero and ardent supporters of constitutionality.

861. "Clergy Targeted in Peru?" *The Christian Century,* v.108, no.21 (July 10-17 1991): 681-682.

About 1,000 European, North American, and Filipino clergy have been engaged in social and relief work in the slums of Peru's cities and in the remote highlands. Until recently they have been ignored by Sendero. However, recent events have raised fears that foreign clergy may now be deliberately targeted by the guerrillas. On May 17 the acting director of the Peruvian office of World Vision, an evangelical missionary organization, and the head of its Colombian field office were shot to death in Lima. The former had been overseeing the organization's $125,000 effort to fight the current cholera epidemic. On May 21, 80 guerrillas entered Huasahuasi in the Andes and murdered an Australian nun and four Peruvians. An Irish priest explains, "In their thinking, Shining Path links our work with Yankee imperialism, and in their view it stands in their way to the popular Maoist uprising which they are fighting for." The Sisters of Saint Joseph, the order to which the slain nun belonged, did not plan to pull out of Peru despite the first killing ever of a member of its society. Diplomats, however, fear that more murders may follow.

862. Rospigliosi, Fernando. "El racismo de Sendero." *Caretas,* no.1169 (July 22 1991): 38-41.

The recent murder of three Japanese engineers in Huaral is part of a plan to cut the country off from foreign technical assistance, but it also has a racist overtones, charges Rospigliosi. In addition to attacking Alberto Fujimori, an editorial in the June 16 issue of the now-clandestine *El Diario* contained a diatribe against Japanese Peruvians and their descendants. It is well known,

said the newspaper, that many pioneer Japanese "entrepreneurs" promoted prostitution or exploited the humble in their general stores which were located in the poor *barrios*. *Caretas* calls this an absurd and insulting distortion of the history of Japanese immigration to Peru that does not merit refuting. It goes on to decry the open racism of the recent presidential campaign; even Fujimori alluded to a rebellion of the *cholitos y chinitos* against the *blanquitos* and *miraflorinos*. Sendero appears to be stirring lower class and *mestizo* resentment against the *nikkeis*, who in general have escaped their working-class origins and attained the status of prosperous entrepreneurs and professionals, like Fujimori. The article compares anti-Japanese and anti-Asian racism with traditional European anti-Semitism; totalitarian communism and totalitarian fascism are not that far apart. *Caretas* compares Guzmán's inflammatory rhetoric with that of Hitler.

Following this article (pp.42-44) is a piece entitled "Xenofobia," that examines Sendero's tendency to demonize all foreigners. This is indeed strange in a movement that mixes German Marxism, Russian Leninism, and Chinese Maoism. *Caretas* details many assaults on foreign technicians, missionaries, and tourists, as well as attacks on foreign-owned businesses and plants. A sidebar describes how Luis Kawata Makawe, once friend and comrade of Abimael Guzmán, was expelled from the party (see no.819).

863. Sáenz, Verónica. "Rondas Ashaninkas." *Caretas*, no.1169 (July 22 1991): 34-37, 50.

Report on the resurgence of the Ashaninka Indians. After having fled their homes in the Ene Valley (*senderistas* drove out their priest and burned his mission), hundreds of Ashaninkas have reassembled in their mission village, where the army is trying to defend them and tend to their needs. Sendero established bases in the valley starting in 1987; Saenz quotes a native on how *senderista* bands came into Indian villages and told them about Mao, President Gonzalo, and the new state. They stole the Ashaninkas's food, and took their young men and women with them. Authorities concede that it is their fault that Sendero grew strong; the presence of the state in remote communities was almost nonexistent. Now the Ashaninkas want the army to defend them, the state to help them raise crops and form defensive patrols. Right now almost 1,500 people, natives and colonists, represent the "recovered masses" of the area.

864. "...pavimentado nuestro camino a la calamidad." *Ideéle*, año 3, no.27 (July 1991): 13-16.

Ideéle, a journal published by the Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL) in Lima, interviews Gustavo Gorriti. Gorriti believes that Sendero's claim of having achieved strategic equilibrium in its people's war is exaggerated. Still, its strategy of establishing popular organizations as a prelude to creating the "new power" means that in many areas of the country Sendero is the authority. The guerrillas claim to have established 26 support bases, but according to Gorriti some of the "bases" are more theoretical than real. The decline in importance of the left in Peru has created a vacuum that Sendero is trying to fill. Gorriti discusses Sendero's tactics; while terror is an integral part of the way Shining Path operates, terror is not the movement's only reason for success in the countryside. He believes that 95% of the nation would reject the prospect of living in Sendero's "people's republic"; the problem is that the state has not learned how to channel the energy of that 95% into positive action against the *senderista* threat. A democratic counterinsurgency strategy would (and could, says Gorriti), operate inside the constitution and the law; he sees little prospect that the government is inclined in this direction. A sidebar comparing the two guerrilla threats to Peru is cogently entitled, "Sendero must be beaten; with MRTA one can have dialogue."

865. "Rondas campesinas: ¿armas para la paz?" *Ideéle*, año 3, no.27 (July 1991): 6-12.

While presenting the peasants of the Alto Cunas communities with 300 shotguns, President Fujimori signaled his "new strategy" to fight Sendero: intelligence efforts in the urban areas and the organization of *rondas campesinas* in the countryside. The state, he said, had an obligation to support self-defense. The peasant should be able to defend his life and liberty; supporting the patrols, however, did not imply that the government was fomenting a civil war, nor abdicating its duty to defend its citizens. More than 20 villages in this important valley have been incorporated into the patrols. *Ideéle* reviews the recent history of the self-defense patrols, which the villagers, forced to chose between the guerrillas and the army, see as the lesser of two evils. Their organization is a clear sign of the population's rejection of Sendero; in addition, it appears that abuses by the security forces tend to diminish in areas where the villages are organized in *rondas*. But *Ideéle* is concerned about the very concept of employing violence to achieve pacification, pointing out some major problems that the creation of the patrols have exacerbated. For example, the patrols may displace traditional community authority. *Ideéle* calls the principle of self-defense unquestionably justified, but wishes to see the patrols as part of a larger pacification strategy, with economic development, citizen security, respect for human rights, etc. Accompanying

the essay are several sidebars; in one Gorriti writes that the *rondas* should only be the first line of defense, and that their limitations be clearly recognized; in another, Degregori wonders whether the arms given to peasants will be used strictly for self-defense. It is possible that villages will use their weapons against each other or in acts of social banditry. While the sierra's violence necessitated the tactic of arming the populace, the *ronda* strategy is sadly still not part of a larger democratic strategy that will pay closer attention to organized popular sectors.

866. Balbi, Carmen Rosa. "Una inquietante encuesta de opinion." *Quehacer,* no.72 (July-August 1991): 40-45.

Report on a troubling opinion poll that indicates that Sendero's influence is more widespread than previously thought. Taken in June in metropolitan Lima, the poll asked "Is subversion justifiable in Peru today?" to which 78% of the respondents said no and 17% said yes; but when broken down by socioeconomic level, the results were more interesting. Only 2% of the highest social strata thought subversion was justified, but 23% of the lowest strata thought it was. Another question asked in which circumstances might subversion be justifiable; among the two lowest socioeconomic levels, 41% of the respondents believe that poverty and misery justify rebellion. Nearly half--44% of all respondents--disapprove of the present economic policies of the government. There is also evidence of growing approval of Sendero; among the two lowest socioeconomic groups, 20% have a favorable opinion of Sendero--and this is among people who actually dared to answer the question openly. Charts define the four socioeconomic groups polled, and also record opinions on IU, other movements, and political personalities. The final question is the most troubling: asked about the future of Sendero, 38% (after statistical adjustment) of all respondents believe that SL may triumph. Extreme skepticism about the government and a lack of belief in the country's future, are also evident in the poll.

867. Carpio, Oswaldo and Zenaida Mateos. "Testimonios de la guerra: confesiones de un contrainsurgente." *Quehacer,* no.72 (July-August 1991): 54-62.

Interview with a draftee who served in the emergency zones. Alberto is 20 years old, the son of small farmers in Ayacucho. He describes his training as "a tragedy." Seven draftees managed to escape from the brutal punishment meted out by *los antiguos,* the sergeants. No one dared to revolt against this treatment. Alberto was promoted along with a few others, and taught how to handle light weapons. He and other NCO's were sent away for six months of counterinsurgency training. Part of that course consisted of being dumped in the desert from a helicopter with only a compass and a map, and told to rendezvous at a certain point the following morning. Alberto was also given a bayonet and forced to defend himself against a horde of famished dogs that were thrown out of the helicopters; the trainees were ordered not to waste ammunition and forbidden to fire a shot. There was no ideological preparation for counter-guerrilla warfare. An officer came and told them, "Do you know why we are doing these things? To go to Ayacucho and fight the terrorists." No one spoke of politics; in the army, this was prohibited. Alberto describes patrols and atrocities against civilians. He says he didn't think about what he was doing; when you're facing an enemy, if you don't fire, you may be shot the next moment. Afterwards, remembering, he felt like crying. Sendero has support among many villages, he affirms, because of what happened before when the sinchis were sent in. The soldiers often found arms, ammunition, and Marxist texts in the villages. Alberto participated in massacres and torture, and admits rape was common. Were there no complaints, no protests, he is asked. To whom would the people protest, he replies, if we were the law? Later, he and others were punished by General Huamán, but as thieves, not as murderers or rapists. Since Alberto left the army, he has been depressed and suffers from guilt. He wonders how he could have been converted into a monster in six months.

868. Carpio, Oswaldo and Zenaida Mateos. " Testimonios de la guerra: relato de un campesino." *Quehacer,* no.72 (July-August 1991): 63-70.

Report from an anonymous community in the district Q___, based on testimony from peasants living there. The villagers raised cattle, as well as llamas and alpacas, and participated in government-sponsored agrarian development programs. They appear to have been relatively prosperous as a community, until 1988, when Sendero began to infiltrate the community and people were afraid to leave their houses after dark. *Senderistas* shot community authorities, painted slogans around the plaza, and burned down the town hall. By 1989 Sendero controlled the community, forced the villagers to blockade the roads, and would not let any vehicles enter the town. Anyone trying to vote in the municipal elections would have his or her fingers cut off before the villagers. The guerrillas were able to recruit a number of village youth during their period of occupation. In October 1989 the military arrived, broke into houses, and tortured people to find

out who were guerrillas. The next month a band of hooded guerrillas from MRTA entered the community, painted their own slogans, and forced the people to yell *"¡vivas!"* in support of their revolution. The testimony describes the tribulations of the community; finally it made a pact with the military in July 1990, agreeing to form a *ronda campesina.* The patrol has been instrumental in prodding the community into greater measures of organization and self-defense, to maintain their community against all outside forces.

869. "Estrategia urbana: los asentamientos de Sendero." *Quehacer,* no.72 (July-August 1991): 13-15.

In May, to commemorate *inicio de lucha armada,* Sendero announced the beginning of a new phase of the war: the phase of "strategic equilibrium," accompanied by a wave of recent attacks throughout the country. What is strategic equilibrium? It is the transition from mobile guerrilla bands to regular battalions, the nucleus of a future army. Sendero is also moving into the cities as part of a political-military strategy, forming open "popular committees" in some zones of Puno, and carrying out attacks in various parts of Lima. The article describes Sendero's activities eight kilometers from Lima, including road blockades, a car bombing, and death threats against the judiciary in an eviction case. All these activities were carried out in the open, demonstrating Sendero's power to the populace. It is clear that Sendero is trying to impose its own order on the working class. To do so it must eliminate all competing movements and radicalize the social struggle. But Sendero also has its limits: the recent municipal elections show continued support for the electoral process, despite the fact that of 387 voting districts, in 100 there were no candidates. The craven murders of three priests in recent days also shows not strength, but weakness on the part of the "hosts of Abimael." What is apparent is that civil society has less and less time to produce an efficient response to SL; on the contrary, by its incapacity, the government ensures that the country remains trapped between the repressive force of the state and *abimalista* terror.

870. Obando Arbulú, Enrique. "Diez años de guerra antisibversiva: una pequeña historia." *Quehacer,* no.72 (July-August 1991): 46-50.

Continuing his analysis of the fight against Sendero, Obando examines the evolution of the military campaign against the guerrillas. One major obstacle has been a series of profound misunderstandings between the armed forces and the police. At the end of military government in 1980, the intelligence services detected Sendero's plans to launch their revolution. For political reasons, they did nothing about it, leaving it to the civilians to handle. The Belaúnde government's relations with the military were not good; because SIN (military intelligence) had been used to investigate political parties during the *docenio,* the government distrusted and downgraded it. When Belaúnde sent the army into Ayacucho in December 1982, it arrived late and lacking intelligence. Creating the post of *jefe político-militar* was a fatal step, as it placed real power and responsibility for the emergency zones in the hands of officers, not elected officials. What followed was "dirty war," fully the responsibility of the armed forces. Their knowledge of counterinsurgency strategy was minimal, and they failed to learn from the British experience in Malaya or the Philippine anti-Huk campaign. There was no coordination between zones, and commanders were frequently replaced. Obando does not even blame Noel for his conduct of the war; not a cruel or inhuman man, he was simply concerned for the welfare of his men and applied the only doctrine he knew. Huamán, Noel's successor, had good ideas, but never received support to carry them out. The *guerra sucia* has been counterproductive in that it has not contained the war, but expanded it. Under García the government opposed *guerra sucia,* but lacked the resources to put into effect a strategy of development. The result was no strategy at all. Under Fujimori there is the beginning of a strategy. It delineates a military war and a political war, with the latter the more important. The police operate in zones under civil law, and assist the military in the emergency zones. Finally, the "organized populace" is an integral part of the fight, through the *rondas campesinas* and Civil Defense Committees. Obando concludes by outlining six aspects of the new policy: confronting subversive ideology with the ideas of democracy, intelligence, new tactics, (especially clandestine operations led by DIRCOTE), psychological warfare, better organization, and a *guerra de masas* to win hearts and minds.

871. Balbi, Carmen Rosa. "Sendero y los sindicatos: la violencia en el medio fabril." *Debate,* no.65 (July-September 1991): 16-18.

Balbi reports on Sendero's shift to focus on the cities and its campaign of intimidation and violence there. On March 17, 1990 Sendero assassinated a union leader who opposed the continuation of a strike against Centromín in the Cerro de Pasco. A year later the guerrillas murdered an industrial relations manager at a factory in the Carretera Central, Lima's industrial

center, after burning down two factories. Sendero, having changed its strategy to focus on urban areas, is trying to build support bases in the cities through "self-generated organisms" and spreading violence throughout the capital. Nine union leaders and 21 business employees have been murdered, and "innumerable" attacks on the industrial infrastructure are the results of this campaign. Sendero appears to be focusing on three "privileged" labor sectors: the state mining concern Centromín, the spinal column of the miner's movement; the Carretera Central in Lima, the capital's most important industrial zone; Peru's new and growing food processing industry. Sendero's means for achieving its objectives include agitation in factories, the formation of "Class Committees," the killing of union leaders, and armed strikes (seven in Lima alone) which workers dare not ignore. These strikes clearly demonstrate the movement's strength, or at least its ability to generate fear. Sendero seeks to heighten tension, emphasize class differences, and continue labor unrest indefinitely. It works against negotiations or settlements with businesses. At the same time, economic pressures have pulled workers out into the streets, leading to inevitable confrontations with the government. The union movement in Peru has been considerably weakened in the past few years; this, combined with continued erosion of wages and living standards, makes Sendero an attractive alternative for some in the lowest socio-economic stratum of the population.

872. Lane, Charles. "Peru: Into the Cross-Fire: Can Green Berets Stop Shining Path?" *Newsweek,* v.118, no.8 (August 19 1991): 29-30.

Shining Path guerrillas recently blew up an experimental farm in Huaral, 50 miles north of Lima, and murdered three visiting Japanese agronomists as "imperialists" propping up the "fascist" government of Alberto Fujimori. Japan has recalled 52 agricultural engineers from Peru. Fujimori has fought back against Sendero with development aid--and acquiesced in counterterror by the country's security forces. Sendero Luminoso now operates in about half the country, and dominates some sprawling shantytowns in Lima itself. On July 30 the State Department proposed sending in 50 Special Forces instructors as part of a $94 million anti-drug aid package to Peru. For the first time the U.S. advisors will work directly with the Peruvian military. "Our objective is anti-narcotics," said a U.S. official. "But [Shining Path] guerrillas are involved in narcotics trafficking, and if their power is degraded, it will be good for our antinarcotics efforts." But quietly a five-man Special Forces team has trained police in jungle warfare for two years, and DEA agents have operated in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Fujimori is now ready to try anything to fight Sendero. Shining Path is not on the edge of victory, says Enrique Obando, expert on terrorism. "But I *would* say that the state is on the verge of defeat. The armed forces could tumble down at any moment," he says. Peruvian television revealed a secret army intelligence document that stated: "The best subversive is a dead subversive; thus, no prisoners will be held." Fujimori affirms that the best defense against Sendero is economic development--yet even with U.S. aid, the country will never have the funds to end Peru's profound rural poverty. No amount of U.S. crop-substitution money can compete with drug profits, much less terrorist intimidation. Even that aid is being held up by Democratic congressmen, demanding improvement in Peru's dismal human rights record. In the end, writes Lane, Peru is not El Salvador--but for the Green Berets, it won't be Kuwait revisited. Says Obando, "The future of Peru is Lebanon--a country so factionalized that no group is able to dominate the entire territory."

873. "Selva Central: El drama de la guerra." *Ideéle,* año 3, no.28 (August 1991): 7-10.

Ironically, a place considered a land of bonanza, identified with hope and a better life, has become one of the most violent places in Peru: the central jungle *(selva central).* The violence has revealed a weak and underdeveloped civil society, the result of a total lack of common interests among the social groups that live in the area. Also evident is the feebleness of government institutions, corroded by corruption and considered illegitimate by most of the population. *Ideéle* reports on recent violence in the *selva central,* caused by fighting between an Indian federation of 52 communities (ANAP) and MRTA, which it expelled from its territory in 1990. MRTA is trying to regain its position. But it is a complicated situation. MRTA is considered the "lesser evil," by most people, since it is considered the best bulwark against both the security forces and Sendero. Both are hated since the arrival of either means death, torture, "popular justice" and, in Sendero's case, forced recruitment as well as other abuses. MRTA tries to present itself as a moral alternative to both. MRTA has encouraged, not opposed, the formation of other popular organizations in the *selva.* For this reason, even when there is no evidence of any link between a group and the *miristas,* the security forces regard them as guerrilla allies. *Ideéle* examines this multi-sided struggle. Its conclusions are familiar: the state would earn more respect if it had a democratic and peaceful presence in the area, one that responded to the needs of society, not merely a resort to military force.

874. "Los desplazados por la violencia." *Ideéle,* año 3, no.28 (August 1991): 29-30.

Report on the refugees who have fled their lands because of *senderista* or security forces violence. Since Sendero began its revolution, its first victims have been peasant communities, which have suffered armed attacks, destruction of equipment and buildings, the murder of anyone who opposes the guerrillas, and confiscation of goods or food for the Party. Their sons have been forcibly recruited by Sendero; if a youth deserts, his family or the entire community may be punished. *Ideéle* looks at this frightening phenomenon; in 1988 investigators estimated that 38,000 people had fled to other places in the emergency zones, and 88,000 to other areas. The majority of highland peasants have gone to departmental capitals or to Lima. Since Apurímac and Ayacucho have the largest number of zones with major guerrilla activity, they have the highest number of displaced. But the coca zones have always attracted a large number of immigrants from other areas, and they suffer violence from both guerrillas and narcotics mafias. The effects of this mass movement are grave: 40% of Ayacucho's and 30% of Huancavelica's populations have emigrated. One of the most perceptible consequences is the crowding of cities, the disappearance of agriculture, and the destruction of Andean culture and society. The social and psychological effects, especially among the young, are also serious and long-lasting.

875. "Peru: Invest and Die." *The Economist,* v.320, no.7723 (September 7 1991): 44.

President Fujimori has issued decrees guaranteeing the best legal and economic safeguards in the world for foreign investors: freedom to remit 100% of profits and unlimited royalties. But there will be few takers--Sendero Luminoso has just mowed down, or carved up, an Australian nun, two Japanese development volunteers, three foreign priests, an admiral, and Juana López, a woman whose only crime appears to have been supplying milk to children in a run-down Lima soup kitchen. Investors would be crazy to risk any money in Peru today. Fujimori's attempts to "reinsert" Peru into the international economy may be futile, given Sendero's violence and the counter-violence of the underpaid security forces. The recent East Asian flow of capital into Peru may be misleading. Instead of a gesture of confidence, it may be *capital golondrina* --money that comes and goes like swallows. Latin American stabilization programs are hard on the people, but as inflation falls, interest rates can reach 20% a month on local currency deposits: "Terrorists find it harder to destroy financial windfalls than factory profits." While the Peruvian economy is improving and inflation is falling, even a small change (like a rise in petrol prices to finance a pay raise for the army) can trigger hyper-inflation. Terrorism may be driving away foreign money, but there are lots of cheap dollars in Peru from coca profits. The key to ending the recession is better coordination between monetary and fiscal policies--but "fiscal policy" means tax reform, which would hurt a lot of people--and successive governments have avoided it for 15 years.

876. "Pateando la olla." *Caretas,* no.1176 (September 9 1991): 30-33, 88.

After the assassination of Juana López de León, coordinator of the "Glass of Milk" program in Callao, some 300 Lima popular kitchens have closed down. Sendero intends to replace existing popular neighborhood organizations with its own "centers of resistance." Sendero has divided the Lima area into five zones, all under the direction of the Metropolitan Committee. Each one's mission is to make propaganda, agitation, direct popular schools, and form terrorist teams. Since the deactivation of *Socorro Popular* and the arrest of its leaders by Dircote, the Committee itself (more active than ever with the release of "Comrade Meche," Laura Zambrano), has been coordinating sabotage and assassinations. The peripheral zones of Lima are the target, so that their *pueblos jóvenes* might in the future serve as places of asylum and support for urban guerrilla operations. Juana López de León received a warning letter with a bullet months ago; she persisted in her work, and on August 31 was shot in front of those she was helping. *Caretas* describes how Sendero is shattering the people's best weapon, solidarity, and how the *barrios* are losing touch with humanitarian organizations like Cáritas, Ofasa, and Community in Action. Slogans are painted on walls, Sendero names its own "authorities," and state-assisted schools are abandoned in favor of "popular schools." The article discusses how this process is being carried out in the neighborhood of "Félix Raucana" in Vitarte.

877. "Primaria senderista." *Caretas,* no.1177 (September 16 191): 40-43.

Article detailing how Sendero is targeting children and young people for recruitment to the revolution. Captured documents reveal plans to establish "Pioneer Schools" for the young as well as the use of *Grupo de Intelectuales Populares* to capture college students. The article describes how a "popular school" functions: instructors use symbols (like the hammer and sickle), drawings, and theater montages to capture attention, and to help explain the rules and basic

principles of Sendero. The students are lectured about their enemies: the police, military, and government, all corrupt and oppressive. They are "catechized" to hate the bourgeois state. The students pass on to lessons about Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and of course, President Gonzalo, described as the greatest person in the history of world communism. Recreation consists of games like "Conquering power," to stimulate sympathy for the armed struggle among pupils eight to twelve years old. For older students, the GIP stages folk music and theater presentations, with works like "Red Seed," "The World is Yours," "The Red Flag," and "In the Morning Look to the East." *Caretas* warns the government that this battlefield is too important to be abandoned to the enemy.

878. "Manzanas sanas. " *Caretas,* no.1178 (September 23 1991): 34-37, 91.

Describes efforts to defeat Sendero in the *pueblos jóvenes.* A manual of counterinsurgency warfare published by the Ministry of Defense teaches how to take back neighborhoods, block by block. The authorities have to regain the confidence of the people. People at the local level, whether shop owners or priests, will know when strangers are present in their neighborhoods. Neighborhood security committees, *vías rondas,* are being established to flush out *senderista* infiltrators. The armed forces are warned in their manual that the system must be voluntary, that it must operate with the help of the military or police, that its objective is the unity of the populace. A census of neighborhoods is one objective. A system of alarms is necessary to alert police to terrorists, as are networks of informants. Above all, the organization of the populace must be based on the city block, with leaders elected by the people themselves. *Caretas* describes how the people of one area, "Héroes del Pacífico" are forming their own night patrols in groups of 20-30 people to defend their neighborhoods. Sendero is not the only enemy: delinquents and common criminals are the first to be caught by these associations.

879. "Sin luz al final del túnel." *Ideéle,* año 3, no.29 (September 1991): 3-5.

It seems as if there is no light at the end of the tunnel with regard to the situation of subversion and violence in Peru. The government's position on human rights has put international aid to Peru in jeopardy, exacerbating an already difficult economic situation. Sendero, having announced it ascension to "strategic equilibrium," is carrying out a series of attacks designed to demonstrate its arrival at that step of popular war. *Ideéle* lists a series of ambushes and assaults, in which 30 soldiers and 43 *senderistas* were killed. Sendero's attacks against civil defense patrols in Ayacucho and its murder of three foreign priests in Ancash appear to have new political objectives: to frustrate the social development work of the Church. At the same time Sendero has obviously assigned great importance to the Lima periphery, as evidenced by its recent actions of agitation, armed propaganda, and road blockades in various *barrios.* Finally, the guerrillas continue to assassinate mayors and candidates for municipal office; Sendero's objective is to eliminate representatives of the state and enforce a boycott of local elections. *Ideéle* analyzes the political ramifications of recent *senderista* actions, those of MRTA, and the counter-actions of the government. Specific attention is paid to the human rights situation; although the government's rhetoric indicates support for human rights, its feeble actions express an indifference to the problem.

880. "La iglesia, blanco senderista." *Ideéle,* año 3, no.29 (September 1991): 8-10.

In the latest attempt to build its "new" power in Peru, Sendero has murdered two Polish priests in the district of Pariacoto, province of Haraz, department of Ancash. The victims were seized after celebrating mass, bound, and taken to the local cemetery in the parish truck. There, after being accused of being "foreign imperialists," of preaching peace and setting back the revolution, and of distributing food that only "lulled the masses," each was shot in the head. With this crime, and the murder of a third foreign priest, an Italian, Shining Path has shown that the pastoral work of the church in promoting social development assistance is an obstacle to its political and military strategy. Eight priests and nuns have been murdered since 1987. Sendero considers religion as the "opium of the masses" that will inevitably disappear with the advent of the revolution and its "new society." Why, asks *Ideéle,* are the guerrillas stepping up attacks on the clergy now? The article examines why the work of the church in building a social fabric is such a threat to Sendero. A quote from the pro-Sendero *El Diario* accuses the church's assistance programs of "dampening the volatility" of the masses; nor is it a coincidence, says the newspaper, that Yankee imperialism is the principal financial supporter of organizations like Cáritas, Care, and Prisma. The murders of priests and nuns, says *Ideéle,* is a sign of weakness of *senderismo,* which must descend to new levels of violence in order to subjugate the population, which, after eleven years, continues to resist its authoritarian designs.

881. "La conspiración del silencio." *Ideéle,* año 3, no.29 (September 1991): 11-14.

On August 14 a Marine patrol was ambushed between two towns in Ucayali. Casualties included nine Marines and two officers killed, two wounded, and two missing. What is really happening in the region of Ucayali? Why are the Marines, and not the army, patrolling this emergency zone? Have human rights abuses diminished, or is the population simply keeping silent in order to avoid reprisals? *Ideéle* examines the situation in Ucayali, which was flooded with refugees from the Upper Huallaga after anti-narcotics operations in 1986. After the department was declared an emergency zone in mid-1989, the Marines began forcing peasants to form *rondas.* But the natives have also rejected MRTA and Sendero, stating that they do not wish to be cannon fodder for anyone, neither guerrillas nor the army. *Ideéle* reports on the dilemma of the populace caught between two fires, Sidebars from a priest from Pucallpa and the president of the regional human rights commission highlight problems with human rights violations in the region.

882. "La 'guerra' llegó a los barrios populares." *Ideéle,* año 3, no.29 (September 1991): 15-16.

The war has come to the *barrios populares* of Lima. Any success Sendero may have there is due to the great misery, lack of services, indifference of the government, political mistreatment, and violence that is the state of affairs in the *barrios. Ideéle* examines this new battleground, and in particular, the cases of Asentamiento Humano "Félix Raucana," and Asentamiento Humano "Los Olivos de Pro," where violence and official indifference have produced growing conflict.

883. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "La estrategia urbana de Sendero: al filo de la navaja." *Quehacer,* no.73 (September-October 1991): 26-29.

Analysis of Shining Path's dangerous new urban-based strategy. Sendero's target in the cities are recent migrants into the shantytowns, people displaced by war, who are extremely poor and totally by-passed by the "myth of progress." Raucana is the best-known example of the movement's new focus, particularly after its defeat in Huaycán. Bearing the brunt of *senderista* violence are the groups that, since the near-total collapse of the state, have been the only functioning bodies in the *pueblos jóvenes:* the soup kitchens, the *vaso de leche* (glass of milk) programs, the neighborhood organizations, and the church groups. The brave response by these threatened, yet courageous workers has forced Sendero, for the first time, to explain its actions and justify them. Unfortunately, even the popular organizations and the military together cannot make up for the lack of any organized political response. Populations that reject Sendero and appeal directly to the armed forces, without any political intermediation, are playing into Sendero's hands, since the militarization of the nation, and polarization of the populace, is its aim. Degregori fears that the government's tendency to cut political parties out of the counterinsurgency equation will only help Sendero achieve its goal of strategic equilibrium.

884. "'Gonzalo' a la caza de Lima: el gran ensayo de Raucana." *Quehacer,* no.73 (September-October 1991): 30-34.

Extremely important article on the failure of Sendero's new urban strategy. Shining Path has been trying to establish itself in the Carretera Central since 1985. Its failure in Huaycán (where leftist groups managed to block it) led it to choose Raucana, a smaller and more manageable community, as a testing ground for its revised strategy. In the Chinese model, Raucana would be an experiment; if the hypothesis proved viable, the lessons would be applied on a national scale. The changes Sendero planned would emphasize neighborhood organizations, rather than unions. They would concentrate their efforts among young people, especially in the secondary schools, technical institutes, and pre-university preparatory academies. They would tolerate certain social institutions, like the popular kitchens; instead of attacking them, they would try to gain control of them. In July, 1990, a mob of primarily young people led an invasion of squatters onto 15 hectares owned by the Isola family. Soon 300 families, comprising some 1,500 people, were camped out and building housing. Sendero's actions were revealing: while most of the houses were made of the flimsiest materials, a brick wall with four guard-towers was built around the site. Indoctrination was intense: the inhabitants were obliged to attend ideological lessons, sing songs, and chant slogans. Social life was completely controlled by the Party. Kitchens and garden plots were communal, as was work, military exercises, and political activities. No one could enter except with permission of the Party, and all visitors were screened and escorted. Meanwhile, the Isola family obtained a court order evicting the squatters. Sendero hoped for a bloody confrontation, and prepared for total war. After a confused period of street-fighting with the police and court petitions, the army entered a shantytown adjacent to Raucana with 500 soldiers on September 6. But to

Sendero's chagrin and everyone's amazement, they came peacefully, and distributed food. A group of women from Raucana asked the soldiers into their *pueblo,* and began to began to hand out food, water, and medicines. They raised the Peruvian flag, erected tents, and began a campaign of civic action. Sendero was taken by surprise, and counterattacked, spreading rumors of military abuses and planning confrontations. This time their highway blockade was swiftly disrupted by the arrest of some 20 *senderistas.* This sensible action by the army demonstrates the effectiveness of using pacific methods rather than brutality. Nevertheless, the army does not have the capacity to carry out this kind of action everywhere Sendero has established itself. What is needed is a political program of pacification that would include the political parties, the state, and the popular movement.

885. Barnhurst, Kevin G. "Contemporary Terrorism in Peru: Sendero Luminoso and the Media." *Journal of Communication,* v.41, no.4 (Autumn 1991): 75-89.

Focuses on Sendero's relationship to the media. Unlike most terrorist or revolutionary groups, Sendero has eschewed publicizing its struggle in the media. Instead, it has preferred communication through direct propaganda--pamphleteering, painting slogans and pasting posters on walls, and even more violent and dramatic actions such as dynamiting electrical pylons, that "directly delivers fear into every darkened home." Sendero seems to prefer the deed to the word. Burning ballot boxes or hanging dogs from lampposts sends their message far more efficiently than holding a press conference, which, they learned from the experience of a guerrilla group in the 1960s, only identifies their leaders and exposes them to retaliation by security forces. The government, in turn, has tightly restricted press access to emergency zones and is suspected of having "disappeared" journalists. Sendero is not entirely hostile to the press, however. Urban sympathizers include friendly journalists, and at least several papers in Peru have served as conduits for Sendero's messages. Since Sendero considers the press a tool of government, it has no qualms whatsoever in exploiting it whenever possible. In particular, Sendero has used the media abroad to gather support for its insurgency.

886. "Ejemplar resistencia." *Caretas,* no.1180 (October 7 1991): 36-37.

On October 3 *senderistas* seized a radio station and obliged the operators to broadcast a taped message from Abimael Guzmán. After the usual vilification of the Peruvian state, there were threats against various people, including the leader of Villa El Salvador, María Elena Moyano. It was Moyano who organized the local *vaso de leche* committee and led a march protesting terrorism. *Caretas* points out that Moyano and others like her need protection, as well as support for their *pueblos jóvenes* and popular organizations.

887. Arroyo, Abilio. "La guerra del Ene." *Caretas,* no.1182 (October 21 1991): 34-39, 46.

Report on the war now raging in the Ene Valley. The army is training the Ashaninkas in the use of their new shotguns, and bringing in food and medicine for the Indians by helicopter. Sendero began operating in the area in 1984; in 1989, after driving out Padre Gagnon, the guerrillas controlled virtually the entire valley. In May of this year General Pérez Documet launched an offensive, forcing Sendero to retreat and abandon the towns and native villages that they had dominated. The guerrillas forced many people to retreat with them to the mountains; native organizations estimate that some 6,500 Indians and 2,000 other colonists are under Sendero's control. Arroyo describes how Sendero took control in communities, killed off native leaders, and enforced the Party's mandate of autarky: peasants were prohibited from planting traditional cash crops such as coffee and cacao, and forced to grow beans, sugar cane and cotton. Sendero divided the area into six sectors. In each sector they organized militias. The *fuerza base* controlled the population, the *fuerza local* guarded the sector, and the *fuerzas principales* carried out attacks on police posts. Arroyo also relates how native *rondas* were pushed back because they lacked arms; how the commander at Huamanga refused to enter the zone because it was not under a state of emergency, and how Sendero isolated Ene. All teachers were drafted into the "popular schools." It was only after President Fujimori's visit that authorities began a massive plan to move Indians into areas where the army could help them defend themselves.

888. Vogel, Tom. "The Lawless Road in Peru: Missionaries as Targets." *Commonweal,* v.118, no.18 (October 25 1991): 611-612.

Threats against Catholic clergy in Peru are not new. Shining Path has warned them not to become too active in community organizing, which they consider a threat to their revolution. But a sort of tacit agreement that Sendero would not attack Catholic clergy seems to have been broken.

Six missionaries have been killed, five in 1991 alone. Vogel describes the mostly foreign-born priests and nuns who have been murdered, the threats, and the bombings by Sendero. The guerrillas often use young people to carry out these attacks, because they are less severely punished than adults, and sometimes even set free. One youth was released in 1988, even though he admitted to shooting a priest in the back as he celebrated Mass. Vogel talks to a priest who has lived in Peru for more than 20 years. The man moves from place to place, never staying in a home more than a week, after receiving anonymous telephone and letter death threats. The calls and letters accuse him of consorting with the rich, even though he served in a very poor parish, of being insensitive to the poor, of pocketing donations, of being an imperialist. The priest was so popular that his parishioners used to celebrate his birthday with fervor. He cannot understand the hate in the communications. Some missionaries are asking to be transferred to safer parishes, but there may be no safe havens in Peru. Missionaries all over the country are receiving threats; there is fear that Shining Path may drive all of them out for good.

889. "Desenmascarado." *Caretas,* no.1183 (October 28 1991): 28-32, 80.

Report on countermoves in the urban struggle between Sendero and the government. For Shining Path, Raucana is a model neighborhood in which to establish an enclave; from there other areas can be infiltrated and converted into base areas. But Sendero has made errors with this strategy; the killings of popular leaders has backfired, and attacking church groups is another mistake. However, Sendero has once again revealed the weaknesses of the state's effort to defeat it. Several notorious examples of abuses by security forces, and a certain lack of energy in pursuing avenues such as more citizen participation, vigilance, intelligence, and communal aid, have become apparent. Marginalized populations, once organized, have an undeniable force; if used properly, they can change matters radically. Security by the government is not enough; food, sanitation, potable water, i.e., minimal services, are needed in order not to squander these promising beginnings.

A sidebar ("Así lo harán") showcases photos of army Special Forces personnel (formerly División Aerotransportada) undergoing training; these will be the troops guarding the civil crusade for Lima. Following (pp.34-35, 80) is a story, "Práctica salvaje," detailing how Sendero uses children to carry bombs. The story relates how a miscalculation about timing killed one *niño* before he could deliver his package to a police post; another was killed because the security forces have started to place land mines around the towers carrying power lines.

890. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "¿Hacia un país ingobernable?" *Ideéle,* no.30, año 3 (October 1991): 13-17.

Interview with the director of the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, and one of the most knowledgeable analysts of Shining Path. Degregori expands upon his hypothesis on the rise of Sendero, as an encounter between a mestizo, provincial, intellectual Marxist-Leninist elite and a youthful fringe, also provincial and mestizo. Sendero has been aided in its growth by an economic crisis and lack of hope. Degregori discusses how "Fujishock" may help Sendero, and how Sendero's new phase of strategic equilibrium is rooted in the effective collapse of the Peruvian state and of the political parties, especially the left, as a bulwark against subversion. The principal line of defense now, says Degregori, and Sendero's prime target, are the NGO's, popular organizations, and church groups. Sendero's objective is to make the country ungovernable, and this they can do.

891. "Barrios de Lima: en la mira del terror." *Ideéle,* no.30, año 3 (October 1991): 18-22.

Report on the campaign of Sendero to take control of Lima *barrios.* Several neighborhood leaders were assassinated in September; the message from Sendero is clear: accept our control or accept the consequences. There is talk of self-defense, and of neighborhood patrols--urban *rondas.* A 44-year-old woman, mother of three, and coordinator of the *vaso de leche* program for her *barrio* was murdered by *senderistas* while preparing breakfast for her family in a communal kitchen named for Pope John Paul II. Police presence (and protection) is minimal in many Lima neighborhoods. *Ideéle* examines the dilemma of the *barrios,* and the popular response to Sendero's campaign of intimidation. The army has recently been practicing civic action, distributing food and medical services. Some leaders, suspicious of past police abuses and arbitrary detentions, do not care to participate in such efforts. One neighborhood association president said, "from the beginning we have formed our own security patrols. Without any arms we are defending our community from the actions of delinquents." A permanent police or army presence would make some uncomfortable; they reject the idea that the security forces replace or subordinate social organization. A sidebar by a Lima deputy, Esther Morreno, "Women organized against hunger and terror," describes efforts by women to organize for mutual self-help in the face of a severe

economic crisis and terrorist violence. Women demanded that the government include in the budget money to support *organizaciones de base* (popular organizations) that feed the poor.

892. Canchanya, Leonidas. "Trote rondero." *Caretas,* no.1185 (November 11 1991): 36-41.

A militia of 3,000 *ronderos,* on foot and on horseback, is confronting Sendero in the Huancavelica province of Angaraes. Temperatures in the area, which is at an altitude of almost 4,000 meters, can drop below zero. The peasants grow maize, potatoes, and barley, and raise livestock. Canchanya reports on how the peasants, even armed with an inadequate number of crudely-made shotguns, have clashed with guerrillas. Most of the *ronderos* have only slingshots *(huaracas),* lances, machetes, and daggers with which to fight. The *rondas* received only 10 of the Winchesters that President Fujimori distributed in June. Nevertheless, the peasants have their own peasant cavalry, supplemented by 600 women organized to detect and warn of suspicious trespassers. Canchanya describes several of the fights that have already taken place. Unfortunately, *senderista* terror is not the only threat to the inhabitants; soldiers have also abused and robbed the peasants. A sidebar ("Venganza") reports on 40 people massacred by *senderistas* in Santo Tomás in retaliation for the death of their *jefe militar,* "Comrade Beto." The guerrillas blockaded the streets, forced the population into the square, and shot the men in front of their families.

893. Woehr, Chris. "Peru: Caught in the Crossfire." *Christianity Today,* v.35, no.13 (November 11 1991): 58-59.

Peasant anti-terrorist patrols, the *rondas campesinas,* are presenting evangelicals in the sierras with a new dilemma: to accept the need for self-defense, or to refuse to take up arms in violation of their beliefs. Membership in the *rondas* is not optional, says the director of the Evangelical Council of Peru: whoever refuses to join is viewed as a subversive or a traitor. One Pentecostal pastor in Chaquispampa was murdered after guerrillas discovered a cache of weapons in his village and accused him of favoring the patrols. Sendero has put enormous pressure on the evangelical movement in Peru, where more than 400 pastors, lay workers, and converts have died since 1980, most murdered by Shining Path. Guerrilla threats have caused World Vision to terminate its child sponsorship program in Peru, and AMEN (Evangelical Missionary Association to the World) has been forced to close five of its feeding centers, although one in Lima's Canto Grande squatter camp remains open, despite the camp's total infiltration by Sendero. An AMEN worker in the camp describes how even basic tasks like building a modest community latrine can bring threats from the guerrillas. Both evangelical and Protestant missionaries and believers are determined to persevere. In Ayacucho ("corner of the dead") one explains, "We count ourselves as dead, that the gospel of Christ may continue to go forward. We have the light; the worst we could do is turn ourselves off."

894. Pasará, Luis. "Escupir al cielo." *Caretas,* no.1187 (November 25 1991): 28-31.

Writing from Washington, Pasará condemns the "double game" of the government: President Fujimori's attacks on human rights organizations, which are counterproductive. Americas Watch's recent letter to "Professor Abimael Guzmán," expressing concern over recent killings in Puno, was entirely within the normal practices of the organization, says its director, Juan Méndez; AW used exactly the same procedure with guerrillas in El Salvador. But it places Sendero within a certain political dimension that three governments have consistently tried to deny the PCP, branding it merely a terrorist organization. The government distorted the contents of the letter, accusing AW of placing Sendero on the same level as the legal government of Peru. Fujimori, speaking at the University of California, Berkeley, declared that Americas Watch had not condemned *senderista* atrocities. The government's double game is to accept aid from Washington, explicitly tied to improvements in the human rights situation, while attacking organizations that monitor such abuses in Peru. *Caretas* publishes seven statements from Americas Watch reports, from 1984 to 1991, clearly condemning guerrilla abuses (including the use of children as *niños bombas).* A sidebar by Carlos Hamann reports on the small band of noisy and strident demonstrators from the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA, who tried to shout down President Fujimori in Berkeley.

895. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Guerra interna y democracia."*Ideéle,* no.31, año 3 (November 1991): 19-26.

Reprint of an analysis by Gorriti of the government's counterinsurgency strategy, first published in the journal *Defense.* Gorriti asks whether it is possible to fight an insurrection without breaking democratic laws. Must one resign oneself to the suspension of legal guarantees for the duration of the conflict? Gorriti examines the late 19th century origins of modern

counterinsurgency strategy. Two opposing schools of counterinsurgency doctrine came from British and French colonial experiences. Ultimately the British doctrine is more or less compatible with democracy, while the French doctrine, which culminated in the doctrine of *guerre révolutionnaire* (influential in Latin America), is not. Each was the work of a specific soldier-theorist. Gorriti describes the evolution of the French model, and the moral, legal, and political dilemmas raised in its application. The British doctrine rests upon the functioning of law; the French tends to assume the form of a moral crusade, and when employed against Marxism, a religious war. The war against Sendero must ultimately be a struggle to fortify democracy in Peru. Two sidebars by José Bailetti Mac-Kee and Santiago Pedraglio comment on Gorriti's article. Bailetti Mac-Kee emphasizes the need to demonstrate the advantages and superiority of democracy in such a conflict. Pedraglio believes that the French model is popular in Latin America precisely because it enables the state to destroy the insurgency without democratizing itself. Peruvian governments from 1980 to today, he writes, have been incapable of understanding the urgency of a creating true democratic revolution in the midst of an internal war.

896. Mayer, Enrique. "Peru in Deep Trouble: Mario Vargas Llosa's 'Inquest in the Andes' Reexamined." *Cultural Anthropology,* v.6, no.4 (November 1991): 466-504.

Anthropological critique of the long-disputed findings of the commission investigating the January 1983 massacre of journalists at Uchuraccay. Mayer summarizes the commission's "hierarchy of conclusions": that the region's communities had decided to kill *senderistas* because they were exasperated by their abuses, exactions, and threats, and that they had already killed at least 25 "terrorists" before the massacre; that the Iquichanos felt they had tacit permission from the government, represented by the sinchis, to do so; that the villagers mistook the journalists for a band of *senderistas* bent upon revenge for some earlier killings of guerrillas; and that there was no participation of any police forces in the massacre. The massacre, then, arose out of cultural misunderstandings and psychological stress during a violent war. Underlying the commission's conclusions were a number of anthropological and sociological assumptions about *comuneros* that reflect deeply-held ethnocentric assumptions and prejudices. One of the commission's rhetorical assumptions was that native custom and tradition clashed with the official laws of an alien culture, and it made the condescending judgment that the native always has the right to prevail, not even bothering to distinguish between tradition and vigilantism: the commission overlooked the previous deaths of the 25 "terrorists" whose killings supposedly triggered the massacre. Many leftists and intellectuals were uncomfortable with the idea that violence could be an inherent part of peasant highland life; therefore the killings had to be part of a police plot. The Vargas Llosa report and its critics both tend to assign manichean moral values to one side or the other; i.e., the peasants are either savages or misled innocents; the police are defenders of law and order or they are assassins. The excuse of "structural violence" (poverty, oppression, abuse, discrimination, racism) is advanced to justify violence by peasants, confusing moral guilt with justification. Similarly, senderologists disbelieve that Shining Path commits indiscriminate murder, which is against the organization's strict rules, not distinguishing between what *senderistas* are taught and what they actually do. Mayer explores the "anthropological authority" that underlay the Vargas Llosa report, the doctrine of *indigenismo* in Peru, and the anthropological discourse to which Vargas Llosa appealed in his findings. He is troubled by the "two Peru" hypothesis, upon which so much of the commission's findings rested, and in his article he examines the ramifications of that discourse, critiquing many senderologists (including Isbell, Poole and Rénique, and Starn). He concludes that the "two Peru" argument is a sterile one, and insufficient for understanding the phenomenon of Sendero. However, the Uchuraccay report proved to be a kaleidoscope, through which the war could be viewed from any number of perspectives, depending on one's own prejudices and predispositions. A striking, if complex and challenging article, utilizing senderology, literature, sociology, and anthropology to examine a society *in extremis.*

897. Noble, Peter. "To Hell on a Shining Path." *Soldier of Fortune* v.16, no.11 (November 1991): 30-33, 69, 71-72.

Florida-based Noble is an "award-winning British photographer"; told by *Soldier of Fortune's* editor to interview some terrorists from Sendero Luminoso, he heads for Peru with a self-admitted near-total ignorance about the war between Sendero, MRTA, and the Peruvian government. Noble did not get his interview, but manages to convey the sense of menace that reigns in both Lima and the highlands. He goes from government office to government office in the capital to obtain grudging permission to enter the emergency zones; in Ayacucho he is met with distrust by everyone, especially the military and police, "who seem to want to tell us that we're strangers, are not welcome here, are poking our noses in business that doesn't concern us." He reaches Taraputo (on the edge of the Amazon) to observe operations against MRTA; when he asks

about 15-20 decapitated bodies dumped by the side of the road, he is greeted with incredulity: "After all," he is told, "these things happen all the time--no big deal." Nobel's photo captions are pithy and informative; in one he writes of the absurdity of giving peasants spears, sticks, and homemade weapons to fight off heavily-armed *senderistas;* in another he reports that Peruvian peasants say there are four terrorist groups in Peru: Sendero, MRTA, the military, and the police. Despite some elementary errors (he twice refers to *Presidente* Gonzalo as Abimalael Guzmán), Nobel discriminates accurately between Shining Path and MRTA in terms of tactics and strategy.

898. Rubio Correa, Marcial. "¿Pacificación o lucha contrasubversiva?" *Quehacer,* no.74 (November-December 1991): 5-10.

Recent legislative decrees show that the government has made the transition from a strictly military counterinsurgency strategy to one that combines military with "psycho-social" elements. But the Fujimori government also appears to hold contradictory counter-subversion and socioeconomic ideas. Rubio Correa delineates three basic conceptions of the fight against Sendero. There is the notion of a strictly military option, in which revolutionary violence is matched by equivalent counterrevolutionary violence. Many believe the armed forces have espoused this idea for years, but they are mistaken; rather it was two successive civilian governments that held to this idea. The second option is one in which political, economic, psycho-social, and military elements are equally considered. And finally, there are those who hold that the war is basically a political one. They theorize that Sendero itself espouses this strategy, sacrificing military ends to political ones when necessary (thus the celebration of the massacre of *senderistas* in Lima prisons in 1986). Rubio Correa reviews recent government legislation that confirms the government's selection of option two, the mixture of military and social elements, as the new counterinsurgency strategy. One important part of this strategy stresses civilian participation in the war, through the *rondas campesinas* and self-defense committees. The problem that Rubio Correa sees is that even as the government formulates a more flexible and sophisticated counterinsurgency strategy with which to fight subversion, its economic policies are exacerbating the plight of the country's poor. [This month *Quehacer's* articles on Fujimori's government are entitled "Salvo el mercado, todo es ilusión" (Except for the [free] market, everything is an illusion), a play on Sendero's Maoist slogan "Salvo el poder, todo es ilusión ("Except for power, everything is illusion").]A sidebar announces the resignation of Raúl González from *Quehacer* and DESCO. González's many penetrating articles over the course of a decade have illuminated different aspects of Shining Path's revolution. He grew tired of repeating that Sendero was basically a political phenomenon, and that it was a mistake to think that it could be wiped from the map without addressing the misery and injustice from which it drew its strength. Thus it is ironic that *El Diario* accused him of precisely the opposite point of view. *Quehacer* wishes him well and condemns threats against him and all other journalists doing their job.

899. Starn, Orin. "Sendero, soldados y ronderos en el Mantaro." *Quehacer,* no.74 (November-December 1991): 60-68.

Incisive, sometimes sarcastic report on the fragile, emerging alliance between *ronderos* in the Mantaro valley and the army. Forty peasants go to the *cuartel* (garrison) in Mantaro for free rice. General Pérez Documet, who believes in astrology, numerology, and spiritualism, asks "Who wants more rifles?" Smiles, applause. So now almost 2,000 five-shot Winchesters have been sent to Mantaro. Starn reviews the sad history of the struggle in the area, where the ruins of an SAIS cooperative and assassinated peasant leaders attest to Sendero's domination up to 1990. Things have changed in 1991: attacks by Sendero have decreased. The peasants' assembly is planning for the future. Electricity has reached the villages, a clinic has just been completed, and the people look forward to expanding the secondary school and paving the road with asphalt. Now they want a parabolic dish, as many have television sets, but there is no reception from Lima. There is cautious optimism. How to explain Sendero's retreat in the Mantaro? Starn explores the complicated reasons the people have largely rejected Sendero. The destruction of bridges and communal buildings, forced recruitment of youths and economic isolation imposed on the villages, were all very unpopular with the people. "It is significant that the majority of the *campesinos* are people who have something to lose, and therefore are not disposed to sacrifice everything for the promise of a revolution." In addition, the open geography of the Mantaro favored the army, which has recently curbed abuses and begun to espouse civic action as a policy. The *rondas* have played a central role; they now number at least 150 in the Mantaro, in addition to 200 more in Junín, 300 in Ayacucho, and 150 in Huancavelica. Approximately 100,000 peasants are participating in self-defense patrols. The *rondas* demonstrate the initiative and determination of the communities. After years of carrying only machetes or shotguns, the government is now sending rifles to arm the patrols, a vote of confidence in the peasantry. Human rights and leftist circles are uneasy about this

trend, as it seems to suggest a diminishing of the role of civil institutions, the necessary base of a democratic society. But what alternative is there, given Sendero's commitment to violence? The explosive growth of *rondas* points to the incapacity of the state to maintain order, the central role of government in any society.

900. "Bronca en SL." *Caretas,* no.1188 (December 2 1991): 42-43.

On December 3 Abimael Guzmán turned 57 years old. What remains of the Party's leadership undoubtedly celebrated the occasion, but there is less and less to celebrate within Sendero's ranks. The fissure opened by the capture of Morote continues to widen. Documents captured by Dircote indicate that the arrest was due in large part to the efforts of a *soplo,* an informer, whose actions may be tied to the increasing gulf between Guzmán and Morote. Morote was ordered to remain in the Huallaga and the sierra, and leave Lima in other hands, but he defied this ban and traveled to the capital repeatedly until he was captured. The documents also shed light on the death of Augusta La Torre, "Comrade Norah." There appears to have been a definite separation between husband and wife, a fundamental disagreement on the conduct and pace of the revolution. Indications are that Augusta La Torre committed suicide at the behest of President Gonzalo. At the same time that Socorro Popular's leaders have been arrested and pressure exerted to refill the depleted ranks of the support organizations, the Central Committee has decided to rein in the autonomous regional committees for having committed "gross errors," such as the irrational murders of priests or popular *barrio* leaders. *Caretas* speaks of a polarization between a *guzmanista* majority and a minority aligned with Morote.

901. "El general y el laberinto." *Caretas,* no.1190 (December 16 1991): 26-28, 90-91.

Discussion with retired British general Richard Clutterbuck, renowned expert and author on counterinsurgency war. After fighting in World War II, Clutterbuck served in Palestine and Malaya. In the latter he was attached to the Director of Operations. He stresses the overriding need to "politicize the war in place of militarizing politics." This is in contrast with the French doctrine of revolutionary war, so misapplied in Indochina and Algeria. Clutterbuck remarks with good humor that the problem with the French is that they haven't won a war since 1812! In Malaya the British created a civic action bureau to supplement personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics. In counterinsurgency operations the function of the army should be to reestablish civil government, not replace it. Although Peru is not Malaya, Clutterbuck believes the lessons the British learned there can be applied to Sendero. In such a conflict, the majority of the population wants nothing to do with either guerrillas or government; perhaps 80% prefer to remain neutral. Another 10% support the government because they identify with the interests of the state; while the remaining 10% support the rebellion, either out of conviction or fear. The British divided guerrillas into four groups: blacks, dark and light grays, and whites. The blacks, some 400 out of 4,000 captured guerrillas, were the irredeemables, those who preferred life in prison to cooperation. The whites, on the other hand, were open to recruitment by the government. The grays were in between. The British also used large rewards for information, the threat (rarely carried out) of the death penalty (thereby forcing prisoners to chose between execution and cooperation), and stressed converting insurgents into collaborators. Clutterbuck cannot think of a single instance of a guerrilla being killed after capture; nothing was more valuable than the information they might give: "SEP (surrendered enemy personnel) were our most valuable informants."

902. "Balance de la violencia." *Caretas,* no.1192 (December 30 1991): 24-27, 80.

Year-end report on continuing violence throughout Peru. This year that violence has claimed 3,200 victims. Last year 3,451 died; incidents of violence have climbed back to the levels of 1984. The number of attacks has increased, and the use of letter-bombs has spread death and injury. This in spite of the hard blows that Sendero and MRTA have suffered this year, including the capture of important leaders. *Caretas* reviews advances in intelligence, the emergence of a real counterinsurgency strategy, and the frightening urban emphasis Sendero has been giving its revolutionary war. Charts record the social cost of violence since 1990, and name prominent civil servants and leaders of communal kitchens and *barrios* who have been murdered.

903. Symes, Patrick W. "Out to Lunch With Sendero." *American Spectator,* v.24, no.12 (December 1991): 26-28.

In a corner of a cellblock in Canto Grande, the guerrillas keep a gift shop, selling handicrafts they make while serving their sentences; "one dollar at a time, they seem to think,

Sendero Luminoso will build up its war chest until all Peru is conquered." Symes reports on a visit to the *senderista* cellblocks in Canto Grande. Sendero won't speak to the press (several journalists who have gone looking for the guerrillas in the field have received the ultimate "no comment"). But in Canto Grande, the *senderistas* have constructed their own chilling fantasy of Peru's future, "a kind of Disneyland of the revolution, complete with gift shop and tour guide. Here the revolutionary psyche is put on display for those who would know Sendero's mind." Symes describes the familiar scenes: the filthy crowded criminal area yielding to the clean, orderly, disciplined guerrilla pavilion, where walls are painted with murals of revolutionary peasants and the movement's patron saints. The prisoners greet him with song, serve him lunch, and describe their revolution. The gift shop sells revolutionary kitsch: tote bags decorated with the hammer and sickle; earrings etched with a tiny scene of the world exploding in flames; a little model of guerrillas gunning down a government official, a reactionary victim of people's war. Lovingly-painted rivulets of blood run down the official's centimeter-high body. As Symes leaves, the guards examine the souvenirs he has purchased. They laugh at the childishness of the art, but they laugh nervously.

1992

904. Americas Watch. *Civil Society and Democracy Under Fire.* New York: Americas Watch, 1992.

Report on human rights in Peru since President Fujimori dissolved Congress, announced the "reorganization" of the judiciary, and suspended the Constitution. Americas Watch analyzes the legality of Fujimori's actions, and describes the arbitrary arrests, censorship, intimidation of the press, and violent abuses of human and civil rights that followed the coup. The government has issued a number of decrees since the *autogolpe* that broaden the definition of terrorism, limit legal access to prisoners, and stiffen penalties for those convicted of terrorism. AW also describes a bloody incident at Canto Grande prison, in which the military assaulted the prison to regain control of the *senderista* cellblocks. Prisoners resisted transfer to other jails, and almost 40 people were killed in the violence that followed. Since then, conditions at the prisons have deteriorated, with severe restrictions on prisoners's privileges and rights. AW also chronicles abuses by security forces, paramilitary groups, and *rondas campesinas,* including massacres in the Alto Huallaga and Ancash, as well as murders by death squads in Lima *barrios.* The report also details assassinations and threats by the Shining Path, especially against women's groups running *vaso de leche* programs and soup kitchens, development groups, community organizations, the press, and human rights activists. A final section reports on United States policy, suspected past links with Vladimiro Montesinos, and U.S. reactions toward the Fujimori coup.

905. Americas Watch. *El Perú de Fujimori: golpe a la democracia y a los derechos humanos.* New York: Americas Watch, 1992.

Detailed report on the actions of Alberto Fujimori since April 5, 1992, when he effectively declared himself dictator of Peru. Americas Watch describes political, military, and popular reaction to the *autogolpe,* and the institutional reforms that Fujimori has proposed. Since April, important judicial norms which leave people in a virtual state of "judicial unprotection" from abuses of power have been modified by fiat. The report summarizes the decrees that have been promulgated and suspended, various abuses by security forces, and international response to the coup by the Organization of American States (OAS), which sent a mission to Peru to investigate the situation and has passed several resolutions and reports expressing its concern over measures taken by the Fujimori government. Peru, Uruguay, Mexico, and El Salvador attacked the annual report of the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights, which is critical of the Peruvian government (among others). AW concludes with a condemnation of Fujimori's "delegitimazation" of democratic life at the same time that Sendero Luminoso is trying to destroy the state. Such actions only serve to weaken public confidence in lawful institutions, placing the government on the road to "the demented plans of Sendero."

906. Americas Watch. *Peru Under Fire: Human Rights Since the Return to Democracy.* (Human Rights Watch Books) New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

After more than a decade of expanding internal violence, Peru has entered the 1990's weakened on all fronts: the economy is in ruins, and an overcentralized and unresponsive democracy is resorting to desperate measures in order to survive. A new government, elected largely as a protest against traditional leadership, and perhaps as the last hope for moderating the violence that grips Peruvian society, appears as overwhelmed as its predecessors. Americas Watch presents a full-length analysis of the Peruvian crisis, examining human rights violations, the judiciary, penal conditions, congressional investigations of human rights abuses, violations of the laws of war by insurgents, the role of civil defense patrols, persecution of human rights monitors, and the role of the United States. Its summary and recommendations make for grim reading: internal armed conflicts tend to punish first the poorest and their leaders and defenders. In Peru, the most experienced *campesino* organizers, traditional village leaders, active unionists, candidates for municipal office, and mayors have been consistently targeted for repression. To Sendero these people, no matter how progressive, are bulwarks of the "old order"; to the security forces, popular organizations are suspect as fronts for subversion. "In assessing the damage that more than a decade of conflict has done this nation, one must consider the loss that such people represent for their communities." Those who are not killed flee, and in Peru's cities they must fend for themselves; every year, more Peruvians must rely upon themselves, as the state can neither protect nor provide for them. Peruvians who remain in the emergency zones, desiring either to stay neutral or take up arms to defend themselves, are living without the benefits of government. "The receding state asks Peruvians to defend it, to believe in the system it represents when that system, a democracy deeply flawed and economically crippled, can do little even to protect their lives." AW urges the Fujimori government to work to create a national consensus on issues of security and human rights, to fortify the legal system, respect human and civil rights, provide political support for popular organizations, unions, and humanitarian groups, and above all to protect its citizens, from both security force repression, and terrorist reprisals. "If the state is to have credibility, and therefore to survive, it must embody virtues superior to those of the insurgents. Alberto Fujimori gave voice to the disaffection of many citizens in his campaign. As president, he can represent them first and foremost by ensuring that their basic rights are respected."

907. Americas Watch and the Women's Rights Project Division of Human Rights Watch. *Untold Terror: Violence Against Women in Peru's Armed Conflict.* New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992.

The Women's Rights Project of Human Rights Watch was established in 1990 to monitor gender discrimination and violence against women throughout the world. This report, written by Robin Kirk and edited by members of the Women's Rights Project, focuses on the violence against women perpetuated by both sides in the Peruvian conflict. Rape by government security forces is widespread and common in the emergency zones; although investigators found no evidence that it was security force policy, it has become a routine accompaniment to military incursions into peasant communities. Few policemen and even fewer soldiers have been prosecuted for such abuse. Until April 1991, rape was treated under the Peruvian civil penal code as a crime against honor, not against a woman's body. This put women seeking to prosecute such abuse at a disadvantage. Since offenses committed under emergency legislation come under military jurisdiction, it is virtually impossible for civil courts to prosecute military personnel. As far as the military is concerned, rape is a regrettable "excess" of the war. Rape by Shining Path members is less common, because of its explicit prohibition and the high number of women within the movement's ranks. However, threats against and the murder of women activists is a serious phenomenon; since 1985 ten female grassroots leaders have been killed by Sendero. The report examines the legal aspects of rape in Peru, its strong links to race and class (no case in which white or wealthy women were raped has ever been reported), and individual testimonies of abuse by both security forces and Sendero. The second part of the report documents the murders of women community activists by the guerrillas. In urban areas, most grassroots organizations are run by poor women; Sendero's systematic assault on such groups is tantamount to a war on women. The report concludes with recommendations for legal and administrative reforms.

908. Amnesty International. *Peru: Human Rights During the Government of President Alberto Fujimori.* London: Amnesty International Secretariat, May 1992.

Despite repeated statements by President Alberto Fujimori and his administration that human rights would be respected, and the issuing of decrees designed to reverse the pattern of abuses extending back to January, 1983, gross violations of human rights continue throughout Peru. Disappearances, extrajudicial execution, and torture perpetrated by security forces are widespread. The vast majority of the victims continues to be peasants suspected of collaboration with insurgents, living in areas declared under a state of emergency. AI is further disturbed by the apparent arbitrary detention of at least 50 persons shortly before or immediately after the Fujimori

autogolpe of April 5, 1992, which established an executive-directed Government of Emergency and National Reconstruction. The detainees include ministers of the former APRA government, politicians, parliamentarians, regional government representatives, a Supreme Court judge, lawyers, journalists, and trade unionists. Although most were released after a few days detention, AI believes that many were arrested because of their opposition to the government, their trade union activities, or for exercising their freedom of expression. AI wrote President Fujimori prior to his inauguration in July, 1990, urging him to declare that violations of human rights would not be tolerated under his administration. It has written several times to government officials, drawing attention to continued abuses, and an AI delegation met with Fujimori and several prominent ministers in July, 1991 to encourage cooperation in resolving individual cases of human rights abuse. However, the organization is left with the impression that the government's emphasis on economic issues and the defeat of the insurgency has marginalized human rights as a political issue. Statistical appendices document continued abuses in Peru.

909. Ansión, Juan, Miguel Piqueras, Daniel del Castillo and Isaura Zegarra. *La escuela en tiempos de guerra: una mirada a la educación desde la crisis y la violencia.* Lima: Centro de Estudios y Acción Para la Paz, 1992.

Education has always played a key role in Sendero's revolution. Schools, together with the family and mass communications, are an important force for socialization. In a country like Peru, where peasant families clamor for education as a means of social advancement, schools can also be sources for democratic or subversive ideologies. The authors ask a series of questions: What role does education in general play in the strategies of both the terrorists and the armed forces? What social and cultural conditions make the educational system fertile ground for the growth of violent movements like Sendero? What parts of the system can be used to confront violence and promote peace? The authors discuss ways in which Sendero pressures schoolteachers in remote communities, how *senderistas* take over the schools to indoctrinate youth, Sendero's infiltration of SUTEP, the national teachers' union, the movement's influence in the universities, and why and how Sendero appeals to young people. Unfortunately, the armed forces tend to see schools as a breeding ground for subversion, and a number of teachers in the emergency zones have been killed, threatened, or "disappeared." Since 1991 the military seems to have gained an appreciation for the positive use of education in the fight against Sendero. The authors conclude with proposals to support education as a means to achieving peace, and strengthening links between communities, local authorities, the church, unions, and schools in urban and rural areas.

910. Avila, Diana, Carlos Basombrío, Ernesto de la Jara, and Isaías Rojas. *Peru hoy: en el oscuro sendero de la guerra.* Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL), 1992.

Third in the IDL's series documenting and analyzing Peru's descent into uncontrolled violence. It is clear that Sendero, MRTA, and the government have all charted new courses over the past year. Sendero, having proclaimed "strategic equilibrium," has moved into the cities, with assassinations and threats against the leaders of organizations in the *barrios populares,* and has stepped up propaganda actions and armed strikes. Sendero sees the *barrios* as "iron belts" with which to strangle the cities; the work of organizing in *barrios* like Raucana is seen as "pilot projects" in building the "new power" in the cities. Sendero has also murdered clergy and foreign aid workers. Its actions constitute a new phase in its war: the consolidation of military, political, and administrative "new power" in certain areas on the one hand, and the acceleration of the destruction of the "old order" on the other. The latter is manifest in ungovernability, economic crisis, corruption, political militarization, poverty, etc. Sendero is destroying state presence where it is weakest, inhibiting economic recovery in order to "heighten the contradictions" of poverty and suffering, and attacking organizations (like the Church and popular groups) that seek to alleviate the population's misery. MRTA, after its Canto Grande jailbreak, has succeeded in reconstituting its political-military structure, but remains marginalized, despite its strength in one area of the country. The IDL recounts MRTA's actions in the Lower Huallaga and its urban attacks; it concludes that the group, unlike Sendero, is not isolated from international socialism; therefore, the collapse of Marxism in Europe and its eclipse in other Latin American countries calls into question to some extent MRTA's aims and objectives. Alberto Fujimori (who optimistically announced his intention to finish Sendero by the end of his term) has not altered in any way the government's fundamental counterinsurgency strategy; while Sendero subordinates all military actions to political objectives, the government does the reverse, downplaying political considerations and emphasizing purely military means to defeat subversion. Insofar as Fujimori has a "new strategy," it consists of stressing authoritarian and anti-democratic means to fight terrorism, attacking other civilian institutions, and arming the population (Fujimori calls civil defense the first line of defense). IDL reviews at length the abysmal situation of human rights in Peru, the

failure of civil institutions such as the Peace Council created by Alán García to influence the course of the war, and the growing link between narcotics trafficking and violence.

911. Benavides, Margarita. "Autodefensa, asháninka, organizaciones nativas y autónoma indígena." In *Perú: el problema agrario en debate/SEPIA IV.* Edited by Carlos Iván Degregori, Javier Escobal, and Benjamín Marticorer. Lima: Universidad Nacional de la Amazona Peruana, Seminario Permanente de Investigación Agraria, 1992, pp.539-559.

Both MRTA and Sendero have made concerted efforts to gain political control over the Asháninka Indians in the central *selva.* In the Ene valley, Sendero has taken control of some communities; in the valley of the Río Pichis, the Asháninkas expelled MRTA. Benavides seeks to explain why Sendero has succeeded in some places, and been repulsed in others. The central deciding factor, she declares, is the presence or absence of indigenous autonomous organizations. Other significant factors include the degree of internal cohesion among the Asháninka communities, the implications of commercial coca cultivation, the extent to which the community is integrated into the national economy, and the presence of the state. Benavides briefly summarizes the mostly unhappy history of the Asháninka in Peru; the establishment of haciendas in the *selva* in the 19th century was accomplished with extreme violence against the Indians. Some Indians joined the guerrilla movement of 1965, motivated by guerrilla agitation against the haciendas, and by their own messianic ideology. When the guerrillas were crushed, the natives suffered from repression. The 1970s brought the law of Native Communities, which permitted the development of indigenous organizations and, in turn, some measure of political autonomy based on ethnic identity. Benavides examines the guerrilla-native confrontation in the Ene and Río Pichis areas in the context of the social, political, and economic situation of the Asháninka communities. She concludes that the Indians of the Pichis have been able to fend off the guerrillas because two decades of work at the local level, as well as strong ethnic self-identity, have enabled them to respond to armed pressure. It is also significant that the natives comprise 70% of the valley's population. The Asháninkas of Perené and Satipo make up only 10% of the populace in their area, and control relatively little of the land. There, two distinct native federations have divided the Indians and prevented unity. Sendero has also been more ruthless and violent than MRTA, determined to control the natives whether they wish it or not. Also, coca is cultivated there, and its growers oppose the Peruvian state, giving Sendero an entry point. Overall, the state's response has been essentially passive; unable to defend the inhabitants, it is deeply feared by them.

912. Berg, Ronald H. "Peasant Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas." In *The Shining Path of Peru.* Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 83-104.

Berg analyzes why Sendero appealed particularly to peasants in one highland province. Andahuaylas, bordering Ayacucho, is poor, agricultural, and Quechua, with deep division between haciendas and small-holding peasants. When radicals organized land invasions and seizures in the 1970's, the state stepped in and converted the haciendas into agricultural cooperatives, in order to block radical, grass-roots expropriation. Eventually, through loans from state and development sources, a small group of middle-class and rich peasants was created; however, this group was deeply resented by the majority of people who remained land-poor. Sendero found fertile ground in this situation. Sendero's actions, the execution of merchants, attacks on police and Civil Guards, and the expropriation and distribution of cooperative and individual wealth, were popular, or at least tacitly and passively supported by the area's peasants. There seems to be considerable approval for "killing the rich"--people who had amassed some goods, wealth, or owned a few homes, entrepreneurs who had obtained loans and could therefore buy materials and hire laborers. Men whom Sendero murdered pretended to be unable to speak Quechua, "holding themselves aloof from the community." Berg summarizes: "Sympathy for the guerrillas, then, was based on notions of economic justice in Andahuaylas communities where the core value is reciprocity and there is resentment against those who accumulate wealth, particularly if they do not remain involved in relations of reciprocity." In general, Sendero has focused on people's grievances and resentments, rarely discussing Maoist principles or programs. In fact, when people discussed Marxism, they generally opposed it; they feared that Sendero would want to expropriate private land to form cooperatives, which, from past experience, peasants oppose.

913. *Cartas y denuncias de los prisioneros de guerra del PCP (Después del genecidio de mayo de 1992).* Sucy-en-Brie [France]: Comité Sol Pérou, 1992.

Series of documents relating to the massacre in Canto Grande prison in May, 1992. Several letters written by imprisoned *senderistas* protest prison conditions and describe the murder of 156 "prisoners of war" held in cellblocks 1-A and 4-B on May 6, 1992. One letter is

addressed to the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights. The other documents are condemnations of the "genocidist" actions of the Fujimori government by surviving Sendero prisoners, and testimony by an eyewitness. All the denunciations conclude with the customary salutations of committed revolutionaries.

914. *Cifras y cronología de la violencia política en la región central del Perú (1980-1991).* Edited by Salvador Peña Guerra. Lima: SEPAR (Servicios Educativos Promoción y Apoyo Rural), 1992.

A precise and detailed record of violence in three areas in central Peru: the Central region (which includes the departments of Ayacucho and Huancavelica), the Region "Andres A. Cáceres," and the valley of Mantaro (which includes Huancayo province). The report presents information on violence by department, by year, by group (guerrillas, police, army, paramilitary, civil patrols), and by type of assault. A 290-page chronology provides a history of the war from May 18, 1980, when *senderistas* burned ballot boxes in Chuschi and Cangallo, to December 28, 1991, when they assassinated the district mayor of Junín.

915. Coronel Aguirre, José and Carlos Loayza Camargo. "Violencia política: formas de respuesta comunera en Ayacucho." In *Perú: el problema agrario en debate/SEPIA IV.* Edited by Carlos Iván Degregori, Javier Escobal, and Benjamín Marticorer. Lima: Universidad Nacional de la Amazona Peruana, Seminario Permanente de Investigación Agraria, 1992, pp.509-537.

How have *comuneros* in Ayacucho responded to the political violence wracking their communities? Coronel and Loayza examine four communities: in Cangallo, Huanta, and Huamanga provinces, principally between 1980 and 1990. They propose that community responses are not homogeneous; they depend largely on the social and economic makeup of the villages involved. Where *latifundias* predominate, there is one type of response; where people have more economic autonomy, there is another. The authors analyze the socio-economic structure of the microregions they chose, and then present the forms of communal response to violence in each one. In "Community A," Sendero came nearly every night to preach revolution to the people; if people didn't shout *"¡Viva!"* they could be in trouble. One community leader was intimidated by *senderistas* into distributing some of the community cattle herd among the *comuneros,* a gesture that satisfied Sendero. By 1982 traditional leaders were scarcely able to exercise their authority. Technicians from the Ministry of Agriculture and NGO's stopped coming because of Sendero's violence. In 1983-84 soldiers, accompanied by people from a rival village, stole cattle from Community A. Twelve people "disappeared" in this period. People began to sleep in the hills at night rather than in their homes. People demanded that Sendero leave; some went to the nearby army base to deny they had any sympathy for Sendero. After negotiations and debates, the community achieved a certain "neutrality"; Sendero did not recruit in their village, nor demand food, and used it only as a transit area. The villagers refused, despite police pressure, to form a patrol. The authors analyze how Community A reacted to growing pressure from outside forces with internal organization and self-determination. Coronel and Loayza found differing community responses to violence: some formed *rondas;* in other places people tended to migrate away; in still others collaboration or an uneasy neutrality was negotiated. Above all, the authors stress that generalizations about community response to violence are often incorrect.

916. Crabtree, John. *Peru Under García: An Opportunity Lost.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992.

In-depth analysis of the failure of reform politics under Alán García. Crabtree traces the APRA government from its electoral triumph in 1985 to its multiple failures in the years 1987-1990. With respect to Sendero, Crabtree analyzes the new counter-insurgency strategy that García intended to put into effect after taking office, and its subsequent unraveling under extreme political and economic pressures. When García assumed office, relations with the military were positive; the old antipathies for APRA were in the past. The armed forces, after the *docenio* of 1968-1980, were not eager to participate directly in politics. García laid down two priorities in the war: an emphasis on development rather than purely military tactics, and a respect for human rights. García telegraphed his intentions to be an active commander-in-chief, in contrast to Belaúnde's hands-off approach. He reorganized the police, dismissed corrupt officials, and replaced the head of the Armed Forces Joint Command. Through the *trapecio andino* (Andean trapezoid) program, aid to agrarian schemes was directed to the highlands and emergency zones. A peace commission was established to explore the possibilities of dialogue and negotiation with Sendero, and a series of dialogues were held with peasant communities. Unfortunately, the development program ran out of resources by 1987; the *trapecio andino* and *microregiones* existed only on paper, and the development corporation in Ayacucho was starved for funds. The Lima prison riots punctured García's image as

a defender of human rights. Although he gave the orders for the suppression of the rebellion, he tried to distance himself from the subsequent political consequences. The military resented his refusal to take full responsibility for his actions. After 1987 Sendero's intensification of assassinations and attacks forced the military to reinforce the emergency zones, and reassert their autonomy in prosecuting the war. Crabtree provides an especially astute and compressed analysis of Sendero, and in his conclusions pinpoints the errors and missed opportunities that robbed Alán García of the chance to halt Peru's precipitous decline. García's ideas for defeating Sendero were good, but the committment and resources to implement them were never forthcoming.

917. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "Campesinado andino y violencia: balance de una década de estudios." In *Perú: el problema agrario en debate/SEPIA IV.* Edited by Carlos Iván Degregori, Javier Escobal, and Benjamín Marticorer. Lima: Universidad Nacional de la Amazona Peruana, Seminario Permanente de Investigación Agraria, 1992, pp.413-439.

In view of eleven years of rural violence and more than 20,000 deaths, Degregori finds a surprising absence of material on social and political change in agrarian and peasant literature written before 1980, a situation not much remedied since. In his brief essay he surveys post-Sendero scholarship for its interpretations of rural violence. This violence is a relatively new phenomenon; a massive peasant movement arose between 1958 and 1964 with the cry "Land or death," but fewer people were killed in its six years of organizing and agitating than in ten days of a single month in 1991. One scholar who studied that movement perceived an explicit desire to avoid or minimize violence. Since 1980, anthropologists and sociologists like Starn, Montoya, McClintock, Ossio, Millones, and Ansión have all examined the roots of rural violence and its relationship to Shining Path. Does Sendero represent *pacahcuti* (the overturning of the world), or *chaqwa* (chaos or disorder)? Since Sendero is not a millenarianist movement, the latter interpretation is more tenable than the former. After 1984 a new trend emerged, in which social scientists examined the historical conditions and structures that made Sendero's rise possible. Manrique emphasized structural violence, Flores Galindo stressed political authoritarianism and racism. Both sought to condemn the *guerra sucia* that was being waged in Ayacucho. Favre traced Sendero's appeal to the deterioration of the traditional Andean world under the pressure of modernization. Degregori himself stressed the pivotal role of the University of Huamanga in shaping a new generation of aspiring mestizos and sons of peasants. By the late 1980's regional studies had arisen: Degregori cites Isbell on Chuschi, Manrique on the central sierra, and José Luis Rénique on Puno. To round out his survey, he mentions two seminal books that appeared in 1990: his own on the rise of Sendero, and Gorriti's history of the movement (in which the peasantry is largely an absent actor). He closes with some reflections on the questions the war has raised: has Peru always been as especially violent country? Is Sendero's violence external to Andean peasant society? Does Sendero's authoritarian ethos coincide with peasant moral tradition? He concludes that more regional, local, and comparative studies are needed . A good bibliography is appended.

918. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "Presentación." *Allpanchis,* no.39 (Primer semestre 1992): 5-13.

Degregori introduces this special issue of *Allpanchis* dedicated to the debate over peasantry and political violence in the Andes, in which Orin Starn criticizes and is in turn critiqued and criticized by his colleagues. The central thesis of Starn is that cultural anthropologists "missed" Sendero's imminent revolution, even as they monopolized the field of Andean anthropology in the 1970's. Starn asks why, and Degregori proposes a few answers. Since Starn counterpoises the work of Isbell with that of Díaz Martínez, Degregori begins with the latter. He briefly summarizes Díaz Martínez's life and work, providing a few new pieces of information, including the fact that the agronomist was not really a Marxist until the late 1960's; as a result of his visits abroad, especially to Egypt, he was really more of a "Nasserist" with a passion to know the peasant experience, and a sympathy for the ELN (which had a brief guerrilla experience in 1965 in Ayacucho). It was not until 1970 that Díaz Martínez began to follow the Sendero line, after joining the *Círculo de Trabajo Intelectual "José Carlos Mariátegui* (CTIM) under the leadership of Abimael Guzmán. Degregori also disputes the commonly-held idea that Díaz Martínez was ever "the number three" man of Sendero. Degregori summarizes some of the diverse schools of anthropological thought reigning in Ayacucho, Peru, and abroad, about the role of the indigenous peasantry in a modernizing world. Unfortunately, while neo-*senderista* circles abandoned the concept of Peru a as semi-feudal society, Sendero remained stuck in an obsolete reality, adjusting its vision of Peru only so far as to concede that the sweeping changes in Peru amounted to "bureaucratic capitalism" that merely "strengthened semi-feudalism." Between the polemics reigning in Huamanga and the "Andeanists" in the U.S., there was no communication. To liberal developmentalists, military reformers, socialists, Marxist-Leninists, and progressive Christians who shared an excessive faith in progress, Sendero was mired in an archaic and obsolete concept of a

semifeudal Peru just advancing to capitalism and modernity, and adhered to Stalin, Mao and the Cultural Revolution in the decade of *perestroika.* In a post-Cold War world, in which we realize that history is not ineluctably marching forward, Sendero has displayed the political will to march counter to the tendencies that until recently prevailed in Peru.

919. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "Return to the Past." (The Origins and Logic of Shining Path: Two Views). In *The Shining Path of Peru.* Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 33-44.

A slightly revised version of his critical article "A Dwarf Star," which appeared in *NACLA Report on the Americas* in 1990. See no.794.

920. Del Pino, Ponciano. "Los campesinos en la guerra. O de como la gente comienza a ponerse macho." In *Peré: el problema agrario en debate/SEPIA IV.* Edited by Carlos Iván Degregori, Javier Escobal, and Benjamín Marticorer. Lima: Universidad Nacional de la Amazona Peruana, Seminario Permanente de Investigación Agraria, 1992, pp.487-508.

Excellent, detailed study of how a community actually responded to Shining Path. Little attention has been paid to the significance and structure of civil defense committees, better known as *montucos.* Too often these committees have been characterized by the simple equation "armed forces=*rondas,* " as if they were passively nothing more than the creation of the military command. Del Pino examines the rupture of relations between Sendero's cadre and peasants in the district of Vinchos, in Huamanga province, Ayacucho department, and how a self-defense patrol emerged from violence. The *senderista* policy of forcing self-sufficiency upon peasant communities, and of prohibiting community participation in rural fairs (which had been the basis for mutual reciprocity among small and poor highland communities), was very unpopular, and produced an effect opposite to that which Sendero had desired. Many peasants initially sympathized with Sendero. The district Del Pino chose to study is high and mountainous, with only 7% of its land cultivable; most of its inhabitants herd llamas, alpacas, and sheep. Sendero sent its cadres into the district starting in 1977; university students enacted art/propaganda presentations, explained to the peasants why they were poor, analyzed their socio-economic situation in Maoist terms, and proposed their solution of armed struggle. Although the people understood little of the ideology, they were initially enthusiastic and identified with the proponents of the "New State." The most receptive to Sendero's message were the young, the sons of peasants who were studying in the city. Recruitment included young people from 13 to 25 years of age. By 1980-83, Sendero controlled the area; it was a "liberated zone." Del Pino finds that contrary to Favre (who proposed that Sendero was more successful in the lower, less Indian areas), here the most Indian villages at the highest altitudes responded to Sendero' program. Del Pino shows how the energy and enthusiasm of the youthful recruits helped Sendero to establish control and enforce its strict morality and norms. How then did the break with the guerrillas come? "Poor organization," says one peasant. Del Pino describes how the original *senderista* cadres moved into other areas, leaving behind the young they had recruited in charge of communities. Gradually relations deteriorated; in some cases placing power in the hands of native sons exacerbated pre-existing community disputes; in other cases *senderistas* abused their new powers. What triggered the formation of *rondas,* however, were the murders or *ajusticiamientos* the cadres carried out on those who possessed "precapitalist commercial capital"; i.e., anyone who possessed a little more than his neighbors. Del Pino also examines the internal dynamic of the *rondas* that were formed, the agrarian crisis of 1989-90 (brought on by drought), and the effects of violence on the district (50 *campesinos* murdered by Sendero in January of 1990 alone). Del Pino's article is one of the few to examine closely exactly how Sendero gained entrance into a peasant community, and why relations with the revolution soured.

921. DeWitt, Charles R. "The Rise and Development of Sendero Luminoso in Peru." (USAWC Military Studies Program Paper) Carlisle Barracks, PA.: U.S. Army War College, 1992.

Restricted to English-language sources, DeWitt has produced a competent, if sometimes narrow analysis of Sendero, and an interesting proposal of what American policy towards the insurgency should be. DeWitt attributes the causes of the insurgency to "a distinct ethnic population that has been historically exploited and feared, and has not been integrated into society; a highly inequitable land distribution system that has resulted in the Indians being described as virtual slaves; and a distinct geographical area where this segment of society is concentrated. The area has been neglected and now serves as a base for the development of this insurgency." On the surface, Sendero appears to have no impact on the U.S. However, according to the 1991 report *National Security Strategy of the United States,* one of our national objectives and interests is to aid democratic institutions in combating threats from aggression, coercion, insurgencies,

subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking. Peru fits these criteria. DeWitt's initial pragmatic recommendation would be for no U.S. involvement. "Our vital interests are not threatened, and the problems are so large and intractable as to almost defy solution. The ultimate solution to these problems requires long term internal action in the economic, social, and political arenas." However, DeWitt concedes that Peru's democratically-elected government deserves our help, that Peru is a key player in the war on drugs, and that the Latin American nations look to the U.S. for help and guidance. His recommendations are increased aid for development, aggressive implementation of the Brady Plan and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, and security assistance. Under no circumstances should U.S. conventional forces be considered. Social reform and democratic institutions must be encouraged. Above all, a comprehensive strategy for dealing with Sendero and drug trafficking is necessary, because the two threats are interrelated. DeWitt closes with a quote from General Adrián Huamán, whose attempts to address the roots of the insurgency with civic action were cut short by his abrupt replacement.

922. Eyzaguierre, Graciela. "Los escenarios de la guerra en la región Cáceres." *Allpanchis,* no.39 (Primer semester 1992): 155-180.

Examination of the war in the crucially strategic Cáceres region, composed of the departments of Junín, Pasco, and Huánuco. Whoever dominates the central *cordillera* dominates the heart of Peru, says a Peruvian general. Eyzaguierre looks at each department in turn, but her conclusions, backed by numerous statistical tables, is that Sendero is on the defensive in the entire region, thanks largely to more military action and, above all, the formation of *rondas campesinas* and civil defense committees. The correlation between the creation of these bodies and a drop in *senderista* attacks is clear. In general these self-defense bodies were not imposed by the military, but arose from popular pressure, although the armed forces have supported them. The guerrillas who have been displaced from the sierra provinces have retreated to the jungle, particularly the Ene Valley (where they clashed with the Asháninkas). Although the military and Sendero are in a condition of stalemate (which is not the same as "strategic equilibrium"), Sendero is still strong and able to make its influence felt at the local level, as evidenced by a high rate of electoral absenteeism and the large number of *municipios* that remain without a functioning government.

923. Gonzales, José E. "Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley." In *The Shining Path of Peru.* Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 105-125.

Extremely important article on the link between Sendero and drugs in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), updated from Gonzales' 1989 essay (see no.610). Between 1970 and 1980 coca plantings increased six-fold in the area, to over 6,000 hectares (15,000 acres). Factors of quantity (3 crops per year), and quality (two varieties produced in the UHV have the highest levels of alkaloid), attracted growers to the region. By 1987 annual production was officially 28,560 metric tones; unofficial figures are as high as 80,000 tons. 95% of the area's economy is based on drug trafficking or coca production. Sendero began operating in the UHV in 1980. The government discovered its presence during antidrug operations by UMOPAR, a police force that worked with the DEA. The UHV was placed under a state of emergency in 1984, with guerrillas, not drugs, as the prime focus. An aggressive general dispersed Sendero's columns with patrols and sweeps, while preventing UMOPAR from carrying out its antidrug operations. This defeated Sendero, and won support from local growers and traffickers. Increased levels of trafficking and local abuses by drug lords and corrupt police followed, which allowed Sendero to regroup and reenter the UHV in 1987. By 1988 they controlled towns and roads in the valley, enforced a strict morality (prohibiting drinking, prostitution, and homosexuality), and protecting coca producers. When the U.S. began using the herbicide "Spike" to eradicate coca, support for Sendero increased. The attack on the police post at Uchiza on March 27, 1989 demonstrated the weakness of the government and the power of the guerrillas. A new general, Alberto Arciniega, assumed command of the UHV in April, 1989. His strategy of attacking Sendero vigorously and wooing the support of coca producers paid off. By viewing coca-growing as a legitimate and necessary economic activity and decriminalizing the producers, he gained the support of the Upper Huallaga Agrarian Cooperative, in which 42 of the 100-odd coca-producing communities participated. A major Sendero attack on a military base failed, and General Arciniega's charismatic personality and aggressive action won him genuine loyalty. When he was re-assigned to Lima, his successor was unable to maintain that support.

Gonzales concludes that the link between peasants and Sendero in the UHV is based on the farmer's economic needs and Sendero's political ones. How to break that link? "For the army, the highest priority is to stop Shining Path; for the police and the DEA, it is to halt coca paste exports." When the guerrillas are the target, as in 1984 and 1989, trafficking will flourish and peasants will support the government. When drugs are the target, peasants will seek support from

the guerrillas. Gonzales suggests making both high priorities: "If drug trafficking is hit strongly and constantly, the price of the coca leaf will decrease and crop substitution becomes viable. If the guerrillas are pursued aggressively but appropriately, in terms of human rights issues, they cannot continue to build ties to UHV peasantry; this opens up political space for democratic parties and organizations."

924. Gonzales Manrique, José. *La prensa como reflejo de desarticulación social: prensa y violencia política en el Perú: el caso de Sendero Luminoso.* Lima: Universidad de Lima, Facultad de Ciencias de la Comunicación, Centro de Investigación en Comunicación Social, 1992.

In a densely-written socio-political examination of the current Peruvian crisis, Gonzales Manrique asks, What is the role of the media caught between Sendero and an authoritarian government? He examines the parameters of the media in Peru, the concept of anomie (particularly through the work of Emile Durkheim) as it applies to social disarticulation, the biological, sociological, psychological, metaphysical, political, and economic origins of violence, as well as the origins of Sendero and the current crisis. Is Sendero merely the extreme expression of institutionalized and structural violence? In his conclusion, Gonzales Manrique ties Sendero's appearance to a lack of confidence in the ruling classes and democratic system on the part of many social sectors in Peru. Decades of abandonment and retreat have led to what Durkheim called a moral crisis. Successive governments have demonstrated an incapacity to deal with or resolve these problems. Sendero's "war" is a political struggle, in which the media plays a crucial role. Sendero may eschew the traditional ways in which guerrillas use the media, but the media's dissemination of images of violence has played a significant role in the course of the struggle. Governments have also tended to blame the press for violence and crisis. Productive relations between government and the media can play a significant role in fighting subversion. A better course than oscillation between conformity and opposition should be found; information about terrorism should be precise and clear: the media's role is first to inform, and then to explain. A "democracy at war" must understand, but not justify, subversion.

925. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. "Shining Path's Stalin and Trotsky." In *The Shining Path of Peru.* Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp.149-170.

Gorriti looks at the career and fate of Sendero's "Trotsky," Luis Kawata Makabe, once considered a possible successor to Guzmán. The son of Japanese immigrants, he taught at the University in Ayacucho even before Guzmán. Kawata was Guzmán's opposite: a laid-back nonconformist. He and Víctor Raúl Zorrilla were known as the "Red Angels," and popular singing partners at parties. He was also considered the movement's best orator, converting many through his spell-binding lectures that neatly explained the entire universe in Marxist terms. A private and personal falling-out with Guzmán precipitated his expulsion from the party. Ironically, even after his expulsion, he was arrested by security forces as a Sendero suspect and sent to prison, where he remained silent about the party's organization: "Unlike Trotsky, Kawata decided not to fight back, Like Trotsky, he was thoroughly humiliated and cut off from the party to which he had dedicated his life." In prison he was treated with hostility by other *senderistas,* who called him "Traitorous Chinese Rat." He was eventually released, his health in ruins, and lived abroad, helping with Sendero activities to the limited extent that the party allows. Gorriti concludes: "[Guzmán] has done Stalin or Mao one better. Instead of seeking out his Trotsky to kill him, Guzmán systematically broke his will to resist instead and then used what remained for whatever purpose suited him. As Guzmán's Trotsky, Kawata lives and serves, an example to all who might resist the discipline and the orthodoxy of the party that their only course is to march onward in lock step for the cause of Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Guzmán."

926. Graham, Carol. *Peru's APRA: Parties, Politics, and the Elusive Quest for Democracy.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

In-depth study of APRA and its role in Peruvian politics. Graham traces APRA's birth, its many years in the wilderness, its conflict with the military, and its six years in power (1985-1990). Of special interest is APRA's relationships with the rest of the Peruvian left and with the marginalized and poor. APRA government officials and functionaries were primary targets for Sendero's assassination squads. MRTA was founded by a former *aprista;* as a less ruthless and more conventional guerrilla movement than Sendero, MRTA found a great deal of support among APRA and IU youth. This created a dilemma for the government, which needed a support base among these very sectors. To complicate matters, the "Comando Rodrigo Franco" death squad, named for a murdered APRA official, began to kill people who criticized the government or human rights abuses in 1988. "APRA found itself challenged by the political violence of the right and the

left, some of it within its own ranks. The government's and the party's response was both incoherent and insufficient." García launched a campaign to raise standards of living in the sierra, granted agrarian credit to farmers, and held public dialogues between *campesino* leaders and the government. But lack of follow-through, inadequate resources, and Sendero's own uncompromising nature doomed these efforts to failure. By 1988 the cycle of violence was out of hand, as government officials, APRA functionaries, judges and lawyers were targeted by Sendero. García was forced to name a retired admiral, a hard-liner, as interior minister. In July 1988 he announced new tough measures against terrorism, making it illegal to be associated with or apologize for terrorist groups, and penalizing possession of unlicensed weapons or explosives. It did not help matters when an off-the-record speech of García's, in which he lauded the revolutionary devotion of Sendero, found its way into print: "Mistaken or not, the *senderista* has what we do not have: mystique and dedication...Those people have what merits our respect and my own personal admiration because they are, whether you like it or not, militants. Fanatics they call them. I believe they have mystique and it is part of our self-criticism, *compañeros,* to know how to recognize that whoever...gives himself to death, gives his life, has mystique." The speech exemplifies the dilemma that APRA faced in trying to maintain itself as a revolutionary party while fighting a war against revolutionary leftist guerrillas.

927. Granados, Manuel Jesús. *El PCP Sendero Luminoso y su ideología.* Lima: Eapsa, 1992.

Indispensable work on Sendero's philosophical foundations. Granados, whose article "El PCP Sendero Luminoso: aproximaciones a su ideología" shocked many *limeños* when it was published in 1987, here analyzes at length Shining Path's strategy, tactics, and ideology. Granados asks a number of questions that lie at the core of the mystery surrounding Sendero. Why did it emerge? He assigns fundamental responsibility to the crisis of Peruvian society, its misery and poverty, and more directly to the incapacity of a series of governments to formulate any solution to Peru's problems. But he denies that poverty alone can cause revolutions, citing the work of political theorists on the necessity of subjective factors out of which emerge a "revolutionary conscience." In other words, Sendero and Guzmán made the revolution, using the fertile ground of impoverished Ayacucho. Sendero's response to Peru's crisis is a rational and political one, even though it does not appear to be either. It has a definite plan to take power; all its actions and positions must be understood within its Maoist context for waging people's war. Its aim is the Vietnamization of Peru. Granados examines how Sendero is operating in the liberated zones, in the universities, and in the cities, where its Popular Committees and Popular Schools are carrying out political work to advance the revolution. Granados reminds the reader that the ethnic component of Sendero, while convenient as an explanation, does not quite agree with the PCP's conception of the revolution as a political struggle between classes. Also valuable is Granados's detailed analysis of *pensamiento Gonzalo:* its characterization of Peruvian society (semifeudal and semicolonial); the revolution's objective (to destroy bureaucratic capitalism); the tasks and instruments of the revolution (the united front of peasants and bourgeois sectors, the Popular Army, and the party of the proletariat); and the all-important "line of the masses." Granados suggests several ways to combat Sendero. He believes that fighting Sendero militarily must take precedence over the massive task of fostering development in the impoverished countryside. The counterinsurgency forces' polarization of the *campo* through terror is counterproductive. Any pacification must be based on social integration, and he discusses ways to accomplish this. Granados concludes on a personal note, describing how he was born in Ayacucho, attended the University there, and how his academic life and Sendero have intertwined. Quoting Kafka, he declares that his book marks the end of 17 years of preoccupation with Sendero, and that he has burned all his materials relating to the Shining Path.

928. [Guzmán, Abimael]. *¡En defensa de la jefetura, contra la dictadura genocida! (Discurso del Presidente Gonzalo, el 24 de septiembre de 1992, en la situación histórica de su detención.)* S.n., s.l., October, 1992.

Text of the proclamation delivered by Guzmán while being exhibited in a Peruvian prison for the benefit of the press. Defiant and unrepentant, he reaffirms his faith in victory and calls on his followers to continue working to fulfill the tasks established by the third congress of the Central Committee. To this end, they are to prosecute the fourth strategic plan for people's war, and continue developing the sixth military plan for assuming power. In ringing phrases, Guzmán reiterates his view of a Peru dominated by other powers: first Spain, then England, then France, and now North American imperialism. Maoism, he declares, is incontestably leading a new wave of worldwide proletarian revolution, and he calls for the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Mao's birth. He concludes with a series of ringing phrases: "Long live the Communist Party of Peru! People's War will inevitably win! We salute the future birth of the People's Republic of Peru! We

say: Glory to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism! And finally we say: honor and glory to the Peruvian people!"

929. Hidalgo Morey, Teodoro. *Sendero Luminoso: la guerra equivocada.* 2nd ed. Lima: Editorial Monterrico, 1992.

The author, a retired colonel of infantry with 35 years of military service, was Inspector of the 31st Infantry Division in Junín, Pasco, and Huánuco departments in 1988. His book examines Sendero's ideological origins and method of operations. Hidalgo Morey criticizes Gonzalo thought for characterizing Peru as semi-feudal and semi-colonial, a judgment that might have been valid in Mariátegui's day, but has been rendered obsolete by the reforms of the 1960's and 1970's. He also faults Guzmán for deviating from classic Maoist people's war by trying to wage a simultaneous rural/urban strategy. Hidalgo Morey reviews the history of the struggle, characterizing Sendero's first two years as "the golden years," or the "easy war." Sendero had success in controlling many peasant villages through its "popular committees," but more through terror than through indoctrination. In 1983 the military assumed control of the emergency zones. Hidalgo Morey believes that the left and the press exaggerated the level of indiscriminate terror practiced by the armed forces; he sees instead a climate of confidence in peasant communities, many of which asked for counterinsurgency bases to be established in their midst. The 60 bases set up in the highlands denied territory to the guerrillas; the response from Sendero was a decline in attacks, and a move to other areas of the country. Hidalgo Morey characterizes the period since 1987 as Sendero's search for new spaces, particularly in its emphasis on urban warfare, and its growing strength in the Alto Huallaga. He concludes that in 1991, Sendero appears to be at the limits of its possibilities: stymied in its jungle expansion, and confronted politically in Lima by the "valiant activity of the organized people." Sendero has been forced to resort more and more to terrorism, which he sees as a dead end. Two factors that Hidalgo Morey highlights as contributing to Sendero's failure are the *rondas campesinas* and other self-defense organizations fighting the guerrillas, and the fact that the left and Sendero are vying for support from the same sector.

930. "In Memoriam: María Elena Moyano." *Connexions,* no.39 (1992), pp.18-19.

Text taken from an Action Alert issued in February, 1992, by Women Living Under Muslim Laws, an international solidarity network based in France. The communiqué pays homage to María Elena Moyano, murdered activist, and recounts both her life and Sendero's campaign against populist leaders in Peru. At age 24 Moyano was elected president of FEPOMUVES, the Federation of Popular Women of Villa El Salvador, which represents about 10,000 women from the Villa. The organization runs the people's kitchens *(comedores populares),* health committees, *vaso de leche* programs, income generating projects, and committees for basic education. Sendero Luminoso is particularly suspicious of women's organizations. "The deep roots of these amongst the people, their commitment to democratic values, their distance from and criticism of political violence, their capacity to create new forms of everyday life (in order to counter the adverse economic conditions in the country) are diametrically opposed to Sendero's political aims." To isolate leaders from their base, Sendero accuses popular leaders of ignominiously betraying the popular struggle. Sendero charges these women with reformism, collaboration with the government, and opportunism (since they are committed to improving their lives and those of their family and community). Sendero is even opposed to the promotion of contraception, since it diminishes the number of children women might produce for the revolution. The communiqué recounts a brief chronology of terror against women leaders, including the murders of a coordinator of one district's *vaso de leche* program and the president of the national federation of people's kitchens. The communiqué expresses solidarity with the women of Peru, pays homage to Moyano's life and struggle, and condemns and rejects the "perverse, authoritarian, and destructive political project which Sendero seeks to impose on our country."

931. Isbell, Billie Jean. "Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho." In *The Shining Path of Peru.* Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992: 59-81.

Analysis of Sendero's relations with peasants in the region of Rio Pampas, province of Cangallo, Ayacucho department. Isbell worked in the area sporadically from 1967 to 1975; while unable to return to Chuschi in the 1980's due to its location in the Ayacucho Emergency Zone, she was nevertheless able to interview people from the region who had fled to Lima. Chuschi is a sierra district without haciendas on its marginal lands. Isbell believes Sendero chose Chuschi deliberately in order to experiment with peasant communities that had strong communal structures, autonomy over their resources, and minimal ties to the capitalist market: "It is likely that Sendero viewed these communities as already having communal structures like those it would establish in

the New Peru after the revolution." Chuschi is an area in which class and ethnic strife and land boundary disputes have been present for many decades. Initially, villagers liked Sendero's education and moralization campaigns, and even approved of the execution of "public enemies" like cattle thieves. However, when eradication was proposed for people accused of minor offenses, villagers turned against the guerrillas, to the extent of asking for the establishment of a Civil Guard post. Sendero attempted to impose communal planting structures on the community without a clear knowledge of how agricultural labor and reciprocity were already organized. This was highly unpopular, as were attempts to mediate old boundary disputes with other towns and proposals to close the road and halt the weekly market. When Sendero tried to prohibit fiestas and drinking, minor clashes occurred. Isbell reports that local conflicts between villages are reflected in the degree of repression from which villages suffer from Sendero or the security forces, or the degree of support which they offer either side. Religious movements are also important, especially evangelical Protestantism. Essentially, Isbell concludes that villages supported Sendero because its short-term goals coincided with their own: to rid themselves of enemies and get better schools. But when Sendero began to establish permanent structures to reorganize society, structures that conflicted with existing communal arrangements (particularly in agriculture), it rapidly lost support. Peasants realized they had exchanged one group of *mistis* or bosses for another: "One of Sendero's major mistakes in provincial Ayacucho was to consider the peasants as an undifferentiated mass with no will of their own. SL viewed them as clay that could be molded in the service of the revolution." In fact, there has risen among many peasants a belief that Sendero is a new form of *ñaqa*, a supernatural being that feeds off the peasantry to sustain itself. Caught between the army and Sendero, many peasants have chosen to flee their homes. Others have become evangelicals, awaiting the coming of a utopian world under Christ.

932. Klaiber, Jeffrey. "The Church in Peru: Between Terrorism and Conservative Restraints." In *Conflict and Competition: The Latin American Church in a Changing Environment.* Edited by Edward L. Cleary and Hannah Stewart-Gambino. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, pp. 87-103.

Klaiber explores the Catholic Church's relations with Sendero, as part of a longer chapter on the Church's role in Peru. Unfortunately, the Church in Ayacucho was a largely conservative and moribund institution, its priests insensitive to Indian culture, poorly-trained, and prone to live in sin in violation of their vows. Of 46 parishes in the archdiocese, 23 were unattended. Sendero paid no attention to the Church in its early years of struggle, as "the conservative church in Ayacucho, which had not felt the winds of Vatican II or Medellín, simply offered no threat or challenge to its strategy." Sendero did not wish to antagonize peasants by attacking religious symbols and persons the Indians might esteem. But as it expanded beyond Ayacucho, it did begin to attack two groups that offered alternatives to Shining Path: evangelical Protestants and progressive Catholics. In August, 1981, Sendero destroyed an educational center for peasants run by the Maryknolls in Juli in the southern highlands. Other attacks on similar institutions followed,. In December, 1987, the first priest (in charge of Cáritas in Ayacucho) was murdered. When Sendero moved out of Ayacucho towards Puno or Cajamarca, it often encountered resistance and rejection, because in the southern highlands, peasants had already undergone politicization. In addition, the progressive southern Church has founded schools to train adult catechists and lay leaders: "These lay church leaders have spread the seeds of Medellín (and liberation theology) to their communities. In this situation the peasants have found religion to be a force that strengthens community cohesion and motivates them to work for community development." Many catechists also serve in the peasant *rondas*. Unfortunately, the security forces often view progressive church activities with suspicion, and committed persons are sometimes caught between the terrorists and the government.

933. Labrousse, Alain. "Peru on the Path of War." *TVI Report,* v.10, no.4 (1992): 4-13.

Chapter reprinted from his work *La drogue, l'argent et les armes.* Labrousse examines the economic and environmental conditions that have made the Upper Huallaga a "drug paradise." He describes coca cultivation and processing, and some of the consequences of cultivation on the people and natural environment of the coca-producing area. Deforestation by coca producers (followed by erosion and land-slides), and pollution are serious problems; for example, millions of liters of kerosene, acid, carbide, acetone, and toluene are thrown into the rivers of the Upper Huallaga each year. As a result, several types of animals have disappeared, and algae proliferation has changed the natural equilibrium of the environment. Extensive coca cultivation also menaces the Indian tribes of the region, as peasant cultivators move into the natives' hunting grounds, destroy their forests, and contaminate their water. The use of herbicides also menaces traditional, non-commercial Indian cultivation of coca. Labrousse summarizes the settlement of the area as "an aborted colonization." Peasants turned to growing coca once the 1968 military government

withdrew its support and subsidies from the development of the eastern *selva* and turned its attention to agrarian reform on the coast and in the highlands. He also recounts in detail the government's coca eradication efforts, and the struggle between Sendero, the army, and police. The U.S.'s anti-narcotics efforts in Colombia, aimed at destroying Pablo Escobar's system, have provoked a price collapse for coca leaf and coca paste in Peru and Bolivia. But Sendero, ignoring market forces, fixed the price artificially high, which brought about violent confrontations between guerrillas and growers. The U.S. prefers that the drug war be fought by the police; one reason is lingering resentment of the Peruvian military's ties to the USSR. The Upper Huallaga, with its extensive territory effectively outside government control and its important reserves of raw materials, including petroleum, is a key geo-political area in the struggle against Sendero.

934. Marga, J.K. *Fujimori and the Drug Trade.* S.n., s.l. 1992.

J.K. Marga, "a supporter of the International Committee to Defend the Life of Dr. Abimael Guzmán," accuses the Fujimori government of active participation in the drug trade, through the sinister person of Vladimiro Montesinos. Montesinos was cashiered from the Peruvian army after improper contacts with the CIA. Despite several international press accounts linking him with Peruvian drug traffickers, he has become Fujimori's right-hand man. Marga cites a number of foreign and Peruvian sources (including Simon Strong and Gustavo Gorriti) that strongly suggest that the CIA, through its alleged continued association with Montesinos, not only had foreknowledge of the *autogolpe,* but a hand in organizing it as well. Marga further alleges that the drug trade, now essential to sustain the Peruvian economy, is being run by Montesinos through the National Intelligence Service, which he controls. "The drug trade," says Marga, "is part of the financial and organizational structure that the *United States government* has erected to serve its interests in Peru." He continues "..not only is the drug trade is a vital part of how the Peruvian government is able to sustain the war against the insurgents in Peru--it appears to be the heart of the mechanism by which the CIA has seized direct control of political and military affairs in Peru." Marga also alleges that the CIA used sophisticated computer methods for analyzing electrical and telephone bills, which helped DICOTE trap Abimael Guzmán.

935. Marks, Tom. "Making Revolution with Shining Path." In *The Shining Path of Peru.* Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp.191-205.

Marks asks, "How can Sendero engage in widespread use of terror and still grow and expand in Peru?" Since it is an article of faith that an insurgent movement must win the "hearts and minds" of the populace, Sendero should have alienated, not won over, the populace at large. Marks finds that contrary to perceived opinion that stresses Sendero's uniqueness, it is in reality conventionally Maoist. Like all revolutionary movements, its leadership is composed of the elites of society, with its followers recruited from the masses. The leadership perceives injustice and deals with it in ideological terms; the followers, having experienced those injustices, attempt to correct immediate wrongs. Marks proposes that the heart and soul of Sendero is not peasant, but disenfranchised, landless, former middle class, Spanish-speaking mestizos. Sendero is not a *campesino* movement. The cadres are drawn from the universities; indeed, they seem to be the movement itself. Sendero uses terror carefully and selectively, even symbolically. Marks finds comparisons between Sendero and the Viet Cong productive. Terror, if used intelligently, can induce, as well as frighten people into supporting a movement: "Persuasion versus terror is an incorrect dichotomy in analyzing their methods. *Indoctrination* holds the key. The 'propaganda of the deed' is very important. The perception of strength goes a long way to being a magnet." Marks concludes that "Providing it is not abused, then, terror, while it may alienate some, also fortifies others. At the margins, it can push an undecided group into support it would not otherwise give. Once involved in the actual mechanisms of such support, the role terror originally played in the process is forgotten." On the other hand, Marks finds that terror employed by the security forces usually is ineffective or counterproductive, and undermines the legitimacy of democratic government.

936. Mauceri, Philip. "State Under Siege: The Weak State and Lower Class Mobilization in Peru, 1973-1990. MA thesis, Columbia University, 1992.

Mauceri argues that the lower class sector mobilization that has taken place in Peru since the early 1970's has produced new forms of radical political behavior and organization, forms that remain unincorporated by the state into the political sphere. Examining Lima shantytowns and their relationship to IU and APRA, he believes that strong anti-system opposition has led to polarization and a weakened Peruvian state. It is this weakened state that has been formulating counterinsurgency strategies, while isolated from a large part of civil society. Mauceri believes that

in this environment, Sendero's Maoist fundamentalism has resonance among some lower class sectors, due in large part to the long process of radicalization in the previous decades. The ten-fold rise in violence between 1980 and 1987 indicates that its radical message has found adherents among many in these sectors.

937. McClintock, Cynthia. "Theories of Revolution and the Case of Peru." In *The Shining Path of Peru.* Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 225-240.

McClintock asks one question: "Is a Shining Path victory possible?" She examines the question from two perspectives: that of mainstream scholars, primarily North American analysts, and of Sendero itself. Conventionally, Peru does not fit the model scholars have established of 20th-century Latin American revolutions: societies governed by longstanding personalistic dictators, against whom revolutionaries were able to rally popular sentiment. But several new variables--the international context of superpower rivalry and world capitalist penetration, and the importance of revolutionary ideology--have made this model suspect. Peru is a democracy, and has held three elections since 1980, with high rates of voter participation and a relatively unfettered press. Yet in Sendero's analysis, Peru is semifeudal and semicapitalist; within that context, elections are meaningless farces in a fascist state. The repeated failures of elected governments since the end of military rule in 1980 has soured many people on formal democracy. In addition, U.S. concern over Peru and levels of aid are far lower than those for El Salvador in the same period. McClintock concludes that the revolutionary models of scholars may be less applicable to Peru than to Mexico, Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Peru's formal democracy precludes the formation of broad, anti-regime coalitions; Sendero's ultra-Maoist violence precludes it from developing broadly-based popular support. Still, a Shining Path victory cannot be ruled out, particularly in the face of economic crisis, declining living conditions, the collapse of public services, and epidemic cholera, all of which have diminished faith in the effectiveness and authority of the government.

938. McCormick, Gordon H. *From the Sierra to the Cities: The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path.* Santa Monica: RAND, 1992.

Sendero's program for victory rests on a strategy to surround the capital from without, while undermining it from within. The movement, McCormick argues, is much closer to accomplishing the former than the latter. After eleven years of political work, it is clear that Sendero has not yet been able to mobilize a network of support in Lima like the one it has established in many parts of rural Peru. However, since it began to alter its rural-based strategy in the mid-1980's Sendero has paid much more attention to its metropolitan organization. First, it has stepped up substantially the number of actions carried out in Lima; second, and more important, it changed from simple armed propaganda to a long-term strategy of building of an enduring base of popular support, backed up by grass-roots organizations. Sendero has expanded its urban front organizations beyond the universities, to infiltrate trade unions and popular groups in the extensive slums surrounding the capital.

McCormick examines the urban guerrilla experience in Latin America, suggesting that repeated failures were due to a failure to build a solid political network prior to initiating armed action. Sendero, he says, cannot be accused of neglecting this aspect of revolutionary work. He reviews Sendero's record in the city, utilizing RAND's Andean Political Violence Data Base to establish a pattern of *senderista* actions. Beginning in 1985, Sendero, which until then had shown little interest in front groups as a tool of mass organization, began to establish a number of such groups in and around Lima. The massacre of *senderistas* in Lima in June, 1986 appears to have been a major blow to the metropolitan organization, which had apparently been directed from prison. Attacks dropped sharply after this major loss of fighters. However, by 1989 Sendero's campaign was moving forward again. Attacks rose sharply, and the movement concentrated on establishing new front organizations ("generated organisms"), such as the Committee of the Families of Political Prisoners of War, the Popular Women's Movement, the Association of Democratic Lawyers, and the Association of Democratic Students. Sendero also concentrated on penetrating existing organizations and capturing "regime-oriented" groups. Both are either neutralized or transformed into guerrilla support.

McCormick uses statistical evidence to show that Sendero is gaining ground in the crucial central highlands adjacent to the capital, in order to physically isolate Lima. The capital's dependence upon the interior for food and hydroelectric power make it highly vulnerable to blockade. Sendero's actions in the sierra in this context can be seen as a prelude and a precondition to enveloping Lima. Ideally, Sendero would like to see its metropolitan organization develop to the point where it can call for a general uprising. But failing this, its ability to isolate the capital from the rest of the country, and to sow terror with car-bombs and ambushes will ultimately bring

a break-down of civil order. The regime, in these circumstances, would not have to be pushed from power; it would collapse of its own accord. Mounting political unrest, food shortages, a sense of impending doom all work to Sendero's advantage. Its goal is to see that such events escalated until the central government flees or is driven from office; Sendero would then be in a position to pick up the pieces. The Shining Path, McCormick believes, is methodically moving to build this option, inside and outside the capital. Whether it succeeds rests almost entirely with SL; the government of Peru has shown little understanding of the insurgency and even less ability to stop it.

939. Montoya, Rodrigo. *Al borde del naufragio (democracia, violencia y problema étnico en el Perú).* Lima: Cuadernos del Sur, 1992.

A series of disparate essays dealing with the problem of ethnic identity in Peru, with particular regard to questions of democracy and violence. In "La ciudadanía étnica como un nuevo fragmento en la utopía de la libertad," Montoya reviews the growth of ethnic political consciousness in Peru since the founding of the Republic. He points out that Sendero considers the organization of "native communities" as part of the "old State," and that its relations (as well as those of MRTA) with the Asháninkas have been generally antagonistic, although both groups have many Indians voluntarily within their ranks. In "Violencia política y grupos étnicos," Montoya looks at the problem of political violence in Peru as a complex question. Many sustain that "structural violence" is a long-standing phenomenon, pointing to a heritage of colonial violence between conquerors and conquered. Now the PCP and MRTA have taken up arms against the State, precipitating another wave of violence. Montoya suggests that this violence be viewed at many levels: from the political arena at the top, to the middle-level struggle between armed groups and the military, to the bottom level of "whites" versus "Indians": a battle between rich and poor, and between first and second-class citizens. Racism and economic discrimination are decisive factors in maintaining open wounds in Peruvian society. The war, largely "contained" to the highlands between 1980 and 1990, has been recently widened: the car-bombs that exploded in Miraflores in July, 1992, the "symbolic *barrio* " of official, colonial, *limeño* power, marked a direct assault on the old order. Montoya, while rejecting early interpretations of Sendero as "indigenous," "messianic," or "indianist," stresses that *Tuta puriq* ("they who travel by night," as *senderistas* are called in Quechua) cannot be separated from the ethnic question in Peru. Ironically, a local leader declared that one of Shining Path's goals will be to eliminate the use of Quechua in Peru should it win. Both left and right equally seem to regard Quechua, and by inference, the Indians of Peru, as obstacles to their divergent visions of modernity and progress.

940. Palmer, David Scott. "Conclusion: The View From the Windows." In *The Shining Path of Peru.* Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 241-247.

Palmer ends his edited volume with a brief wrap-up: is there any consensus on Shining Path's viability and its threat to Peru? After posing a number of open-ended questions, he draws some conclusions. Among them is the observation that Sendero is derived from the university, not the peasantry, and is provincial, originating in one particular Peruvian province. It is therefore largely intellectual, ideological, and biased in interpreting Peruvian society in light of Ayacuchan conditions. Sendero's main motivations are political, not military; all its actions are undertaken for their political impact. Sendero makes its least progress where strong regional or national political or social organizations already exist. Palmer reminds us that Sendero is the creation of Abimael Guzmán: "the movement is indelibly stamped with his personality-- dogmatic, uncompromising, totally committed, diligent, compulsive, dominating." Palmer prophetically goes on to state "The movement is also most likely vulnerable should he be removed." But the center's inattention towards Sendero during its first crucial early years of armed struggle meant that the insurgency gained valuable time to learn. Now the weakened condition of the Peruvian state and economy means that there will *not* be forthcoming the necessary economic and social assistance necessary to defeat Sendero in the near future.

941. Palmer, David Scott. "The Shining Path in Peru: Insurgency and the Drug Problem." In *Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World.* Edited by Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, pp.150-170.

After a succinct summary of Sendero's origins and evolution, Palmer assesses the movement utilizing an analytical framework developed by Max G. Mawaring (outlined in an earlier chapter). The criteria Manwaring applies to the examination of an insurgency are legitimacy, organization for unity of effort, external support for the targeted government and the insurgency, intelligence, discipline and capabilities of the armed forces. Palmer, after discussing each at length,

concludes that Shining Path is clearly superior only in organization now that the government of Peru under Fujimori has reintegrated the country back into the international financial and foreign assistance communities. The government clearly had the edge in legitimacy until Fujimori's *autogolpe* undermined it. Both the military and Sendero have had successes in utilizing intelligence; but the government has had problems in infiltrating Sendero, and Sendero has exaggerated the extent of its intelligence network ("the revolution has a thousand eyes and ears"). Palmer considers the Peruvian armed forces to be generally well-trained and prepared, but points to problems in equipment, mission orientation, lack of command continuity, and haphazard operating tactics. The key factor in coming years will be the government's ability to regenerate economic growth and government services to give more tangible dimensions to the abstract legitimacy it maintained up until the coup, which Palmer considers a grave miscalculation on Fujimori's part. If this reduces rather than increases governmental legitimacy and authority, then the advantage will shift to Sendero.

942. Pérez Mundaca, José. "Poder, violencia y campesinado en Cajamarca: el case de la microregión central." In *Perú: el problema agrario en debate/SEPIA IV.* Edited by Carlos Iván Degregori, Javier Escobal, and Benjamín Marticorer. Lima: Universidad Nacional de la Amazona Peruana, Seminario Permanente de Investigación Agraria, 1992, pp.459-485.

Investigation of violence in a "microregion": the old province of Chota in Cajamarca department. Chota had a long history of political violence in the 19th century, as well as a longstanding problem of cattle rustling. Pérez Mundaca examines the social and economic structure of the microregion. *Rondas* that were formed initially to battle theft became committees, then *ronda* federations. Political parties like APRA, Acción Popular, and leftist groups sought to influence and enlist the various *rondas* in their ranks. In the early years of the 1980's a group of students from the University of Cajamarca tried to rally peasant support for Sendero, but were rebuffed by the *rondas.* In 1984 a noted *senderista* leader tried again, and was obliged to flee the area. While Sendero had a presence in the department's capital, the city had no social, economic, or political relations with Chota. The Sendero militants who tried to infiltrate Chota were outsiders. Chota was an area of small-holdings, with no large landed estates and little extremes of poverty. The peasants had a high degree of cohesion, and their *rondas* had been originally organized on the basis of the defense of private property. For all these reasons Sendero made little headway in Chota. In contrast to Chota, Sendero had full control of Cajabamba, an area in the extreme south of Cajamarca. Here Sendero's proselytizing campaign was carefully planned, headed by top leaders (Osmán Morote B.), and was better received. Cajabamba is a region with large properties (CAP's and some estates not effected by agrarian reform), more social stratification, less peasant organization, and stronger ties between Sendero and local peasants than Chota. Pérez Mundaca concludes with some observations on the factors that aid or hinder Sendero's success in a given area: strong peasant cohesion, "antiterrorist attitudes," peasant organizations, etc. If these factors are not present, as in the case of Chota, Sendero may simply resort to violence to gain entrance, as it has done in areas it considers strategic, like Huancayo and the coastal valleys near Lima.

943. *Perú 1992: la democracia en cuestión.* Lima: Centro Norte Sur, Universidad de Miami; Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales; Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1992.

This book is the result of a seminar entitled "The Peruvian Crisis: Internal Reactions and International Responses," held May 28-29, 1992, at the University of Miami's North-South Center. Panels examined the *autogolpe* of April 5, and the response of Washington and international financial bodies to the coup. One panel, "Sendero Luminoso, narcotráfico, las políticas de contrainsurgencia y derechos humanos," featured Gustavo Gorriti and Javier Diez Canseco. Gorriti, noting that Marx divided history into two parts, drama/comedy and farce, succinctly summarizes Sendero's rise. Why, he asks, has Sendero advanced so far? It is the first insurrection in this hemisphere planned, developed, and executed in accordance with a consistent strategy, created out of Maoist doctrine and the concept of prolonged people's war. Also, like a new virus, neither the State nor society was prepared for it; after the war began, it was fought with punitive and repressive, rather than political measures. The *senderista* revolution is basically an administrative insurrection guided by politics. It seeks to control territory through the creation of base organizations. And, of course, its strong discipline, remarkable organization, fanaticism, and long-term strategic vision are also important assets. Gorriti contrasts the approaches of the Belaúnde, García, and Fujimori governments in fighting Sendero; Fujimori's decision to arm the *rondas* with loans of government weapons, and to consider any excesses committed by security forces in the emergency zones as "acts of service," represent the positive and negative aspects of his counterinsurgency philosophy.

Diez Canseco takes an even longer view of the present crisis. In his opinion, Peruvian society is a system that is unable to respond to the basic needs of a majority of the population; such an exclusionary society promotes the existence of Sendero Luminoso. Shining Path, on the other hand, has a political-ideological agenda, but one that requires a general crisis in the country in order to be realized. Sendero, declares Diez Canseco, "refeeds" the crisis, because it exacerbates the wretched economic situation. Still, Peru has a political system that has educated the population to the idea that force is the principle factor in politics. What Sendero has done is to fill a vacuum that the state has allowed to develop. In spite of its "Pol Pot" fundamentalism, Sendero represents a certain degree of order, and a response, within its conception of values, to the crisis that afflicts Peru today.

944. Poole, Deborah and Gerardo Rénique. "Perdiendo de vista al Perú: réplica a Orin Starn." *Allpanchis,* no.39 (Primer semester 1992): 73-92.

In replying to Orin Starn's "Missing the Revolution," Poole and Rénqiue accuse him of "losing sight of Peru." He is, they write, more interested in moral denunciations of "incorrect" colleagues than in understanding the discursive and historical complexities of Peruvian society. They charge him with ignoring the existing literature on peasant ethnicity, migration, and economy that could aid in better understanding peasant society. In their reply, they state, they do not intend to correct Starn's bibliographic omissions; nevertheless, Poole and Rénqiue include in their article an extremely long list of books and articles they claim refute Starn's arguments. They charge him with simplifying the complex question of what constitutes "Andeanism"; of failing to place his Andeanist discourse within an historical context; of not considering the organized left in Peru; of elitism and moral authoritarianism; and of taking a moral "high ground" in regards to Andean anthropology. Starn, they charge, has lost sight of the particular discursive ethnic and political processes that constitute the present political violence in Peru.

Following Poole and Rénqiue are further critiques by Linda J. Seligman ("Es más facil destruir que crear," pp.93-101); Mark Thurner ("¿Una conclusión resulta prematura?," pp.103-107); Frank Saloman ("Una polémica de once años de antiguedad," pp.109-112); and Juan Ansión ("Acerca de un irritante debate entre antropólogos del norte," pp.113-122). While all criticize Starn, Ansión's "Concerning an irritating debate among northern anthropologists" addresses directly the relationship between Sendero and the Andean peasantry, and says to his American colleagues "learn to dialogue with those who know the historical and social context well because we live here. If you do this, you will be less mistaken..." Starn replies with some final comments (pp.123-129), in which he concedes some gaps in his arguments, defends the validity of his thesis, and takes a swipe at Poole and Rénique for some "elitism" of their own and for their tendency to polarize discussion and fling mud at other scholars.

945. Poole, Deborah and Gerardo Rénique. *Peru: Time of Fear.* London: Latin American Bureau, 1992.

Poole and Rénique, authors of a stinging critique of the work of prominent U.S. Senderologists (see no.825), have written a dense, detailed, informative, and passionate examination of Peru "in the time of fear." Although thematic, rather than chronological in structure, this work is probably the most comprehensive, if openly partisan, work on Peru and the Shining Path yet written. Poole and Rénique trace the origins and development of Sendero, outlining the structure and nature of "people's war" and examining the philosophy of "Gonzalo Thought" through the movement's own primary documents. In "Time of Fear," the authors give a detailed account of the war, with particular emphasis on Sendero's rural campaigns in Puno, Pasco, and Junín, and its urban strategy to capture Lima and its industrial zones and *pueblos jóvenes.* The authors then go back in mid-book ("A Nation for the Few") to review the political and economic history of Peru following its disastrous defeat by Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883). Immediately following are chapters on Alberto Fujimori's government ("The Neo-liberal Revolution"), and the impact of the coca trade on Peru's domestic and international relations ("Coca Capitalism"). Haya de la Torre, APRA, García, and Fujimori all garner their share of criticism for their alleged failures to work for the best interests of the Peruvian people; sharing the stage as principal villains are foreign (especially U.S.) capital and the Peruvian elites. The United States is held particularly responsible for the rise of the "new El Dorado" in what the authors call the "Huallaga Republic" [of Sendero]: "By invoking the menace of Latin 'drug lords' and 'foreign drugs,' the Reagan and Bush administrations have presented themselves as defenders of western democracy and civilization. This ideological posture can do little, however, to turn the tide of rising unemployment, industrial recession, poverty and social polarization that has resulted from their own economic policies and that provides the environment in which the drug economy thrives. At one extreme of this economy are the US working-class Latino and black youth who have been marginalized by Reaganomics and racism. At the other, are the Andean peasants whose economies

have been destroyed by US-backed IMF austerity measures and neo-liberal reforms. For both these disenfranchised populations, the drug economy offers their only source of security." Poole and Rénique make it clear from the outset that their sympathies lie with "the people" of Peru, and against the violence of paramilitary organizations, the police and military, and their declared enemy, Sendero Luminoso. They conclude their chapter "War on Democracy" by writing, "In their struggle to define a solution to their country's many-faceted crisis, Peruvians will have to steer a course between the competing authoritarian projects of Shining Path and a state willing to sacrifice democratic principles and the welfare of the majority to the debt payments and profits demanded by a handful of multinational banks."

946. *Refuting the "Big Lies" About Peru.* S.n., s.l., October 1992.

Submitted by a supporter of the International Committee to Defend the Life of Dr. Abimael Guzmán, this pamphlet challenges the reader: "Paper will accept anything that is printed on it and a television set will simply repeat whatever it receives, but thinking people shouldn't." The anonymous author then goes on to "prove" the absurdity of four sloppy fabrications: that Sendero is responsible for 40,000 deaths; that the rebels are financing their war through narcotics traffic; that Abimael Guzmán is a traitor; and that the PCP is terrorist. The government's own figures for 12 years of war in Peru add up to less than 25,000, and most of these casualties were admittedly inflicted by the government upon the peasants. The government itself is in the drug trade up to its eyeballs, says the author; it would have fallen long ago if not for coca dollars, which represent at least half the nation's exports. Ex-president García is working with the notorious Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the world's biggest money-laundering and drug finance center, itself an instrument of the CIA. As for the treason charge against Guzmán, was it not Fujimori who launched his own military coup? He has turned the economy over to the IMF, the armed forces to the U.S. military, and the police to the CIA. So who is the traitor to Peru? As for terror, one might ask how the PCP and its army managed to grow from a small handful to between 5,000 and 25,000? "Can terror ever really create and keep together an army, especially when another army--and another state--is already in control?" The government's army is conscripted and plagued by desertions; the People's Guerrilla Army is, by all accounts, growing by leaps and bounds. What explains the PCP's spectacular success? It is the ardent and growing support from Peruvian peasants, shanty-town dwellers, the "Indians" and "cholos," and the invisible masses. What else can explain the undeniable fact that millions look to Abimael Guzmán and the PCP? Isn't it really Fujimori & Company, and their foreign backers, who have little to rely on but terror? And isn't this "trial" being staged not only to silence Guzmán and his party, but to terrorize all in Peru who cannot accept the future Fujimori represents?

947. Rénique, José Luis. "Violencia y democracia en la sierra sur del Perú: Puno en la era post-velasquista." In *Perú: el problema agrario en debate/SEPIA IV.* Edited by Carlos Iván Degregori, Javier Escobal, and Benjamín Marticorer. Lima: Universidad Nacional de la Amazona Peruana, Seminario Permanente de Investigación Agraria, 1992, pp.441-458.

Puno was once seen as a remote and immutable place, its haciendas and communities unchanged since colonial times. But since the 1960's Puno has undergone significant transformation in its social, economic, and agrarian structures. Agrarian reform was only partially realized, leaving a legacy of frustration. Rénique examines what happened to Puno after the end of Velasco's reformist military regime. Much of the region's rural conflict is directly related to the *velasquista* agrarian reform, which established associated enterprises that needed technical assistance and created a new class of landed proprietors, the cooperatives' directors. Thanks to radical parties (like the Trotskyist PUM), church groups and other NGO's, the peasantry's organization and politicization was well-advanced by the time Sendero began its first incursions into the department. Sendero looked for a role as protagonist in Puno, concentrating its efforts in two directions: it tried to preempt PUM in mass land movements, and it killed government officials and representatives of the PAP. Between 1986 and 1987 a complicated three-sided struggle developed in Puno, between Sendero, the "pro-*comunero* block," and an alliance of agricultural enterprise managers and technocracts. Rénqiue traces the fortunes of the Puno peasant confederation (FDCP), the PUM, and Sendero's efforts to reestablish itself in Puno after its initial rebuff. The PCP sent in a popular guerrilla army column, murdered policemen and a judge, and reconstituted its support bases in rural areas. Sendero sought to break the fragile links established between the church, the PUM, and peasant and community groups. At the same time, violence came from other sources: both the security forces and agricultural "gentry" attacked the peasants for different reasons. Rénique shows how the complex tensions in Puno predated the struggle with Sendero, and how different visions of Puno's future proceed from radically different ideological viewpoints.

948. Rodríguez, Yolanda. "Los actores sociales y la violencia política en el Perú." *Allpanchis,* no.39 (Primer semestre 1992): 131-154.

Examination of political violence in Puno. Rodríguez traces Sendero's entrance into Puno in the early 1980's, its recruitment of local forces among communities, its confrontation with other leftist parties and peasant confederations, and its push to develop a "mass front," infiltrating unions, student groups, and *campesino* organizations. By October, 1990, Puno's provinces were declared in a state of emergency, and many districts lacked any sort of state authority. Rodríguez examines how Puno's people reacted to violence, and whether their participation in popular committees and armed actions was coerced or voluntary. After ten years in Puno, she writes, it is difficult to still consider Sendero as an external agent. Sendero has sought to legitimate itself, to carry out actions designed to "benefit" the population, like punishing abuses and liquidating thieves and cattle rustlers. Rodríguez looks at the response of peasants, their development of self-defense groups (first organized to fight cattle theft), their uncomfortable position between *senderista* terror and state repression, and their ambivalent attitude towards Shining Path. One leftist mayor called them *"compañeros* risen in arms" and "terrorists" simultaneously. Rodríguez concludes with a look at Sendero's appeal to the young of Puno; a stratum of upwardly-mobile but frustrated peasant youth resembles Ayacucho's young in the 1970's.

949. Rudolph, James D. *Peru: The Evolution of a Crisis.* Westport: Praeger Publishers/Hoover Institution, 1992.

Solid and detailed analysis of Peru's steady political and economic spiral downwards. Rudolph integrates the story of Sendero's revolution into a broader framework within which he examines the political trajectory of the nation from independence onwards. After short preliminary sections detailing the colonial and national background of the nation, Rudolph describes military reformism (1968-1980), the "Belaúnde reprise," and the rise and fall of Alán García. His summary of Sendero is succinct and well-informed. Rudolph argues that Sendero's rural assassination and terror campaign was not, as some have insisted, designed to create a power vacuum in the countryside that it could fill. The agrarian reforms of the Velasco military government had already finished off a declining *hacendado* class: "In large part, then, a power vacuum was already a fact of rural Peru when Sendero came onto the scene. Thus a more suitable analogy might be that Sendero filled a power vacuum throughout much of the Peruvian *sierra,* and that the war represents the government's effort to recover its lost authority." Rudolph concludes that few Peruvians really believe that Sendero will take power in the near future, but the insurgency is a nagging reminder of the gravity of their crisis. *La crisis* is comprised of long-standing fiscal irresponsibility, long-term foreign debt, *desgobierno* going back to the War of the Pacific, and a profound social malaise dating back at least as far as the Spanish conquest, and the subsequent failure of European and Indian societies to integrate under Spanish rule or to form a collective national identity since independence. He quotes a Peruvian sociologist to the effect that Peru's traditional oligarchical social order collapsed during the second half of the 20th century, but has not generated a replacement. The result has been widespread chaos, with the fixed rules of social conduct replaced by the law of the jungle.

950. Schulz, Donald E. and Gabriel Marcella. *Strategy for Peru: A Political-Military Dialogue: Special Report.* Carlisle Barracks, PA.: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

Special report on a roundtable held June 11, 1992 at the U.S. Army War College. Among the participants were David Scott Palmer, Cynthia McClintock, Michael Smith, John Fishel, other social scientists, and a number of serving and retired U.S. army officers. The conference examined challenges to U.S. national interests and objectives, Sendero and MRTA, counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics, coca, the socio-economic and political crisis in Peru, the Peruvian crisis in a regional context, and the U.S. economic, political, and military responses. Each section includes summaries of presentations and ensuing discussions. A summary of the whole conference notes that disagreements were more interesting than agreements; all conceded that Peru was a basket case, but whether it was in the United States's interests to become more deeply involved was a matter of debate. Even more divisive was the question of how the U.S. should treat Peru. Should a traditional security approach be tried? Or is this now discredited with Congress? All the participants felt Sendero was a problem, but disagreed on the magnitude and importance of its threat. The chances for a victory by Sendero were assessed as low, but it was agreed that in the event it won, it is unlikely that the movement will be limited to Peru. Sendero's actions seem to be less important than those of the government; it is less a matter of the guerrillas winning the war than of the state losing it.

951. Selbin, Eric. *Modern Latin American Revolutions.* Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Selbin examines several "modern" (i.e., "second generation") revolutions in Latin America, seeking to link four selected social revolutionary movements to a model of institutionalization and consolidation. Although the four movements Selbin selects are Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada, at the end of his work he contrasts Shining Path with his own paradigm. Selbin emphasizes Sendero's disdain for internal or external allies, its utter rejection of compromise, and its enshrinement of violence. Sendero has been able to control parts of Peru, including some of the shanty-towns around Lima, and is particularly strong in its home base of Ayacucho. Where it has control, it has made some attempt to institutionalize a system of government, including education, security, and taxes. But the movement has made no real effort to "win hearts and minds," except through terror. Sendero, Selbin writes, appears to believe in the salutary effect of heightened contradictions and immersion in the revolutionary struggle. It has made no effort to create trust or to develop a sense of opportunity; its vision of the future is vague, perhaps intentionally so. Selbin judges that Sendero, like the revolutionaries in El Salvador, has achieved stalemate with the government, but unlike the FMLN-FDR, this has not prompted it to consider negotiations. Indeed, the recent Fujimori *autogolpe* should strengthen Sendero's efforts to "heighten the contradictions" of Peruvian society and plunge the country deeper into crisis.

952. *The Shining Path of Peru.* Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

The first collection of scholarly essays on Sendero to appear in English, Palmer's book is a crucial resource for an understanding of Shining Path. With contributions by Degregori, McClintock, Smith, Isbell, Tarazona-Sevillano, Gorriti, and others, many different aspects of the war, including political theory, peasant responses, military strategy, *narcotráfico*, organization, and intra-left relations are thoroughly explored. Palmer has brought together in one volume some of the best Peruvian and foreign Senderologists, who have had the opportunity to bring their ideas up to date. (Some of the chapters are revised reprints of previously published articles.) Each chapter is individually annotated here.

953. Smith, Michael. *Entre dos fuegos: ONG, desarrollo rural y violencia política.* Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1992.

Smith examines efforts to transform Third World rural zones through grass-roots development groups and organizations--what he calls *Organizaciones de Apoyo a Grupos de Base* (OAGB). Peru has seen a significant growth of these organizations in the preceding decades. Their aim is to focus state development efforts at the local level, and to attempt to provide continuity through political changes and bureaucratic obstacles. In nations like Peru, El Salvador, and Colombia, the most intensive efforts have been made in the poorest and most underdeveloped areas. Ironically, the OAGB's have been under fire from both guerrillas and narcotics traffickers (who view them as obstacles or competitors), and from police and military forces, (who consider them as destabilizing agents, or covert supporters of the guerrillas). Smith looks at some 400 such centers in Peru, in the *barrios populares* and rural communities, working with women, street vendors, household domestics, and provincial and municipal governments. He examines in detail two particular OAGB's: the agricultural station Allpachka in Ayacucho in 1982, and the rural development program of IER Waqrani in Puno in 1989. Run by the University in Ayacucho and the Catholic Church respectively, each ran afoul not only of Sendero, but also of regional interests and the security forces. These conflicts preceeded attacks by the guerrillas. He concludes that development has to be truly focused locally, and must take into account micro-regional differences in Andean grass-roots groups. Nevertheless, these OAGB's must be part of larger structures; isolated, they stand little chance of resisting violence. Coordination, communication, and sharing of information are key elements to success. Searching for areas where OAGB's can work without the threat of violence is futile; they are needed most in the places where insurrection has broken out.

954. Smith, Michael L. "Shining Path's Urban Strategy: Ate Vitarte." In *The Shining Path of Peru.* Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 127-147.

Smith analyzes Ate Vitarte, a district in the eastern Lima metropolitan area. Ate Vitarte is part of the capital's traditional industrial corridor, and has a clear strategic value: it is the chokepoint for Lima's water and electrical supplies, and its thermal and hydroelectric plants provide some 60% of Lima's power. Crucial minerals, metals, and foodstuffs pass along its transportation links. The Central Highway was the focus of intense and radical unionizing activity in the 1960's and 1970's; Abimael Guzmán himself spent his last four years "above ground" at La

Cantuta, a nearby national teacher's college, although Sendero did not participate in the area's union or political activity. Sendero's random urban bombings and blackouts in the early 1980's belie the importance it placed on Lima. The PCP-SL's Metropolitan Bureau is on an equal footing with the Principal Regional Committee in Ayacucho, and is charged with urban operations (bombings, arsons, and painting slogans), protecting Guzmán and the party leaders, and punishing traitors and dissidents. Urban areas were divided into zones, sectors, subsectors, and cells, each with political and military cadres. Sendero worked among migrants who fled rural areas because of violence. The squatter's settlements were laboratories for organizing and recruiting. Sendero also managed to infiltrate labor unions along the Central Highway, using the longstanding tolerance of radical movements within the unions to gain a foothold. Sendero assassinated rival labor leaders, especially labor relations managers (between January and May 1989, it killed more than 51 union leaders nationwide). Its aim was to prolong and intensify labor disputes, not resolve them: "It pushed strikes for the sake of the conflict...in effect, Sendero wanted to put plant floors on permanent strike standing." Sendero has also pushed other grass-roots efforts, placing 100 teachers in the area's shantytown schools. In addition, it has worked intensively among cultural clubs, folk dance, musical, and theater groups, as well as resident and barrio organizations. It infiltrated soup kitchens, school milk programs, evangelical groups, and political parties; this meant that there were no free forums where people could debate without being noticed by *senderista* spies and sympathizers. In 1989 Sendero began using the armed strike as an urban tactic. The media and analysts described them as failures, but Sendero found private bus federations (which control 90% of Lima's public transport), to be vulnerable and unwilling to risk their vehicles. Sendero also found that it could reduce Lima's food supply for brief periods. Sendero was aided by the continual erosion of the state's public presence in urban zones: the government lost control in many neighborhoods and could not expand its services to meet the city's explosive growth. Schoolteachers were not paid; police did not patrol the streets; corruption flourished. Sendero has found it easy to move into the vacuum the state left.

955. Soberón Garrido, Ricardo. "Narcotráfico, violencia y campesinado en la selva alta." In *Perú: el problema agrario en debate/SEPIA IV.* Edited by Carlos Iván Degregori, Javier Escobal, and Benjamín Marticorer. Lima: Universidad Nacional de la Amazona Peruana, Seminario Permanente de Investigación Agraria, 1992, pp.561-577.

Peru and Bolivia produce 90% of the world's coca. The expansion of coca production is a product of international demand, and of the collapse of the government's development policies. Soberón Garrido traces the relationship between the jungle and highlands over the course of time; economic links between the two zones predated the Spaniards. In the 20th century, colonization of the *selva* became enmeshed in national politics. Now coca is critical to the national economy, but the *campesinos,* caught between the *narcotraficantes* and the police, have been hit by constantly-falling prices for their crop. In 1983 Sendero decided to move into the coca-producing areas to build bases of support. This initiated a multifaceted conflict between Indians, producers, *narcos,* the army, police, and two guerrilla armies. Soberón Garrido summarizes the growing struggle, marked by internationalization of the drug war and increasing U.S. participation. The government is faced by simultaneous wars in the same terrain, one against narcotics and the other against terrorism. Under Fujimori a *convenio* (accord) with the United States has supposedly produced agreement on coca eradication. But the Peruvian peasant Federation (CCP) called for a rejection of the agreement, and other agencies decreed coca a national patrimony, and a natural resource. The only solutions are development and pacification, but at the present, neither the intervention of the UN, the economic "generosity" of industrialized nations, nor the paper changes in the government's antisubversion policies, can achieve that solution.

956. Starn, Orin. "Antropología andina, 'andinismo' y Sendero Luminoso." *Allpanhcis*, no.39 (Primer semester 1992): 15-71.

Translation of his 1991 essay "Missing the Revolution" in *Cultural Anthropology* (see no. 831); Starn has added a few paragraphs to bring readers up to date. He concludes that a circle has been completed in Andean studies: a discourse on Andeanism by outsiders has become how not only the rest of the world, but the Andean people themselves see their culture. During this century, idealized sentiments about an Incaic heritage, harmony with nature, and communal ethics have filtered through the Andes by means of scholarly texts, radio, television, and political discourse. Those who study Andean culture are always connected to the people they study; "we" and "they" are now linked by the most subtle of connections. Starn's "Missing the Revolution" is critiqued by Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique; see no.944.

957. Starn, Orin. "New Literature on Peru's Sendero Luminoso." *Latin American Research Review,* v.27, no.2 (1992): 212-226.

Excellent review essay on the literature of Sendero. *Senderología* is reaching maturity as the revolution heads into its second decade; here Starn examines the field at large. Although the term "Senderology" might seem to suggest a tightly knit discourse, early Senderology was a patchwork of different and often contradictory theories. Sendero-watchers operated from a gamut of political and intellectual presuppositions. Also contributing to multiple understandings was Sendero's own silence and the dangers of conducting field research in Peru: "The initial dearth of good information gave scholars especially free reign in constructing their own interpretations of Guzmán's cultural-revolution-style Maoist party. Sendero was depicted as, among other things, a peasant rebellion, an ethnic-based Indian uprising, and an insurrection of Peru's Andean periphery against the coastal center." Starn gives center stage to the work of the two most eminent Peruvians in the field: Degregori and Gorriti. Degregori's work, especially his *Surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso* established Sendero as primarily a strong vanguard faction characterized by tight organization and planned use of mass violence, and not as a broad-based movement. This interpretation basically destroyed two popular theories: McClintock's portrayal of Sendero as a peasant rebellion, and the image of Sendero as an Andean millenarian movement, an idea whose proponents included Ansión, Flores Galindo, Macera, and Ossio. (Starn admits indulging in some Andeanism of his own: e.g., ascribing the choice of May 17 for ILA because of its resonance with the execution of the neo-Inca rebel Tupac Amaru II in 1871.) While Starn mildly criticizes Degregori (along with other senderologists) for neglecting the critical role of women in the movement, he finds his work compelling. He also praises Gorriti's *Sendero: historia de la guerra milenaria en el Perú* for its vivid portrait of Guzmán and its exploration of Sendero's extreme violence. Turning to the politics of Senderology, Starn finds that virtually all scholars, especially those in the U.S., are repelled by Sendero, but are loathe to align themselves with a Peruvian government that has fought the war in the most bloody and callous way possible. Can Senderologists play a role, Starn asks, in tempering the brutality of the counterinsurgency? Unlike the struggles in El Salvador or Nicaragua, few care to take sides. One U.S. scholar, Carol Andreas, is allied with Sendero. The two most prominent American senderologists, Palmer and McClintock, were accused of being apologists for U.S. foreign policy by Poole and Rénique, whose essay in *The Bulletin of Latin American Research* is characterized as a "smart but nasty diatribe." Starn concedes that American Senderology tends to gloss over the pain and suffering of so many Peruvians in the distancing language of scientific objectivism. He concludes with some speculations on the future of the war. He contrasts Gorriti, who stresses Sendero's strength, with Degregori, who emphasizes Sendero's limits. After critiquing both positions, he draws disheartening conclusions. Sendero, which absolutely rejects any negotiation, is not like Colombia's M-19 movement. Authoritarian government, economic hardship, impoverishment and internal displacement would seem to be the future for millions; what Quechua-speakers call *manchay tiempo,* the time of fear, will continue.

958. Strong, Simon. *Shining Path: The World's Deadliest Revolutionary Force.* London: HarperCollins, 1992.

Strong lived in Peru and worked as a correspondent for various newspapers for four years. His work, the first full-length book on Sendero in English, is written with a biting, journalistic style that keeps the reader interested. Nevertheless, Strong's highly opinionated judgments have stirred considerable controversy, not least in Peru, where his fundamental analysis of Sendero has been attacked as misguided, wrong, even racist. Strong is at his best in chapters like "Rise of the Red Sun," in which he builds a detailed and penetrating portrait of Abimael Guzmán, the brilliant, spellbinding egotistical intellectual who was nicknamed *El maestro* (The Master) and "Shampoo" for his ability to wash clean the minds of his students. Strong even indulges in some armchair psychoanalysis when he ascribes Guzmán's alienation from society as based partly on his resentment of his father, his early school experiences (where he was treated as a provincial outsider), and his illegitimacy. In other chapters, such as "Under a State of Terror," Strong writes with a stinging, bitter acuity, as he paints a portrait of a campaign of merciless terror unleashed by security forces ignorant or contemptuous of any principles of effective counterinsurgency warfare upon hapless peasants and countless innocent victims.

But Strong is far more controversial when he turns to other subjects. In "Gunning for the White Goddess," his virulent anti-Americanism underlies his accusation that the Peruvian and United States governments are responsible for driving the peasants of the Huallaga Valley into the arms of Sendero and stimulating the explosive growth of the cocaine trade. Strong is on firm ground when he asserts that "Shining Path prospered out of hatred and fear generated by the lawlessness of the coca barons, the corruption of the police, and the government's U.S.-sponsored

drug busts. The guerrillas sought to convert the peasants into Shining Path militants. They offered them protection against exploitation by the Colombians and their Peruvian minions and against repression by the Americans and the Peruvian government." But Strong seems to excuse or downplay Sendero's role in the trade, explaining that "Shining Path regards it [coca] as part of the Indian popular culture, which, like religion, time and a 'scientific' understanding of life will erode." The party, says Strong, does not market coca: "As an aspirant state, it taxes the trade by way of requesting collaboration money from it as well as other businesses...In protecting the peasants from low prices forced on them by the traffickers on the one hand, and from police repression on the other, Shining Path perceives itself to be doing its job as a nascent government. Although in doing so the guerrillas are intrinsically regulating the trade, they insist they are slowly pushing the drug traffickers out of the areas under their control and reducing the proportion of hectares devoted to coca cultivation..." Strong seems to accept Sendero's claims that it is undermining, rather than bolstering the cocaine trade, although a few pages later he writes that the party's minimal share from taxing cocaine flights is $40 million dollars annually.

But it is Strong's fundamental interpretation of Sendero Luminoso that has aroused passions in Lima. In "Down the Inca Trail" he paints a manichean portrait of a Peru totally riven by race since the colonial period: "The tension between Western and Indian culture is at the heart of Peru's post-conquest period." Of Europeans and Native Americas, he judges that "the gulf between them has never been bridged, the guilt never assuaged, and the resentment never vanquished." Strong draws a stark picture of a Peru in which racism permeates every part of society, in which mutual hatred and scorn between contemptuous white elites and resentful Indians leaves no room for any middle ground. This picture leads Strong naturally into his basic assertion that Sendero's roots lie in centuries of oppression: "To the east...over the Andes, a red sun dawns for the desperate. Shining Path thrives not only on the social and economic crisis that racks Peru, but also, more than its predecessors, on Indian myth and mythology. Abimael Guzmán benefits from a strange dovetailing of Marxist and Maoist thought with Andean traditions." Strong asserts that "For all the disillusioned and racially and culturally alienated, the movement offers hope, identity, and self-advancement as well as a chance to unleash ethnic and social vengeance." He goes on to state that "For his Indian followers, Abimael Guzmán is the Red Sun and the snake that vanishes in the grass. He is the messiah of the conquered who will lead them in another *pachacuti,* when time and space are inverted; he will reverse the present order and give his people back their land." Strong draws parallels in customs, language, and religion between Chinese and Andean cultures, comparing terms like "yin and yang" with Quechua words like *hanang* and *hurin,* comparisons which are rejected by some anthropologists as coincidental and misleading. Strong's book is full of colorful and moving detail, and it is written from a strong and definite viewpoint. But its basic thesis has been vigorously challenged: see no.1061, 1098.

959. Tarazona-Sevillano, Gabriela. "The Organization of Shining Path." In *The Shining Path of Peru.* Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 171-190.

Tarazona-Sevillano analyzes Sendero's organization and structure. Shining Path is unusual among guerrilla movements for its strong and complex organization and substantial grass-roots structure. The six regional committees beneath the National Central Committee have an unusual degree of autonomy. By 1990 the National Central Committee had organized a number of intermediate entities: a Department for Organizational Support (DAO) to aid the Central Committee, a Group of Popular Support (GAP) to do intelligence work and coordinate popular aid, a Department of Finance to handle funds, presumably including those generated by the cocaine trade in the Upper Huallaga Valley, and a Department of International Relations to work with overseas sympathizers. Popular support includes committees to aid the families of jailed *senderistas*, a department of legal defense, and liaison with Sendero sympathizers among the population at large. Tarazona-Sevillano points out that those who participate in popular organizations do not necessarily face prosecution, as membership in a nonmilitary political organization is not a criminal offense. Sendero is structured hierarchically, and is composed of five levels: sympathizers, activists, militants, commanders, and the "cupola," or national leadership. Its strengths its ability to change, adapt, and capitalize upon Peru's evolving political and economic crises, its growing body of "generated organizations" outside of the military cadres, and its economic self-sufficiency, (thanks to coca money). Its weaknesses include its inability to infiltrate Peru's largest and most powerful labor unions, rural disenchantment with the insurgency's violence, and defections from its own ranks. Tarazona-Sevillano suggests that the government's best tactic would be to facilitate, *de jure,* the defection of Sendero members.

960. Tubino, Fidel and Oscar Espinosa.*Violencia y narcotráfico en la Amazonia.* Lima: CAAAP (Centro Amazónico de Antropología y Aplicación Práctica), May, 1992.

Examination of violence in Amazonian Peru. The authors look at Sendero's and MRTA's links with coca producers and *narcotraficantes*. Sendero is active in the Upper Huallaga (Huánuco and San Martín departments), the central *selva* (Cáceres region), and the Ucayali region. MRTA is concentrated in the northern *selva,* in the department of San Martín, in Yurimaguas, and in part of Loreto province. The history of guerrilla involvement in each region is examined separately. The authors also look at the antisubversion campaign, which dragged the Asháninka Indians into a war they wanted no part of. The Asháninkas were actually attacked first by MRTA, when it assassinated a native leader for having turned a guerrilla over to the army in the abortive guerrilla movement of 1965! (MRTA later repented of their tactical error in killing an Indian leader.) The natives reacted swiftly and violently to the killing, mobilizing an "Asháninka army" to expel the guerrillas. Later, Sendero clashed with the Indians who were living in encampments under army protection and participating in *rondas.* However, the security forces have also been guilty of violating human rights in the Amazon region. The authors also examine in some detail the development and present scope of the coca trade in the area, from cultivation to export. They characterize relations between traffickers and guerrillas as an "alliance" and a *convivenica* (living together). Both words are in quotation marks, indicating a less-than-amiable relationship. The *campesinos* who raise coca are uninterested in *senderista* ideology, while the guerrillas are only interested in the payment of *cupos,* which bring them in the neighborhood of $100 million annually. The authors conclude with some observations on international anti-drug efforts, and some suggestions for economic alternatives to the cultivation of coca.

961. Valencia Cárdenas, Alberto. *Los crímenes de Sendero Luminoso en Ayacucho.* Lima: Editorial Impacto, 1992.

Text of a document presented April 3, 1992 before the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva. The author, a deputy from Ayacucho, while respectful of Amnesty International's excellent record of defending human rights, states that nevertheless until very recently AI never denounced the flagrant abuses and violations committed by the Shining Path, the cruelest and most fanatical terrorist group ever to appear in Latin America. Valencia Cárdenas' purpose is to rectify that neglect, and to document Sendero's many crimes. He uses Abimael Guzmán's own words to show that the very concept of human rights is scorned by Sendero: Guzmán, in his *El Diario* interview, declared human rights to be based on a bourgeois concept of individuality, "which conceives humanity as a family in order to negate the class struggle." To Guzmán, Sendero's excesses do not constitute crimes, but are a form of "popular justice." On the contrary, it is the government's repression which constitute "massacres, genocide, and murder." Valencia Cárdenas also quotes Guzmán at length on the role of violence in class struggle, his famous "river of blood" that must be crossed to build the new Peru, and the concept of the blood price *(la cuota)*-- the "quota" that both *senderistas* and the population will have to pay to achieve that goal. Valencia Cárdenas then documents 84 cases of atrocities committed by Sendero, including the first *ajusticiamientos,* the destruction of the experimental farm at Alpacahca, the massacre of Lucanamarca, throat-cuttings, tongues torn out, people burned alive, a crucifixion and flaying, and many simple murders. He also furnishes several examples of the notorious Sendero use of *niños-bombas,* or "child bombs," where children or adolescents carried dynamite to a target, and then blew themselves up.

962. Wickham Crowley, Timothy. *Guerrillas and Revolutionaries in Latin America.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

An ambitious attempt to analyze guerrilla movements and revolutions in Latin America since 1956 in comparative perspective. Wickham Crowley looks at six movements in Cuba, Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia up to 1960, and contrasts them with later guerrilla campaigns in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia. He focuses principally on the social and political origins of guerrilla movements, the role of the military, regime weakness, and above all, the sources of peasant support upon which the majority of the movements, successful or not, have built their insurrection. In comparing the "first wave" of revolutionary movements with the "second wave" (after the mid-1960's), Wickham Crowley notes that most remain rooted in the countryside. After considerable methodological analysis, he concludes that the single most crucial element for a rural guerrilla movement, peasant support, cannot be predicted or calculated precisely: "There is no single social condition that predicts peasant support in every circumstance...no single such condition, be it...'agrarian structure' or the moral-economic 'agrarian disruption,' serves as an infallible guide in all instances." Wickham Crowley focuses more on Peru's abortive 1965 guerrilla campaign than on Shining Path, but he does link an economic downturn for Peruvian peasants in the early 1960's to the subsistence crisis

in the Andes in the 1980's that was documented by McClintock. He finds several other simularities between Sendero and other Latin American revolutions: genesis in a state university; mid-level leaders drawn from peasant backgrounds and high-level leadership from the national elite; close ethnic or linguistic links between guerrillas and peasants; and a movement originating not from explosions of discontent among unorganized masses, but rather from individuals already embedded in political organizations and "marginal political elites." However, Wickham Crowley still highlights Sendero's singularities: "A combination of Maoist dominance of the regional University of Huamanga and a subsistence crisis in the Andes produced the powerful guerrilla movement *Sendero Luminoso,* radically different in many ways from its counterparts elsewhere. The affinity between the Maoist message of peasant war against the cities and the Sierran conditions typically conducive to peasant millenarian revolt has led to a merger of the two eschatologies in a powerful revolutionary movement with apocalyptic overtones."

963. Wit, Ton de and Vera Gianotten. "The Center's Multiple Failures." (The Origins and Logic of Shining Path: Two Views). In *The Shining Path of Peru.* Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 33-57.

The authors, who worked in Ayacucho between 1977 and 1983 as part of a rural development program sponsored by the Dutch government, had opportunity to witness first-hand Sendero's influence and educational methods. In Ayacucho, crucial differences in background, heritage and origin among Indian communities, some of them going back hundreds of years to pre-Hispanic times, have created a fragmented peasant sector. These old antagonisms prevented *ayacuchanos* from developing any strong peasant unions or political parties. This lack of alternative political outlets assisted Sendero in its early organizing efforts. Also helping the guerrillas was the central government's total lack of interest in and assistance to Ayacucho province, an indifference shared by all national political parties. A deficient infrastructure, limited energy sources, and poor communications are among Ayacucho's deficiencies. Ayacucho's senators and representatives have tried and failed repeatedly for more than a century to get the government to invest in a project to provide adequate drinking water for the city and its environs. The repeated failure of the center to respond to peripheral needs has provided fertile grounds for revolutionary recruiting in Ayacucho and elsewhere. Explanations for this lack of response include institutionalized racism, the lack of economic, social, cultural, and political integration in Peru, and a weak civil society and state--"a society made up of disarticulated groups that are seldom mutually involved and a state unable to process effectively and respond appropriately to the demands of its population."

964. Woy-Hazelton, Sandra and William A. Hazelton. "Sendero Luminoso and the Marxist Left." In *The Shining Path of Peru.* Edited by David Scott Palmer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 207-224.

Analyzes relations between Sendero and the legal left in Peru. Shining Path's and United Left's goals and means are diametrically opposed. The IU coalition, composed of many leftist sectarian parties, managed to stay together throughout the 1980's because it was a loose coalition, because its success at the local and regional levels convinced leaders they could gain national power, and because it avoided divisive, and therefore decisive, issues. IU managed to capture as much as 24% of the vote in municipal elections in 1980, but failed to win power in the 1990 presidential elections, largely due to internal squabbling and a lack of unity. A continuing dialogue over legal versus violent means to power, and strong championing of human and civil rights in the face of government repression has marked IU's course in the 1980's. IU and Sendero, especially Sendero's "generated organizations" for grass-roots support, are in direct competition for the loyalty of workers and peasants. IU continues to work through legal means to transform Peru; Sendero calls for electoral boycotts and believes only violent revolution will bring about change: "To date...even though the electoral left has not been able to translate its presumed leadership of the popular sectors into power, neither has the armed left."

965. "Verano sangriento." *Caretas,* no.1195 (January 27 1992): 34-37, 84.

Sendero has ushered in the new year in a bloody fashion, by murdering policemen and community leaders. Apparently the hard line urged by Osmán Morote is being adopted by Sendero. *Caretas* recounts recent attacks on local leaders like Ernesto López de la Cruz, secretary of the Asentamiento Humano "José Gálvez Barrenechea." After riddling him with bullets, the assassins left the customary piece of paper with the slogan, "Death to the *rondas urbanas.* The Party has a thousand eyes and ears.*Viva el PCP.* " The security forces, says *Caretas,* have a "scheme of operations," but not a real strategy. If a counterinsurgency strategy really existed, the authorities would protect*barrio* leaders and popular organizations, the best defense against subversion.

966. Spalding, Hobart A. "Peru on the Brink." *Monthly Review,* v.43 (January 1992): 29-43.

Spalding believes that Peru stands on the brink of civil war and chaos, due to the desperate economic situation and the guerrilla insurgency. He sketches political and economic developments in Peru from the 1968 coup through the election of Fujimori. One result of the unraveling of Peruvian society is that regional, neighborhood, and sectoral organizations now provide services that the government cannot or will not supply, such as day care and soup kitchens. People's confidence in government has been destroyed; it is now viewed as only a negative influence, "the bringer of salary freezes, higher prices, repression, decaying infrastructure, ineptitude, and corruption." Spalding points out that 60% of those convicted of terrorism are under 25 years of age, and many have secondary education and some university courses to their credit. The U.S. seeks to hide its anti-leftist campaign inside a failed drug policy, but the Peruvian government wants U.S. support for a war that it is losing, and drugs make an ideal pretext. The crisis is also manifested in societal violence: six out of ten women in Lima have reported domestic or job-related violence. Mainstream analysts maintain that Sendero "has no reason to exist, that it recruits and rules purely by fear, and that it remains an ultra-orthodox organization mired in its own limited analysis of Peru and the world." Spalding depressingly catalogs the many reasons why Sendero exists and continues to grow.

967. Diez Canseco, Javier. "La izquierda en el Perú, el problema nacional y la democracia." *Nueva sociedad,* no.117 (January-February 1992): 77-87.

Diez Canseco, a leader of United Left and a Peruvian senator, analyzes the role of the left during the present crisis. A neoliberal recession and internal war have brought the nation to the brink of ruin. "Fujishock" and a retreat from the public service sector may satisfy the requirements of finance capital, but they have also increased the national misery index. The other half of the equation is the war against Sendero, whose growing militarization is undermining the entire democratic process. Diez Canseco describes the state of emergency under which two-thirds of the nation lives, a judicial system that has almost ceased to function, and a nation that lamentably leads the world in disappearances and allegations of human rights abuse for the fourth year in a row. In some emergency zones there is no civil government, no elections, no functioning politics of any type. The vacuum of power is being filled either by the armed forces, or by Sendero's popular committees. In other areas this vacuum is being filled by communal power, or by organizations based in peasant communities. How the left has responded to these changes forms the heart of Diez Canseco's analysis. Still arguing over the meaning of socialism and its relationship with a free market, the left cannot agree on what shape their desired society should take. Antistate neoliberal ideology and terrorism both challenge the left to come up with a better alternative: a demilitarized and peaceful nation based on social justice. Diez Canseco concludes with a comment on Peru's sad dependency upon narcotics dollars, and the 200,000 coca producers and one million Peruvians who are linked in one way or another with the drug trade. He warns that under the pretext of aiding the anti-drug effort, the United States is increasing its direct aid to the Peruvian military to fight subversion.

968. Kirk, Robin. "Los desplazados del Perú." *Quehacer,* no.75 (January-February 1992): 78-87.

Report on the "displaced" of Peru. Since 1983 at least 200,000 people have fled their homes because of political violence. The majority are peasants from the southern highlands, although more recently people have fled from other areas, including the central sierra. This migration is quite distinct from economic migrations, explains the head of refugee assistance of the Episcopal Commission for Social Action (CEAS). The government has done absolutely nothing for these internal refugees; independent organizations that work with them characterize the government's policy as "an immense civil vacuum." Kirk describes the plight of these *desplazados* as an "emergency." More than 50% are younger than eighteen; malnutrition, infectious disease, and psychological trauma are common. Religious and independent aid organizations can only supply 20% of the needs of these people. To make matters worse, Sendero has begun to attack the people and institutions which help the refugees. Kirk talks with a women who runs a *comedor popular.* "Rafelina" and her children fled Ayacucho in 1984, when *senderistas* burned their house down. Afterwards soldiers came and accused her of contact with the *terrucos* (terrorists); when they left, guerrillas came back and accused her family of helping the military! Kirk discusses the odyssey of families like Rafelina's, from their villages to district capitals, and from there to department capitals or Lima. Often the refugees from the emergency zones, who speak only Quechua, are discriminated against by the inhabitants of the*barrios* themselves. Sendero will often confiscate their identity cards; without a *libreta* one cannot obtain a job, get a bank loan, enter public buildings where one

has to present one's identification, etc. Kirk also looks at the problems of the NGO's helping the refugees. Cáritas and CARE can only cover 15% of the cost of soup kitchens. Although Fujimori has mentioned the plight of the *desplazados,* his government has done nothing concrete to help, not even to defend them from Sendero. *Los desplazados* should be aided, Kirk concludes, not only out of simple humanity, but also as part of a general strategy of pacification for Peru.

969. "A Tribe Takes Up Arms in Peru." *Newsweek,* v.119, no.5 (February 3 1992): 31.

Brief report on the plight of the Asháninkas, accompanied by striking black-and-white photos by Alejandro Balaguer. A guerrilla campaign of terror has divided the Asháninkas, killed hundreds, and caused thousands to flee to seek refuge around military bases. Now some have begun to reclaim their lands: "Their effort requires courage, a yearning for cultural survival, and tragically, an adaptation to the violent world in which they must live." Armed with bows and arrows and the occasional shotgun provided by the army, they are organizing self-defense patrols. "So far the strategy, devised and overseen by the army, seems to be working. But nothing can fully restore the Asháninkas' once peaceful existence..."

970. "La muerte anunciada." *Caretas,* no.1198 (February 17 1992): 26-30.

Just a few days before her death, María Elena Moyano led a march for peace and against the violence of Shining Path. At the head of a column of mothers and other popular leaders, she defied Sendero, and prevented them from establishing their *base de apoyo* in Villa El Salvador. If this is a war, declares *Caretas,* then her murder is equivalent to the loss of one of the most important and effective generals of the campaign. She said the only thing Sendero could achieve is to accentuate the misery of her people. She helped form the local committees of *vaso de leche,* mother's clubs, and social assistance programs; fought for water and light for the *barrio* and for communal kitchens and other public works. *El Diario* accused her of misappropriating funds and using mothers and children for her own profit. Despite Sendero's threats and bullying, Moyano had the support of the people. In municipal elections she was elected lieutenant governor. She had already been liaison to the health commission, and president of the social service commission. On February 15 she was attending a chicken barbecue with her fellow *salvadoreños,* when four terrorists walked in and shot her. She called out, "My son, help me please, help me..." The *senderistas* fired at the crowd, which fled, then killed Moyano. One terrorist attached a bag with two kilos of dynamite to her body, which blew it into pieces. The remainder of the *Caretas* article describes a wave of recent Sendero attacks, including an attack on the SUNAT building, the American embassy, and the murders of policemen, industrialists, and leaders. Sendero's armed strike seems to have been partly successful; micro-and omnibuses were notable for their absence from city streets.*Caretas* also describes a Sendero pamphlet on the *paro armado* distributed by hand throughout Lima. The strike is being called against hunger and economic crisis, without mentioning, of course, the sabotage and terror that has cut off electricity to the industrial zone, producing this misery. The objectives of the strike are agitation, propaganda, sabotage, selective assassination, and guerrilla combat (e.g., mining roads). *Fuerzas Especiales* of the army and *Unidades Especiales* of the police are being mobilized to fight this threat.

971. Klaiber, Jeffrey. "Peru: The Church and Shining Path." *America,* v.166, no.6 (February 22 1991): 136-138.

In 1987 a Peruvian priest was murdered in Ayacucho while celebrating mass. This was thought to be an aberrant act, but since September, 1990 Shining Path has turned its wrath directly on the church, sparing no one who stands in its way. Two nuns, one from Australia, and three priests, two Poles and an Italian, have been murdered since 1990. At least five lay pastoral agents, and dozens of peasant catechists have also been killed. Klaiber succinctly summarizes Sendero's history, including its recent switch from rural to urban guerrilla warfare. In 1991 three-quarters of its attacks have occurred in urban centers, particularly in Lima. The church and various civic groups have organized against them. "The church is the key link that ties all the disparate cultural realities of Peru together, from mountain village to squatter settlement on the coast." Even since Vatican II and Medellín, the church has identified itself with the people's struggle to better their lives. Liberation theology in this context is a blessing on the peasant and urban poor to organize themselves and develop their communities. In Cajamarca many *ronderos* are catechists; in the south, hundreds of peasant leaders are also lay leaders trained in church centers to promote their rights. This explains why Sendero waited so long before directly attacking church leaders. The new message of Medellín has replaced the older, fatalistic folk Catholicism with a new dynamic belief in community solidarity, self-help, and pride in one's Indian culture. Traditional, purely

sacramental Catholicism did not pose a threat to Sendero; the new Catholicism of Medellín and Puebla does.

972. "La batalla de Lima." *Caretas,* no.1199 (February 24 1992): 33-37, 84-85.

Impassioned report on "the battle for Lima." President Fujimori seems perplexed and passive, says *Caretas,* while the "iron belt" of Sendero continues surrounding the capital. The lack of a counterinsurgency strategy, the mutual suspicion that separates the security forces from popular organizations, the fragmentation of political parties, and the lack of resources and misuse of those that are available, are some of the obstacles in the fight against terrorism. The article severely criticizes Fujimori for not attending Moyano's funeral; he had there an opportunity to demonstrate his concern and support for the people bearing the brunt of the recent wave of terrorism, and to call for collaboration between the armed forces and the whole Peruvian people. But he did nothing; the fleeting presence of the vice-president and interior minister was hardly a substitute. In fact, Vladimiro Montesinos has been telling Fujimori that his antisubversion strategy is working, and that his triumph over Sendero is imminent. *Caretas* relates how Sendero, through bloody defeat in the sierra, came to reset its sights on Lima. The NGO's and popular organizations are Sendero's targets; a recent issue of *El Diario* made disparaging remarks about the NGO's and "their role as the mattress in the decomposition of the old order; there they traffic with the needs of the people" [a sexually-suggestive disparagement]. Sendero's object is to destroy the popular organizations through terror, provoke more misery and discontent, and enlist the young in their ranks. The political parties are virtually absent from the *pueblos jóvenes;* the victory of APEMIVES, the association of small factories in the Villa El Salvador (a list of candidates supported by Sendero), was occasioned by the legal left's inability to field any candidates at all. The police are definitely on the defensive; the growing mining of roads has had the effect of forcing the police to retreat when the opposite, more patrolling, is needed.

Accompanying the special report are many sidebars and supplementary articles. One criticizes the lack of working patrol cars in metropolitan Lima; Lima and Callao, with seven million inhabitants, have 30,000 police; Bogotá, with fewer people, has 40,000. Another asks why the police didn't protect Moyano. Still another celebrates María Elena Moyano's life with photos. An important sidebar ("Lo que debe hacer") calls for the creation of neighborhood patrols and popular night watches, equipped with portable radios and walkie-talkies to communicate with the police.

973. Andreas, Peter R. and Kenneth E. Sharpe. "Cocaine Politics in the Andes." *Current History,* v.91, no.562 (February 1992): 74-79.

The political and economic landscape of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru is being transformed by a thriving cocaine industry and an increasingly militarized U.S. strategy to suppress it. Issues like foreign debt, economic crisis, civil-military relations, human rights, democracy, and guerrilla insurgencies are being shaped by the politics of cocaine. The explosive world demand for cocaine has turned coca into the single most lucrative export commodity in the region's economy: "the current boom provides employment for hundreds of thousands of peasants, and is the single most important source of foreign exchange for the region's debt-burdened economies." Ironically, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia have been economically integrated by a simple division of labor within the cocaine industry. Peru and Bolivia specialize in the labor-intensive cultivation of the coca plant and the processing of its leaves into raw paste. Colombia's role is largely entrepreneurial and managerial: Colombians transport the coca paste to their processing labs in Colombia, and ship the refined cocaine to distribution networks in Europe and the U.S. Cocaine is also redefining U.S.-Latin American relations in the post-cold war era. All aspects of interamerican relations, from debt to human rights, has been subordinated to the war on drugs. U.S. trade policy, loans, and military aid have all been tied to anti-drug policy. Despite abysmal human rights records and drug-related corruption in the Andean militaries, U.S. assistance to police and armed forces has grown from less than $5 million in 1988 to more than $140 million in 1990. A 5-year strategy, President George Bush's Andean initiative, was launched in 1989, and has made Andean interdiction and eradication the centerpiece of international drug control policy. Andreas and Sharpe examine how the narcotics industry is affecting each of the Andean nations, focusing on the Bolivian economy's dependence on cocaine money, and the severe effects of Fujimori's austerity programs on the population. As one official commented, for the U.S. to expect Peru to fight a drug war is like "asking a country that's fighting the Civil War and going thorough the Great Depression at the same time to suddenly take on Prohibition as well."

974. "En los barrios, confrontación decisiva." *Ideéle,* año 4, no.34 (February 1992): 14-15.

For Sendero, the *barrios* of Lima are priority number one in its declared step of strategic equilibrium. *Idéele* chronicles recent assassinations and woundings of *vaso de leche* workers, *barrio* leaders, and communal kitchen directors. Sendero justifies these attacks as punishment of "traffickers, squealers, *ronderos,* or revisionists." As a result there is a great deal of fear in the popular organizations, as much of the military and police, as of the guerrillas. The urban *rondas* were recently termed "tools of the armed forces" and "masses against masses" by the pro-Sendero paper *El Diario.* The *barrio* situation is very difficult now; social organizations, marginalized by the police, are weakened and lack protection. These groups should have been an effective barrier against the Sendero.

975. Robertson, J. Michael. "Latin American Revolutionaries in the Post-Soviet Era: The Case of Sendero Luminoso." *Strategic Review,* v.20, no.1 (Winter 1992): 42-49.

Interesting analysis of Sendero's philosophy that makes maximum use of English-language sources. Robertson examines the plight of Marxist regimes in the post-Soviet world. The collapse of communism does not necessarily mean the end of revolutionary movements in Latin America, principally because those movements are rooted in a philosophical tradition that, while employing elements of Marxism, is not explicitly Marxist. Robertson asserts that Marxism-Leninism and its variants are the consequences of an historical break with Christian religious tradition by secular movements that have taken on the trappings of religion. These philosophies reflect a pessimistic loss of faith in society, and seek to build a better and more perfect world through rational and scientific thought. Merged in Latin America with anti-U.S. and anti-imperialist antipathies, they appeal powerfully to intellectuals. Sendero's philosophy-religion provides a link between the Indians and the masses who need to be led. Its revolution embraces all Quechua-speaking peoples throughout the Andes, giving the movement potentially continental dimensions. Robertson also examines Guzmán's cult of personality, Sendero's "long march" to revolution, (Guzmán, he asserts, began organizing for revolution as early as 1963), and the problem of narco-terrorism. Sendero's income from its control of narcotics trafficking puts its financial resources well ahead of those of the Peruvian military; Robertson cites a Peruvian legislator who estimates Sendero's profits at $500 million, and believes that Sendero will soon announce the establishment of an independent state in the Upper Huallaga. Thus the dismemberment of the USSR will be of little consequence to narcoterrorists.

976. Rosenau, William and Linda Head Flanagan. "Blood of the Condor: The Genocidal Talons of Peru's Shining Path." *Policy Review,* no. 59 (Winter 1992): 82-85.

Two analysts at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government describe Sendero with a minimum of embellishment. Their use of language, although sparing, is calculated to repel: Sendero is compared from the first line to the "rabid" Maoist cadres of Pol Pot. Shining Path is described as a totalitarian movement of unparalleled brutality, its fanatical followers led by a quasi-deified "philosopher king" who has a mystical attachment to the supposedly purifying effects of violence. Sendero's tactics are intimidation, assassination, "people's trials", and the imposition of a rigidly puritanical discipline in villages that it controls. Anyone who helps Peru's poor--Catholic priests and nuns, aid workers, foreign investors, United Nations officials--faces death. Sendero has grown rapidly xenophobic; its anti-Japanese "scabrous" propaganda is compared to "traditional European anti-Semitic literature." The authors make no attempt to disguise the brutality and ineffectiveness of the government's response: extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, and disappearances are common. They conclude with some concrete suggestions for improving the counterguerrilla struggle: strengthening the police to play a leading role in the fight; setting up an amnesty program with real incentives for desertion; providing witness protection for cadres who betray Sendero, as well as for anyone who cooperates against the guerrillas (offers of a new life, perhaps in Miami would help to sow doubt and discord among *senderistas);* paying for firearms that are turned into the authorities; and cleaning out the prisons, moving *senderistas* out of Canto Grande prison and onto prison barges or other facilities. The authors admit that these steps will not crush the insurgency, and that "in all likelihood, it will take generations for Peru to overcome the kind of social and economic conditions that have given rise to the movement." [Exceedingly literal in their analysis, the authors unfortunately display little feeling for the realities of Peru after decades of alternating military and corrupt civilian rule and devastating economic battering. The article, with its villification of the guerrillas and its textbook counterinsurgency policies, evokes analyses of Vietnam in the early 1960's.]

977. Smith, Philip. "Grappling With Shining Path." *New Politics,* v.3, no.4 (Winter 1992): 87-100.

Leftist analysis of the Peruvian situation. Smith postulates a triumphant Peru in 1980, with "the power of the oligarchs broken once and for all by sweeping agrarian reform," the military chastened by popular rejection and forced back to its barracks, and popular organization and mobilization for change at levels never seen before. Now plagued by guerrilla war, the worst depression in its history, wracked by class, regional and ethnic tensions, and ruined, not only by García's quixotic heterodox polices, but by an increasingly neoliberal world economic order, Peru stares into an abyss. In the face of an apparent exhaustion of normal politics, a significant minority of Peruvians have turned to Sendero's revolutionary violence, despite its well-deserved reputation for brutality and dogmatic authoritarianism. The Peruvian state's response has been entirely military; the failure of civilian political institutions to deal with the insurgency is shared by all branches of government and the entire political spectrum, including most of Izquierda Unida, which is rent by dissension and factionalism. Smith, in analyzing Sendero's move into the cities, sees a movement that, weaving together the resentment born of racial oppression, economic desperation, and political frustration with utopian vision, may be unstoppable. If popular democratic forces are to avoid political and physical liquidation, they must move quickly and imaginatively to defend their institutions. At the same time, the new social movements are not a solution to acute political and economic crisis, but an expression of it; they are undertaking functions because the state has abandoned them. Sendero has an uncanny ability to find the contradictions in Peruvian society and exploit them to the fullest. Should it appear on the verge of power, an all-encompassing white terror is waiting in the wings. Sendero must be challenged politically by a real alternative, and the left must "go to the masses" once again to rebuild ties to its natural constituency and forge working relationships with the new social movements.

978. "Desconfianza mutua: la batalla de Lima." *Caretas*, no.1201 (March 9 1992): 38-42.

Examines the mixed results of army intrusion into the *barrios populares.* In some communities, such as Bocanegro, in Callao, where a "popular school" was rumored to exist, and where several leaders had been killed or wounded by Sendero, the entrance of some 100 Marines has been a success. The Marines brought potable water, set up a clinic, and distributed food. Before the operation, they coordinated their entrance into the*barrio* with community leaders. But in other places (for example Juan Pablo II in Canto Grande), things have been more difficult. An assembly of people rejected the army and demanded that they vacate the local community hall they had occupied. *Caretas* examines the reasons why this has occurred. Either the population has no confidence in the security forces, or fears Sendero will take revenge after the army leaves. But the army has also handled matters insensitively at times, by not consulting local leaders or examining the local situation before carrying out their plans. They also persist in regarding all popular leaders with suspicion; to the army "popular"="communist," and "communist"="terrorist." A sarcastic sidebar, "Rito de guerra," examines the continuity of military ritual, from Inca times to the present. The armed forces always changes commanders in the emergency zones after one year, forfeiting all the experience an officer has learned during his tenure. Another ritual is not fighting at night; "when the shadows fall, the uniforms retire to their garrisons, instead of making use of their technical superiority (infrared night sights, etc.)..."

979. United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. *The Threat of Shining Path to Democracy in Peru: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, March 11 and 12, 1992.* Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992.

During two days of hearings, the subcommittee hears testimony from Gordon McCormick of RAND, Alexander Wilde, Executive Director of the Washington Office on Latin America, Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, David Scott Palmer, and Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Each presents a prepared statement, and answers questions posed by Congressmen. Appended are two documents: an account of Sendero's history, submitted by Representative Robert J. Lagomarsino of California, and a report from the U.S. Embassy in Lima on USAID activities in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Chairman Robert Torricelli seems most concerned about U.S. involvement, describing American personnel as sitting in an essentially unfortified base in the middle of the UHV. He warns against the U.S. becoming involved in Peru without debate; in fighting one war against drugs, we might find ourselves involved in another against Sendero. Congressman Stephen Solarz declares that "supply side policies" in the anti-drug war, which consist of raising the price of production and physically limiting supplies, have failed. The Peruvian military, he judges, is unable to contain Sendero, and the best outcome we can realistically expect is a violent stalemate.

McCormick, reflecting his deep pessimism over the outcome of the war, outlines Sendero's growing pressure on Lima. What should the U.S. do? To become militarily involved

would risk the country becoming embroiled in a "dirty war." But a Sendero victory would have a dramatic impact on the hemisphere. The U.S. would then be under extreme pressure to do something to reverse or mitigate such an outcome. If there were no direct American intervention, then substantial U.S. military assistance would have to be granted to Peru's neighbors. However, McCormick does not feel that American interests in Peru justify the level of involvement required to make a difference in the conflict. The principal American interest in Peru is the war against drugs. Counterinsurgency and counternarcotics are contradictory objectives; the counternarcotics campaign has only served to strengthen Sendero's hold in the UHV. The insurgency, he believes, is too far advanced for the U.S. to accept the costs and risks of becoming involved at this late date. Given current trends, Sendero is much closer to the end than it is to the beginning. The Peruvian security establishment has proven to be an ineffective and unreliable ally in any joint effort to defeat Sendero. The military has not yet grasped the nature of the challenge of Shining Path, and shows little appreciate for the principles of counterinsurgency. It appears institutionally incapable of devising and implementing a coherent national strategy to halt Sendero's advance, or to reclaim what it has lost. This weakness is compounded by profound deficiencies in tactical-level leadership, training, intelligence, command and control, mobility, and virtually every area of logistics and support. The U.S. would have to start from scratch to reorganize, re-equip, retrain, and institutionally transform the Peruvian security establishment. Such a program is beyond our capacity to carry out.

Alexander Wilde believes that the U.S. should not provide military aid to Peru, primarily because Peru does not meet human rights conditions laid out in section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1960 as amended, or in the International Narcotics Control Act of 1990. Such aid could fuel nationalist reaction, and actually play into Sendero's hands. Furthermore, aid would be wasted; Alexander quotes a GAO report of October 1991: "Peru has not been successful in establishing a climate in which U.S. aid can be effectively employed..." He urges economic aid, debt relief, and support for development (especially for alternative development projects where Sendero has been most active). Peruvian NGO's have an excellent track record in effectively using outside aid. Tarazona-Sevillano warns of *senderista* activity in Bolivia, northern Argentina, and possibly Ecuador. Bolivia, through its economic dependence on the coca trade, is particularly vulnerable to guerrilla influence. Palmer warns that the Fujimori government is at a critical juncture, but he believes that Peruvian initiatives to implement a more balanced civil/military response to the insurgency are being made. He differs with McCormick over the military, declaring that it is better trained than most in Latin America, with good internal *elán.* It lacks resources, and has been trained (by the USSR) for conventional warfare; what it lacks is experience in counterinsurgency war. Aronson believes that the Peruvian government must develop a comprehensive political, economic, and social strategy to confront Sendero. Judicial reform is especially crucial, and the protection of judges, juries, investigators, and police is also extremely necessary. At present, the conviction rate for accused terrorists is less than 10% (and this, he declares, does not reflect a lack of will).

980. "Los miradores de Sendero: la batalla de Lima." *Caretas,* no.1202 (March 16 1992): 34-39.

A detailed map of Lima outlines seven "red zones," with strong *senderista* presence, twenty-one "pink zones," where terrorism has begun to root itself, and four "lookouts," high areas that Sendero has taken in its advance against Lima. These elevated places serve as observation points and places of refuge for terrorists. Each time the city is blacked out, hammers and sickles are illuminated on these heights. An intelligence memo warns security forces not to enter these areas without orders from the high command. Urban militias and "neighborhood commissaries" are said to have been established, displacing*barrio* leaders and communal kitchens. In these places the presence of the state is almost nonexistent. The urban *rondas* were disbanded, accused of being cannon fodder and counterrevolutionary, pitting "the masses against the masses." *Caretas* examines this dangerous phenomenon.

981. Kirk, Robin. "The Deadly Women of the Shining Path." *Image Magazine* [San Francisco Chronicle], (March 22 1992): 15-21.

Sendero, Kirk relates, is a terrifying and ruthless group, and more than any other revolutionary force in the world, it is one dominated by women. Shining Path claims that forty percent of its members are female. Approximately one-third of the prisoners held by Peruvian authorities on charges of terrorism are women. Police estimate that eight of 19 members of the party's clandestine central committee are women, as are two of the five members of the political bureau. Women are very active in the assassination squads that hunt down police and military officers, dispatching victims with a pistol shot to the back of the neck. Kirk explores the role of women inside the movement. Prominent among them was Edith Lagos, a beautiful guerrilla leader

killed in ambush at the age of 19. Lagos's wild life and violent death helped fuel the myth of the *senderista* bitch-goddess, both sensual and deadly, that is so popular in Peru. Kirk analyzes the relationship between the ideologue Guzmán and Sendero's women, finding that Shining Path is not a monument to revolutionary feminism, but rather a profoundly paternalistic organization based on a particularly deceptive machismo. Recounting the disturbing story of the mysterious death of Guzmán's wife, Augusta de la Torre, Kirk concludes: "For his own reasons, Guzmán has given women a special place in what he calls his 'killing machine.' In return, they look up to him as if he were a god. And like a god, he demands of them the ultimate sacrifice." Although painted by the Peruvian press as fierce and inhuman monsters, those with whom Kirk was able to meet and speak were normal, even pleasant. An engrossing account of a visit to the women's cellblock in Castro Castro prison, and an interview with a fiercely committed fighter conclude an excellent and illuminating article.

982. Aronson, Bernard. "Peru's Brutal Insurgency: Sendero Luminoso." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, v.3, no.12 (March 23 1992): 236-240.

Reprint of Aronson's statement before the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. Aronson, quoting from Guzmán's "river of blood" declaration, declares: "Make no mistake: If Sendero were to take power, we would see this century's third genocide." Luis Arce Borja told a Lima newspaper that the current strategic equilibrium would cost one million Peruvian lives. Aronson summarizes Sendero's ideology and threat, citing a long list of *senderista* atrocities. Declaring that Sendero can only be defeated by Peruvians, he nevertheless proposes a number of ways the world can help Peru. The international community and human rights organizations should focus on the threat of Sendero; this does not mean, however, that the Peruvian government should get a pass on human rights. The international community should help Peru overcome the economic crisis which the guerrillas take advantage of. The government must develop a comprehensive political, economic, and social strategy to meet Sendero's threat. Peru must fundamentally reform and strengthen its system for administering justice. The U.S. and Europe must reduce their domestic demand for drugs. The international community should support efforts by Peru and Ecuador to resolve their border dispute, in order to allow Peru to concentrate its efforts on its real enemy: not Chile or Ecuador, but Shining Path. Aronson expands upon each one of these points in detail. He concludes by conceding that there is a convincing case against U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency against Sendero, but at the same time urges closer engagement with Peru to stop drug trafficking, strengthen democracy, and defend human rights.

983. "Justicia endeble." *Caretas*, no.1204 (March 30 1992): 34-37, 82-83.

Indignant article outlining how the law continues to favor Sendero. The laws to fight terrorism are inadequate and permissive, says *Caretas;* judges are often intimidated and free suspects; the prisons are still under the control of their inmates, who maintain communication with the outside. Even the existence of special tribunals has not remedied the situation. Prisoners insult judges, threaten their lives, and yell revolutionary slogans in court with total freedom. It is also no secret that the judiciary has been infiltrated by Sendero; a group called "Trabajadores Clasistas del Poder Judicial," has recently been formed. *Caretas* believes that the example of West Germany, which moved quickly to fight terrorism with its legal system, should inspire similar changes in Peru. Germany severely limited the rights of accused terrorists, and virtually cut them off from communication within and outside of prison. A sidebar ("¡Qué tal jueza!") details how a group of suspects, captured with automatic rifles and explosives, was freed by a particular judge, who had previously set free a woman known by Dircote to be Guzmán's secretary.

984. Kirk, Robin. "Murder in a Shantytown: Shining Path's War on Hope." *The Nation*, v.254, no.12 (March 30 1992): 412-414.

The murder of community activist María Elena Moyano, like that of Brazilian rain-forest leader Chico Mendes, marks a grim new chapter in Peru's political violence. Like Mendes, Moyano represented a new generation of Latin American leaders: not white, often female, with a constituency in the impoverished community where they live. But unlike Mendes, her murder provoked little international outrage. Few foreigners feel as strongly about self-help movements in the *pueblos jóvenes* as they do about the rain forest. Kirk recounts meeting Moyano in Villa El Salvador. Moyano, a black woman, was twelve years old when her parents participated in the land takeover that led to the Villa's founding in 1971. The people of the Villa defended themselves from attempts to evict them, and circulated petitions for water, bus lines, and electricity. Over time, the *pueblo* 's 300,000 residents organized their own government, schools, health clinics and an industrial park. Moyano was an activist, president of the Women's Federation, and was elected

deputy mayor in 1989 as the Izquierda Unida candidate. Last September, after rural defeats, the Shining Path made Lima shantytowns its new battlefield. Guerrillas blew up a warehouse that supplied 92 soup kitchens. Local leaders were threatened; in one *pueblo* two men were murdered for rejecting Sendero's orders. Moyano told Kirk that she once believed that Sendero was wrong, but at least it was fighting for justice. But when it began to attack local leaders, she openly repudiated them; worse, she led a courageous, if foolhardy, march against them. On February 15 she was murdered, her body blown apart with dynamite. Moyano knew what could lead to such a desperate act: "Our politicians are more interested in their speeches than the economic situation. But our youth are rebellious, impulsive. In the Shining Path you see expressed their doubts and frustration about their lack of a future. It is a mystique, a total commitment, that seems to answer their hunger for a complete change." Moyano tried to defeat Sendero's message of terror with one of hope. "With her murder," wrotes Kirk, "hope is not lost. But in Villa, where the only forest is the one people plant and tend and where it never, ever rains, terror now seems to be in the lead."

985. "Communism Marches Forth in Peru." *A World to Win,* no.17 (March 1992): 8-18.

People's war has reached strategic equilibrium, declares *A World to Win.* The People's Guerrilla Army (PGA) has won relative stability for base areas in the countryside; these base areas are the "bone marrow" for people's war. Strategic equilibrium does not mean that the PGA, local forces, and militia have achieved equality with the government's better-equipped military, but rather that the PGA has been successful in its evolution from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare. *AWTW* explains how Sendero's concept of liberated zones differs from the revisionist Soviet model, and how these base areas make concrete the movement's vision of a revolutionary society. The PGA is the cutting edge, and the new state, the heart of people's war. The article then reviews progress in different areas of Peru, describes the preparations the party is making for urban insurrection, and summarizes the state of the war, the economy, and the possibility of U.S. intervention. It lauds Amnesty International for its condemnation of human rights violations by Fujimori's government, but criticizes the organization for its crusade against and lies about the Peruvian Communist Party.

986. Moyano, María Elena. "'Contra el hambre y el terror.'" *Ideéle,* año 4, no.35 (March 1992): 4-5.

A short statement from the popular leader a few months before she was murdered. Moyano, speaking in the name of 20,000 women like herself, condemns hunger and terror; the former is the result of neoliberal economic policies that hurt the very poorest. Added to this are the military forces that violate human rights. Moyano calls for alternatives that will generate employment, salary increases, and more arms for the peasantry to fight Sendero with, as well as machinery, seeds, and aid. "Against those who call for a 'fight for justice,' we raise our proposal for self-government from the people themselves. We believe in the organizations that the people have generated out of necessity, and further, in self-defense..." Moyano calls for a national assembly of popular organizations. The people should decide democratically how to defend themselves, without mandates imposed from the outside. It is clear that Sendero is concentrating on Lima, in particular on the *barrios populares;* in order to advance it needs to do away with the soup kitchens, the *vaso de leche* program, and the neighborhood survival organizations. That is a task it cannot accomplish democratically as long as the *barrio* women reject terrorism and support peaceful change, as shown by the multitudes who marched September 26...

987. "Sendero Luminoso contra los ONG's." *Ideéle,* año 4, no.35 (March 1992): 19-22.

Ideéle publishes, with rebuttal and commentary, a statement by *El Diario* attacking the NGO's as tools of Yankee imperialism, elements of a two-part strategy that combines military aid and social development. The NGO's serve the old exploitative order; such movements constitute *asistencialismo* ("assistance-ism"), which merely lulls the popular masses and deflects them from revolution. Peace marches in the *barrios populares,* counterrevolutionary urban *rondas,* and collaboration with the police and armed forces are part of the strategy implemented by the genocidal Fujimori. They would not exist without funds provided by European social democracy, North American and Canadian NGO's, revisionism, and the World Bank. *El Diario* names a number of such NGO's: CARE, Acción Comunitaria, DESCO, etc., a few of the dozens of groups that under the cover of trying to "develop" marginality, are perpetuating the system of exploitation. It also condemns women's groups, Church organizations, and several media outlets, including the journals *Tarea* and *Calandria* (a women's magazine), as well as educational, technological, and developmental organizations. That such groups are perceived by Sendero as obstacles to its objectives, says *Ideéle,* as well as instruments of imperialist domination, is a tribute to their effectiveness.

988. "Lima, según Sendero: las acciones." *Quehacer,* no.76 (March-April 1992): 39-42.

Report (complete with graphs) on terrorist actions in and around Lima since 1980. The graphs clearly show that since 1990, attacks on police patrols, bombings, and assassinations of *barrio* representatives have increased dramatically. Various "spikes" can be explained as by-products of the campaign against municipal elections, Sendero's rivalry with MRTA, etc. There is an important difference between attacks on electrical transmission towers designed to darken the capital, and the present sustained assault to gain control of the shantytowns surrounding Lima. This all-out attack includes hijacking food trucks and distributing the contents to the people, a tactic previously only used by MRTA.

989. Montoya, David. "Juguemos a la ronda: ¿lobo estás?" *Quehacer,* no.76 (March-April 1992): 43-47.

Since 1989 popular organizations have discussed among themselves the necessity of self-defense against Sendero, in effect extending the *rondas,* the self-defense patrols so crucial to the counterinsurgency fight in the countryside, to the urban areas. In fact, this idea is part of a strategy to build a broad coalition of all sectors of civil society to defend democracy, a people-State-military coalition to fight Sendero, a proposal backed by Senderologists. Many leftist politicians are opposed to this idea; they object to any alliance with a government they term anti-populist. In addition, many people in the *barrios* are afraid of *senderista* retaliation, distrust the police and army, or see the *rondas* as too dependent on the military. They fear converting their neighborhoods into "many Ayacuchos." Montoya examines the many facets of this debate; he concludes that while most people want to defend their neighborhoods against Sendero, collaboration with the military is unthinkable; people prefer fighting subversion through a strategy of peace and development, rather than with arms.

990. Montoya, David and Carlos Reyna. "Sendero Luminoso: informe de Lima, según Sendero." *Quehacer,* no.76 (March-April 1992): 35-42.

Ever since the beginning of the *senderista* insurrection, Lima has been one of its most important objectives. As early as 1978, its blueprint for people's war emphasized Lima as well as the central sierra. This plan, in fact, modifies Mao's classic strategy, in which the cities are important only in the very last phase of insurrection, before the final assault to take power. Montoya and Reyna cite recent Sendero documents that pinpoint the "immense *barrio* masses" as potential revolutionary cadre, like "iron bands that can encircle the enemy and that hold back the reactionary forces." Using *senderista* sources such as "Six years of *guerra popular"* and "Bases de discusión" published in *El Diario,* they outline Sendero's stated objectives and methods: Lima's concentration of economic power invites sabotage; its centralization of power makes it a target for "annihilation"; the concentration of national and international media and foreign representatives make it difficult for the government to hide or cover up Sendero's actions. Most important is "work among the masses," for which Sendero created the Movimiento Revolucionario de Defensa del Pueblo (MRDP). In Sendero's original doctrine, the MRDP was not supposed to be a nucleus of the New Power; its job was to build centers of resistance to assist in people's war. Since Sendero's central committee decided that the revolution was entering the phrase of "strategic equilibrium," Lima has become even more important. Reflecting this ideological change, the cities are now supposed to be part of the "new power," originally confined to the countryside. The MRDP will be part of that process. To substantiate this, the authors cite a recent issue of *El Diario* : "[In] the immense masses (almost eight million inhabitants of Lima) lived the force of the new power through the MRDP..." The takeover of the *barrio* Félix Raucana was the prototype of Sendero's new urban strategy. The decisive battle will be to control the *barriadas* on the Lima periphery. Attacks on police and *barrio* leaders have escalated in order to create a vacuum of power that the guerrillas will fill. Lima, say Montoya and Reyna, will see many violent episodes in the months to come.

991. "Villa El Salvador: la batalla por la CUAVES." *Quehacer,* no.76 (March-April 1992): 48-50.

Report on the battle for the Communidad Urbana Autogestionario de Villa El Salvador, the Urban Self-Managed Community of Villa El Salvador (CUAVES). Rather more than a simple battle between the community and Sendero, it is a complicated struggle between various community factions and opinions. Izquierda Unida partisans are fighting with *aprista* supporters, and against long-standing, entrenched community leaders. Since CUAVES was established, feminist, youth, and small business groups have emerged that are demanding a share in the running of the community. One faction charges the ex-mayor with responsibility for the death of María Elena Moyano, of enriching himself, and of allowing the military to establish a base in one part of

the community. After examining a tangled and complicated situation, the article concludes that Sendero is the real winner in this situation. In a follow-up piece, "A río revuelta" (pp.51-55), Carlos Reyna interviews various marchers in a CUAVES demonstration about the dissention in the organization, the assassination of Moyano, their feelings about an army presence in their community, etc. A sidebar ("In Order Not to Forget") reminds readers of the heroism shown by many community leaders today in the face of Sendero terror. Months before her murder, Sendero tried to blacken Moyano's name by insinuating that she helped the security forces and was not truly a popular leader. She had to live a virtually clandestine life, moving from house to house. Only she had the courage to lead a march against Sendero on the day it called an armed strike. She filled a political vacuum that even the left feared to try to fulfill. The day after her murder, a *senderista* faction won approval for support of the *paro armado.* Everyone, says *Quehacer,* can draw their own conclusions.

992. Selbin, Eric."Is Peru the Pentagon's Next Battlefield?" *Utne Reader,* no.50 (March-April 1992): 18-20.

As the U.S. casts about for a role in the post-communist "new world order," drug traffickers, terrorists, and insurgent groups are the new enemies. U.S. military advisors (now being sent to Peru) have historically been the harbingers of major U.S. military incursions. Selbin, citing various press accounts and reports by Americas Watch, paints a picture of a nation wracked by poverty, debt, and cholera, in which only the coca trade is thriving. U.S. intentions in Peru go beyond narcotics: "The goal is to contain the expansion of Sendero Luminoso." The complexities of Sendero, says Selbin, defy a capsule explanation; he cites the December 1990/January 1991 issue of *NACLA Report on the Americas* as the best overview, singling out Degregori and Andreas for special praise. Selbin finds that U.S. involvement in Peru has been underreported; this includes the training of two Peruvian combat battalions by Green Berets, the creation of river patrols under the supervision of the U.S. Navy, and a general upgrading of Peru's helicopters and jets. U.S. forces have already fought at least one large-scale battle with *senderistas.* Selbin concludes with a quote from a Franciscan missionary, who fears that the United States, fresh from its Middle Eastern "triumphs," is willing, perhaps even eager, to carry out another foreign crusade.

993. González, Raúl. "'Sendero no podrá vencernos:' entrevista a Miguel Azcueta." *Debate,* no.68 (March-May 1992): 44-48.

Raúl González interviews Michel Azcueta, ex-mayor of Villa El Salvador, on Sendero's lethal offensive against popular leaders. In February a list of candidates supported by Sendero won an election in the Industrial Park of the Villa. As a consequence, both González and Azcueta, their lives threatened by terrorism, have left Peru for Spain. González asks Azcueta about the position of the left in fighting Sendero in Perul; in particular, about the failure of some groups to support María Elena Moyano in her battle with Sendero, and about the crucial role that the popular organizations have in organizing the people of Villa El Salvador.

994. Pásara, Luis H. "El Perú posible." *Debate,* no.68 (March-May 1992): 22-32.

In an essay written before Alberto Fujimori's *autogolpe* of April 5, Pásara sketches some possible futures for his country. He reminds readers that Shining Path has shown an ability to adapt to changing circumstances surprising in a movement so longed deemed rigidly dogmatic and vertically authoritarian by its critics. Sendero has demonstrated, in particular in the Huallaga, that it can combine unyielding strategic perspective with tactical flexibility, which allows it to form a pact with *narcotráfico* or co-exist with an authority that does not wish to confront it. Pásara terms Sendero a "mutant" that is learning to combine seduction with threat. If we define taking power as the exercise of control over social relations, Pásara says, then Sendero is taking power. It is collecting "taxes" from merchants and *narcotraficantes,* controlling roads and access to *barrios,* exacerbating social conflicts, terrorizing judges and paralyzing those who denounce it. Sendero is the principal political actor on the Peruvian scene. It alone has a strategic vision of its objectives, and the capacity to achieve them. Pásara places Sendero within his analysis of the old national fissure in Peru that separates the state and society, a crack that Sendero's war has opened wide.

995. "Las siete predicciones." *Debate,* no.68 (March-May 1992): 38-42.

Debate asks prominent Peruvians for their opinions on seven problems that will be important in Peru in the coming years: the recession, taxes, the economy, politics, etc. Concerning Shining Path, it asks Carlos Iván Degregori an astoundingly prophetic question: "What impact

would the detention of Abimael Guzmán have on Sendero?" Degregori answers somewhat elliptically, but almost lyrically, that Sendero has an impractical vision of a "nirvana" or "promised land." In its own words: "A society of great harmony...a new society, without exploited or exploiters, without oppressed or oppressors, without classes, without a state, without parties, without democracy, without arms, without wars." History teaches us, Degregori says, that if Sendero arrived at such a promised land, it would flow not with milk and honey, but with more blood and misery. The greatest strengths of Sendero--its leadership and vertical organization--could be converted into weaknesses. Guzmán is too prominent to avoid bloody disputes over his mantle should he hypothetically disappear. Aso, a rigid structure breaks more easily than a flexible one. But the challenge of Sendero would continue whether or not there were division within its ranks.

996. "Objectivo SL: vacío de poder." *Caretas,* no.1205 (April 6 1992): 32-35.

Report on Sendero's immediate objective: to abort the municipal elections of November, and to create a power vacuum that it can then fill. Beginning in 1987, Sendero stepped up pressure against mayors and council-members, killing fifteen *alcaldes* and three *regidores;* they murdered nineteen and six respectively in 1988, and thirty and twelve in 1989, with another fourteen candidates assassinated. In 1990 a dozen mayors and councilmen have been killed so far. The article details where this violence has taken place, and graphically charts the percentage of blank, spoiled, and invalid ballots by year. A table shows districts where there have been no elections since 1989. Neither the government nor political parties, says *Caretas,* have given this phenomenon the attention it deserves.

Following is an excellent piece, "¿Por qué Zacarías?", on the murder of an individual who was a "social promoter" working for the NGO "Ideas," and well as a leader in his*barrio* in Vitarte. Zacarías Magallanes, 35, used to belong to the leftist party Vanguardia Revolucionaria before joining an NGO. *Caretas* recounts his life and political odyssey. He worked as a construction laborer while attending teacher's college, then joined VR and IU before deciding on a life of social work. He helped people obtain social assistance and sanitation, and was the prime mover behind the construction of a school. But the Carretera Central is where Sendero is determined to build its *bases de apoyo,* so that it can eventually blockade Lima. People like Magallanes stand in Sendero's way, so he was murdered. When, asks *Caretas,* will the government realize that people like Magallanes are the best bulwark against subversion?

997. Trujillo, Stephen G. "Peru's Maoist Drug Dealers." *The New York Times* (April 7 1992): A27.

Well-meaning analysts still ignore the truth about Shining Path's involvement in the drug trade that poisons Peruvian society. Trujillo, a former army Ranger and Green Beret, worked for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in the Upper Huallaga Valley; he refutes these lies from personal experience. Trujillo recounts a raid on a drug lab in the Upper Huallaga, where fresh cocaine base residue and notated Maoist lesson plans were found. Also discovered were ledgers with up-to-date payments to coca framers and income from Colombian traffickers. The guerrillas, from Los Tigres cell, escaped into the jungle. Trujillo accuses Sendero of controlling coca cultivation in the Valley, forcing farmers to grow coca or face punishment. Their involvement in trafficking is less certain, but they control Uchiza, the cocaine capital of the world at night, sharing taxes on coca flights out of the area with equally corrupt army officers. Sendero has intimidated Colombia *firmas,* or drug mafias, with their complete ruthlessness, and control the number of Colombians working in the Huallaga. Sendero's domination of the *firmas* allows it to tax all levels of the trade, from subsistence farmers to middlemen, and lab owners to traffickers. In addition, the rebels process and refine cocaine in their own jungle labs. It is clear, charges Trujillo, that Sendero is financing its revolution with cocaine; its estimated annual revenue is between $15 million and $35 million. The money goes to people's committees and the Guerrilla Army of the People. Trujillo also describes an entire national economy dependent upon coca money; while the Peruvian GDP has shrunk by 22% in two years and inflation has destroyed legal income, Peru has not missed a payment on its foreign debt since the election of Fujimori. Many believe that Peru's creditors are being paid in narco-dollars. Trujillo concludes by warning that a military "dirty war" solution to Sendero will not work; such a war in 1983-84 killed thousands and merely forced Sendero underground. The U.S. should realize that its war on drugs may only abet this repression.

998. Trujillo, Stephen G. "Cocaine and Corruption in Peru." *The New York Times* (April 8 1992): A25.

Trujillo analyzes the state of the war on drugs in Peru. Although the Andean Strategy has earmarked more than half its 5-year, 42.2 billion dollar budget for economic measures, most of Peru's allotment has been used to pay interest on the national debt. Smuggling has continued unabated, with barely a dozen out of hundreds of drug flights intercepted or diverted. Although

cultivation leveled off in the Huallaga last year, fungal blight, not counter-drug campaigns, was the cause. Up to 380,000 of the Valley's inhabitants are engaged in the cocaine trade, and cultivation is spreading to other parts of Peru. Eradication, crop substitution, and interdiction efforts have all failed to stem the flow of "coke" to the U.S. The Santa Lucia base was attacked, and one U.S. helicopter has crashed or been shot down, with three American casualties. The destruction of dozens of cocaine labs has only forced the remainder to be more efficient; the result has been smaller, decentralized labs processing purer cocaine deeper in the jungle. Trujillo describes tensions between the Peruvian police and army, some of whose senior officers have formed relationships with Colombian *firmas.* He recounts tense, armed stand-offs between policemen and soldiers guarding cocaine, stash houses, airfields, and aircraft used by traffickers. He also describes millions in drug money divided up between army officers and local authorities in Uchiza, a bustling city dedicated to the export of unrefined cocaine. Corruption is rising even among the drug police. Trujillo believes that if corruption among the Peruvian police reaches the point where DEA agents cannot sleep safely in their quarters, then construction of the $50 million [Santa Lucia] base will have been in vain. The Fujimori coup may mean the end of the drug war in Peru; Trujillo now fears for the safety of the honest policemen with whom he risked his life. Perhaps no amount of aid would have been enough to buy the loyalty of those who profit from drug trafficking, but the U.S.'s half-hearted effort has made no difference at all. The generals will have to be told that U.S. aid will not resume unless democracy is restored. "Our vices are the cause of great suffering in Peru," writes Trujillo. Cocaine must be fought at its source, but with more sensitivity to the crisis confronting Peru.

999. "El cerco de Lima." *Caretas,* no.1207 (April 20 1992): 38-41.

Sendero's encirclement of Lima is based on two coordinated movements. One is the infiltration of the *pueblos jóvenes* that surround the capital. The other is the capture of neighboring towns and access routes to Lima. Right now Sendero controls almost all of the secondary roads. Except for the main highways, everything is under its command. Sendero recently demolished the community of Andajes, whose inhabitants fled. Sendero has now forbidden buses from traveling in certain areas where it controls the roads. A driver told *Caretas* that the road between Cerro de Pasco and Huánuco is virtually under *senderista* authority. Police posts have been relocated to provincial capitals, or replaced by the army. Other routes to the coast are under attack. A police official told *Caretas* about listening to a government minister elaborate about intelligence and counterinsurgency tasks. The police he inspected are short of manpower, have only a camera and a tape recorder for intelligence gathering, and no funds to pay informants. Worse still, the national police intelligence agency (DIRIN) has only two computers and no photographic or film equipment. Meanwhile, demonstrations of open support for the Popular Guerrilla Army can take place in broad daylight in some *barrios.* A large-scale map of Lima and its surrounding areas under Sendero's control or influence, with dramatic illustrations of masked terrorists, accompanies the article.

1000. Lane, Charles. "The 'Self-Coup' That Rocked Peru." *Newsweek,* v.119 (April 20 1992): 43-44.

Although U.S. intelligence had warned of deep-seated resentments simmering in Peru's officer corps, the U.S. was still caught by surprise by President Fujimori's *autogolpe,* by which he dissolved Congress, suspended civil liberties, and established government by decree. The Bush administration's "point man for democracy in Latin America," Bernard Aronson, suspended anti-drug discussions in Peru and recommended suspending all but humanitarian aid. Inasmuch as Venezuela suffered a failed coup attempt and Bolivia is beset by strikes and coup rumors, the forces of authoritarianism will surely take heart from Fujimori's example. Lane describes Fujimori as a moderate abroad, and an anti-politics maverick at home, attacking Congress and the Catholic Church. But he has accepted U.S. aid, resumed debt payments to the World Bank, and restored access to international credit. 71% of Peruvians support his dissolution of Congress, and 89% his plan to restructure a corrupt judiciary. The major beneficiary of the coup is expected to be the army, which has been given a free hand to fight Shining Path. But Fujimori's coup may play into its hands; Sendero has long tried to provoke the government into revealing its fascist character. There is a proviso in the 1979 Constitution that permits people "to rise up in defense of the Constitution." Fujimori's gamble may fail, Lane speculates, if he fails to get results.

A follow-up piece, "The Soldier's Story: An Army in Chaos," looks at an army in disarray. Troops in the Andean town of Puquio are short of bullets, food, and are paid only $23 a month. When Sendero attacked Puquio in January, blew up the bank and town hall, and murdered three policemen, soldiers did not stir, and even sabotaged their radio so that orders could not reach them. Army support for Fujimori's coup reflects frustration and humiliation over the poor state of the armed forces. A lack of spare parts has grounded one-third of Peru's 60 Russian helicopters. A

jungle garrison has 230 troops to patrol 10,000 square miles, no vehicles, and one chopper 50 miles away. The military spends only 15% of its budget on counterinsurgency; the rest goes to buy heavy weapons to deter Chile and Ecuador, Peru's traditional rivals. The country is planning to purchase 100 T-55 tanks from Czechoslovakia. Soldiers' salaries have been cut and eroded by inflation; moonlighting and corruption are epidemic. The government budgets more to pay for jail rations than food for its soldiers. The desertion rate is high; last year 10% of the NCO's and officers requested early retirement. In fighting Sendero, the army routinely resorts to torture and extrajudicial executions. Soldiers privately say it's pointless to take prisoners, since a corrupt and frightened judiciary has freed 85% of some 7,000 suspected terrorists arrested since 1982. U.S. aid could help, but it has been tied to largely futile anti-drug efforts, and to improvements in the human rights situation.

1001. Robinson, Linda. "Destroying the Law in Order to Save It." *U.S. News & World Report,* v.112, no.15 (April 20 1992): 59.

Report on the Fujimori *autogolpe,* which has instantly given credence to Sendero's claim that Peru is a dictatorship. "Shining Path must be applauding this more than anyone," declared expert Gustavo Gorriti, who was detained and then released. Robinson reviews Fujimori's feeble counterinsurgency moves since the coup, which have been limited to accompanying troops painting over *senderista* graffiti and giving an army that was already an abuser of human rights free rein against the guerrillas. But the army's aging, Soviet-style equipment limits its freedom of action. Fujimori is depending on more peasant self-defense patrols and better army intelligence, but nothing will help as much as economic success. However, the OAS is debating sanctions, and a cutoff of foreign aid will dash any chances of economic recovery. Isolated and inept, the government is an easy target for Sendero, "which appeals to mestizos and university students whose aspirations are blocked by Peru's caste-conscious, racist society." Fujimori pledges to defeat the guerrillas by 1995; Abimael Guzmán vows victory in the 1990's. "Unless Peru changes course, Guzmán's crystal ball may be accurate."

1002. Chauvin, Lucien. "In Peru, Fujimori Fever Runs High Despite Coup." *National Catholic Reporter,* v.28, no.25 (April 24 1992): 10.

Report from post-coup Peru, where polls show that more than 70% of the population supports Fujimori's actions. "Fujimori has the right ideas on how to improve the country, and the Congress was trying to block him," says a student at Catholic University. "This country needed a radical change, and that's exactly what Fujimori has decided to do." The joint chiefs of staff fully back the president; author Mario Vargas Llosa told the U.S. press that the Peruvian military engineered the coup and that Fujimori was little more than a puppet. Unions, NGO's, and churches have called upon the government to restore constitutional order. Catholic bishops have expressed the hope that democracy can be quickly restored. Chauvin spoke with Catholic relief workers and evangelicals who are concerned over a rise in human rights violations and repression against grass-roots organizations. Gustavo Gorriti says that Fujimori has played into Sendero's hands: "The government has shot itself in the foot, sweeping away its best method of confronting Shining Path through democracy." Sendero's answer to the coup was a 200-pound "bus bomb," exploded in front of the Villa El Salvador police station.

1003. Gaupp, Peter and Richard Bauer. "Progress and Pain in Latin America." *Swiss Review of World Affairs,* v.42, no.1 (April 1992): 12-17.

In this article subtitled "Adios to Latin America's Guerrillas?", Gaupp looks at the current status of insurgencies in Latin America. With the renunciation of violent revolution by El Salvador's Farabundo Marti Liberation Front, the greatest Latin American guerrilla victories--Cuba and Nicaragua--lie 30 and 10 years respectively in the past. The collapse of military regimes in the Andes and Southern Cone, the establishment of democratic conditions, and the end of superpower rivalry between East and West has diminished guerrilla activity in the hemisphere. The authors examine Guatemala and Colombia, and ask why these insurgencies continue. Their symptoms (ethnic conflict and drug trade involvement) are even more pronounced in Peru, where social, ethnic, and regional disparities are similar to those in Guatemala. As long as Sendero and MRTA retain their links to the cocaine Mafia, "both groups are in a secure material position and have no reason to yield ground as long as the areas under their control are not seriously threatened." In Peru, armed resistance has completely degenerated into terrorism. "Those who refer to the Sendero Luminoso as a 'guerrilla organization' do a serious injustice to many other groups--from Fidel Castro's fighters in the Sierra Maestra to the Salvadoran MFLN--which have fought more or less credibly for ethical principles and did not elevate terrorism to an absolute dogma. The

age of the 'classical' guerrillas is over in Latin America." What remains, say the authors, are "dirty wars" in a few countries with special circumstances, and a hard core of terrorist groups (in Chile, Peru, and Panama). Following the article is a section entitled "Human Rights and Terrorism in Peru: A Special Case," that examines the situation in Peru. Bauer succinctly summarizes Sendero's war, concluding that while Sendero's support may be dwindling in the countryside, its urban campaign continues; it remains successful at getting the police and army to fragment their forces geographically and lure them into unpopular overreactions.

1004. Terrorismo en el Perú." *Revista javeriana,* v.60, no.583 (April 1992): 207-212.

The Jesuit publication *Revista javeriana* (whose subtitle is "Christian thought in dialogue with the world"), wishes to repudiate Sendero's systematic campaign of distortion, and set out the facts about what kind of organization it is. At the same time, it provides a liberal Christian analysis of Peru's problems. First, the article analyzes contemporary Peru, a country that is 40% Indian, 40% mestizo, 10% European, and 5% Asian and black. Until the 20th century Peru was a feudal society with power and wealth concentrated in a few hands; it is a nation in which to be Indian is to be poor. The demographic explosion of the 1950's and subsequent decades has produced profound waves of migrations to Lima and other cities. There has also been extensive economic development, whose benefits are inequitably distributed. Peru has 46 universities with almost a half-million students, young people who know that they are candidates for a future of "subemployment," which produces social and political resentments. The question *Revista javeriana* poses is, "Can a country divided by profound racial resentments and afflicted by a massive and growing impoverishment live in democracy?" The article traces developments of the 1980's; with respect to Sendero, it charges that its violence and terror is not just one of a number of strategies, but its essential mode of operation. How can Sendero be fought? First, it is necessary to understand that Sendero is not a movement like the Sandinistas of Nicaragua; a better comparison would be with Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge of Cambodia. Sendero is not a popular movement; it cannot count on the support of either the peasantry or the urban poor. *Rondas campesinas* are merely one of a number of popular organizations fighting Sendero. It is important for bodies like Amnesty International and the OAS's Human Rights Commission to keep pressure on the government to respect human rights, and to condemn Sendero as well. But *Revista javeriana* 's final and most crucial point is that Sendero is acting within a context of a terrible crisis in Peru; the struggle against Sendero is part of a battle against poverty and injustice.

1005. "Raúl González: 'Sendero Luminoso crece, pero no avanza.'" *Ideéle,* año 4, no.36 (April 1992): 15-20.

Ideéle interviews *Quehacer* 's leading expert on Sendero, just hours before he left Peru because of threats against his life. González, a sociologist at the Catholic University, believes that "Sendero is growing but not advancing," and that strategically it is trapped. Sendero, he notes, is not just pledged to destroy the old order, but to construct a new one. Is it doing this? González says no; he also believes that paradoxically, Sendero is growing more in the cities than in the countryside, and this is a bad sign for the movement. He discusses at length how Sendero's urban campaign has been vindicated by Guzmán (who declared, without any justification, that Sendero's task of constructing a new social order in the countryside has been completed). The "achievement" of strategic equilibrium means that the cities now have priority. What Guzmán has gained in terms of internal correlation, he has lost ideologically. Strategic equilibrium, declares González, is a fiction. He also disputes that Sendero is an unknown or cryptic movement; on the contrary, it is very comprehensible, because its plans and goals have been clearly stated from the start. Its plans are divided into campaigns: each campaign has a political objective; the duration of each offensive is predetermined; each offensive is the translation of a political objective into military ends; at the end of each campaign there is a final step; and afterwards the party holds a plenary session to evaluate its progress. González is of the opinion that "there is nothing more foreseeable than the political logic of Sendero."

1006. "Violencia política y educación: la letra con sangre entra." *Ideéle,* año 4, no.36 (April 1992): 4-13.

The recent murder by Sendero of eight teachers in Huancayo underlines the key role Shining Path assigns to education in its strategy of people's war. The "massification" or expansion of education in Peru has also extended the presence of the state into areas where Sendero would prefer to be the sole figure of authority. The expansion of education is not merely the creation of the government, but a response to popular demand, especially from the peasantry. Schools are centers for more than education alone: teachers have also been active in social organization and mobilization, and they have frequently acted as intermediaries between the people and the

authorities. Thus, in many villages they are people of considerable power. One expert, Rosa María Mujica, criticizes college education in Peru as conducive to Sendero's message; she characterizes it as antidemocratic, authoritarian, repressive, oriented towards submission, repetitive, mechanical, and antithetical to critical thinking. But Peru's economic crisis has diminished the educational sector: hyperinflation has wiped out teacher's salaries, and state aid to education has been reduced. This has worked in Sendero's favor. Where it has not driven out teachers through threats, the movement has sought to control their unions, in order to use teachers to articulate its strategy for people's war. *Ideéle* describes the functioning of "popular schools," and their message. The schools teach mathematics, language, and history, in order to better instruct the people in *pensamiento Gonzalo.* Where Sendero teaches people to read and write, slogans *(lemas),* songs, and *senderista* rules (Mao's famous regulations) are the first things taught. All national symbols, including the national anthem and the flag, are prohibited. To make matters worse, while Sendero infiltrated urban and rural schools, the government has concentrated on breaking the national teacher's strike and their union movement.

An interesting sidebar quotes at length from *El Diario* on Sendero's "new education": the semifeudal and semicolonal nature of Peru will be broken only by violent armed revolution, embodied in Peru country by People's War. In the popular committees there is a new type of education; not the elitist, anti-scientific education tied to the old order, but a new, scientific, and truly popular education, at the service of the people. The curriculum is subordinate to the ideology of the proletariat and the needs of the people themselves. It includes Historical Materialism, for the understanding of history and the social forces that move it; Dialectic Materialism, for the comprehension of nature and the origin of man; and Gonzalo Thought, as the application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the conditions of the Peruvian revolution...(*El Diario,* August 29, 1991).

1007. Marks, Tom. "Making Revolution: Sendero Luminoso in Peru." *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* v.3 (Spring 1992): 22-46.

Marks critiques the "third generation" scholarship of insurgency for its emphasis on structural factors over deliberative (purposive) action. In examining Shining Path, he finds that its departure from traditional *foco-* style insurrections may make it different from other Latin American revolutionary movements, but that its tactical, operational, and strategic objectives are not particularly unique when viewed in international perspective. Sendero, like many other insurgencies, is comprised of leaders drawn from the elite and followers from the masses. When the two interact with one another, and the ideological approach of the leadership holds sway over the masses, then insurgency, rather than mere rebellion, will result. Shining Path, Marks writes, is not a peasant rebellion that has been "captured." Marks outlines in detail the actual mechanisms of indoctrination and recruitment that Sendero has used in Ayacucho to build support bases and popular committees within guerrilla zones. In his critique of Sendero's strategy, he notes both success in the Huallaga Valley and difficulties in Lima, where conditions seem particularly ripe for revolt. But as long as Sendero continues to use terror, not as an end in itself, but as a tool to facilitate the functioning and expansion of its infrastructure, the movement will remain viable. Marks concludes with some extremely perceptive remarks on parallels with America's experience in Vietnam. Like the Viet Cong, Sendero uses terror selectively for political ends. "It is the total insurgent movement, particularly its use of political means to achieve political ends, that is the most significant aspect of the revolutionary war being waged by Sendero--with force available when needed to make a point." Mark's work, based largely on interviews with foreign and Peruvian military and political observers, is probably the best military analysis of Sendero available in English.

1008. "Shining Path Carries the War to Peru's Cities." *RAND Research Review,* v.16 (Spring 1992): 8-9.

Twenty years ago, following in the best tradition of Latin American radicals, Abimael Guzmán went to the mountains and started a revolution, a revolution that looks not to Cuba or Nicaragua, but to a model based on Chinese-style Marxism and the long-forgotten social structure of the ancient Incas. Today Guzmán and Sendero Luminoso are ready to begin the final act of the struggle. Already established in 114 provinces, Sendero now controls or contests control of Peru's entire central sierra. RAND quotes from its own study by McCormick, which pessimistically predicts possible success for Sendero. Fujimori's *autogolpe* played into Sendero's hands. Its present urban campaign is designed to create the conditions for social disintegration; the guerrillas intend to squeeze the city from within while undermining its integrity from without. McCormick disputes U.S. government figures, which put Sendero's strength at 3-5,000 armed cadres; he puts the figure closer to 10-15,000. In recent testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, McCormick discussed U.S. policy options with respect to Peru. Although a victory by fanatic

Sendero would send shock waves throughout the hemisphere and put pressure on the U.S. to "do something" to reverse or mitigate such an outcome, McCormick does not believe U.S. interests in Peru are great enough to justify the risks and high levels of military involvement necessary to make a difference in the conflict. Not even American interest in stopping the flow of narcotics from Peru is a compelling reason, he argues. Because Sendero supports the peasant growers, the U.S. would have to suspend counterdrug operations to fight the guerrillas. While this strategy of separating the grower from the guerrilla might work, it would put the U.S. in the absurd position of official sanctioning the cultivation of coca in exchange for support against Sendero.

1009. "Visto de cerca: Operativo mudanza 1." *Caretas,* no.1210 (May 11 1992): 10-17, 80-83.

Extended report on the operation to retake Canto Grande prison, which has resulted in a bloody debacle. At dawn on May 2, 650 police from various divisions, including special operations and SWAT teams, gathered to launch operation "Mudanza 1," whose objective was to transfer prisoners to other jails. The *senderistas,* who had fortified their pavilions, fought back for three days, while the whole inglorious operation was televised by CNN and watched by a horrified group of prisoners' families. *Caretas* describes in detail, with maps and drawings, the siege of Canto Grande, during which the police had to resort to explosives to blast their way into the *senderista* cellblocks. The death toll is ten prisoners and three policemen dead, and another 15 wounded. Most of the prisoners' bodies bear multiple gunshot wounds. *Caretas* lists the errors committed by the authorities, the first of which was the decision to take the *senderista* pavilion back at any cost. The whole operation was improvised, with inadequate personnel and logistical support. The army and SIN withheld information on arms and tunnels inside Canto Grande, in order to embarrass the police. Above all, the authorities declined to negotiate with the prisoners, preferring to force them into surrender. The Fujimori government, concludes *Caretas,* has not enhanced its prestige with this operation.

1010. "Canto Grande: por dentro." *Caretas,* no.1211 (May 18 1992): 35-41, 82-83.

Follow-up report on what *Caretas* calls a necessary but disordered intervention. Public opinion supports the government; in no country in the world are terrorists permitted to control their own prisons and convert them into schools and redoubts for revolution. But the chaos and disorder of the operation are characteristic of this dictatorship. Although the government has reaped the applause of the "addicted press," and public opinion is for the moment favorable, the results of the massacre will not be what some believe. Many thought the Lima prison massacres of 1986 would be a mortal blow for Sendero; this was not so. The body count has risen, from an official ten prisoners dead, to a total of 47 bodies in the Lima morgues, marked as being from "Castro Castro" prison, not Canto Grande. The OAS's Human Rights Commission has been systematically blocked from access to the prisons, in spite of promises from the Fujimori government to the contrary. *Caretas,* after speaking to policemen (including the wounded), reconstructs the operation, recounts the personal histories of some of the *senderista* victims, and details the agreement which several Sendero delegates had reached with the government on April 14 to give the prison service access to their cellblocks in the presence of the Public Ministry and Red Cross. Following is a story ("Secuela explosiva," pp.42-46, 85), on how Sendero is commemorating the twelfth anniversary of ILA with violence, including a car bomb which consisted of 350 kilos of dynamite and was exploded outside the building housing the personnel office of the National Police.

1011. Neier, Aryeh. "Watching Rights." *The Nation,* v.254, no.19 (May 18 1992): 657.

President Fujimori, having shut down Congress and the courts, has given the military the free hand it has long sought against Sendero. The military may now round up suspected terrorists and torture them. Similarly, it no longer has to worry about denunciations in Congress when it massacres a whole village in which Sendero is said to have established itself. Neier fears that a "Guatemalan" solution may be in the offing. Sendero has rooted itself so deeply in the country that "[T]o fulfill Fujimori's pledge to wipe out Sendero by 1995, it might be necessary to massacre whole neighborhoods in Lima for terror to work sufficiently in the city's slum dwellers. The armed forces would have to kill hundreds of thousands. There could be no quarter. Utter ruthlessness would have to be the rule..." Short of such a terror campaign, it is impossible to image how Fujimori can make good on his pledge. Another option--to fight a clean war--has yet to be tried. The government could discipline the armed forces, punish those who violate human rights, and attempt to establish legitimacy among the poor. Could this work? Probably not without a tremendous infusion of outside resources to help alleviate economic misery, says Neier. "It would

be a monumental task, after all these years, to persuade poor Peruvians that the government and its armed forces have changed."

1012. Strong, Simon. "Where the Shining Path Leads." *The New York Times Magazine* (May 24 1992): 12-17, 35.

Good account of Sendero's growing influence outside Peru. Although about a third of Strong's article recounts the history of Shining Path, the greater portion describes how far-flung supporters of Sendero are spreading its doctrine in Europe and the United States. For example, Kreuzberg, a crumbling district near the Berlin Wall, home to skinheads, artists, revolutionaries, migrant workers and the down-and-out, features walls bearing the slogan "Revolutionary Sister City Ayacucho-Kreuzberg." Among Sendero's supporters is "Enrique," the spokesman for the Peru's People Movement in Europe, a group of exiles whose goal is to win people to Sendero's cause and bring about the formation of Maoist revolutionary parties. Another key player is Luis Arce Borja, who now publishes a monthly called *El Diario Internacional* in Spanish, English, and French. Other groups include Sol-Perú; its French branch sells party literature and *El Diario* at a table in the Cité Universitaire. In Belgium, Sendero has the support of the Belgian Workers Party and is regularly featured in its paper. In Britain, a conference called to condemn Fujimori's regime as fascist during his visit to London was attended by a former Labor parliamentarian, Green Party delegates, and Indian and Turkish leftists. Messages of support were received from the National Union of Students and Labor MP Tony Benn. In the United States, the Revolutionary Communist Party U.S.A. disseminates Maoist and Sendero materials through its chain of Revolution Books stores. In 1985 the San Francisco branch and other activists formed the U.S. Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru. Strong mentions indications that pro-Maoists are active in Bolivia, and that Sendero has support among the left in Ecuador and Colombia; there is some evidence of Shining Path influence in Chile and Argentina as well. The end of the Cold War and the crumbling of the Soviet bloc has seen not peace, but increased ethnic tension and economic hardship. "Allies of Sendero Luminoso see in the misery of migrants and the urban poor an opportunity to win adherents to their cause. Within the last few years, Peru People's Movements--clandestine organizations set up by Shining Path--have sprouted in Germany, France, Sweden, Switzerland and Mexico. Their goal is the creation of Maoist revolutionary parties, often via the radicalizing of local political groups, in the host countries." A spokesman for the Revolutionary Communist Party U.S.A. says that his organization is working alongside "developing fronts" of protest, including, he says, the struggles of the homeless, immigrants, women and ethnic minorities fighting racism. Robert Torricelli, Democratic Representative from New Jersey, remarked at a Congresional hearing on Sendero that he had no doubt that at some future time the United States would be faced "with Shining Path as a larger problem of more immediate concern, potentially on a global scale of response."

1013. "Estrategia antisubversiva: ¿Hacia la guerra total?" *Ideéle,* año 4 , no.37 (May 1992): 19-24.

Are we marching towards total war? asks *Ideéle.* What are the plans of the self-proclaimed "Emergency Government of National Reconstruction" to confront Sendero and MRTA? Will the result be a free hand for the armed forces, and total impunity for human rights abuses? This scenario represents a reversal of the small advances made in the participation of society in the counterinsurgency effort, and will make the human rights situation worse. Fujimori's Supreme Decree 171-90-PCM gives military tribunals jurisdiction over cases involving crimes committed by security personnel in the emergency zones. *Ideéle* also discusses Law 733, a national mobilization law that converts the entire country into a sort of emergency zone, and other new decrees that limit freedom of expression in the interests of fighting subversion, and that could be used to punish journalists who uncover human rights abuses and other violations of law and the constitution by the security forces. The total militarization of the war will, in the end, only help Sendero, and bring more misery and suffering to millions of Peruvians.

Following is a short piece entitled "MRTA: perhaps the final sunset?", which examines the situation of MRTA. The recent capture by DIRCOTE of a top *mirista* leader has been a severe blow to the organization. The imprisonment of MRTA leaders and the efforts of others to seek asylum in Europe reveal a movement in crisis. Still, no one will state that MRTA has disappeared or is incapable of military action; the coup of April 5 may enable it to refill its ranks and make it again a major player on the national scene.

1014. Balbi, Carmen Rosa. "Sendero en las fábricas: encendiendo la mecha." *Quehacer,* no.77 (May-June 1992): 76-88.

Long report on Sendero's attempt to infiltrate and dominate the Lima labor unions. The report is divided into two parts: "Relaciones peligrosas," and "Habla dirigente obrero senderista." Balbi also includes a chronology of armed strikes called, and labor organizers assassinated, by Sendero. It appears that Sendero's first attempts to establish "Open Classist Committees" in the factories failed. Now the movement is seeking to recruit workers as its cadres. Its method of doing so is to increase general tensions in the factory environment between workers and management in establishments where conflict is already present. Sendero is also assassinating selected plant managers and plant staff, to heighten an "us versus them" feeling among workers. Balbi looks at the general state of capital-labor relations, and examines how Sendero is exploiting the state of those relations to widen its social base. In doing so, she also analyzes changes in labor since the 1970's, such as collective negotiation, new laws, and industrial communities, which were brought about by the Velasco government. A new labor militancy resulted in an almost permanent state of labor-management antagonism, an atmosphere that persists today. In the present recession, such antagonisms have been exacerbated; Sendero's killings are designed to generate support for its brand of militant armed action. Balbi quotes some factory owners to show that feelings of class antagonisms do exist; Sendero seeks to channel those feelings into concrete support for its revolution.

In the second part of the report, a *senderista* union leader, having been deceived, he says, by Izquierda Unida, has opted for the violence of Shining Path as the only way to establish a society where social justice prevails. The *senderista* discusses the impact of the current economic crisis upon the union and popular movements, and justifies methods used by Sendero: selected assassinations, armed strikes, threats and intimidation. Armed strikes, he says, educate the public, and show the people who their enemy is. The torching of microbuses owned by the state (ENATRU) is entirely justified. Conditions are much more militarized than during the 1970's. His factory owner is a fascist, says the militant, because he seeks to nullify the class struggle; first he lowers salaries, and then he gives you help through emergency social programs. Popular kitchens were created to contain the masses. Neither the unions nor the federations can change society; even their massive strikes don't do this. We have to do it another way, he says, by overturning the dominating class. The war of the federations [the left] has become a paper war, a war of administrators. The army of unemployed and hungry in Peru today want change, and change means revolution.

1015. Montoya, David. "Toque de queda: no se aprende la lección." *Quehacer,* no.77 (May-June 1992): 50-54.

Sendero's new tactic of massive car-bombings in Lima and Callao has been directed more at the security forces than against the public; seven of the fourteen bombs exploded since April 5 were directed at the police, and three against military targets. The deadly new element is the quantity of explosives used in the *coche-bombas.* The first car-bombing was carried out by MRTA in 1985, against the APRA government. MRTA also attacked various embassies, including the U.S. embassy in Lima (bombed in April, 1986, to show solidarity with the Libyan people after American air raids against Libya). Reyna summarizes the subsequent use of bombs by MRTA and Sendero; the latter has employed horses, mules, and even children as delivery vehicles for explosives. But not until this year did the scale of the car-bombs escalate ("some megatons of difference"): attacks against the U.S. ambassador's residence, the police station in Villa San Salvador, and Channel 2 are on a larger scale than ever seen before. The curfews decreed by successive governments dating back to Velasco, although supported by the population, have not stopped attacks. More innocent civilians have been killed during curfews than guerrillas: 41 in Lima in 1986-87. Now vehicular restrictions will be added to the curfew in a (probably futile) attempt to forestall more attacks and bombings.

1016. Reyna, Carlos. "¿Asoma la intervención? Sendero tras las fronteras." *Quehacer,* no.77 (May-June 1992): 72-75.

Even while Sendero appears to be in retreat in the Andes, there is evidence that it has spread across Peru's frontiers. In neighboring counties, small subversive groups are carrying out armed actions in the name of Sendero. In Quito, the "Heroes of Canto Grande" tried to dynamite the foreign relations ministry, and later released a communiqué demanding the expulsion of Peruvian diplomats. In Chile, the "Revolutionary Guerrilla Coordinate for a Free America" sent letters to businesses in an attempt to extort money, with the warning "every fascist company will pay for its security." In Mexico, unknown persons left a dead dog at the door of the Peruvian embassy, and painted warnings on walls that the recent Canto Grande massacre would be avenged. In Bolivia, two leaders of the "Guerrilla Army Túpac Katari," which supposedly has links with Sendero, were detained. In December, 1989, the "Revolutionary Worker's Movement," a group

aligned with Sendero, assassinated the Peruvian naval attaché in La Paz. Poverty, writes Reyna, is alienating Latin American youth as never before; the collapse of the romantic guerrilla image, the impotence of parliamentary leftism, and the ideological chaos of the present favor the development of groups like Sendero. Reyna looks at the ominous fallout of the "continental irradiation of Sendero": a proposal from Carlos Menem of Argentina for the creation of a continental-wide force to guarantee stability and democracy ("Peru alone can't fight Sendero Luminoso"); a warning from Patricio Aylwin of Chile that if Sendero takes power, other nations will take action to prevent an "empire of terrorist violence"; and some warning signals in the U.S. press indicating a rising concern with the Peruvian situation. The specter of Sendero's spread has produced a current of opinion in favor of possible inter-American intervention in Peru. Such intervention would have the gravest consequences for Peru's very identity as a nation, which is exactly the effect Sendero would like to provoke.

1017. "Terror sin límites." *Caretas,* no.1214 (June 8 1992): 10-15, 82-83.

Only a week after running short pieces on how to protect yourself against car bombs, and the dangers of large supplies of explosives freely available in a mining nation, *Caretas* reports on the bombing of television station Channel 2 in Lima. A truck belonging to the Marines was hijacked, packed with explosives, and driven up to Channel's 2's studio, where it was detonated. *Caretas* criticizes the lack of a quick notification of the hijacking; who else but terrorists would steal a truck belonging to the military? The journal follows with a strongly-worded editorial, "Llega la hora" (the hour has come). The hour has come, says *Caretas,* to declare war against this terror; to utilize captured *senderistas* as sources of information; to reign in the security forces and have them befriend rather than brutalize the populace; to admit that barbaric tactics such as the prison massacres are counterproductive; to direct military resources to fighting subversion; to build a true counterinsurgency strategy; and to demolish the barriers between the military and the people. In other words, the time has come to admit that the best way to fight terrorism is through political and social, as well as military and security options.

Following (p.16) is an essay by Gustavo Gorriti, entitled "El tiempo de la dinamita." After twelve ears of internal war, says Gorriti, we have come to the time of dynamite. Explosives used to be a tool of Shining Path, an auxiliary to its attacks; now they have become its principal weapon. Just as in Beirut and Medellín, the aim of the car bomb is not intimidation, but destruction and general shock, designed to provoke the collapse of collective will. We leave behind the old adage of terrorism, "Kill one and terrorize ten thousand," for indiscriminate and massive destruction. Gorriti analyzes the history of the bomb, from Alfred Nobel's invention of dynamite through the Russian and European anarchists. But his conclusions are intended to give his fellow citizens heart: no democracy has ever fallen through the actions of terrorists; rather it has been absolutist or dictatorial regimes that have proven unstable. "We should learn from history, if we wish someday to be able to write our own."

1018. "Toque sin sentido." *Caretas,* no.1215 (June 15 1992): 34-38.

Evaluates recent government counter-moves against Sendero, many of which are ineffective and counterproductive. Popular revulsion against the murder of María Elena Moyano might have been channeled into municipal and neighborhood organization against Sendero, with the participation of diverse political, social, and ecclesiastical sectors. But the Fujimori government prefers its own methods. The "curfew," for example, is largely useless; a chart shows that the majority of Sendero's most spectacular attacks have taken place when the curfew is not in effect; i.e., between 5 a.m. and 10 p.m. Although the government insists that its "vehicular restrictions" are not a curfew, they are in anything but name. Since many transit companies opt to stop running their buses two hours before the "restrictions" go into effect, the impact on many people, particularly working people, has been very hard. Many stores and restaurants have seen their business severely diminished as well. *Caretas* once again urges the adoption of a counterinsurgency strategy that enlists, rather than alienates, the populace. One expert urges the formation of "security brigades," directed by the security forces, armed and equipped with radios, to help the police and military; the article discusses the pros and cons, and the political implications of such a strategy. A sidebar praises the formation of private night watches, which have been functioning in San Isidro with success. Unfortunately, an urban *ronda* organized in El Augustino was dissolved in the face of *senderista* intimidation after the authorities did nothing to help or encourage it. What is needed is intelligence and vigilance mechanisms that combine citizen participation with that of the security forces. Such patrols should have whistles, cellular phones, and walkie-talkies.

1019. Moorehead, Caroline. "Path of Blood." *The Independent Magazine* [Great Britain] (June 20 1992): 22-28.

Largely unnoticed, supporters of Shining Path have been taking up positions outside of Peru. Within the last few years, clandestine cells calling themselves Peru People's Movements have appeared in Germany, Canada, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, France, and Britain. While most of the left shuns Sendero as too fanatical and violent, the Communist Party of Turkey, the Parti du Travail in Belgium and the Revolutionary Communist Party of the USA are among Sendero's allies. In London a Peruvian exile wrote the *Guardian* justifying the murder of María Elena Moyano (whom she characterized as a strike-breaker in league with Peru's fascists) as a just execution, and sings revolutionary songs with the Musical Guerrilla Army in fashionable pubs. A jovial, bearded businessman named Adolofo Oleachea, said to be Sendero's representative in Britain, churns out revolutionary literature from his basement. In Brussels, Luis Arce Borja publishes *El Diario* in English, Spanish, and French versions; in Germany Sendero has been picking up followers of the dispersed Baader-Meinhof group. Moorehead talks with Bruno Kervin, a Belgian Senderologist, about the alarming advance of Sendero within a number of Belgian immigration and social welfare organizations. Sendero, Kervin says, is excellent at propaganda, and plays upon people's ignorance of South America. To many, Sendero has become the last Utopia, "the symbol of revolt of the poor countries against imperialism. Peru is the new Vietnam." Sendero's emergence in Europe and North America, and growing support in Bolivia, Colombia, Argentina, and Chile, is coincidental with its long-planned second stage, strategic equilibrium. Moorehead concludes with a quote from Luis Arce Borja: "[T]he struggle will be long and bloody...and perhaps more violent and difficult than the Vietnam war. It is estimated that this new stage in the war will claim a million victims." The death of Moyano was foretold in the pages of *El Diario* weeks before it happened; with admiring films like "Dispatches" (shown on British television), international support for a ruthless movement hoping to masquerade as just can only grow.

1020. Kerr, Sarah. "Fujimori's Plot: An Interview with Gustavo Gorriti." *The New York Review of Books,* v.39, no.12 (June 25 1992): 18-22.

Gorriti discusses Fujimori's *autogolpe,* and tells of his arrest at 3:30 a.m. by one hundred soldiers and some army intelligence officers carrying silenced submachine guns. They took him (and his computer) to the *pentagonito* (little Pentagon), military headquarters in Lima. Gorriti refused to give them the password to his hard drive, and was released after three days, due to strong international pressure. Gorriti describes Fujimori's emergency measures--*habeus corpus* has been virtually eliminated; collaboration with terrorists has been so broadly defined that it could include almost anyone, and the penalty is 20 years in jail. People accused of these crimes will be tried by secret tribunals. He also discusses Fujimori's authoritarian tendencies, his "Fujishock" austerity measures, and Vladimiro Montesinos, the president's informal national security advisor and lawyer. Kerr asks, What about Fujimori's claim that these measures were necessary to fight the Sendero? Gorriti answers that the coup has divided, perhaps irreversibly, a coalition of political forces (particularly popular organizations in Lima) that had just begun to take practical shape against Sendero. María Elena Moyano's murder was a catalyst. People on the left who would never have thought of speaking to the military were suddenly trying to coordinate district protection with the police and armed forces. At the same time, a remarkable left-right coalition in Congress prepared legislation to fight Sendero that was clearly compatible with democratic government. Civilians would have had a greater role on local government committees; grass-roots organizations would coordinate protective measures with security forces in their area; human rights would be an integral part of internal defense policy. Then came the coup--and people who would have fought against Shining Path like the IU and popular organizations began to be hounded. "For many, the struggle against Fujimori has taken on greater practical importance than the fight against Sendero. This is a very dangerous development."

Gorriti also discusses the impact of the coup on Sendero. The *autogolpe* has sabotaged Peru's internal defense against Shining Path. Bloody means, he reminds Kerr, have defeated insurgencies in places like Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, among others. But these were relatively superficial movements. A well-organized orthodox Communist insurgency, on the other hand, usually emerges from repression stronger than before, as in China in the 1930's. In the long term, Sendero will benefit from the polarization caused by the coup. Gorriti then discusses international reaction to the *golpe*, internal political opposition, and foreign economic pressure upon Peru. He concludes with some thoughts on Peruvian society: "In many ways the centralized court structure of the viceroyalty is still in place, along with that corrosive feature of the colonial mind, defining one's being through imitation, imitation of the dominant foreign model, as the way to reach power and status." Too many Peruvians, he says, look to foreign models; to many, imitation equals

identity. "It is important to remember, too, that although some thought for a time that the Shining Path was an autonomous phenomenon, 'the cry of the Andes,' it is in fact very cosmopolitan. It grows out of a century of Marxist thought, and particularly its Maoist version. Almost all of the movement's philosophy comes from somewhere else."

1021. Esperanza, Miguel. "Terrorism in Peru." *America,* v.166, no.21 (June 27 1992): 537-540.

Impassioned overview of Peru's crisis. Esperanza lays emphasis on the extremes of poverty and affluence in Peru, on its uneven regional development, on urban crowding and squalor, and on the general crisis of social institutions that cannot deliver a better life for almost half the population. "Can a country so deeply divided by racial resentment and afflicted by massive impoverishment continue to live in democracy?", he asks. Esperanza reviews the origins and evolution of Shining Path, stressing that it has little in reality to do with the thinking of José Carlos Mariátegui; it uses terror and violence not as one of several strategies, but rather as its essential strategy. We are not, he writes, talking about a movement comparable to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua; the most exact comparison is with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Sendero is not a popular, grassroots movement; it was not born out of a popular struggle. It sprang instead out of the radicalized dreams of impoverished students, from ideological consciousness-raising in university hallways. Where Sendero has attempted to win control of popular organizations, it has always failed. But grassroots organizations are fighting back; the fight against Shining Path is basically a fight against the terrible poverty and injustice within Peru.. Friends of Peru can help by urging that its foreign debt burden be eased, so that the government can spend its money on feeding its people rather than paying back foreign banks.

1022. "La batalla por Puno." *Ideéle,* no.39, año 4 (June 1992): 13-22.

For better or worse, Puno is a vital area where an alternative to violence is being tried; like the Villa El Salvador in Lima, it is a model for pacification. *Ideéle* examines how Sendero, having been rebuffed in its propaganda and proselytizing efforts in 1989 by the *puneños,* is trying different tactics: infiltrating existing labor and popular organizations. Sendero in the last few months appears to be trying two tacks: agitation and propaganda in the cities, and military activity in the countryside to establish bases of the so-called "new power." At the same time, Sendero is stepping up its selective assassination of local authorities and peasant leaders, to create power vacuums in rural areas that it can then fill. *Ideéle* describes recent *senderista* actions in the Puno region. One of the reasons for Sendero's success is the crisis in certain democratic movements, especially the Puno Peasants' Federation. In effect, this regional democratic movement, which struggled to restructure agrarian properties, was the principle deterrent to political violence in the region. *Ideéle* describes the successes and failures of the peasant movement; sadly, rivalry between the PUM (which helped organize it) and APRA has hurt efforts for peaceful mobilization in Puno. The armed forces have not helped by regarding all political organizing and mobilization as tantamount to subversion. The profound distrust between military and civil institutions means that the battle for Puno can still be lost.

1023. "Doce años después: un sendero sin fin..." *Ideéle,* año 4, no.39 (June 1992): 8-13.

A mixture of fear, indifference, and profound fatigue has taken possession of *ayacuchanos* on the twelfth anniversary of Sendero's initiation of the armed struggle. Sendero has chosen two tactics especially to commemorate this anniversary: the armed strike and selective "annihilations," both of which serve to paralyze the establishment, negate what Sendero calls the old state, and affirm the existence of the New State. Attacks on the military, police, and especially on civil defense *rondas* have increased. Also, Sendero is accelerating its propaganda efforts and attempts to infiltrate the *barrios;* for the movement, agitation and propaganda are merely different forms of armed struggle. As the PCP says, it is necessary to sow people's war and generate public opinion; without the creation of public opinion there will be no victory. For Shining Path, the generation and development of mass organizations ("new forms of power") is part of the preparations for the insurrection that will cap the planned strategic offensive to take power. *Ideéle,* examines this latest stage in Sendero's urban campaign. In one sidebar ("Sendero Luminoso en Lima"), Isabel Corral summarizes three stages of Sendero's "insertion" into Lima *pueblos jóvenes.* In another ("A doce años del ILA"), Jaime Urrutia reflects not only on twelve years of Maoist guerrilla war, but also on the violence, corruption, authoritarianism, racism, economic crisis, etc., that the war has intensified, magnified, and highlighted.

1024. Harvey, Thomas. "Sendero Luminoso: The Rise of a Revolutionary Movement." *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs,* v.16, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 163-182.

Harvey utilizes models of insurrection and comparisons with other Latin American revolutions to evaluate Sendero. It "has fanned the resentment of the native Indian population against a government that alternately exploited and neglected it. In this sense, Sendero sits squarely within the existing tradition of Latin American insurgency movements." Drawing principally upon the work of Palmer, McClintock, and Tarazona-Sevillano, Harvey lays the blame for Sendero's rise on highland poverty, racism, center-periphery tensions, and the appeal of a charismatic leader and Sendero's ideology of prehispanic Inca communism. Unfortunately, Harvey's reliance solely on English-language sources confines him to utilizing a limited number of theories about Sendero, some of which have been modified or contradicted by Peruvian scholarship.

1025. Hazelton, William and Sandra Woy-Hazelton. "Sendero Luminoso: A Communist Party Crosses a River of Blood." *Terrorism and Political Violence,* v.4, no.2 (Summer 1992): 62-83.

General overview of Sendero's armed struggle, concentrating on ideology and strategy. Too many observers have dismissed Sendero as an aberrant terrorist group, when it is really a revolutionary vanguard party, with a carefully-crafted ideological line. Sendero has been criticized as applying Mao to an outdated "memory of Peru," when in fact it is China during its Cultural Revolution rather than Mariátegui's Peru of the 1920's that serves as Sendero's model. The New Democratic Republic which Sendero envisions would confiscate large landholdings and bank accounts, stop payment on Peru's foreign debt, and most likely put the entire economy under state control. Still, its ultimate goals remain vague, and most guerrillas, in the words of one senderologist, probably know why they are fighting, but not what for. Despite the activities of Sendero's front groups or "generated organisms," it has not been able to establish itself in the cities as strongly as in the sierra, because the existence of strong popular organizations has given even Lima's shantytown dwellers alternatives to Sendero. The Woy-Hazeltons believe that since Sendero has not been strong enough to bring down the Peruvian state by guerrilla warfare, it will eventually need political allies and a stronger popular base. However, its ideological intolerance and brutal intimidation mitigate against the creation of a broad revolutionary front. To become ideologically more tolerant, organizationally less authoritarian, and strategically more pragmatic, would amount to "revisionism," and this Guzmán and his ardent followers will not allow.

1026. Zapata Saldaña, Eduardo E. "Signos y poder en el Perú." *Debate,* no.69 (June-August 1992): 59-61.

Esoteric examination of the "discourse" of Sendero Luminoso, a discourse that is aimed at the semi-literate segment of the population, people more attuned to oral than to written modes of communication. Sendero's message, simplified and repetitious, is a manichean one: it divides the world between good and evil, with no equivocations or shades of gray. Sendero reinforces its message through "popular theater" and graffiti, and in popular dance. Zapata refers to Sendero's discourse as "counter-textural," especially in contrast with the present dissatisfying political discourse of Peru. Since April 5, Alberto Fujimori has launched his own discourse, so now Peru has three: Sendero's, Fujimori's, and an "official" or traditional discourse. Zapata outlines in a chart Abimael Guzmán's discourse, from the people (guided by the Party), to the state (or power), through violent revolution. Fujimori's discourse runs from the people through himself and the armed forces to the state. Zapata deconstructs "signs" and "power" in the present political situation.

1027. Simon, Joel. "The Shining Path to Revolution." *San Francisco Weekly,* v.11, no.18 (July 1 1992): 13-14.

When Alberto Fujimori came to the University of California, Berkeley, to give a speech, he was totally unaware that Berkeley is the national headquarters of the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru (CSRP). During his talk, Sendero supporters screamed "murderer" and "assassin" at him before being ejected. Simon talks to Heriberto "Eddy" Ocasio, an affable Puerto Rican nationalist who is the group's national spokesman, about his support for Sendero. Ocasio says that Sendero's war has meaning for all those around the world who want to see genuine change. He and others support Sendero not because of what it is doing in Peru, but because it represents a new kind of Third World revolution. Simon also examines the Revolutionary Communist Party in the Bay Area. Carl Dix, the RCP's spokesman, claims that the collapse of "phony communism" in the USSR has given new life to the RCP, Maoism, and class-based revolution around the world. In the U.S., Sendero can be an inspiration to inner city blacks and Latinos, according to Dix, who says he did some organizing in Los Angeles in the aftermath of the South Central riots. Ocasio rejects stories of Sendero atrocities as lies, and claims that groups like Amnesty International reiterate Peruvian government reports; such exaggerated stories are being used to justify U.S. intervention in Peru. Ocasio says his goal is to build an organization like

CISPES, the Committee to Support with *[sic]* the People of El Salvador. Right now the CSRP, with about a dozen core members in the Bay Area, makes up for its lack of numbers with confrontational tactics. Ocasio believes that eventually, as the truth about Sendero gets out, more people will join his group. The small size and lack of power of pro-Sendero groups around the world doesn't bother Ocasio. "What is important is not the number of people, but the conditions. Conditions around the world, he argues, are so bad that revolution is now becoming possible."

1028. "Abimael y las drogas." *Caretas,* no.1218 (July 9 1992): 34-37, 100.

Detailed account of Sendero's involvement in the coca trade. Sendero's annual take in the Huallaga could be as high as $250 million a year. Documents found in a raid prove that Sendero controls prices and the coca commerce of the valley. *Caretas* reviews Sendero's history in the Huallaga: from 1983, when it forced the coca "mafias" to pay peasant cultivators a fair price for their crop; to collecting a quota from peasants and recruiting them for the armed struggle; to the present, when it controls much of the trade. Sendero, in controlling communities, enforced a strict morality, expelled prostitutes and drug addicts, and tried to impose its new society under the rule of *comisarios*. The arrival of security forces forced the *narcos* and Sendero to adopt a more flexible posture. Coca money enables Guzmán and his entourage to live comfortably in Lima, and supports Sendero's "prisoners of war" and their families. Nevertheless, the money the party collects is far more than is needed for these ends; the police believe that the rest is in secret accounts accessible only to Guzmán and his intimates. Part of the basic cocaine paste that Sendero produces or collects circulates among the poor in Lima. *Caretas* reproduces a document carrying the authorization of President Gonzalo, setting out the rules for the trade: it summarizes prices, weights, and negotiations between producers and Peruvian and foreign buyers. These regulations include control of legal and clandestine airports in the Huallaga: all flights have to pay a tax to the New State. Direct relations between peasant and buyers cuts out intermediaries, eliminating fraud. *Narcos* should not carry arms or help the peasant *rondas*, and must support the Party. They can have relations with the "enemy" (security forces), but only in order to feed information to the Party. The Party should collect $15,000 per coca flight; 50% of this should go to the movement, 40% to purchase communication equipment, and 10% for munitions and supplies for the columns.

An accompanying article reproduces photographs of Abimael Guzmán taken in one of his safe houses; he is shown embracing a number of people (including Martha Huatay, president of the Association of Democratic Lawyers). In two other photos he stands by a figure covered by a hammer and sickle flag, placing his hand on the dead woman's forehead; the corpse is presumably that of "Comrade Norah," Augusta La Torre. The caption states that party members questioned Guzmán about her mysterious death; Comrade "Juana" asked for an investigation, but the leadership refused.

1029. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Senderología gringa." *Caretas,* no.1218 (July 9 1992): 32, 99.

A whole forest, says Gorriti, has probably been sacrificed to print the bibliography of Sendero and Peru's internal war. What began as a few articles analyzing an exotic phenomenon has become an avalanche of books and studies. Gorriti briefly describes Palmer's anthology, Strong's *Shining Path,* and works by Starn and McCormick, whose pessimistic prognostications Gorriti disputes at length. He notes that McCormick does not mention NGO's, *ronda campesinas,* or other self-defense organizations at all. He also criticizes McCormick, who like many others has little actual experience of Peru, for not taking into account Peru's flexible social fabric, which McCormick sees only as a weakness.

1030. "MRTA contra MRTA." *Caretas,* no.1218 (July 9 1992): 24.

MRTA continues to break into pieces; Hugo Avellaneda Rincón, number three in the guerrilla movement, was murdered last week in the *selva* by a column of dissident *miristas.* Avellaneda, considered the ideologue of MRTA, was in the jungle to unify the forces, dismayed by the capture in Lima of Víctor Polay Campos and Peter Cárdenas Shulte. Quarrels over money [presumably from coca] and power led to the killing of one column's leader; it is this column that deserted and decided to take vengeance against Avellaneda. Hugo Avellaneda, ex-student of literature at San Marcos, belonged to the MIR-El Militante faction that joined with PSR-ML in 1980 to form MRTA; he was arrested in 1988 when he tried to leave Peru for Mexico on an Ecuadorian passport, but was set free.

1031. "Peor que nunca." *Caretas,* no.1220 (July 20 1992): 18-28, 94.

Extended special report on the car bomb that exploded at 9:20 p.m. on July 16, devastating affluent Miraflores. "A new dimension of horror," says *Caretas* of Sendero's "bestiality." When the journal went to press, 20 persons had been killed and more than 120 injured, with 183 families displaced, 400 commercial establishment destroyed or damaged, and 63 autos wrecked by the bomb, which was probably at least 500 kilograms in size and composed of fertilizer and gasoline. Accompanying the report are pages of gruesome photos documenting the destruction, and supplementary articles and sidebars. One repeats *Caretas*'s urgent recommendations for total mobilization and citizen participation against terrorism. Another reports that *senderista* "hardliners" came to Lima two weeks ago to participate in this latest wave of attacks. The *cerreños,* from Cerro de Pasco, are said to be from the far-left group Puka Llacta, and are unknown to the security forces. By shifting its forces from one front to another, Sendero can give the impression of being stronger than it really is. The report also quotes from *El Diario Internacional,* which announced that the war would be intensified after May 6-9, and that the movement would take revenge for the massacre in Canto Grande.

Following is a report ("Engaño en Huaycán," pp.32-35, 37) on the formation of the first "urban *ronda"* to fight subversion, which was blessed by Fujimori himself. However, the government is still neglecting the vital task of providing security for NGO's and popular leaders. On pp.36-37 is an article on Sendero's "new methods" of operation. Having learned a lesson from its failure in Raucana, Sendero is trying a new way of infiltrating the *pueblos jóvenes.* Their "Open Popular Committees" no longer confront church and popular groups, but seek instead to place their sympathizers in positions of leadership. Finally, Fernando Rospigliosi interviews David Scott Palmer ("El golpe ayuda a Sendero," pp.38-41). Palmer answers questions about Washington's changing perception of and growing interest in fighting Sendero, the impact of Fujimori's *autogolpe* on foreign aid and the war, and Guzmán's central role in Shining Path. Palmer reiterates that the coup has only helped Sendero, declares that an "Argentine or Chilean" solution" will not defeat the guerrillas, and speculates on the possible effects of Guzmán's death or imprisonment. He believes that this might encourage a more moderate line (which he says have always existed within Sendero), to come to the fore.

1032. "Libanización: peligro latente." *Caretas,* no.1221 (July 30 1992): 18.

Reflecting the latent paranoia of a nation under siege, *Caretas* explores the hypothetical disintegration of Peru and foreign intervention. There are indications that the U.S. and other South American nations are preoccupied with Peru, terrorism and narcotics trafficking. The possibilities of exporting terrorists, *narcotraficantes,* or simply numbers of Peruvians fleeing the country are not wholly imaginary fears. General Francisco Morales Bermúdez and historian Pablo Macera have both speculated on possible scenarios; the latter said that it is not exaggerated to fear possible multilateral foreign intervention blessed by the OAS. There is additional danger of Peru's neighbors considering "security zones" to protect themselves, or satisfying old territorial disputes. A map shows possible routes for intervention by Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador, with U.S. aircraft carriers stationed offshore to launch air attacks against the Huallaga.

1033. "El poder del terror." *Caretas,* no.1221 (July 30 1992): 34-41.

Bitter report on Sendero's latest armed strike, which has been accompanied by killings, bombings, and the mining of roads, with the government seemingly doing nothing in response. The destructive new car bombs are ANFO--Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil, exploded by a small quantity of dynamite. The government cannot even seem to be able to control ammonium nitrate, a necessary ingredient, without hurting farmers who need fertilizer for their crops. Sendero's new armed strike tactic seems to be self-justification, a move prompted by cadres reporting that although people are terrorized into compliance, they are not gaining adherents to the cause. Flyers carry the party's "platform": they claim that Sendero is fighting for increases in teachers' salaries, retirees' pensions, lower light and water bills (even as it sabotages the city's infrastructure), lower taxes (although it bombed the SUNAT's offices), and demand that the army and police ship water to the *barrios* every day (even though Sendero calls for the annihilation of both). But who, asks *Caretas,* can refute Sendero? Evidently neither the military nor the police, nor the impotent political parties, nor even the labor movement, whose own strike fizzled, in contrast to the fear caused by Sendero's.

A sidebar calls the armed strike of July 22-23, Sendero's seventh, the most violent of all, with 18 people murdered, 82 injured, 17 vehicles burned, and 16 car-bombs which were either disarmed or failed to explode; it also gives the dates of the previous six. Another asks "Where are they [the terrorists] hiding?" The security forces believe they are based in the *barrios populares,* emerging to launch an attack and retiring to the safety of the shantytowns. But it should be acknowledged that many are from the middle class, and live in the better districts; there is no

doubt that Guzmán and other leaders are to be found there. Dircote, which has done a good job of tracking them, should be given more resources, and there should be an end to these inter-service rivalries. Indicative of Lima's atmosphere of fear is "Seguridad vecinal," (pp.44-51), which calls for the organization of the entire metropolitan population to fight Sendero, with both private and state efforts playing a role. Tips on security, practical means for controlling neighborhoods, precautions against bomb-blast, recommendations for security, and a description of how Comas organized itself under a PUM mayor follow.

1034. Arredondo, Pedro. "Oscuridades de Sendero Luminoso." *Mensaje,* v.41, no.410 (July 1992): 246-248.

Brief overview of Sendero, which Arredondo writes is characterized by a cult of leadership and a belief in the absolute necessity of violence. The response of succeeding governments has been one of repressive military violence, that has helped Sendero in its goal of polarizing the country. Violence, for Sendero, is not just a strategy, but an essential part of its revolution. Arredondo sketches some of Sendero's operating methods in the countryside. When it exercises its power, Sendero shows a lack of respect for cultural traditions and organizations, and establishes a draconian new "ethic" that is part of its new vision for the world. Its "New Democracy" will mean in theory the abolition of all classes and of history, a step from necessity to liberty, of absolute peace and supreme harmony. What it wrought so far is 25,000 deaths, and the systematic destruction of the country's infrastructure and economy to the tune of $23 million. Arredondo also examines resistance to Sendero, which he says is not a popular movement. It has failed to get the support of any peasant or urban poor organization. When it has tried to gain control of popular organizations by democratic means it has always failed. Resistance is also apparent in the growth of the *rondas campesinas.* Arredondo recounts instances in Cajamarca, Villa El Salvador, Puno, and Lima where Sendero has been rejected by the people. Sendero is acting within the context of the terrible crisis of Peruvian society, which it did not create. If there were no poverty or injustice in Peru, Sendero would not exist.

1035. Dennett, Nolan A. "National Ballet Faces Maoist Terrorism in Peru." *Dance Magazine,* v.66, no.7 (July 1992): 19-20.

In spite of terror and incredible economic hardships, performances continue in Peru. The Instituto Cultural Peruano Norteamericano (ICPNA) co-sponsors concerts in downtown Lima and Miraflores, even though people are reluctant to go into central Lima at night. Performances are still held in the Teatro Municipal and the Teatro Segura, the oldest continually-operating theater in the Americas. The ICPNA and National Ballet of Peru struggle on, without funding or amenities of any kind. Dennett discusses recent works, including the premiere performance of *Escenas Peruanas* (choreographed by the author). As the audience (including the wife of the U.S. ambassador) congratulated the dancers, an explosion shook the building and the lights went out--but this time the ICPNA was not the target.

1036. Radu, Michael. "Can Fujimori Save Peru?" *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* v.48, no.6 (July-August 1992): 16-21.

Largely an *apologia* for Fujimori's *auto-golpe,* Radu's article chronicles more than a decade of corrupt, inefficient government. No major political party or alliance in Congress would work with the new president; his proposed laws were dismissed or undermined by a legislature that voted itself salary increases and larger staffs. Radu characterizes Peru's judiciary as incompetent, slow, absurd, corrupt, politicized, and vulnerable to threats. Judges have been bought, intimidated, or terrorized by Sendero, MRTA, and drug traffickers. The police are so corrupt that they are viewed by the populace as another group of thugs who threaten their pockets and their lives. The military, according to Radu, took nearly every wrong step possible for more than a decade in the fight against Sendero and MRTA. Still obsessed with its historic foes, Ecuador and Chile, the armed forces keep half their troops based outside the emergency zones. Neither the military nor any government since 1980 has devised a coherent strategy for combating either guerrilla movement. The Peruvian legal and journalism communities are riddled with Sendero sympathizers; according to Radu, the entire membership of the Democratic Lawyers Association and the staff of *El Diario* are fellow-travelers or closet *senderistas.* Democracy, he writes, cannot be established in a quick-fix election by an ignorant population; nor is it something that can be installed or arbitrated by Washington, Brussels, or the United Nations, especially after decades of communism and authoritarianism. Peruvian support for Fujimori's actions does not imply that the population does not desire democracy; rather it signals frustration with and hostility to democratic inefficiency. Fujimori, Radu says, did not kill democracy; he removed a democratic mask.

Withdrawing U.S. aid and cooperation will be self-defeating, aiding both the *narcotraficantes* and Sendero.

1037. Reyna, Carlos. "Lucanamarca en Lima." *Quehacer,* no.79 (July-August 1992): 21-26.

The most recent wave of attacks is reminiscent of the *senderista* massacre of peasants in Lucanamarca in April, 1983, in that there is a link between Sendero's violence and its political objectives. The goal of the current campaign of terror is to destabilize the Fujimori government, particularly after the coup of April. The recent wave of car-bombings in Lima, combined with calls for armed strikes, is of an intensity previously unknown in the capital. In July there were 295 "actions" in the country, 179 of them in Lima, and 145 in the week July 16-23, the week of armed strikes. 50% of all the terrorist acts being carried out in Peru are now taking place in the capital. Sendero puts the populace on edge by announcing *paros armados* a week ahead of time, to allow tension to build, while it steps up attacks leading up to the day of the strike. Such a pattern took place in February, and again in July of this year. The appearance in Lima of the car-bomb, of immense power and destructiveness, is especially unnerving. Sendero's targets now seem to be civilians more than security forces; Reyna notes "the fear of the civil population continues being its [Sendero's] principle weapon." A sidebar asks, Is the violence a new wave of indiscriminate attacks, as the press suggests? An analysis of the attacks suggests that it is not; apart from the Miraflores bombing, each attack seems deliberately aimed at a specific and logical target: banks, electricity, urban transport, colleges, labor centers, etc. Each target seems to have clear political objectives.

1038. Sánchez León, Abelardo. "Alejandro Mayta no murió en el pabellón británico." *Quehacer,* no.79 (July-August 1992): 31-37.

Interesting essay that looks at Mario Vargas Llosa's 1983 novel, *Historia de Mayta* (translated into English as *The Real Life of Alejandro Mayta),* as a work of the imagination that eerily prefigured what was to come in Peru. The story of a leftist's journey, of war in Peru's cities, of the role of NGO's in the poor and miserable periphery of Lima, were part of a novel that seemed to forecast the rise of Sendero. But in its ending, fiction deviates from reality; in the novel, Mayta leaves prison a pathetic figure. In real life, the *senderistas* incarcerated in the "British" pavilion preferred to die for their revolution.

1039. Schmidt, Corrine. "Peru: The Government, the Rebels, and the Women in Between." *Ms.,* v.3, no.1 (July/August 1992): 18-20.

Report on the women of the mothers's clubs, people's kitchens, health committees, and *vaso de leche* programs of Lima *barrios,* women who are all that stands between their neighborhoods and chaos. Fujimori's IMF-approved economic "shock" has more than doubled the cost of staples like milk and bread. The government promised emergency food aid to help soften the blow, but it never came. The austerity program has increased the number of Peruvians living in poverty from seven to twelve million. It was the shantytowns's network of women's organizations that kept people alive during the price shock and the desperate months that followed. In some areas, it was the womens's groups that battled the cholera epidemic; health care volunteers went door to door to warn people about the disease, and only two people died in a district of 40,000. Sendero calls such groups "cushions of the system" that makes it harder for them to "heighten the contradictions" that will lead the people to revolution. The Shining Path's revolution, according to Schmidt, consists mostly of attacks on civilians: "Over the past ten years, its victims have included nuns, priests labor leaders, journalists, development engineers, foreign aid workers--and thousands of peasants." Now it has made Lima a battlefield and begun targeting women community leaders. Schmidt describes the murder of Christian socialist Moyano. Many of Sendero's actions are carried out by women. "But despite women's participation, Shining Path--with its emphasis on the infallibility of its leader, Guzmán--remains a patriarchal, indeed totalitarian organization. Reports have been widely circulated that Guzmán forced his own wife to commit suicide when she began questioning 'Gonzalo Thought.'" The army has now set up civic action programs in the shantytowns, hoping to win popular support by bypassing successful community groups. Despite mistrust of the military, many leaders are afraid of what will happen when the soldiers leave, and want the army to stay. Others are afraid of continuing their work under Sendero's threats, and want to quit. But the vast majority of Lima's grass-roots leaders have convinced each other that they have to keep on working.

1040. Palmer, David Scott. "Perú 1992: la sorpresa de abril de Fujimori." *Estudios internacionales,* v.25, no.99 (July-September 1992): 378-384.

Scott examines the reasons why Fujimori initiated his coup and established an "emergency government of national reconstruction." This act virtually dismantled twelve years of constitutional rule, the democratic basis, however imperfect, upon which the legitimacy of government rested. Although he knew that international reaction would strongly condemn him, and internal opposition would be equally strong, Fujimori counted upon the immediate support of the armed forces (which was largely forthcoming). Polls showed his public approval stood at between 70% and 83%. Scott briefly recounts the effects of "fujishock" (inflation dropped from 7,650% in 1990 to 140% in 1991, and economic indicators rose a modest 2%, the first rise in 4 years), and Fujimori's efforts to "reinsert" Peru into the world economy after the disastrous isolationist policies of García. He also highlights the problems of political bickering and corruption in congress, and judicial ineptitude and timidity that Fujimori said impelled him to act. What will be the effect of the *autogolpe* on the fight against Sendero? The suspension of congress and the reorganization of the courts gives the armed forces and the executive a freer hand to take a hard line with the guerrillas, unencumbered by criticism or limitations imposed by other branches of government. But the price the government may pay for its actions may ultimately hurt the anti-guerrilla effort. The security forces have lost access to training and equipment due to international opposition. Sendero's taunt that bourgeois democratic government is a facade has some truth to it. If the insurgency is really Fujimori's first priority, the suspension of democratic government as a solution may have exactly the opposite effect.

1041. Larmer, Brook. "'Any Car Could Have a Bomb.'" *Newsweek,* v.120, no.5 (August 3 1992): 40.

On the evening of July 16 an enormous car-bomb blew up in the posh Lima suburb of Miraflores. Within days a further series of car-bombs accompanied a two-day "armed strike" called by Sendero. Casualties included 39 dead and 150 injured, with tens of millions of dollars in property damage and a traumatized city. Sendero is targeting the middle class with unprecedented intensity, abandoning its campaign of systematic (and discriminate) "indoctrinate or assassinate." Schools, gas stations, embassies, and crowded shopping areas have been targeted. Military analyst Enrique Obando commented: "This isn't Maoism, Marxism, or Leninism. It's pure terrorism." Yet there is method to this madness. The attacks are designed to destroy the presidency of Alberto Fujimori; in the words of one foreign diplomat, to undermine it until it falls on its own. Fujimori, hiding in a military bunker during the attacks, emerged to vow an army sweep of Sendero strongholds, and swift military justice for terrorists, but has offered no real strategy to stop Sendero. Larmer also discusses Fujimori's post-*golpe* performance. He is good at political infighting, but has waffled on his timetable to restore democracy. Military officers are angry that they have not received any big pay raise following the coup, and many dislike the corruption and political favoritism within the high command. Middle level officers have formed a secret group, COMACA (commanders, majors, and captains) to push for real change. Fujimori is now the only alternative [to chaos], but if his credibility drops, the armed forces will feel obligated to find their own solution.

1042. Rospigliosi, Fernando. "Ramificaciones." *Caretas,* no.1222 (August 6 1992): 44-45, 70.

Anyone reading Simon Strong's *Sendero Luminoso* will have little desire to travel to Peru after 271 pages describing not only the horrors of war, but the misery and hopelessness of a country falling to pieces. The most informative section for the general public is Strong's last chapter, where he describes the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement and its links with Sendero in Europe and the United States; Bob Avakian's Revolutionary Communist Party, USA, is headquartered in the east in Patterson, New Jersey, and in the west in San Francisco. In Europe, according to one expert, Sendero appeals to frustrated youth seeking to channel their rage. However, Strong's vision of Peru is of a decadent, racist, and divided society; for Strong, Sendero's roots lie in the structure of Peruvian society. The worst thing about Peru's elite white oligarchy is that it neither changes nor learns. Massacres and human rights violations by both Sendero and the government are highlighted, and government officials are linked to the narcotics trade. Although Strong does not offer any sources, the image he paints of Peru is devastating; it is, however, a realistic vision. Perhaps the observations of this foreigner can help this "white elite" to see things that their own position prevents them from observing.

1043. Cooper, Marc."The Country That Died Waits for a Miracle." *New Statesman & Society,* v.5, no.214 (August 7 1992): 18-20.

Vivid, perceptive report on post-coup Peru. There is no electricity or running water for eight hours a day in Lima. Only 18% of the city's population has stable employment; almost

everyone with a car has become a taxi driver; the entire first column of "positions desired" ads is for prostitutes, "understandable in a city where the minimum wage of US$3 a day is about two bucks short of a sandwich and a beer." A journalist friend remarks that Peru has just collapsed, that as a nation it no longer exists. Pessimism is so widespread that only 16% of Peruvians disagree with Fujimori's decision to suspend Congress and "reform" the judiciary. Cooper reviews the dismal recent history of the country, as well as Fujimori's rise from obscurity. Social scientists with whom he talks echo the same sentiments: failure and defeatism have become the national spirit. Peru, says Cooper, puts its faith in saviors rather than in democracy, probably because they've never had real democracy. The absence of communism, the dominance of economic markets, and elections do not add up to democracy. Privatization, deregulation and free trade have enriched some in Peru, but impoverished the great mass of the populace. A state worker's spending power is 7% of what it was 20 years ago. 44% of Lima families live below the poverty line. Public budgeting for education stands at $20 per student per year. In these circumstances, says Cooper, Sendero's absolutist solutions to Peru's problems make some sort of sense. Cooper concludes, dramatically: "Peruvians are perched on oblivion, torn between the Incan god Tumi and the beneficent Colonel Sanders, between a can-do businessman named Fujimori and an icon named Mao Tse-tung."

1044. Donovan, Paul. "Paths of Blood." *New Statesman & Society,* v.5, no.214 (August 7 1992): 20.

Donovan draws some harsh parallels between Khmer Rouge and Shining Path. Just as western commentators first believed that the Pol Pot's Cambodian experiment was a possible socialist model for Third World agrarian societies, so recent TV and press features on Sendero have sanitized the truth about the movement. Both Sendero and Khmer Rouge have leaders who are regarded with a certain mystical quality. Young people played an important role in both revolutions (the Khmer Rouge boasted that one or two million young people were enough to make the new Kampuchea). Both Pol Pot and Guzmán have decreed a leading role for violence in their revolutions; Guzmán has spoken of crossing a river of blood. Both movements believe their revolution is a struggle to destroy all capitalist structures; Degregori has compared the Khmer "Year Zero" to Sendero's desire not just to stop time, but turn it back until the page is once again blank. Donovan traces what he calls the role of Western capitalism in the development of both groups. Today the peace process in Cambodia has legitimized the Khmer Rouge; Sendero has claimed "strategic equilibrium" and roams freely over 40% of the country. "Whether Peru will be the scene of 'the killing fields' of the 1990s is a question only time will answer."

1045. Arroyo, Abilio. "El Huallaga en armas." *Caretas,* no.1223 (August 13 1992): 30-37.

Somewhere around 10,000 peasants are armed and prepared to expel Sendero in the Huallaga. However, the coca-growing peasants do not trust the government, which created expectations with its "Fujimori doctrine," only to disappoint them. We are witnessing, says Arroyo, the creation of an autonomous army, that today is allied with the Peruvian military, but tomorrow may challenge the authority of the state if it does not coincide with local interests. The article relates how the antidrug convention between the U.S. and various Latin American nations has failed, leaving peasants without alternatives. Some 30 million dollars would be needed to compensate peasants for not growing coca, but the government's ultraliberal agrarian policy permits free importation of food, which depresses prices. The peasants, who get only $2,000 per year, are disposed to switch crops, if only because they are fed up with the violence that coca generates. Arroyo reports on some 26 Huallaga communities that have formed their own Self-Defense Committees in order to protect themselves against terrorism. They have even captured some *senderista* leaders and turned them over to the authorities. Their aggressive attitude has prompted the army to establish a base near Crisnejas, a sort of "frontier" with neighboring "red zones." Arroyo describes how Sendero was able to establish open "popular committees" among a population antagonized by the anti-coca activities of the security forces. By 1985, thanks to a blight that wiped out coca crops and depressed the local economy, people had tired of Sendero, and began to rebel. Now they form their own *rondas,* which have largely taken over the leadership role formerly held by the coca-producer's federation, FEDECAH (Frente de Defensa de Cocaleros del Alto Huallaga), which collapsed after government promises of help went unfulfilled.

1046. Daniels, Anthony. "The Shining Path's Camp Followers." *The Spectator,* v.269, no.8563 (August 22 1992): 8-10.

"Now that the full ruthlessness and brutality of Sendero are widely recognized, the time is ripe for the organization to receive the support of Western intellectuals...where once it was dismissed as merely bizarre and atavistic, of anthropological or psychiatric interest, perhaps, it has

begun to receive the kind of sympathetic and respectful attention reserved for national liberation movements in far-off lands, no matter the number of disastrous outcomes." Daniels invites the London head of Comité Sol Peru, which conducts agitprop on Sendero's behalf, to explain his views over lunch. Señor Olechea brings with him a woman, an artist and member of the Federation of Democratic Women of Peru, who recently published a letter in the *Guardian* justifying the murder of María Elena Moyano as a snitch and reactionary. Both luncheon guests, judges Daniels, are in the grip of monomania, having lost the most elementary sense of ethical restraint. Both contemplate the death of thousands with equanimity. Olechea does not deny *senderista* killings, but justifies them with Mao's dictum, "revolutions are not tea parties," and goes on to complain that Stalin and Mao were insufficiently ruthless. Daniels asks, What turns someone into a Gonzalo Thinker? There has recently been a spate of mostly-favorable publicity in Britain for Sendero; a television channel screened a documentary entitled *Condemned to Win,* "which was only slightly more informative about Sendero than Leni Riefensthal's *Triumph of the Will* was about Nazi death camps." Daniels condemns the documentary's "moral agnosticism"; in the film, which made no mention of Sendero's origins as a student movement led by a philosophy professor, Sendero was presented to a public that presumably had no knowledge of the movement as "the natural and spontaneous outcome of the oppression of the Peruvian peasantry." The Peruvian embassy protested its screening. Daniels acidly notes that "...if the history of the 20th century teaches anything, it teaches that, in certain circumstances (alas present in Peru), such minor intellectuals are dangerous beyond the wildest dreams of mere military psychopaths."

1047. "Ante el horror sin límite, ¿hay salida?" *Ideéle,* año 4, no.40 (August 1992): 3-17.

At 9:30 on the night of July 16 a car-bomb with 600 kilos of dynamite exploded in Miraflores, killing 22 people in their own homes, wounding more than 200, and virtually destroying the zone, as if an aerial bombardment had flattened the area. The next day another in Villa El Salvador destroyed even more buildings. And this, says *Ideéle*, is only the beginning...*Ideéle* analyzes the latest Sendero attack, as only part of a wave of actions designed specifically to terrorize Lima. It also examines the structure of Sendero's strategy (from defense to equilibrium to offense), and its response to Fujimori's *autogolpe*, quoting from May 1992 PCP documents that characterize the coup as the restructuring of the old state in the march towards absolute centralization. Fujimori's coup merely underlines the Maoist dictum that whoever has weapons has power: Fujimori is now supported only by arms. Sendero's response will be to intensify people's war. *Ideéle* also examines how Sendero's urban "front," the Democratic Revolutionary Movement of the People (MRDP) is not only calling for armed strikes, but also demanding salary and pension increases, land for peasants, tariff barriers to protect workers, rejection of taxes, opposition to privatization of public works, and currency devaluation. Sendero is apparently seeking to broaden its appeal ("democratize the war"), at least on paper.

1048. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Heroic Reporters Speak from the Rubble." *IPI Report,* v.41, no.8 (August 1992): 8-9.

Gorriti reports from the ruins of the Channel Two television station in Lima, destroyed by Sendero's car-bomb. Station personnel (who have just attended the funeral of their news producer, killed in the blast) heroically continue to do their jobs in the rubble. The station is transmitting on emergency frequencies; Gorriti, asked to speak, comments on the role of the besieged press in defending freedom and democracy. He compares Station Two to the Colombian newspaper *El Espectador,* bombed (presumably) by the drug cartel. Gorriti has himself received telephoned death threats, but suspects they are not from Sendero; later he finds that they came from people close to the SIN and Vladimir Montesinos, Fujimori's shadowy advisor. A sidebar reports on the truck bomb that wrecked the TV station, killing five and wounding 20. After the blast the station's news director declared, "They are not going to defeat us, not Abimael nor anyone."

1049. Chauvin, Lucien. "Peruvian University Caught in Crossfire of Political Violence." *The Chronicle of Higher Education,* v.39, no.2 (September 2 1992): A47-A48.

Report from the Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga. In the birthplace of Shining Path, the University's rector holds one of higher education's most dangerous jobs. Death threats are routine, and can be from Sendero, the military, or right-wing death squads, all of whom have cause to see the rector and the university as an enemy of their cause. In the past few years Sendero has destroyed laboratories, classrooms, vehicles, and dormitories. Nine professors have been killed and an unknown number of students "disappeared." The rector estimates that five to ten percent of the university's student body of 5,000 belong to Sendero or are sympathizers. However, economic times are so tough that most students are more concerned with survival than politics.

Resources for the university are in desperately short supply, but the attendance of President Fujimori at a recent anniversary celebration surprised many and gave some cause to hope that official help might be forthcoming.

1050. "La marcha sobre Lima." *Caretas,* no.1226 (September 3 1992): 26-29, 96.

Report on how Sendero has neutralized CUAVES, the Comunidad Urbana Autogestionaria de Villa El Salvador. In the very community where María Elena Moyano was murdered, Sendero infiltrated CUAVES sufficiently to dominate its sixth convention. The document issued at the meeting's end represents a victory for Sendero: it calls for repudiation of Izquierda Unida, a boycott of elections, the retreat of the community from what it calls the "old, decrepit, and rotten state," the immediate withdrawal of the reactionary armed forces from Villa El Salvador, suppression of the human rights and neighborhood self-defense organizations, and "ideological reorientation and organic restructuring" of CUAVES at all levels. "You must be pleased at what happened yesterday," says one municipal functionary to an ex-*compañero* from San Marcos, who was a "delegate" to the convention. "More or less," is the reply; "but we don't want to control CUAVES, because that would expose our people to the forces of repression, but rather to sabotage it so that this exploitative organization disappears."

1051. "Formando autómatas." *Caretas,* no.1227 (September 10 1992): 34-37, 48.

Among the documents captured in a raid in July was "Over the Two Hills (Study Document for the Balance of the Third Campaign)." In its 71 pages, aimed at middle ranks and leaders, it justifies the murder of two Polish monks (for actively opposing "reckonings" with communal leaders), condemns MRTA as a reactionary attempt to destroy people's war, accuses Channel 2 (bombed in June) of being a tool of the army, María Elena Moyano of enriching herself from food meant for the masses, calls Hernando de Soto an agent of imperialism, etc. Everything outside the Party is anathema; the United Nations, for example, is at the service of imperialism and counterrevolution, because the UN condemned Sendero for using children from five to ten years of age in its attacks. Human and civil rights are dismissed as bourgeois ideas; human rights organizations are part of Yankee imperialism, and church and popular organizations are deprecated, but in order to "heighten the contradictions," the Party's aim is to use all that can be used for the revolution. When the army distributes goods as part of its program of civic action, Sendero will infiltrate, suffocate, and sabotage these efforts from within and without. It will agitate the masses to seize the goods, demand more than can be delivered, explain that these are not gifts but a product of the revolution, for without People's War they would never have been given. This December 1991 document believes that the bourgeois democracy is creaking and tottering, demonstrating even more the fragility of the Peruvian state and its institutions, and it accuses Fujimori of marching towards "presidential absolutism." What is worse, says *Caretas,* is that the state and society have not responded intelligently and efficiently up to now to these hallucinatory and nonsensical *senderista* doctrines.

1052. Chauvin, Lucien. "Peru Deconstructs: 'Path' Hits, Response Misses." *Commonweal,* v.119, no.15 (September 11 1992): 6-7.

Report on the doleful state of the nation. Lima, once known as the garden city, is being called the new Beirut. Lima is the target of Sendero's new offensive, including car bombs that killed 22 people and left banks, businesses, and hotels in ruins. One American comments on the climate of fear in the city: "For the first time, the people of Miraflores, who once thought the violence was directed at the poor, feel that they are now targets." Sendero struck again within hours, destroying a police station and school in the poor *barrio* of Villa El Salvador, home to 300,000 people. The number of unemployed and underemployed in Lima is estimated to be at more than 80%. The government's response to the attacks was to redouble the curfew, deploy additional troops in the city, and announce a recommittment to all-out war. Now accused "terrorists" can be tried and sentenced by military courts within 24 hours of their capture. Yet the Peruvian army is still geared toward a conventional war; one Peruvian journalist referred to it as an antiquated machine, lumbering forward but unable to adjust to the war against the Shining Path. "The government has to realize that this isn't a conventional war, but one which requires a coherent plan of military intelligence." While the government searches for ever-harsher measures, the Peruvian Conference of Bishops stated in a document, "Poverty, which yesterday meant there was little to eat, today has become only the bitter taste of tears...Peru will not be at peace until Peruvians can feed their children."

1053. "Fundamentalismo de la sangre." *Caretas,* no.1228 (September 17 1992): 10-12, 14-18, 23-24, 75.

Special report on the arrest of Abimael Guzmán. One section describes the dramatic raid itself: as Dincote agents rushed into the room where Guzmán was sitting, watching television, his companion Elena Iparraguirre fought the police, prompting Guzmán to shout "Enough with violence! Calm!" "Who are you?" he asked the men. "We are Dincote," an officer replied. "You are the ones who killed my three sons," said Guzmán, (referring to three *senderista* leaders killed in Canto Grande, an operation in which Dincote had little or no part). "Be considerate of President Gonzalo," shouted the highly-strung Iparraguirre. An officer, his voice breaking with emotion, announced into his radio, "Big Cheeks has fallen, *¡viva la PIP!"* All the policemen were highly moved; some cried with happiness. *El Cachetón* was finally in their hands. When the head of Dincote, General Antonio Vidal Herrera entered the house, he exchanged pleasantries with Guzmán. "There are times in life when you win, and times when you lose. This time it's your turn to lose," said the general. "I've only lost a battle," replied Guzmán; "You General, should know that the Party is everywhere in Peru. We've advanced sufficiently that we can't lose now."

Following (pp.13, 80-81) is a profile of Antonio Ketín Vidal Herrera, director of Dincote, and a history of how the Department of State Security became DIRCOTE (Dirección Contra el Terrorismo) in 1981, then R:DIRCOTE in 1985, and finally DINCOTE. Also important is the GEIN (Grupo Especial de Inteligencia), created in 1990 with six policemen and an old typewriter as its total strength. GEIN was entrusted with compiling and interpreting captured documents; its staff slowly built up a picture of the principal *senderista* leadership. GEIN developed its own "guiding thought," *"pensamiento Benedicto,"* named for a studious police official whose goal was Guzmán's capture.

The series of articles includes a schematic drawing of the house at Calle Uno 459, Surquillo; an account of how Dincote operatives began to suspect the house was where Guzmán was hiding; how they staked it out; and a profile of dancer Maritza Garrido Lecca, in whose name it was rented and whose trail led Dincote to Guzmán. A number of editorials and sidebars follow. In one, "El mito y la reja" (pp.26-28), Gustavo Gorriti comments on how throughout the years of preparation for insurrection and war the myth of Guzmán became the principal weapon of Sendero; now it may be its greatest weakness. Another reviews Fujimori's strategy to fight Sendero, including *rondas,* rewards, and amnesty for surrendered guerrillas. Yet another speculates on the future of Sendero: one danger is that completely unknown militant cadres will rise to the fore. Dincote captured all or most of Sendero's plans for future operations, but Sendero might split into different parts; the Huallaga wing, with its coca dollars, might go its own way. The piece names important *senderista* leaders still at large. Another sidebar ("La mirada gringa," pp.80-81), reports on foreign press reaction to the arrest: prudent enthusiasm from politicians, caution from academics. An editorial celebrates Guzmán's capture, but notes a number of paradoxes: that Guzmán fell when Sendero was stronger than ever; that he was arrested by the police, a service deprecated by the president, who clearly prefers the army; that Dincote was one of the few teams to survive government purges; and that despite authoritarianism and violence, Guzmán was captured using classic police methods, and in conditions perfectly compatible with democracy.

1054. "Peru: The Cell at the End of the Path." *The Economist,* v.324, no.7777 (September 19 1992): 50-53.

The arrest of Guzmán and his lover, Comrade Miriam, Numbers 1 and 2 of the lethal Shining Path, may give Alberto Fujimori exactly what he wants. Elections that Fujimori hopes will legitimize the dictatorial powers he assumed in April are due November 22. The three government-sponsored lists of candidates will probably win by a huge majority--changing politics in Peru and relegating traditional parties to the sidelines. Fujimori's yes-men will predominate in executive, legislative, and judicial branches; a grateful public may even re-elect Fujimori in 1995. These "ifs" assume that Sendero has been dealt a lethal blow. Two hundred people were arrested after Guzmán's seizure; one, Germán Sipián Tavara, alias Comrade Arthur, is Sendero's chief coordinator, and knows the links between one cell and another. Many prominent Peruvians have been fingered as *senderistas,* including an army officer and an unnamed ministry official. Guzmán's capture was a polite affair; General Antonio Ketin Vidal said "Doctor Guzmán, you believe in the dialectic. At times you win, but then you must lose." "Yes," replied Guzmán, "it was my turn to lose. Congratulations." Now the government is frequently showing a flabby and humiliated figure on television to break the myth of an unbeatable leader, and is talking about a plebiscite to allow the death penalty for treason. After the elections, according to an anti-terrorist source, Guzmán might get ill, "try to escape," or simply not get his psoriasis medicine. To keep him alive is a huge risk, since escape, rescue, or a forced swap for a kidnapped bigwig would be a humiliation for the government. Some Senderologists believe that a "subjective myth" about Guzmán which has taken root among his followers has little to do whether he lives or dies. He will continue to be revered, and the conditions for his kind of cruel revolution will persist in Peru.

Speculation on what Sendero does now includes the possibility that the movement will split into political and military wings, as has happened to other Latin American guerrilla movements. Leadership may fall to Number 3, Alberto Ramírez Durán, the particularly ferocious son of a retired general; Durán is a military activist who might order more violence. September is a month laden with dates that Sendero is wont to celebrate with car bombs and assassinations. The *Economist* concludes: "It is not yet time to celebrate in Lima."

1055. Simon, John. "Blocking the Shining Path." *The Spectator,* v.269, no.8567 (September 19 1992): 11-12.

When Abimael Guzmán was arrested, affluent Miraflores, shaken by the carnage of the July 16 car-bomb, was a happy place; people hooted their horns and hung out Peruvian flags. The arrest, says Simon, was the result of good old-fashioned police work. The army gets all the money, and is apt to respond to terrorism by declaring dirty war against the peasants; the police, low in morale and pay, are not much better. But Dincote is commanded by a decent man, General Vidal, who discourages the use of torture. An informer told Dincote that Guzmán was in a house in Surco; Dincote concentrated all its efforts there. They tapped phones and searched garbage; the taps revealed that a meeting of the Central Committee was to take place September 12. Thirty officers, commanded by General Vidal, raided the house. He neglected to inform President Fujimori beforehand, so Fujimori was out of town when the entire Sendero leadership was arrested. "The thought is that general Vidal's career won't advance much. The general is unlikely to worry about it."

1056. United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. *The Shining Path After Guzmán: The Threat and the International Response. Hearing, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 23, 1992.* Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992.

The Committee heard testimony and prepared statements from Lt. General William Odom (ret.), Director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute, journalist Gustavo Gorriti, currently a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Cynthia McClintock, and Jeremy Stone, President of the Federation of American Scientists. General Odom admits he is not an expert on Peru, but has done much analysis of client states that the United States has supported in counterinsurgency situations. He has been so disturbed by American experiences in Vietnam, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, that he wrote *On Internal War* as a critique of U.S. policy. He urges complete land reform in Peru ("Marxist-Leninist insurgents love landless peasants. Marxist-Leninists are frightened of landed peasants"), and privatization of businesses, declaring that Peru has used foreign aid as a substitute for a tax base. The root of Peru's problems is the state's weakness, and its inability to provide law and order and even minimal public services. Odom believes that Sendero is dangerous even without Guzmán. There is, he says, still a lack of solid understanding of Sendero, its strength, tactics, resources, etc. The views of specialists differ widely, and he is unpersuaded by virtually all viewpoints. Still, the Peruvian state is so weak that it is a surprise Sendero did not overthrow it some time ago. There is virtually no Peruvian state, writes Odom; rather, cliques of oligarchic elites manipulate the shell of the state to their private advantage. The Peruvian economy is only slightly less statist than the old Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The state owns virtually all land, and peasant use and holdings are not on a solid basis. He calls for the government to strike a massive blow to Sendero by implementing a sweeping land reform, to give peasants clear deeds and ownership of lands they now farm.

Gustavo Gorriti was asked, What will happen to Sendero after the capture of Guzmán, and what will happen in Peru? Contrary to other Communist parties (which developed leader worship after victory), Sendero developed a cult-like devotion to Guzmán before the insurgency even began. Other fundamentalist groups, like Hezbollah, have recovered from the loss of their spiritual leader. Guzmán's life and welfare will probably now take precedence over continuing the insurgency. Gorriti then discusses Fujimori's coup; the international community, he states, should keep pressure on Fujimori to completely restore democracy. McClintock believes that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure: a Sendero victory would have tremendous repercussions and demands for U.S. action, so assistance now would be a better option. Guzmán's capture does not mean that the war is over, but rather that a major battle has been won. The feeling in Peru was widespread that not only was a Sendero victory possible, but almost likely. The psychological bubble of Sendero invincibility has been burst. She urges consideration of subregional cooperation against Sendero, but concedes that traditional suspicions between Peru, Ecuador, and Chile will make that difficult. In her prepared statement she calls for economic support for democratic groups and organizations, especially those confronting Sendero, physical protection for civil authorities, and judicial and human rights reforms. Stone proposes that Peru should solicit the advice of a

wide range of experts on Maoist counterinsurgency, including experts on human rights and the judiciary, for a long-term strategy against the movement. Foreign and international assistance should then be dependent upon how Peru responds to this advice.

Congressmen then pose a number of questions to the experts. Will Sendero attempt to free Guzmán? Gorriti thinks this unlikely; rather, Sendero will now be using all the legal means available to save Guzmán's life. A rescue attempt could put his life at risk. He also discusses the lack of a clear successor to Guzmán, who, apparently having learned a lesson from the Chinese Cultural revolution, did not want a Lin Bio at his side. Gorriti is against the execution of Guzmán, which is not feasible under current Peruvian law. Solarz and Gorriti conclude with an interesting exchange on the size and structure of Sendero's top leadership.

1057. "Criterio rayado." *Caretas*, no.1229 (September 24 1992): 10-15, 32.

Contrary to popular thought, Abimael Guzmán is being well-treated by his captors, who include a psychologist. The detectives are using sophisticated methods to obtain information from the leader of Sendero, who has retained a bourgeois enjoyment of classical music and wine. There is no thought of applying torture; more can be gained from intelligent and wise treatment. Guzmán is addressed as "Dr. Guzmán" or "President Gonzalo"; used to being treated as royalty for years, he will feel more confident and might be better disposed to talk. Elena Iparraguire, who turned 45 in captivity, was even allowed to celebrate with Guzmán. His interrogation has thrown some light on his personality; he related that his mother wanted to have an abortion (he is an *hijo natural*, i.e., illegitimate). He still harbors a resentment against her. Guzmán has admitted to being "President Gonzalo," justified Sendero's crimes, and expressed a profound hatred of the state and security forces. Asked how he considered himself, he answered, "I am an atom of the universe. I have lit a bonfire; if I don't finish it, someone will follow me." Captured with Guzmán were computer disks said to hold the names of 6,000 individuals, including professionals, artists, students, and people of all classes who have written letters of "subjection" to Guzmán. The article names some, and discusses their involvement with the movement. A sidebar, "Dincote maltratada" (pp.12-13), describes a campaign being waged to exaggerate the role of the SIN (military intelligence) in the capture, and downplay that of Dincote. Fujimori, off fishing in Iquitos when the arrest was made, is taking his vengeance on Dincote, as are others in the government. No one from GEIN or Dincote has been promoted. The police who work in both are paid miserable salaries; they have not gained a cent from Guzmán's capture. The reward money, it has been suggested, should go to pay the debts of slain policemen. Another article, "Lo que se viene" (pp.24-25), asks what to do with Guzmán. As the death penalty is inapplicable, the answer is not simple. Next week Guzmán will go on trial before a military court. The sentence is a forgone conclusion: life in prison. The article discusses the dangers of holding Guzmán, the absolute need to isolate the *senderista* leaders, and the possibility of building a maximum security prison modeled on the one in Germany that held the Baader-Meinhof terrorists.

1058. Robinson, Linda S. "No Holds Barred." *U.S. News & World Report*, v.113, no.12 (September 28 1992): 49-50.

As Peruvian police review captured documents and computer information on disks seized along with Guzmán, they claim to have uncovered a network of domestic and international support for Sendero far larger, more complex, and better connected than anyone thought. Guzmán's safe house was purchased by Maritza Garrido, one of Lima's most celebrated dancers; her uncle (apparently innocent), one of Peru's leading composers, was also arrested. Police believe that Sendero has a war chest of $40 million, derived from "landing fees" from cocaine flights out of the Huallaga, and from contributions from overseas groups in Europe and the U.S.--although little evidence has been offered. The Swedish government has announced it will expel 500 Peruvians with links to Sendero. But despite Guzmán's arrest, the movement's cash and connections will allow an estimated 5,000 troops to fight on for years, although analysts say the movement could split apart, with the most violent factions even more dangerous than before. The mood in Lima is tense, not celebratory, with army and police on full alert and the border with Bolivia closed. An attempt to spring Guzmán from jail seems inevitable. Gordon McCormick told a House committee in March that "[t]he military...has not managed to stop the movement anywhere. Should these trends continue, Sendero, by definition, will win in Peru." Sendero's recent advances, including information that the movement was spreading to Bolivia, alarmed Washington, and there was quiet discussion about more active U.S. support for Peru or even possible direct intervention. But Fujimori's April *golpe* cut that short. Now the Bush administration would like to cut Fujimori "a tiny bit of slack," including $7 million for election observers. But any large-scale aid will depend upon the human rights situation in Peru.

1059. Watson, Russell. "It's Your Turn to Lose." *Newsweek,* v.120, no.13 (September 28 1992): 28-29.

Report on the capture of Abimael Guzmán, once "Presidente Gonzalo," "Puka Inti," the "Fourth Sword of Marxism," now Prisoner 11509, a paunchy, middle-aged man with a ragged beard and thick glasses, walking with a limp and suffering from psoriasis. Guzmán seems to have been done in by carelessness, and his psoriasis. His condition aggravated by the dry highland air, he was living in a rented house at 459 First Street in the quiet Surquillo section of Lima. Undercover Dincote agents were led there by two separate investigations of Sendero suspects. Soon Surquillo was flooded with Dincote agents, posing as street sweepers, meter readers, and smooching lovers. They were suspicious of the slender young ballerina who rented the house, who ate a lot of bread and smoked Winchesters, Guzmán's brand. When agents raided the house, they found Guzmán there with his companion and second-in-command, Elana Iparraguirre. "Bingo," shouted an agent into his radio, "we got Big Cheeks." Dincote General Antonio Vidal Herrera (trained in the U.S. and USSR) rushed to the house. "There are times in life when you win and times when you lose. This time it's your turn to lose," he told Guzmán. Guzmán, tapping his head, responded, "You can take everything away from a man but this. If one dies this stays with the rest and will never be erased." Within days 200 more suspected *senderistas* were rounded up, along with papers and computers disks, detailing plans for a huge October offensive against Lima. Isabel Coral, a community activist, said "This is the beginning of the end for Sendero. Their ideas will be around for years, but we will return them to their origins, when we all laughed at them." Watson writes that the struggle will go on without Guzmán; the poverty that made his revolution still exists, with the gap between rich and poor in Peru wider than a decade ago. A *senderista* told *Newsweek* in Villa El Salvador: "What unites the party is ideology. We admire Gonzalo, but it is Gonzalo Thought that guides us." There is no obvious successor; neither rural leader Julio César Mezzich nor military commander Oscar Alberto Ramón Durand can hope to inherit Guzmán's full authority. Nelson Manrique commented that in the medium term, Sendero has lost something central: its monolithic character. "One person could decide what was right and what was wrong. This gave Shining Path an image of great efficiency in a country where nothing seemed to work right." Guzmán is scheduled to stay in a Dincote cell until September 27, when he will be transferred to a maximum-security facility for trial. He will face a military tribunal. Fujimori has decreed that terrorists will face treason charges, with a maximum sentence of life in prison. He may reap a political reward November 22, when elections for a new Constitutional assembly will be held. For now, the myth of the invincible Gonzalo has been destroyed.

1060. Smolowe, Jill. "His Turn to Lose." *Time,* v.140, no.13 (September 28 1992): 47-48.

"Our fear was broken from one day to another," says Isabel Coral, a community activist, of Guzmán's capture. In a year-long assault on Lima, the guerrillas came close to terrorizing the population into capitulation, writes Smolowe. Guzmán's arrest has not only slowed the guerrillas' momentum, but gave the government a much-needed morale boost. Credit goes to Dincote, but Fujimori will reap the biggest reward: Guzmán's capture may ensure his re-election. But Gustavo Gorriti warns, "The fall of Guzmán, the main enemy of democracy, is paradoxically going to do a lot of harm to democracy in the short term by strengthening Fujimori." Much depends on how Sendero strikes back. Will the guerrillas try to release him? David Scott Palmer predicts that "They are going to move heaven and earth to get him out." The government is likely to avoid making Guzmán a martyr. Since Sendero is a uniquely top-down organization in its decision-making structure, says U.S. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson, capturing the senior leadership has to make a difference. The movement may also have been shaken by the defection of a faction that felt Guzmán had abandoned true Maoism and put too much emphasis on terror rather than on political action designed to win hearts and minds. But to say that Sendero is broken is premature. Radical movements in the Philippines, India, Iran, and Colombia collapsed after losing their leaders, but Sendero is too well entrenched and its cadres too disciplined and patient to fall apart. Gordon McCormick disagrees with the conventional wisdom that "if you lop off the top of the head, the body will die. Sendero has been highly institutionalized and has the capacity for self-renewal." The movement's legal fronts and citizen-aid groups and regional committees are still intact. "I don't see them disappearing," declared Gorriti; "they're too close to victory for that." The planned-October offensive may still occur. Alfredo Crespo, Guzmán's lawyer and president of the Democratic Lawyers Association said "I don't think this is the end of the party. The revolution will continue and probably get stronger."

1061. "El Perú de Strong." *Ideéle,* año 4, no.41 (September 1992): 26-27.

Simon Strong, in his "Sendero Luminoso: The World's Most Lethal Subversive Movement," attempts to identify deeply-rooted structural processes at work during five centuries of Peruvian history in order to explain Sendero's rise. According to Strong, everything can be traced back to the Spaniards who conquered Peru; although he writes that the Inca empire was despotic, it is seen as a golden age by the majority of Peruvians, save those of European descent who dominate the country politically and economically. Strong draws parallels between Chinese and Andean cultures, parallels that *Ideéle* calls exaggerated and misleading. The journal believes that Strong's comparison between Chinese and Andean cultures may inadvertently imply that Sendero's Maoism and Andean culture are naturally complementary, an implication *Ideéle* rejects. The brief essay goes on to cite a number of instances where Strong takes certain facts out of context, potentially misleading the reader, or where one quote may be used to overgeneralize a complex situation, especially in regard to the problem of racism in Peruvian society. For example, the words of Salvador Palomino, Peruvian secretary general of the Indigenous Council of Latin America, are treated as holy writ. *Ideéle* also criticizes Strong for presenting an "idyllic" vision of Abimael Guzmán's personality; the worst thing that Strong says about Guzmán is that his intellectual stature doesn't quite measure up to his predecessors, Marx, Lenin, and Mao. He also exaggerates Sendero's successes. In short, *Ideéle* is concerned about the portrait of Sendero than Strong presents: "...we believe that it is not a book that is going to contribute to the information the English-reading public has about Peru and the drama in which it is living. Quite the contrary."

1062. Harmon, Christopher. "The Purposes of Terrorism Within Insurgency: Shining Path in Peru." *Small Wars & Insurgencies,* v.3, no.2 (Autumn 1992): 170-190.

Harmon summarizes the factors that make Shining Path a particularly distinctive insurgency, and sketches its strategy: a movement driven by politics, an emphasis on rural guerrilla warfare, and a profound dependence upon terrorism. It is the last factor upon which he focuses his attention. Terror plays a profound part in all phases of Sendero's 5-stage war. It is considerably more reliant upon terrorism than was the Russian Revolution. Terror has many uses within insurgency: it demonstrates a power that discredits the government, draws attention to the revolutionaries's political program, and softens up the resistance of the "audience," whether on a national or a local level. Terrorism is crucial to Sendero's strategy; to dismiss it as merely a tactic is to underestimate its systematic employment, national scope, and the purpose to which it is a means--the total transformation of Peruvian life and full political power for Sendero. Harmon analyzes in depth the psychology and impact of Sendero's use of terror for precise political ends. Sendero's terror strikes at government and political officials: APRA politicians and workers have been targeted, and now Fujimori's "Cambio 90" as well. These attacks diminish the government's power; people are reluctant to occupy official positions. Its terror intimidates judges and weakens the judicial system upon which democracy itself depends. Sendero's aim is to intimidate and co-opt the population; it especially targets community leaders and organizers for murder. Sendero attacks the police and civilian defense militias, bodies that help maintain the status quo Sendero wishes to destroy. Its economic sabotage is also calculated to damage the existing structure of society. Finally, Sendero's terror has the ultimate objective of "purifying" Peruvian culture and harkens back to pre-Spanish civilization. It taps into class and racial divisions within Peru, and uses xenophobia (especially against Asian entrepreneurs) and nationalism to fan passions. Even the capture of Guzmán and the top *senderista* leadership does not spell the end of the threat to Peru; after all, its cadre's record in prison is one of total organization and staunchness. Guzmán will try to lead and inspire from his cell. Peru has left it too late to respond to Sendero; mere counter-terrorism programs are not enough. Harmon suggests that a return to democracy from Fujimori's *autogolpe* is necessary. The nation as a whole must be mobilized against Sendero. Cooperation between the regular armed forces and the lightly-armed civilian patrols is key, and arming these patrols is crucial: "The peasant has proven his mettle; he must be given the tools he needs to carry on his duties and his defense of home and hearth."

1063. Palmer, David Scott. "Peru, the Drug Business, and the Shining Path: Between Scylla and Charybdis?" *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,* v.34, no.3 (Fall 1992): 65-88.

Excellent analysis of the difficulties facing both the U.S. and Peru in the fight against the narcotics traffic of the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV). Despite financial and logistical aid, the production of cocaine in the UHV has continued to rise. One reason is that coca production is the major, indeed sole source of income for most of the 300,000 farmers there. Coca prices range from 4 to 34 times higher than alternative crops such as cacao and corn. Neither local eradication teams, the herbicide "spike," nor seizures of coca leaf have stemmed the flow. Adding to the problem is the guerrilla complication: Sendero and MRTA have vied to become "protectors" of the UHV and its coca producers. Sendero had control of the UHV in 1984-85, and again since 1991. "By

protecting the coca-growing peasants there from joint Peruvian-US government efforts to combat the drug trade, *Sendero* believes it can gain additional support bases for its proposed New Democracy in Peru." Sendero not incidentally is collecting annual incomes estimated at between 10 and 100 million dollars from the cocaine trade. Rivalries between the Peruvian army and police account for an almost total lack of cooperation in anti-guerrilla or anti-drug efforts, with different ministries (police under Interior, the army under Defense) and different missions ensuring a continuing impasse. U.S. helicopters, funds, and training for the police only exacerbate the rivalries. When a successful military effort under General Arciniega pushed guerrillas out of the valley in 1989, it was only at the price of eschewing any interference in peasant coca-growing activities. Because of Peru's economic crisis, the General depended on "local resources"; i.e., drug money--bringing opposition from the police and the U.S. President Fujimori has insisted on both economic and military aid to fight the problem; developing viable alternatives for coca-growing *campesinos* is a top priority. The U.S sees drugs as its major Peruvian problem; Peru, not surprisingly, sees the economy and Sendero as more important. Intensive negotiations between the two countries finally led to agreement in May, 1991; while stopping drugs remains critical, the U.S. now recognizes that economic assistance and security in coca-producing areas are equally crucial. Since then, debates in Congress over anti-drug and anti-guerrilla aid to Peru have raised concerns over human rights abuses and whether the U.S. has any vital interests in Peru. Fujimori's *autogolpe* has brought a suspension of American aid, which has proved a setback for his plans to defeat Sendero and reintegrate Peru into the international economic community. Both the democratic legitimacy and the economic progress of Fujimori's first 20 months in office have been severely undermined by the April coup. Palmer concludes by urging a rapid and full restoration of democracy, strengthening non-governmental organizations at the grass-roots level, extensive military aid and training, more civic action programs, and a general decentralization of resources to enable structures at the local level in direct contact with the people function better.

1064. Rees, John. "Third World Communists May Yet Rule: How Democracy Fares." *Orbis,* v.36, no.4 (Fall 1992): 565-579.

Many in the West have celebrated the demise of communism, but it is clear that communism is not dead--not in Russia, not in the former Soviet republics, and not outside the old USSR. Orthodox and reform communist parties still rule in China, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Laos. An even more telling indicator of communism's vitality is the number of Marxist-Leninist insurgent groups that may yet take power, including the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the New Peoples' Army in the Philippines, the African National Congress in South Africa, the PKK, or Kurdish Workers' Party, and Sendero Luminoso in Peru. The last three movements all have a reasonable chance of achieving state power by the end of the decade. Sendero has capitalized on five conditions in Peru: the drug trade in cocaine; the brutality and incompetence of the military and police; a collapsed economy; widespread corruption in government; and the deep divisions between the impoverished, disempowered mestizos and Indians and the European elite. Rees briefly expands upon each of these factors, as well as upon Sendero's strategy and tactics. He judges that the Sendero insurgency is now advanced and that the capital is being encircled. If Washington turns its back on Peru because of the collapse of democracy in Lima, he asks, what will it do when Sendero Luminoso creates its own "strategic equilibrium" of a million dead? Rees also examines the struggles in South Africa and in Turkey by Marxist-dominated guerrilla movements. It would be unwise, he concludes, to maintain that the Marxist utopian vision has burnt itself out. The lure of Marxism-Leninism has been its use as a rationale and structure for armed insurrection. As long as the grievances of national minorities and ethnic groups remain, so will the lure of Leninism. "As a result, it is no time for self-delusion within the democratic countries."

1065. Balbi, Carmen Rosa and Juan Carlos Callirgo. "Sendero y la mujer." *Quehacer,* no.79 (September-October 1992): 50-53.

The active participation of women in Shining Path at all levels, from rank-and-file to positions of leadership, as well as in violent actions, is a new political phenomenon. They are notorious for participating in "hit squads," and are often chosen to administer the "coup de grace." They tend to receive longer jail sentences than male *senderistas.* Their role in the movement's legal organizations, such as the MFP (Popular Women's Movement), derives, according to Abimael Guzmán, from the emancipation of women driven by the mobilization of women workers, peasants, students, and *barrio-* dwellers. In fact, Sendero has an active strategy to win the support of women. Nor does it neglect children; one of the *bases de discusión* calls for the active participation of children in people's war through tasks that will help them adopt the ideology of the proletariat. Balbi and Callirgos cite Denis Chávez's figures on jailed *senderistas:* the proportion of women prisoners with advanced degrees is higher than that of the men. Women in

Peru have historically been relegated to a domestic role; their political participation has also been limited. Sendero uses the facts of oppression to preach the idea that women should incorporate themselves in the world revolution, to do away with family, religious, and clan oppression. The authors also advance the thesis that professional women and students are frustrated by real and perceived barriers to good careers and positions. Of course, Sendero also appeals to women who are struggling to keep their families fed, clothed, housed, healthy, etc.

1066. Campodónico, Humberto. "Las relaciones Perú-EEUU: dos audiencias polémicas." *Quehacer,* no.79 (September-October 1992): 24-29.

Campodónico summarizes the concerns of U.S. legislators over the threat of Shining Path, as evidenced by two hearings before Congress. Congress is concerned over a possible widening of the war against drugs, typified by the "Andean Initiative" of the Bush administration. The State Department, on the other hand, believes that it is not possible to separate the war on drugs from the war against Sendero. The suspension of all anti-drug aid is a possibility, following the failure of San Antonio summit. Robert Torricelli, chair of the relevant subcommittee, is concerned about Sendero's threat to the new world order, and believes that it is the responsibility of the international community to fight terrorism. Congressman Stephen Solarz compared Sendero to the Khmer Rouge, saying that if Sendero took power, it would make Pol Pot and his legions look like Boy Scouts. All the participants affirmed that a Sendero victory would bring genocide. Campodónico summarizes the testimony of McCormick and Palmer; the former was pessimistic about the police and military's ability to fight Sendero; the latter thought such apprehensions exaggerated. Other testimony centered on official corruption among the army and police. The outcome of the hearings seemed to be a preparation of the ground for possible direct U.S. military assistance to the Peruvian armed forces. Campodónico also examines U.S. policy towards Fujimori after his *autogolpe;* the capture of Guzmán seems to have softened Washington's disapproval. American aid is conditional on Fujimori's "return to democratic institutionality." It seems that as long as Fujimori sticks to neoliberal economic policies, his authoritarian style will be tolerated.

1067. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "Después de la caída." *Quehacer,* no.79 (September-October 1992): 39-43.

Degregori examines the role of Guzmán in the transformation of the PCP-Sendero Luminoso into a fundamentalist movement. This occurred before the beginning of armed struggle, and served to blind Sendero to a reality crushingly divergent from its perceptions. Sendero isolated itself from all other leftist parties, proposing "the dictatorship of the proletariat" at the very moment Peru was in transition towards democracy, and in the midst of the greatest social movement in its history. It broke not only with the rest of the Peruvian left, but in part with classical Maoism. The dimension of this break can be seen in three texts Guzmán wrote between 1979 and 1980: *"Por la nueva bandera," "Sobre tres capítulos de nuestra historia,"* and *"Somos los iniciadores."* The prevalence of Biblical and apocalyptic phrases in these texts is significant. Guzmán speaks of rebirth, of cleansing, and of triumphant inevitability for the pure in spirit: "Our people were illuminated by an intense light, that of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-Tung thought; first we were dazzled by the endless light, light and nothing else; little by little our eyes began to understand this light; we lowered our eyes and began to see our country, through Mariátegui and our reality, and we found our perspective: the Reconstitution of the Party." Degregori remarks: Mount Tabor, Easter, and Pentecost condensed in a single phrase. Degregori shows how these three texts demonstrate a rabid will to obliterate individuality, linked with absolute certainty to a teleological vision predetermined by history. Militants had to sign a "letter of subjugation," not to the party or to the revolutionary line, but to President Gonzalo. In "The Two Flags," Guzmán speaks of "a higher voice," a celestial voice in Beethoven's Ninth Symphony (ironically outlawed in China during the Cultural Revolution). It is clear, writes Degregori, that Guzmán identifies with this voice from above. The references to Mariátegui disappear, and in the midst of a growing river of blood the master/leader becomes the master/messiah, the Fourth Sword of Marxism, the soloist in Beethoven's Ninth. This is the person who has fallen prisoner.

1068. Mavila León, Rosa. "Presente y futuro de las mujeres de la guerra." *Quehacer,* no.79 (September-October 1992): 44-49.

The media, according to the author, have misrepresented the role played by *senderista* women, propagating stereotypes like "participants in orgies of sex and liquor with Guzmán," "masters of terrorism," and "the women of Gonzalo." Women have functioned at all levels within Shining Path. Edith Lagos and Carlota Tello were leaders of the First Regional Committee and helped plan the jail-break in Huamanga in 1982; Augusta la Torre was one of the central architects of the party support groups; Laura Zembrano was political leader of the Metropolitan Committee

for a time, and took control of dollar exchanges with the narcotics traffickers after leaving prison. Women are to be found in the international movement in Europe and the U.S., in *Socorro Popular*, in the Association of Democratic Lawyers, in *El Diario*, and as intellectual apologists *(canteras intelectuales)* like Sybila Arredondo. Their prominent role is highlighted by the capture of four women along with Abimael Guzmán. But they are also combatants and participants in political, logistical, operational, and military tasks. The last Central Committee was 56% female, and women are prominent in regional committees as well. Mavila traces this tendency back to the "Sacred Family" of original *senderistas* in Ayacucho. The Popular Women's Front and Revolutionary Student Front served to recruit women and the young into the lower and middle ranks of the movement. Mavila explores the almost nun-like devotion to the cause displayed by cadres and captured *senderistas*. Significantly, she also mentions the split in Sendero's leadership over the transfer of the war from the countryside to the cities in which Comrade Norah played an important role; La Torre's significance was emphasized by the many rumors surrounding her death (suicide, murder, death in combat, or heart attack). Mavila underlines the contradictions of the prominent role women play in Sendero, whose leader has paternally referred to his female fighters as "daughters" *(hijas)*, and probes the strong appeal the movement holds for poor women. Perhaps *senderismo* is the only path for confronting the sexism, physical abuse, poverty and misery that is the lot of many women. But the murder of María Elena Moyano (said to be personally ordered by Guzmán), shows that the movement was aware that feminist community organizing posed a challenge to its chosen path of armed struggle.

1069. Obando Arbulú, Enrique. "Después de la caída de Abimael Guzmán: situación de la subversión." *Debate*, no.70 (September-October 1992): 19-22.

The capture of Guzmán signifies that the initiative in the war has changed hands, even though *senderista* actions continue and the fight may go on for many years. Obando looks at the reasons for guarded optimism following Guzmán's arrest. Recent legislation reflects a real desire on the part of the government to confront the problem of subversion. The *rondas campesinas* are recovering wide areas of land in the Mantaro and Ene valleys. Sendero found out that trying to cut off food supplies to the cities was futile, because urban Peru imports much of its food. So it changed its priority to the cities; four years later, and in danger of losing its gains in the countryside, Sendero began to attack Lima with armed strikes and car-bombs. When this happened, Dincote was finally given the financial and human resources to track down Sendero's leadership. The bombing offensive brought "black days" to Lima in April and May, with Sendero assassinating popular leaders in the capital's periphery as well. Sendero made it known that October would bring a new and fiercer offensive. What Guzmán's capture has done is destroy the myth of Gonzalo's invincibility, and give the population a psychological boost. But it would be fatal to believe that this will end the war. Obando warns of efforts to break Guzmán out of jail, or to swap him for kidnapped Peruvians or foreigners. He also proposes that dissident elements inside Sendero--who accused Guzmán of abandoning rural people's war for an urban campaign, and of substituting terror for political work--may now gain ascendancy, which could weaken the movement. What should the government do now? It should encourage defections through more amnesties, concentrate Dincote's efforts on eliminating the rest of the Central Committee, and work to improve the abysmal state of civil-military relations. Apart from Dincote and the *rondas*, not much else in the counterinsurgency effort has worked. "Now fate has given us a new historic opportunity to show that Peru is possible. We should not squander it." A sidebar (pp.21-22) by General Luis F. Cisneros Vizquerra looks at the dynamic of the war after Guzmán's capture. The myth of the superman has been broken, as well the continuity of leadership that has guided the movement for 20 years. The general looks at relations between intelligence agencies, the government, the military, and the security forces. Following Obando's article (pp.23-26) is the testimony of a young *senderista* who defected after becoming disillusioned with the revolution ("Así me engañaron...testimonio de un arrepentido").

1070. Reyna, Carlos. "La captura del sol." *Quehacer*, no.79 (September-October 1992): 32-37.

When Guzmán said, "It's my turn to lose," upon being arrested, was he speaking for himself only, or for his whole movement? There is no doubt that this has been the strongest blow Sendero has suffered since it began its revolution, worse than the damage it suffered in 1983-84 in Ayacucho, when its leadership remained intact and the repression actually served to reinforce the spirit of its militants. The capture represents a problem as important as the upsurge in *rondas* in the highlands; for a movement that claims to be a peasant revolution, this challenge seriously raised the possibility of losing. Above all, the capture of Guzmán represents a defeat in the realm of the imagination. This is crucial, because one of Sendero's most important characteristics has been the manipulation of symbols and representations. Reyna discusses the "bewitchment of

images" that the movement tried to foster: of Sendero as an overwhelming machine of destruction, and of an impotent state on the verge of collapse. The wave of car-bombings created a terrifying vision of Sendero annihilating the middle class. Perhaps the party began to believe too strongly in its own illusions; captured documents speak of the imminence of collapse and victory. Part of Sendero's shock is a reflection of its "Gonzalocentric" image. Guzmán is the "Red Sun" of an organization with a centralized, directing leadership. Now there is a vacuum at its center. From its earliest days, Guzmán's persona was central to the movement; he was the guarantor of communism's triumph. He was also ideological magistrate, organizer, and military strategist; he oversaw the "two-line struggle" that constantly keeps the party on course and unified. "Gonzalo" has been the fundamental factor in the internal cohesion of Sendero. Now it must depend upon its sacred texts and the continuity of the cult. Reyna points out that once the PCP reached "strategic equilibrium," time began to work against it for a number of reasons, not least of which were heightened expectations of an imminent victory. After twelve years of terror, Sendero has yet to obtain the solid support of any important sector of the population. Without the option of negotiation, the movement must keep moving forward, or it will die.

1071. "Juicio total." *Caretas,* no.1230 (October 1 1992): 10-13, 15-16, 65-65, 79.

More repercussions from the arrest of Guzmán and the bizarre aftermath. "How can he get a fair and impartial trial after this?" asked a BBC journalist of his Peruvian colleague, watching the spectacle of Guzmán, dressed in a black-and-white-striped convict's outfit, on display in a cage before a jeering mob of reporters. (Guzmán took the opportunity to shout his defiance to the world, ordering his followers to press ahead with a new military campaign.) The "show" was probably the SIN's idea. Guzmán's guilt, says *Caretas,* is not debatable; what should be in evidence is the difference between Sendero's brutality and democratic justice. This is not only for the benefit of the rest of the world, but for Peruvians as well: a recent poll has shown a high level of sympathy and compassion for Abimael Guzmán. *Caretas* details how Guzmán was transferred from police jurisdiction to that of the Navy, and how the military court will try him. This proceding, says *Caretas,* should be as public as the Nuremberg trials, which not only sentenced Nazi criminals, but also showed the world their perverse soul. Alfredo Crespo, Guzmán's attorney, has already complained that he has not been allowed to see his client or communicate with him since he passed into the Navy's hands. An editorial by Fernando Rospigliosi, "Caza de brujas" (p.25), decries the "witch hunt" now being carried out by a triumphant Fujimori government. A list of supposed *senderistas* released by the government contains the names of *barrio* leaders known to oppose and to have been threatened by Sendero, and a list of supposed Sendero agents abroad, which mixes *senderistas* with others known to be declared enemies of terrorism. This, along with the arbitrary exclusion of IU from upcoming elections, the invasion of the University of San Marcos by troops, the jailing in Cusco of a human rights activist and reporter, and the accusation by a government minister that leftist parliamentarians are brothers of Sendero, are all part of this campaign. "This witch hunt," says Rospigliosi, "that the government has begun will only prolong the war."

1072. "El sendero de Chiang Ching." *Caretas,* no.1230 (October 1 1992): 18-21.

An essay on the role of women within Sendero. It is common to attribute to Abimael Guzmán an unmatched skill at political seduction, based not on passion, as was Simón Bolívar's, but on politics. Guzmán, cerebral, solitary, hardly a picture of Don Juan, has nevertheless demonstrated a capacity to subjugate feminine wills. He recognized the importance of female emancipation, but not in any bourgeois liberal manner; women, he wrote, will play a role in the great class struggles ahead. As head of the Education Faculty at the UNSCH in the mid-1970's, (a school comprised mostly of women), he was able to recruit many members. "Abimael found in women a source of power, but at the same time an impulse that disciplined him." His wife, Augusta La Torre, was a passionate, but disciplined and determined woman; it is said that she stopped Guzmán from going abroad to teach. It is ironic that her determination may have led to her death, for having advocated a dissident line against her husband. Augusta La Torre never became Chiang Ching, widow of Mao and leader of the "Gang of Four"; that role was reserved for Elena Iparraguirre. The ferocity of women in Sendero mirrors an Andean tradition, the vivid image of Mamá Huaco, one of the wives of the Ayar brothers, who divided Pacaritampu to found the Inca empire. According to Guamán Poma, Mamá Huaco was warlike and manly, leading troops into battle. She is the matriarchal symbol of Sendero's women, not only capable of mounting ambushes, but also of giving the Incan *coup de grace* to those being "judged."

1073. "El tribunal de la isla." *Caretas,* no.1231 (October 8 1992): 10-14, 8787.

A hooded panel of Navy judges has sentenced Abimael Guzmán to life in prison for terrorism and treason to *la patria.* His sentence will be ratified by the Council of War, also composed of naval officers. This proceeding took place in secret on the isle of San Lorenzo. The trial was videotaped, and watched by President Fujimori. *Caretas* describes the trial, before which Guzmán's lawyer was allowed only ten minutes to discuss the case with the defendant by telephone. Guzmán, who launched into a speech, remained defiant throughout. His lawyer, who complained that he had had insufficient time to examine the thousand or more pages of indictment, declared that Guzmán should have been tried by a civil court. His fellow *senderistas* have already been before an army court. Several foreign lawyers journeyed to Lima to try and participate in Guzmán's defense, sent by a London-based "International Federation of Democratic Jurists." Following ("Guzmán por dentro, pp.16-18, 20-21) is a story that examines the psychopathology of fanatics like Guzmán, Pol Pot, Stalin, or Khomeni. Guzmán's past is probed for clues with which to build a psychological profile of Sendero's leader.

1074. "Abogado del diablo." *Caretas,* no.1233 (October 22 1992): 26-31, 77-78.

The capture of Martha Huatay Ruiz by Dincote effectively disrupts the leadership of the Lima "annihilation" squads that Sendero had reorganized under the command of the so-called Socorro Popular. The police found explosives in Huatay's house, as well as materials on the police, military, politicians, and *barrio* leaders. The article describes her capture, and her journey from the Association of Democratic Lawyers (linked to the MOTC) to head of Socorro Popular. Huatay acted as a sort of *senderista* "ambassador" abroad, and defended many accused terrorists before the courts. President Fujimori insisted that Sendero's woman had "divided" Peru into three parts: Martha Huatay ("Rosa") was in command in Lima, Teresa Durand Araujo ("Juana") leads in the north, and Margie Clavo Peralta is in charge in the south. Dincote has captured 80% of the membership of the Central Committee, but they are in the process of being replaced. A photograph of Huatay at Guzmán's side at the wake of Comrade Norah accompanies the article. A sidebar ("Cambio brusco") reports that General Vidal's promotion to lieutenant general has excited jealousy. Vidal will be leaving Dincote; the director of the National Police was already upset with him for not having let him know immediately of Guzmán's capture. Fujimori still prefers the armed forces, who are extremely jealous of Dincote's tremendous success. The official ceremony honoring Vidal and the other police who arrested Guzmán was long delayed.

1075. Frame, Rudy. "Binding the Strongman: For Better or Worse?" *Christianity Today,* v.36, no.12 (October 26 1992): 80.

Evangelicals in Peru are asking whether the arrest of Guzmán will mean anything at all to them. While they rejoice in his capture, they are uncertain whether there will be a lessening of the violence that has taken the life of over 400 pastors and church leaders; a Bible translator and Quechua church leader were murdered just eight days before the capture of Sendero's leader. Even Peruvian Christians opposed on principle to capital punishment are finding themselves compelled to make an exception in Guzmán's case. But they are also concerned about the political benefits that Fujimori may receive as a result. The Evangelical Council of Peru has condemned many actions of the government as immoral. Caleb Meza, director of the National Evangelical Council noted, "Evangelical people are frustrated with Fujimori. We are concerned about trends toward dictatorship."

1076. Gorriti, Gustavo. "What Happens When the Queen Bee Falls?" *IPI Report,* v.41, no.10 (October 1992): 3, 6.

What is to become of Shining Path now that its philosopher-king has been captured? Gorriti seeks antecedents in orthodox Communist and integrist movements, (especially Moslem ones), to explain the importance of Guzmán to his revolutionary movement. The cult of personality that Guzmán allowed to develop around him went beyond even the bounds of excess; new party militants were forced to write a "letter of subjection" in which they declared their willingness to give their lives not merely for the party and the revolution, but for Guzmán personally. "Every Senderista proclaimed that he had his life in his fingertips, ready to hand it over to Gonzalo." So what happens when the Queen Bee falls? Today stupor is giving way to desolation in the ranks of Shining Path. Until just days before Guzmán's capture, Sendero clearly held the strategic initiative, but a single stunning police action has reversed the situation. Can the movement recover? The few valid historical antecedents suggest different interpretations. Examples from the past show that the loss of a leader to a Maoist insurrection has resulted in disintegration (in India), destruction in combat (the Sarbedaran in Iran), or drift (the EPL in Colombia). Tito, Mao, and Ho Chi Minh, on the other hand, stayed free and won. (Ho was a prisoner for a brief time in China, which seriously

affected his party.) Gorriti suggests that the consequences for Sendero could be corrosive, if not totally crushing. On the other hand, secular integrist elements in the movement might create a religious vision of Guzmán's incarceration that could produce the same effect as the kidnapping of the Iman in Libya upon Hizbollah in Lebanon. "Hizbollah reinforced itself and the absence of the Iman eventually turned out to be more effective than his presence."

1077. Azabache C., César. "Sobre el juicio de Abimael Guzmán." *Ideéle,* año 4, no.42-43 (October 1992): 31-33.

Abimael Guzmán must answer for all the crimes committed by his movement, but it is essential that his trial be a judicial proceeding, based on solid legal principles. Azabache, a lawyer for the Instituto de Defensa Legal, lays out how the charges against Guzmán should be formulated. According to Law 25659 (promulgated August 13 1992), there are two forums in which terrorism can be judged: in civil courts for such crimes as terrorist association, collaboration, "apology," or incitement; and before military tribunals for selective assassinations, car-bombings, and supplying explosives (now called "treasonous crimes against *la patria").* Guzmán should be tried under the laws in effect at the time various crimes were committed in his name and under his authority. Azabache analyzes the complexities of trying a movement's leadership for acts committed by its members, especially in the present complicated legal atmosphere. Holding Guzmán responsible for everything done in his name since 1980 might be difficult. A sidebar, "Could the death penalty return?", probes the question of whether Guzmán can be executed under Peru's present laws. (Prevailing opinion is that it would be a flagrant violation of international law, since a hemispheric convention prohibits the retroactive application of the death penalty.)

1078. "La captura de Guzmán y los medios de comunicación." *Ideéle,* año 4, no.42-43 (October 1992): 28-30.

The dramatic images of Guzmán behind bars have provoked various reactions in Peru; in fact, the role of the media *vis-`a-vis* groups like Sendero has been hotly disputed ever since the war began. The media's early fervent mission to inform the public has undergone many changes; by 1991 television stations were forbidden to report on subversion for more than one minute in each program. The complicated issue of the relationship between terrorism and the media has never been resolved, in spite of the fact that many of the "disappeared" have been journalists. After Guzmán's capture, the media show staged by the SIN has caused many to wonder at the fine line between cooperation and co-optation. Some stations interviewed victims of *senderista* violence; others asked people in the street what they would do with Guzmán. *Ideéle* asks whether such a violent society needs another dose; is Peru not becoming "senderized," or addicted to violence? Public opinion is more emotional than rational, and such polling does not help the civic process of justice. *Ideéle* is also concerned with SIN's "pyscho-social" manipulation of the media in presenting Guzmán before the press, dressed in a ludicrous black-and-white striped convict's outfit. The aim of humiliating and embarrassing Guzmán would seem to have backfired, since *Caretas* reported that 20% of those watching the spectacle felt some sympathy for Guzmán in his absurd getup. It is hoped that such images will not drive some *senderistas* to commit more savage actions in reprisal in the months ahead. And what about international reaction? Does Peru want to appear ridiculous in the eyes of the world with such charades? Perhaps it is time to "politicize" Guzmán's capture, in the best sense of the word, by showing the movement's aims as unworkable and absurd, and no solution to the grave problems of the nation.

1079. Montaigne, Eduardo. "La captura de Abimael: ¿final de una pesadilla?" *Ideéle,* año 4, no.42-43 (October 1992): 21-24.

The author, a member of the Peruvian Institute of Psychoanalysis, asks whether the long national nightmare is really over with the capture of Guzmán. Montaigne examines the collective euphoria that swept Lima following the arrest, especially in light of the various psychological traumas that the country has undergone in twelve years of violence: horror and/or fascination with the slaughter, passivity, denial of reality, collective fantasy, etc. Now that Peruvians have awakened from their nightmare, they must face reality, which may be no more preferable than their horrible dream.

1080. "Repercusiones de una historia captura." *Ideéle,* año 4, no.42-43 (October 1992): 4-11.

The capture of Guzmán has changed the course of political violence in Peru. The pinnacle of *senderista* ideology and organization has fallen; as Hubert Lanssiers put it, it is as if the Pope

said that God did not exist. Nevertheless this is not the end for Sendero. *Ideéle* reviews the details of Guzmán's arrest, and analyzes what his capture means for Peru. Dincote's patient intelligence work indicates a thorough effort to understand the structure and logic of Sendero. It is significant that Sendero's greatest defeat came about through the employment of sophisticated intelligence work carried out within the framework of the law, in the sharpest contrast to a strategy that has produced thousands of cases of arbitrary detention, torture, and disappearances. Dincote's, and General Vidal's triumph will be muted, since it comes at the military's, and to a lesser extent, President Fujimori's expense. Will Guzmán's capture be the end for Sendero? *Ideéle* looks at his unique role as Sendero's head, president of the New Popular Republic of Peru, fount of *pensamiento Gonzalo*, and director of the movement's political and military programs. Sendero cannot simply replace Guzmán; that would be tantamount to creating a new demigod. It is more likely that the movement will carry on, insisting that alive or dead, Guzmán will continue to inspire it through his philosophy. But without him, the possibilities of error, deviation, and disaster seem greater, especially since so many top *senderista* leaders have been captured or died in various prison confrontations. Guzmán's absence will have repercussions, especially as the PCP was due to hold its first party conference since 1988, and was preparing for the sixth general (military) plan. The next step after strategic equilibrium is strategic offensive, the last stage prior to taking power. *Ideéle* warns against the collective amnesia that seems to have taken hold about Sendero since Guzmán's capture, amnesia about the violence, human rights violations, and authoritarian dictatorship which Peru will continue to endure. A sidebar quotes from party documents that illustrate just how central Guzmán is to the movement; the extravagant praise reveals the cult of personality that lies at Sendero's heart. Following (p.12) is a short piece asking, "How is Sendero reacting to Guzmán's fall?" Among the questions it poses are: Will the movement abort its ambitious plans for insurrection? Will Peru see an October offensive as intense as those of May and July? Sendero is being forced to reconstitute its leadership. The clear lack of a designated successor may mean an eventual fracturing of the Party. Unfortunately, figures show that Guzmán's capture has not significantly slowed *senderista* violence; *Ideéle* documents the attacks carried out since September 12. It reminds readers that although decapitated, this organization has been forged through fanaticism and has an implacable discipline. "One must be prepared. There aren't always miracles in October."

1081. Hinojosa, Iván. "Entre el poder y la ilusión: Pol Pot, Sendero y las utopías campesinas." *Debate agrario,* no.15 (October-December 1992): 69-94.

Thoughtful and well-researched essay examining the similarities and differences between Sendero and the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, the political movement to which Shining Path has most often been compared. After a thorough analysis of the political and social roots of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, Hinojosa compares the two guerrilla movements. Both had as their objective the breaking of foreign domination, the destruction of the old state, and the construction of an agriculturally-based socialism. Contrary to popular opinion, the Khmer Rouge did not seek to "return to the past," but rather to modernize the country and to develop light industry. Turning the entire country into a gigantic plantation is not modern, but it was thought necessary in order to "purify" the population and build a non-bureaucratic socialism. Society was visualized as an integrated body of militants and peasants. Both Sendero and the Khmer Rouge are small militarized parties, in which political direction is centralized, vertical, and authoritarian. In Cambodia between 1971 and 1978, and in Peruvian "liberated zones" today, the objective of the revolution remains the creation of a regimented society controlling all social, cultural, and economic relations. Both movements are led by a small, interrelated family nucleus. Both believe a "quota" of sacrifice is necessary to achieve the rebirth of society. But the Khmer Rouge came to power in the midst of a horrific war; Sendero began its revolution on the eve of a return to democracy. Hinojosa also discusses the relationship between Stalinism, Maoism, and the two parties, as well as the profound differences between the two revolutionary experiences: in Cambodia there was no powerful (and increasingly progressive) church, no NGO's, no political parties, etc. In addition, for Sendero, education is all-important: the words of "Gonzalo thought" are a key ingredient in its revolution; in prison the educated taught the illiterate to read. Hinojosa concludes that the greatest similarity between Peru and Cambodia is the horrific price one has paid, and one would pay, in the event of victory.

1082. Buckley, William F. "Execute Guzmán." *National Review,* v.44. no.21 (November 2 1992): 70-71.

Buckley calls for Guzmán's execution, arguing that "if you can suspend the constitution, you can make the necessary modifications to apply the ultimate sanction here." Guzmán's capture should have led to the same fate as that suffered by Che Guevara. The Bolivian president knew that keeping Che alive would be the greatest threat to the Bolivian people; he did not even dare to

fly him to La Paz, let alone risk a long public trial of the kind granted Frenchman Régis Debray, "arousing all the leftist intelligentsia of the West to his defense." Guzmán was sentenced to life in prison. "That failure of nerve (he should have been shot) is a sentence of death for who knows how many Peruvians. Moreover, the sentence of perpetual life in jail is all but meaningless." Buckley cites precedents in South Africa, where even prisoners guilty of capital crimes have been released as a good will gesture, and Israel, which swapped 1,150 Arabs for three Israeli POW's. "That is what happens when governments come to terms with revolutionists: the release of prisoners." Herewith, a call for the execution of Abimael Guzmán.

1083. Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement. "Glory to the Communist Heroes of Canto Grande." *A World to Win,* no.18 (November 1992): 28-30.

Battered by a rising revolutionary tide, Peru's Fujimori government has been raging for revenge. But unable to inflict military defeat on the revolutionary armed forces led by the Communist Party of Peru and its Chairman Gonzalo, it has sought to show its strength by attacking where it thought it could win most easily--the prisons where it holds captured revolutionaries. A great many comrades have been murdered. But through their heroic, self-sacrificing resistance, the enemy has been robbed of any triumph. The Committee of the RIM recounts the rebellion and murder of captured *senderistas* in Canto Grande. Even when dogs were unleashed upon helpless prisoners lying on the ground (allegedly in the presence of Fujimori), the prisoners continued to sing and chant. The RIM concludes, "As the days of the reactionary system in Peru draw to an end, the foreign imperialists and their local lackeys who have so long fattened off the Peruvian masses are lashing out ever more frantically. This is how it is with revolution: the reactionaries try to turn back its advances through slaughter, while each new crime only further exposes their nature and the basis of their system and spurs revolution against them, until finally they are overthrown by the armed revolutionary masses." That day in Peru, says the RIM, may not be far off.

1084. Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement. "Move Heaven and Earth to Defend the Life of Chairman Gonzalo." *A World to Win,* no.18 (November 1992): 8-9.

The RIM calls upon people all over the world to fight to defend the life of Comrade Gonzalo. Millions of people worldwide who despise imperialism look to Chairman Gonzalo and the people's war he is leading to batter down the old social order and bring the fresh revolutionary winds of liberation that know no bounds among the oppressed. The capture of the Chairman is a bitter blow to revolutionary people the world over, and the danger to our comrade's life is extreme. Defending the life of Chairman Gonzalo means defending the right of the slave to rebel. He is accused of treason, but it is the Peruvian state that has betrayed the country and is at the beck and call of its Yankee masters. He is accused of murder, but it is the Peruvian armed forces who massacred unarmed peasants. He is accused of "narco-trafficking," but it is the Peruvian army and state that is in the narcotics industry up to their necks. He is accused of terrorism, but it is the Peruvian state that murdered hundreds of unarmed prisoners in 1986 and 1992. He is accused of disrupting the economy, but it is the shameless Fujimori who, on the orders of the IMF and World Bank, is starving the already- impoverished people with his "Fuji-shock." We must fight for the recognition of Chairman Gonzalo's stature as the leader of the newly-emerging state of the Peruvian people. We must not allow them to take the life of this precious and uncompromising revolutionary communist leader. Move Heaven and Earth to Defend the Life of Chairman Gonzalo! We Need Comrade Gonzalo at His Post, in the Forefront of the Revolution in Peru and the International Communist Movement! Fight for His Liberation!

1085. Communist Party of Peru, Central Committee. "The Revolution Continues to Advance." *A World to Win,* no.18 (November 1992): 34-36.

Sent out by fax a few days after Abimael Guzmán's capture, this document, *Construir la conquista del poder en el medio de la guerra popular* (To build the conquest of power in the midst of people's war), is based upon a report from the second Plenary Meeting of the PCP in February, 1991. Since the process of constructing revolution will bring disequilibrium, the Party must plan for such a situation, and overcome it. War involves both victory and setbacks; this is the process of revolution, and the Party must know how to deal with it. As Chairman Mao teaches, "We pick up our dead, treat our wounded, and continue fighting." The Party can never be paralyzed because it is clear on the course to follow, and it is united. The reaction is seeking to wipe out people's war; the Party is in a transitional stage, the hardest period, that will mark the turning point of the whole war. The enemy is striving to preserve his system; we are striving to prepare for

the strategic offensive by organizing for the seizure of power. The decisive thing is to go to the masses and act together with them. "We base ourselves on our ideology, weapons are not principal. Let ideas arms hands, our ideology is the arm that will win victory." *AWTW* follows this document with a reprint of Abimael Guzmán's famous 1988 interview with *El Diario.*

1086. "'Defend the Life of Chairman Gonzalo': The Battle-Cry Resounds on Every Continent." *A World to Win,* no.18 (November 1992): 12-18.

Report on worldwide efforts to defend the life of Chairman Gonzalo, Dr. Abimael Guzmán. The Peruvian people's response has included an armed strike, the successful annihilation of a DINCOTE secret police commander, and the disruption of Armed Forces Day celebrations. In poor Lima shantytowns huge quantities of a PCP pamphlet, "Defend the Life of Chairman Gonzalo" were distributed. International delegations have exposed Fujimori's crimes; the IEC's call to defend Abimael Guzmán's life has been signed by government leaders, academics, writers, musicians, and artists from all around the world. *A World to Win* publishes photographs of demonstrations in Bangladesh, India, and Germany, and statements by Carlos La Torre, Abimael Guzmán's father-in-law, and two international delegations that traveled to Peru to protest the conditions of Guzmán's trial. On p.21, *AWTW* also publishes the text of the "Call to Create an International Emergency Committee to Defend the Life of Dr. Abimael Guzmán," and the names of more than a hundred signatories. They include British Labour MP Tony Benn, attorney William Kunstler, former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, and Carol Andreas. Appended (pp.23-26) are excerpts from world-wide protests.

1087. Guzmán, Abimael. "Win New Victories." *A World to Win,* no.18 (November 1992): 10-11.

On September 24, 1992, Chairman Gonzalo was displayed in a cage in front of several hundred hostile journalists at the headquarters of the Anti-Terrorist Police in Lima. Over their taunts, he called on the Party to carry out the tasks laid down at the Third Plenary session of the Central Committee, and exhorted them to continue with the Sixth Military Plan. *A World to Win* reproduces the text of his passionate speech, which concluded with a promise to the people of Peru that People's War will inevitably be victorious.

1088. "High Stakes, Great Challenge." *A World to Win,* no.18 (November 1992): 4-7.

The stakes in the battle to defend the life of Comrade Gonzalo are very high for both the revolutionary movement and the imperialists and their flunkies. For years the international media has tried to minimize the importance of the people's war led by the PCP and imposed a news blockade. But the capture of Chairman Gonzalo has been portrayed as the arrest of public enemy number one in Latin America, the last communist leader of the 20th century, and the world's most dangerous man. Why? Because of him, peasants, and workers are breaking their bonds and advancing towards the fortress of state power itself. Even more terrifying and incomprehensible to them is that women have stepped forward as fighters, commanders, and political leaders of this revolution. They are also afraid of the masses of people of the world; now that the movements dependent upon the phony "socialist" USSR have been forced to capitulate, the revolution in Peru is an example to all peoples everywhere. In the propaganda sphere, the PCP and People's War have been smeared and branded as "terrorists." Today all their efforts are focused on one man: Chairman Gonzalo. The Maoists abroad have grasped and acted upon the urgency of the situation: the RIM has accepted the challenge thrown before it. No class can fail to go all-out to defend its leader; this is especially true for the revolutionary proletariat, because it is not easy for an oppressed class to give rise to men and women who can lead the slaves in successful battle. The battle to save the life of Chairman Gonzalo is now the center of all work to support the People's War in Peru. The stakes are high, but victory is possible. The situation can be turned into a political and moral defeat for the enemy. The imperialists and reactionaries have picked up a big rock to hurl against the people, but an increasing number of people are fighting to force them to drop this rock on their own feet.

1089. International Emergency Committee to Defend the Life of Dr. Abimael Guzmán. "The Black-Hooded Justice of the Fujimori Dictatorship." *A World to Win,* no.18 (November 1992): 27.

A statement by the International Committee condemns the trial of Abimael Guzmán as a trampling of internationally-established treaties and conventions governing the treatment of political prisoners. The defendant had no opportunity to call witnesses, conduct a defense, or consult with his attorney. All press and observers were banned. The trial and verdict must therefore

be considered null and void. The Fujimori dictatorship, according to the Committee, has had only one concern since Dr. Guzmán's arrest: to silence permanently the leader of the insurgency as quickly as possible. Although Fujimori has abandoned the idea of a legal execution of Dr. Guzmán, there is still every reason to fear an extra-legal execution under the cover of escape attempt, suicide, or death by natural causes. The statement also accuses the Western powers and world media of aiding the Fujimori regime by portraying Dr. Guzmán as a dangerous terrorist and "the most dangerous man on earth," while ignoring his "kangaroo trial" during which every established legal principle was trampled. Despite this worldwide orchestra of lies and hysteria, a movement has developed around the world with remarkable speed, that has brought together jurists, defenders of human rights, journalists, political activists, and tens of thousands of ordinary people, to fight against the threats to Dr. Guzmán's life.

1090. "Statement by the Prisoners of Canto Grande: Long Live This Great Milestone of Mass Heroism!" *A World to Win,* no.18 (November 1992): 31-33.

The survivors of shining trench of combat 4-B (men's cellblock) in Canto Grande prison denounce the evil, monstrous, and despicable genocide perpetrated from May 6 to May 9. The reactionary government of the genocidal national traitor Fujimori and his genocidal armed forces and police attacked the 131 women prisoners of war in cellblock 1-A and 403 men prisoners of war in cellblock 4-B, murdering more than 40 and wounding almost a hundred people. The statement by the Canto Grande prisoners summarizes the agreement concluded with the government that allowed prison authorities to inspect their cellblocks under the eye of the International Red Cross. The government violated these agreements on May 6 by attacking the cellblocks to reinstate their "principle of authority," with troops, rockets, helicopters, and explosives. The manifesto documents the resistance in each cellblock, naming individuals who were killed, or captured, tortured, and subsequently murdered. It concludes with the customary *lemas* (slogans): Long live Chairman Gonzalo, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Gonzalo Thought, the Communist Party of Peru, the Twelfth anniversary of the victoriously advancing People's War, and strategic equilibrium. "Our decision: heroic resistance! Our Vow: To Give Our Lives for the Party and the Revolution!"

1091. "The 'Trial' of Chairman Gonzalo: A Desperate Farce." *A World to Win,* no.18 (November 1992): 18-20.

Chairman Gonzalo's trial was scandalous on two counts: first, that a leader of workers and peasants fighting a just war of liberation should be treated like a criminal; secondly, that even by the standards of bourgeois law, the "trial" was nothing more than a naked exercise of power, particularly as Fujimori had already announced a sentence of isolation for life beforehand. Chairman Gonzalo is being kept in an underground bunker that military officials have called "his tomb." He is to have no communications, no reading or writing materials, and his glasses have been taken away from him. He is not permitted to see his lawyer. After total isolation for a year, he is to be put to forced labor, with one visit from a relative allowed per month. But there is reason to believe that the regime has no intention of keeping Guzmán alive at all; these conditions make it easier for the government to stage an "illness" or "suicide." Fujimori has also opened the question of legal execution for Chairman Gonzalo and other political prisoners. *A World to Win* reviews Guzmán's trial, conducted at an isolated island military base in the greatest secrecy. The judges (all navy officers) wore black hoods; "everything about the way this drama was staged points to a conscious attempt to recreated the terror of the Spanish Inquisition..." The defendant's lawyer was allowed to consult with his client for only 15 minutes by phone. This was the first and last time they were allowed to discuss the case. The trial lasted only a few hours. Chairman Gonzalo was interrogated about his political convictions, puting the revolution itself on trial. The Chairman allegedly gave a three-and-half hour speech, "which threw the courtroom into disorder." His lawyer was allowed to see the indictment only after the conclusion of the trial, and is not allowed ever to divulge any details of the case. An international delegation of four lawyers, from France, Germany, and the U.S. (including Leonard Weinglass), have concluded that the trial violated the Peruvian constitution. *AWTW* publishes a summary of their findings.

1092. Manuel, Anne. "Americas Watch: sobre el juicio de Guzmán." *Ideéle,* año 4, no.44 (November 1992): 24-25.

The position adopted by Americas Watch on Guzmán's capture has been controversial in Lima as well as in the United States. Some have criticized AW for expressing satisfaction over the capture of Guzmán by a government that AW has condemned as a violator of human rights. In Lima the government rejects the defense of Guzmán's rights as an apology for terrorism. AW's

position is that all those responsible for violating human rights and war crimes must be prosecuted and punished, but always by independent and impartial tribunals. Guzmán and his acolytes deserve trial and severe punishment in accordance with the law, but much of the government's new anti-terrorist legislation violates the constitution. Neither Pinochet nor Videla [military dictators of Chile and Argentina] reversed the principle of the presumption of innocence in the name of protecting society. A just and open trial for Guzmán would be seen as a triumph of the lawful state over barbarism. Manuel spells out in detail the many steps that the Fujimori government is taking that will narrow, not widen democratic practices in Peru, including punishing those who "apologize" for terrorism, holding suspects incommunicado for 15 days, impeding lawyers' access to clients accused of terrorism, etc. The elimination of fundamental guarantees of *habeas corpus* and other rights violates international accords signed by Peru. The antiterrorist legislation decreed by the government after April 5 leaves Peruvians effectively without protection from the abuse of power.

1093. Montoya, David. "Sendero Luminoso: la guerra no ha terminado." *Quehacer,* no.80 (November-December 1992): 60-64.

Montoya, a DESCO researcher, warns that the capture of Guzmán does not mean that the war is over. President Fujimori may have declared that Sendero activity has been diminished by 95%, but the facts prove otherwise. Two charts show that Sendero attacks and killings dropped off drastically in the wake of the September 12 arrest, but have since regained the high levels of July. Furthermore, one of the rationales advanced for Fujimori's *autogolpe* was an ability to confront terrorism more efficiently. DESCO's figures show that in the 35 weeks following the coup, violent incidents actually increased slightly. Montoya also analyzes arrests and detentions, finding that in spite of numerous desertions and arrests of guerrillas, the movement has continued to strike hard blows at the state. However, desertions from the PCP are up in certain areas of the country. Montoya feels there are indications that those deserting are the recently-recruited, not long-term or hardened Sendero cadres. Sendero began a new offensive in Lima on November 18, but its direction is unclear. The "armed strike" shows that Sendero is active, but it lacks the force of previous actions. There is no doubt about police successes of recent months, but above all the executive and security forces must make good on their proclamations that their anti-terrorism policy does not depend solely on military means, but seeks development as well.

1094. Cisneros Hamánn, Luis Jaime. "Entrevista al general Luis Cisneros." *Debate,* v.15, no.71 (November 1992-January 1993): 8-16.

General Cisneros is interviewed by *Debate* on a number of subjects: the role of the military in Peru, recent events in the wake of both the April *autogolpe* and Guzmán's capture, the possibility of another coup (by the armed forces), and the influence of Fujimori's advisor and *éminence grise,* Vladimiro Montesinos, in the government. Cisneros is especially candid on relations between Fujimori and his generals. Asked to evaluate current counterinsurgency strategy, he sees some positive signs. The armed forces, he reminds his interviewer, have always said that the insurgency would not be defeated while sole responsibility lay with the military. Education is very important, especially as the majority of guerrilla fighters are young people. Sendero recruits them out of the universities and schools; to kill all these *chicos* would make the nation's youth disappear. The Ministry of Education has a responsibility to teach the fundamental values of citizenship. Cisneros also believes that the press is acting more responsibly now in the fight against subversion than it did four years ago. But the media, whatever its shade of politics, must work more closely with national and local authorities. Economically, the picture is bleaker: the rural zones where the insurgency is most active must be a priority for economic aid from the state. To declare that democracy is better than Sendero's alternative in the face of poverty, misery, illiteracy, and infant mortality, only breeds cynicism. The nation needs a war economy: the army must pay its soldiers a decent wage, feed them, and make sure that their widows receive pensions. Cisneros also does not believe, despite Fujimori's declarations, that the war will be over by 1995. He thinks that a national effort will need 20 years.

1095. Hernández, Max. "La piel dura." *Debate,* v.15, no.71 (November 1992-January 1993): 20-21.

Has Sendero served a purpose, asks Hernández? What has Peru learned in twelve years of war? Peru has suffered an internal war, as well as neoliberal economics, the disillusionment of an old and failed party, "Fujishock," as well as massive human rights violations by both Sendero and the armed forces. Has racism been exacerbated in these hard years? In a paradox, every day Peru becomes more mestizo, and every day the Andean presence becomes more evident in urban areas.

Hernández reflects on the "hard skin" that Peru has developed, and the hard questions about ethnicity and Peru's colonial legacy that the war has brought to the surface.

1096. "La larga noche." *Caretas,* no.1240 (December 10 1992): 34-35, 45.

Interview with Gordon McCormick of the RAND Corporation, one of the most influential North American experts on Sendero. The prevailing view in Washington is that the war is over. McCormick disagrees; he does not believe that Sendero will split apart, and he thinks that Guzmán can be replaced. He argues that Sendero is a strong organization, one that carried on its daily operations without Guzmán anyway. McCormick thinks Sendero's discipline and chain of command will permit it to continue functioning. Sendero is a rural organization that can retreat to the countryside when attacked; in addition, the socioeconomic conditions in Peru that gave rise to the revolution have not changed. McCormick thinks that Sendero has been hurt (mostly psychologically) by Guzmán's capture, but not fatally. He characterizes the military's counterinsurgency strategy as woefully understrength; he also does not believe that the *rondas* are very useful militarily ("the best that one can say about them is that they complicate Sendero's offensive system, but they do not offer the Peruvian government the possibility of controlling an area"). McCormick also comments on Sendero's renewed offensive capabilities, and the differences of opinion in Washington between the State Department, Pentagon, and the CIA on Sendero's future.

1097. "1992: Balance bajo fuego." *Caretas,* no.1243 (December 30 1992): 18-21.

Analysis of the balance-sheet for 1992: from panic and desperation in July and August, to euphoria in September. But on December 28 the wall around the Chinese Embassy was demolished by a car bomb. Is Sendero in decline? In 1992 Sendero carried out 908 attacks that killed 364 persons in Lima, making it the second most violent year since the war began. Up to July 12, Sendero had carried out 1,650 attacks in the entire country, claiming 1,569 victims. New attacks reinforce the belief that Sendero is recovering and planning a new offensive. *Caretas* reviews the events of 1992; accompanying tables list attacks, victims, and disappearances. One clearly shows that attacks fell to almost nothing following Guzmán's capture, but by November had regained the levels of July. "In sum," says the journal, "a year of exaggeration, of great victories and defeats, of deep pessimism and exultant optimism, where passions excelled over unruffled and cold analysis of events."

1098. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "¡Dejen en paz a Túpac Amaru! Simon Strong, los Andes, y Sendero Luminoso." *Argumentos,* año 1, no.2 (December 1992): 14-16.

Strongly-worded review of (and attack on) Simon Strong's book *Sendero Luminoso,* by the dean of Peruvian senderologists, a review that becomes a moving declaration on what Sendero is and what it is not. Sendero has from its inception been viewed as different variants of Said's "Orientalism," in which the essentialization of The Other is as an exotic being moved by values and millenarian traditions intrinsic to its nature. Sendero exerted a fascination with millenarianism on commentators, and was interpreted as a revolt of Indians moved by centuries of oppression. This interpretation gave way in the course of a decade to more solid analyses. Now the millenarianist thesis has returned, exaggerated to the point of caricature, in Strong's book. Strong, Degregori charges, has plundered, without decency, without citation, and absolutely out of context, the literature on Inkarrí, *pistacos*, symbology, and millenarianism from, among others, the work of Alberto Flores Galindo and Manuel Burga. Strong tries to prove a number of theses: that a hemorrhaging of blood and "racial hatred" is recurrent in Andean history; that the Indians are immersed in a mythical and baroque philosophy tangential to Western thought; and that Guzmán consciously or unconsciously exploited this mind-set, which amazingly coincided with Chinese philosophy. Strong, Degregori writes, has mixed isolated half-truths to construct a Eurocentric image of an "exotic" Peru. Degregori refutes Strong's attempts to construct parallels between Chinese and Andean mythology and philosophy. He criticizes Strong even more strongly for not having the classic excuses of a journalist, haste and unfamiliarity, since Strong spent twelve years reporting from Peru and had at his disposal the work of Henri Favre and Ronald Berg upon which to draw. It is time, Degregori says, to admit that Sendero is fundamentally a Western and Christian movement, that it treats the peasants even more brutally than does the military, that the majority of its cadres are not Indian, that the *rondas* are not only or even principally the product of state imposition, but the option of a peasantry capable of political initiative. Sendero, Degregori declares, emerged *counter* to a great social movement, that, with substantial indigenous participation and a minimum of violence, sprang up in the decades 1960-1980. Degregori admits

that his comments are harsh, but the subject is too sorrowful to be treated in such an irresponsible manner; furthermore, the indigenous population and Peruvians in general deserve better than to be seen as "exotic." However, the fact that Strong's book is a best-seller shows that many Peruvian city-dwellers prefer an exotic vision of what Basadre called *el Perú profundo*, a vision that shares the eurocentrism and racism of this book.

1099. Nangle, Joe. "Terror on the Left." *Sojourners*, v.21, no.10 (December 1992): 5-6.

Nangle, a Franciscan brother, condemns Sendero as nothing more than a rigid, unscrupulous group of ideologues bent on the violent reordering of Peruvian government and society in their own image and likeness. He goes on to state: "There are no redeeming qualities about Sendero Luminoso, despite a strong and somewhat successful national and international propaganda campaign." Sendero wantonly kills defenseless civilians and popular leaders; its leftist propaganda must be seen for what it is--lies and half-truths, cloaked in the rhetoric of a revolution that is indeed needed in Peru. The vast majority of the poor, to whom Sendero might be expected to appeal, see it as one more threat in their lives. Guzmán's capture holds the promise of an end to this scourge. As one Peruvian put it, "This is the first of a hundred steps we have to take in order to redeem our country." Economic, racial, and moral restricting must come in Peru, says Nangle, but at least the cancerous spread of Shining Path may finally have been halted.

1100. Smith, Philip. "Andean Armageddon: Peru on the Brink." *Peace and Democracy News*, v.6, no.2 (Winter 1992-1993): 29-34.

Smith expands on his article in *New Politics* (see no.977), concentrating on the Fujimori administration's policies, Sendero's challenge, and Washington's response. Fujimori seems to have two objectives: crushing the Shining Path, and mandating neo-liberal economic policies to bring Peru into accord with the wishes of the International Monetary Fund. Smith characterizes the United States's response to the *autogolpe* of April 1992 as appropriately harsh, but hollow; nor has the U.S. seemed overly concerned about creeping military encroachment on civilian political spheres. In the tense months leading up to the coup, neither the U.S. government nor the American ambassador warned Fujimori or the military against seizing power. In a similar fashion, the international community, including the IMF and World Bank, is unlikely to jeopardize the economic progress Peru has made after two years of economic shock treatment. Sendero, Smith believes, will probably not mount an all-our assault on Lima this year or next. In classic Maoist fashion, the party will wait until it is in firm control of the countryside, while laying the groundwork for insurrection by making the city ungovernable through mass organization and rioting. He quotes Gordon McCormick to the effect that the final campaign for the capital will begin sometime in the next five years. Smith, evaluating Sendero's progress, Fujimori's authoritarian modernization, and the left's disarray, finds the prospects for Peru grim.

1993

1101. Amnesty International. *Human Rights Since the Suspension of Constitutional Government.* New York: Amnesty International, May 1993.

Amnesty has continued to document a pattern of systematic human rights violations by security forces following the suspension of constitutional rule by President Alberto Fujimori on April 5, 1992. AI is particularly concerned with the emergency measures taken by President Fujimori, especially Decree Law no.25,418, which establishes the Emergency Government of National Reconstruction. This government rules by executive fiat, has suspended civilian courts, and has removed, among others, all members of the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees, the Supreme Court, and the nation's Attorney General. New decrees have widened the definition of crimes related to terrorism, granted the police virtually unlimited pre-trial powers, and significantly lengthened prison terms for those convicted. The report gives detailed summaries of these legislative changes, and chronicles extrajudicial executions, disappearances, cases of torture and ill-treatment, detentions and irregular legal proceedings, the persecution of prisoners of conscience, arbitrary detentions, official impunity granted to the security forces, and abuses committed by the insurgents.

1102. *Anatomy of a Government Lie: The True Story of the Shining Path and the Asháninka Indians.* [Cambridge: Revolution Books, 1993.]

This pamphlet, reprinted from the September 26, 1993 issue of *Revolutionary Worker,* seeks to refute the world media's "campaign of lies" to discredit the revolution in Peru in the eyes of many people around the world who support the Amazon Indians in their struggle against genocide. Quoting a *Caretas* article on the massacre of more than 60 Indians by alleged Shining Path guerrillas, the pamphlet charges that a military officer (Lieutenant "Poison") threatened villagers with death if they did not join *rondas.* Three days later, fifteen villages were attacked and people were killed by armed men who accused them of not forming the civil defense patrols. Why then, asks the *Revolutionary Worker,* should anyone believe that these murders were the work of revolutionaries, and not of soldiers acting with sinchi and U.S. approval? The pamphlet explains how the revolution made deep links with the Asháninka people, creating a "new unity between peasant settlers and the jungle Indians--based on a common struggle against the system." The government has tried to create hostilities between settlers and Indians, to recruit the Asháninkas to fight for the government. This, says *RW,* is a classic U.S. tactic, harkening back to the Green Berets and the Meo people in the highlands of Vietnam. The pamphlet reiterates the necessity of "learning to recognize imperialist disinformation." The second part of the publication explains "how people's power took root among the Asháninka." While the government continues to enslave the native people (by forcing them to fight one another and the revolution through their *rondas),* the Communist Party of Peru has launched a historic revolution to liberate the people.

1103. Balaguer, Alejandro. *Rostros de la guerra/The Faces of War.* Lima: Peru Reporting. 1993.

Photojournalist Balaguer has assembled a powerful collection of photographs documenting the war and its impact on Peruvian society. In "Ayacucho, corner of the dead," the faces of peasants forced to join the civil patrol, and then given sharpened stakes rather than rifles, show a desperate strain. In essays on the Huallaga valley, refugees, Asháninka Indians, the destitute children of Peru's villages and cities, and the violent streets and *barrios* of Lima, Balaguer documents the human suffering inflicted by terrorist violence and government repression. An excellent bilingual text gives context to the stark black and white photographs.

1104. Castañeda, Jorge G. *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War.* New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993.

Detailed and knowledgeable examination of the status of Marxism as a philosophy and a political movement in Latin America following the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism. Castañeda discusses the deeply influential role of Marxism in Latin American society, from legal parliamentary and grass-roots organizations to subversive guerrilla movements. Within this context, he sees Sendero as an anomalous, if successful post-Castro armed left-wing organization, one of the most effective, thriving, terrifying and mysterious organizations ever encountered in Latin America. Castañeda characterizes Shining Path as sectarian, fundamentalist, violent, and isolationist. Whether it survives or not following the capture of Guzmán, Sendero is already a major component of the Latin American left, innovative and archaic at the same time. It is the first guerrilla organization to be truly and significantly involved in the drug trade; it is the only one that is 100% free of foreign support, training, or funds; and it has gradually built an international network of support and solidarity of its own. It is also the first guerrilla movement in Latin America to build a mass base among the urban, marginalized poor. But it is, of course, the last movement to openly proclaim its allegiance to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, which makes it a lingering remnant of a by-gone age: "The degree of violence and sacrifice along with the existential asceticism, ideological certainties, and ensuing cohesion that Sendero conserves to this day all seem obsolete in Latin America."

1105. Degregori, Carlos Iván. "Identidad étnica, movimientos sociales y participación política en el Perú." In *Democracia, etnicidad y violencia política en los países andinos.* Edited by Alberto Adrianzán and Jean Michel Blanquier, *et al.* (Serie problema no.16/Série Travaux, v.70 de IFEA) Lima: IEP/IFEA, 1993, pp.113-133.

During the 1980's, the Andean nations found themselves in crisis; while Ecuador and Bolivia saw the emergence of important self-identified ethnic social movements, Peru was convulsed by a hyper-classist party, Sendero Luminoso. None of Sendero's documents mention the ethnic problems of Peru. What accounts for these differences, asks Degregori? He examines how the ethnic dimension, ever-present in stratification, social movements, political life, and cultural identity, differs from country to country. Degregori explores whether ethnic identity is "primordial"

or "situational," gives a brief history of ethnicity in Peru and the construction of the concept of the "Indian," and examines how ethnicity is viewed in Peru today. With the expansion of the 19th-century *latifundio,* the term *indio* became synonymous with "poor peasant." By the 1940's, the word *indígena* had "officially" replaced *indio,* and as the century progressed, national integration and cultural pluralism were alternatively the aim of successive governments. Degregori reviews how autonomous peasant organizations and unions arose in the 1960's, and how land reform, the expansion of the market, great migratory movements, and improved communications have made the question of ethnic identify more complex. He asks, finally, what is a "Peruvian citizen?" Is class, region, or ethnicity more important in such a definition? In recent years, the need to organize for self-defense against Sendero has brought to the forefront once again the question of identification with the Peruvian state.

1106. Degregori, Carlos Iván and Carlos Rivera Paz. *Perú 1980-1993: fuerzas armadas, subversión y democracia. Redefinación del papel militar en un contexto de violencia subversiva y colapso del régimen democrático.* Documento de Trabajo, 53. Serie Documentos de Política, 5. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1993.

The end of the Cold War, the redefinition of the role of the Latin American military, and the region's transition to democracy have met a strong counter-current in Peru, where the military is waging an internal war of exceptional virulence by Latin American standards. Degregori and Rivera examine the history of military-civil relations since the return to democracy in 1980. In contrast to Chile or Brazil, the military left power with rather modest prerogatives, totally lacking any popular support base among Peruvians. Although many segments of the government (including the current Minister of War and many officers) were opposed to giving the military primary responsibility in fighting Shining Path, the reality of the police's inability to cope with subversion left Belaúnde little choice. Once engaged, the armed forces, lacking an adequate strategy, unfortunately adopted the Southern Cone doctrine of National Security as their model, which resulted in widespread human rights abuses. Tracing the upward trajectory of military power through the Belaúnde and García governments, the authors find a growing tendency towards authoritarian solutions among the military; e.g., the dangers of a "Guatemalan solution" to Sendero's threat. Under Fujimori, the military, (or at least those segments which favor the president), has found a sympathetic executive, whose own authoritarian inclinations dovetail with theirs. There is considerable danger of a "politicization" of the armed forces, for all practical purposes converted into the party of government. The November, 1992 coup plot against Fujimori reflected more a distrust of the president's advisor Montesinos than discontent with Fujimori or his antisubversion strategy. The authors warn that the military in Peru is not subordinate to a democratic government with a balance of powers, but to an individual who monopolizes all power within a "hyperpresidential" constitution. The authors conclude by warning against some of the legal modifications that have since 1980 produced a very unequal civil equation between civilian power and the armed forces, changes that may have contributed to the weakening of Sendero Luminoso, but that bode ill for the reconstruction of civil society. The politicization of the armed forces, and the militarization of society in general, are a legacy of thirteen years of struggle against terrorism.

1107. *Destroy Sendero Luminoso! End U.S.-Supported Narcoterrorism in Peru.* Leesburg, VA.: The New Federalist, August 1992.

Publication of The New Federalist, which features Lyndon LaRouche on "Sendero's genocide." Peru, says the pamphlet, must be supported in its war against Sendero, but it is fighting a two-front war, the second front of which is international. Peru is the target of a Bush Administration campaign to politically and economically attack the government of Fujimori for daring to declare war against Sendero Luminoso. Washington is supporting the narcoterrorists. A long essay recounting the history of Sendero from Mariátegui to Ayacucho supposedly ties Sendero's rise to long-term gnostic and indigenist intellectual movements in Europe and the Americas. A second section explains, "Why the U.S. Government is Committed to Bringing Sendero Luminoso to Power." The U.S. is more concerned with forcing Latin governments to democratize than in fighting insurgencies; certain powerful Washington elements are determined to destroy military institutions in Central and South America. The work of David Scott Palmer and other academics is cited (out of context) to "prove" their support for Sendero.

1108. Escalante, María Antonieta, Javier Hernández, Percy Medina, and Mirko Perstilla. *Los decretos de la guerra: Dos años de políticas antisubversivas y una propuesta de paz.* Coordinated by Ana María Vidal. Lima: IDS, 1993.

Study on the state of Peruvian democracy, which is termed precarious, due mainly to the emergency decrees passed in order to fight Sendero and the strong influence of the military in Peruvian politics. One focus is on state intervention in universities, colleges, primary schools, which is supposed to forestall *senderista* infiltration; another is on the reorganization of the administration of justice. Most of the book deals with antiterrorist legislation. The work examines individual decrees on penalties for terrorists, punishment for adolescents involved in such activities (a majority of Sendero's fighters are very young), "treason" against the state, widening the powers of the security forces to fight terrorism, the death penalty, *rondas campensinas,* etc. The relevant decrees and their general impact on Peruvian democracy are considered collectively. The study concludes with a "democratic proposal for national pacification," that includes a redefinition of state-military relations, an emphasis on civil democratic institutions (especially in the emergency zones) and on the state as a guarantor of individual rights, a strengthening of local and grass-roots institutions, a de-emphasis of the militarization of the anti-terrorist struggle (and a greater role for the police), and renewed attention to the social and economic roots of the conflict.

1109. *Founding Conference of the International Emergency Committee to Defend the Life of Abimael Guzmán. Duisberg, Germany--27-28 February 1993. Speeches and Resolutions.* London: International Emergency Committee to Defend the Life of Dr. Abimael Guzmán, [1993].

On February 27-28, nearly 1,000 people from around the world converged on Berlin to attend the founding conference of the International Emergency Committee, many at great financial sacrifice or danger to their lives. This publication reproduces many of the speeches made at the conference; of particular interest is the keynote address ("Why We Call Abimael Guzmán the Most Important Political Prisoner in the World Today"), and speeches by Guzmán's father-in-law, Carlos Torres, Luis Arce Borja, and Carol Andreas, of the Department of Sociology at the University of Northern Colorado. Andreas celebrates the leading role of women in the PCP, roles that have allowed them to overcome their subordinate status within society. She declared: "We have come together to celebrate resistance to a so-called New World Order being imposed by the elites of the United States and their allies. Those who are on the front lines of struggle to develop an alternative future for our planet are native and colonized people who suffer most directly the consequences of this imposition. Many of you, as well as myself, have been impressed with the growth of the Communist Party of Peru because it brings together ethnic, gender, and class struggle in a way that changes the discourse of politics. It also brings discipline and reason to the creative power of the disenfranchised majority." Statements of solidarity with the Peruvian people and calls for Guzmán's release were expressed by delegates from Turkey, England, the Philippines, South Africa, Bangladesh, Nepal, and the United States.

1110. Gagnon, Mariano. *Warriors in Eden.* New York: William Morrow, 1993.

Gagnon, a Franciscan monk, spent decades working as a Catholic missionary among the Asháninka Indians of eastern Peru. At Cutivireni mission in the Ene River valley, the Asháninka lived in uneasy co-existence with both "narcos" who cultivated coca in the area, and with *mestizo* settlers who began to encroach on Indian lands. After the traffickers and Sendero began their tacit alliance in the 1980's, the Asháninkas found themselves directly in the middle. Gagnon relates how he attempted to work among his flock, while trying to stay on friendly terms with settlers, sinchis, *"aero narcos,"* and the army. He was accused of being a foreign agent, and of enslaving and exploiting the Indians; his mission was mysteriously torched, and Sendero murdered his assistants. After the Asháninkas retaliated by killing 16 *senderistas,* the Indians were forced to flee. Gagnon describes his efforts to reconstitute his missionary community. An eloquent plea for innocents caught in the middle of a struggle totally alien to their world.

1111. Gillespie, Richard. "Guerrilla Warfare in the 1980's." In *The Latin American Left: From the Fall of Allende to Perestroika.* Edited by Barry Carr and Steve Ellner. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 187-203.

In the 1980's the insurgent left in Latin America reacted not only to past defeats and authoritarianism, but also to success (the Sandinistas in Nicaragua). But the crisis of communism in the 1990's has sown doubts about the viability of armed struggle. The defeat of the Sandinistas and the growing isolation and economic problems of Cuba (reference points for all Latin American insurgents apart from the autarkic *senderistas),* have created uncertainty about what can be done with political power even when attainable through armed struggle. Gillespie reviews insurgencies in the 1980's. In discussing Peru, he highlights Sendero's switch from its revolution in the countryside to a largely urban campaign in the second half of the 1980's. Sendero has proven itself much more pragmatic than its dogmatic tone might indicate, but there are deep divisions within the

movement. Morever, "signs of increased U.S. intervention in Peru at the end of the decade indicated just how far Sendero had progressed, while the split in Izquierda Unida in 1989 and its electoral reverse in 1990 suggested that further recruitment to Sendero and the MRTA would not be difficult." Gillespie concludes by suggesting that the Colombian, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan peace initiatives, whether they succeed or not, signal that the Guevarist tradition is now in decline. Some sort of armed struggle will undoubtedly persist as long as widespread social deprivation continues in Latin America. More terrorism, a drift into banditry or criminality (as exemplified by drug-trafficking), and increasing anomie (typified by Brazilian street gangs), are strong possibilities.

1112. Granados, Manuel Jesús. "El PCP Sendero Luminoso: aproximaciones a una ideología." In *Juicio a Abimael: Sendero, ideología y realidad.* Edited by Raúl Vento García. Pueblo Libre, Peru: Agenda 2000 Editores, [1993], pp.35-148.

A reprinting of the author's critical work *El PCP Sendero Luminoso y su ideología,* originally published in 1992, with certain sections in slightly different order. See no. 927.

1113. Haworth, Nigel. "Radicalization and the Left in Peru, 1976-1991." In *The Latin American Left: From the Fall of Allende to Perestroika.* Edited by Barry Carr and Steve Ellner. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 41-59.

Analysis of the emergence of the parliamentary left in Peru and its impact on the national political landscape. It was only in the 1960's that the left emerged as a coherent political force in Peru; in the last decades it has had to respond to both popular demands and aspirations raised by the demise of the populist military experiment of 1968-1975, and pressure from the more extreme left in the form of Sendero and other guerrilla movements that advocate armed struggle as opposed to legal democratic politics. Haworth reviews the demise of the Morales Bermúdez government (1975-80), the success of various leftist parties in assembly elections, and the emergence of popular movements. The rise (and subsequent paralysis) of Izquierda Unida is particularly poignant when contrasted with the *caudillismo* of APRA under García. Haworth also examines IU's tenure in office in Lima, which exposed "all the contradictions of leftist access to power under capitalism." Sendero's impact upon IU has been profound; many IU militants, caught between condemnation and admiration, felt ambivalent about Sendero. The "responsible" sectors of IU have denounced Sendero, if only to ward off attacks by the right, and repression from the police and army. Inevitably, "there has been some erosion of IU under the influence of Sendero's 'backsliding' critique." IU is caught in a precarious position; Sendero has so polarized politics in Peru that it is making legal leftism untenable.

1114. Herzog, Kristin. *Finding Their Voice: Peruvian Women's Testimonies of War.* Valley Forge, PA.: Trinity Press International, 1993.

Dedicated to the memory of María Elena Moyano, this richly textured and creative work explores the impact of a dozen years of struggle on Peruvian women. Herzog gathers testimony from women of all classes and ethnicities, examining the war's impact through what she calls "witnessing in different forms"; women's literature, folk theater (Yuyachkani), film *("La boca del lobo"),* folk art (*arpilleras,* or colorful fabric pictures of burlap), and the words of victims and fighters themselves. Herzog reviews the history of feminism in Peru, addresses the painful and difficult subject of rape, and looks at the church's role in women's confrontations with violence. Her recounting of the tale of María Elena Moyano's life, work, violent death, and legacy, includes excerpts from interviews that Moyano gave to several newspapers shortly before her murder at the hands of Sendero. Counterpoised to this account is an excellent section on the women of Shining Path, which quotes from a German documentary narrative (*"Seele aus Stein und Taube"*-- "Soul of Stone and Dove") shot inside Canto Grande prison in 1988. Herzog outlines an argument basic to the question of women and their role in Sendero: whether the movement "empowers" women through revolutionary struggle, as some claim, or reduces them to participants in a quasi-religious cult of violence. The circumstances in which Abimael Guzmán was captured (along with a number of middle-class women), re-focused attention on their part in Sendero's revolution. Herzog concludes by exploring the theoretical challenges situations of war and peace present women, using theological, philosophical, and literary criticism to underline their role in confronting violence, poverty, and oppression.

1115. Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America. *Systematic Violations and a New Legal Order: Human Rights in Peru.* Toronto: ICCHRLA, December 1993.

The ICCHRLA has been monitoring the human rights situation in Peru for more than ten years. It has sent protests to the government and conducted onsite visits in Peru, during which its members met with representatives from many sectors of society, and gained access to several prisons in order to assess conditions there. The ICCHRLA appears to be involved with a wider spectrum of concerns than Amnesty International or Americas Watch; separate chapters deal with the political, social, and economic contexts of the human rights situation in Peru. The organization reports on municipal elections, Congress's independence in the wake of Fujimori's *autogolpe,* what it terms a "politicized judiciary," and the human cost of the neoliberal authoritarian model espoused by the government for political and economic progress. Of particular concern is the draft constitution being prepared by the Fujimori-controlled Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD). This new constitution would reinstate of the death penalty for "crimes of treason in the case of war and of terrorism"; entrench the neoliberal economic model that has already seen an erosion of basic social services; drop any mention of fundamental rights (such as the basic need for housing) that were nominally recognized by the 1979 constitution; grant military or police personnel virtual impunity for abuses; and concentrate power in the executive branch. The ICCHRLA also reports on government and guerrilla human rights abuses, (including the La Cantuta case), and attacks against journalists and human rights investigators. In its recommendations, the group urges the Canadian government to continue its suspension of government-to-government cooperation and restriction of trade relations until authentic democracy is restored in Peru. It urges that any overseas development funds for Peru be channeled solely through NGO's.

1116. *The International Campaign to Defend the Life of Dr. Abimael Guzmán.* London: International Emergency Committee, September, 1993.

Collection of various documents relating to the IEC's campaign. The slim booklet poses questions such as: "Why is Dr. Abimael Guzmán the most important political prisoner in the world today?", and "What has Amnesty International done to defend the life of Dr. Abimael Guzmán?" [apparently nothing; Americans Watch even congratulated Fujimori on his capture]. They also refute allegations that Guzmán is a terrorist; ask if his life is still in danger (because of the move to modify the death penalty clauses in Peru's constitution, the answer is "yes"); and ask "Is it possible to win this campaign?" Also included is Guzmán's "Speech from the cage" of September 24, 1992, a review of IEC activities around the world, a report on various international delegations to Peru, and brief reports on the treatment of political prisoners and lawyers in Peru. The report concludes with a summary of the IEC's founding conference, and an explanation of where the IEC's money comes from (mostly from thousands of individuals in various countries, who have sacrificed enormously to defend Dr. Guzmán's life). On the inside covers of the booklet are the names of some of the people who have signed the Call of the IEC to defend the life of Dr. Abimael Guzmán.

1117. Jarama, Sinesio. "Perú: un país subversivo." In *Juicio a Abimael: Sendero, ideología y realidad.* Edited by Raúl Vento García. Pueblo Libre, Peru: Agenda 2000 Editores, [1993], pp. 13-23.

The author, a retired general and former Political-Military commander of Ayacucho, offers some thoughts on Guzmán's capture and Sendero's future. Jarama is cautious, reminding readers that violence in the country has not ended with Guzmán's arrest. As long as levels of poverty and unemployment, infant mortality, and frustration and impotence, especially among the young, remain high, it will require only a leader, an ideology, and a party to fan the flames of revolution once again. Jarama calls for the reconstruction of Peru's social and political base, and especially for the reconstitution of municipal authority. Jarama, calling Sendero without Guzmán a ship without a course, judges that Durand is not as capable a leader as Guzmán, and that Sendero is in trouble. Nevertheless, he warns that the intelligence coup that resulted in the detention of Sendero's leadership, while an excellent display of police professionalism, is not the same as a counterinsurgency strategy, which must ultimately be political in nature. He concludes by expressing the hope that the country has learned some hard lessons from Sendero's insurgency; perhaps all the sacrifice and deaths have shown the left, right, and center that they must work together for the future of the country.

1118. Kirk, Robin. *Grabado en piedra: las mujeres de Sendero Luminoso.* (Colección mínima, 29) Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, August 1993.

Excellent study of women in Shining Path. The dominant image of a woman lacking political vision, used as an instrument by psychopathic and violent men is wrong; women in Sendero are far from being either subordinate or stupid. Their decision to join Shining Path is usually a profoundly personal and political one. Kirk makes it clear that as a human rights activist

she feels no sympathy for Sendero; its thirst for massacre and totalitarian ideals are abhorrent to her. But it is not enough to criticize; one must understand what drew women into this ultra-violent movement, a movement that proudly proclaims that 40% of its membership is female. Kirk interviews various *senderistas*, both imprisoned and at large. The popular view that they are *locas* is not substantiated by the women she meets. "Betty," orphaned and escaping a barren home, made a conscious decision to fight poverty and misery. Edith Lagos, *misti* daughter of a middle-class family, defied her parents' wishes that she study law and chose a course that led her through increasing radicalism to Sendero, and to her death at age 19. Augusta La Torre, a mediocre student who loved romance novels, found her destiny at age 18 when she married a brilliant student who was full of ideas. "If Abimael had been a doctor," writes Kirk, "she would have been his nurse; if he had dedicated himself to business, she would have kept the accounts. As he was a communist, she became a comrade, follower, and faithful disciple." Kirk visits Canto Grande, recounts the martyrdom of Edith Lagos, and the mysterious death of Comrade Nora. After Guzmán's capture, rumors abounded that his successor would be a woman, perhaps Techi Durand, or Martha Huatay. It would be an exaggeration, says Kirk, to suggest that Sendero is the future of women, much less that of Peru. The majority of Peruvian women are not comrades, but heads of communal kitchens, mothers' clubs, human rights organizations, and Protestant church groups, who believe that peace is necessary to produce change.

1119. Kirk, Robin. *To Build Anew: An Update on Peru's Internally Displaced People.* Issue paper. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, October 1993.

Kirk updates developments on Peru's internal refugees since the publication of her book *The Decade of Chaqwa.* The capture of Guzmán and other top Sendero leaders led many to hope that the worst of the violence had passed. "But government mismanagement and the suspension of basic constitutional rights have resulted in continuing violence and the persistence of human rights abuses." However, there are a few positive changes worth noting. The Population Promotion and Development Center (CEPRODEP), a private organization, has issued a better, although still incomplete estimate of the size and composition of the displaced population. CEPRODEP estimates that there are at least 600,000 internally displaced people in Peru, with at least 90% coming from four southern and central departments: Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurímac, and Junín. In October, 1992, Peruvian religious groups and NGO's began, with international assistance, to coordinate efforts to help displaced people. At the invitation of the government, the United Nations Commission for Refugees and other UN agencies are studying the Peruvian situation in order to develop a greater international humanitarian response. However, against these positive developments, the government continues to be unwilling to confront the displaced population problem directly, protect the refugees from harassment from both sides, and develop concrete aid strategies. Kirk cites several notable examples of government intransigence, and outlines security developments, the impact of economic hardship on the displaced, and the continued threat from Shining Path in the sierra. For most displaced Peruvians, the prospect of returning to their villages is a distant, still impossible dream. For many, however, it remains the object of constant thought, planning, and coordination. Kirk concludes with the recommendations of the U.S. Committee for Refugees. The Committee urges the Peruvian government to make public a UN report on the internally displaced, assist international organizations in their work, allow *desplazado* children to attend school, and protect the refugees from security force harassment. It calls upon Sendero to abide by the Geneva Conventions, cease its use of collective punishments of non-combatants, and respect the right of returnees not to participate in armed actions.

1120. Koppel, Martin. *Peru's Shining Path: Anatomy of a Reactionary Sect.* New York: Pathfinder Press, 1993.

Interesting leftist analysis of the Peruvian revolution, published by the Socialist Worker's Party. Koppel accuses Sendero of falsely posing as a communist movement, and of being a reactionary organization using terrorism to impose its policies on working people and drive them out of political activity. Koppel describes Sendero as hostile to workers and peasants: "[I]t attempts to push working people out of political activity and instill fear, passivity, and dependence on a savior, namely Guzmán and his gang." Sendero views Peru's unions as a "labor aristocracy," and treats all strikes and organizations it does not control as threats to the primacy of its revolution. Koppel utterly condemns both Fujimori and Sendero. Is there an alternative to capitalism and Shining Path, he asks? He answers in the affirmative: "The working class is the only class in modern society that can lead a struggle to overthrow capitalist rule, establish a government of working people, and begin the fight to build socialism."

1121. Loayza, Francisco. "Todos somos culpables." In *Juicio a Abimael: Sendero, ideología y realidad.* Edited by Raúl Vento García. Pueblo Libre, Peru: Agenda 2000 Editores, [1993], pp.25-33.

Terrorism, declares Loayza, requires a collective responsibility. He traces this responsibility back into the 1960's, when the process of changing a semifeudal *latifundista* society began, changes that were interrupted by more conservative officers in the 1970's. To some degree Sendero Luminoso gestated slowly as a movement in the poorest areas of the country as part of this process. Still, the government should have quickly stopped Sendero from expanding; instead it gave the movement two years to grow and develop. Loyaza ties the guerrillas to the profound social, economic, and political changes that Peru has undergone since the mid-1960's. He cautions that Guzmán's capture is not a magical solution, and challenges in particular the country's dominant class and political right to articulate a clearer vision of society for the future. Loyaza warns in addition against the consequences of Fujimori's economic policies.

1122. López Chau, Alfonso. "Destrucción y restauración ¿1910?" In *Juicio a Abimael: Sendero, ideología y realidad.* Edited by Raúl Vento García. Pueblo Libre, Peru: Agenda 2000 Editores, [1993], pp.149-176.

No one, says López Chau, with a minimum of humanity can fail to morally condemn Shining Path. However, political forces should concentrate at this time on an agenda for action, using the same conceptual framework as Sendero, in order to develop what *senderismo* forgot: a mature and serious socialism, that takes from the best of economic theory and the best of German philosophy. López Chau examines socialism's philosophical roots, criticizing virtually all Marxists (including Lenin, Stalin, and Mao) for their lack of economic knowledge. He calls for "Peru's own 1910"; i.e., its own Mexican Revolution. In calling for a direct and organic democracy for Peru, he harkens back to the words of "our Mariátegui," integrating the indigenous sectors of society into a national campaign for renewal.

1123. *María Elena Moyano: En busca de una esperanza.* Edited by Diana Miloslavich Tupac. Lima: Centro de la Mujer Peruana "Flora Tristán," 1993.

Both a tribute to the courage of slain community leader María Elena Moyano, and a description of the community's answer to poverty, misery, and terror, this work examines Villa El Salvador and the organizations that emerged in response to people's needs in the 1980's. Brief sections explain the history and origins of the Federación Popular de Mujeres de Villa El Salvador (Fepomuves), the *Vaso de leche* program, the people's kitchens *(comedores populares),* the Popular Committee for the Defense of the Consumer, and municipal government in the *barrio* in Moyano's own words. In "Sendero Luminoso y el terror," Moyano recounts how *El Diario* began to attack her and the Women's Federation, calling them "mattresses of the system," and Moyano a revisionist and manipulator of women. Moyano draws her courage from the women of her community, but she criticizes the left for not opposing Sendero in stronger terms. In the end, Sendero cannot condemn those who support the *vaso de leche* program and people's kitchens, who do so because they are hungry. The second part of the work is an autobiographical essay by Moyano. Concluding the book are a few poems and a bibliography on Moyano and her work.

1124. McClintock, Cynthia. "Communal Strife in Peru: A Case of Absence of Spillover into the International Arena." In *The Internationalization of Communal Strife.* Edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. London: Routledge, 1993, pp.209-232.

Since 1980 Peru has suffered intense political violence; yet despite the seriousness of Sendero's threat to the Peruvian state and the high human toll, the conflict has not spilled over into the international arena. McClintock explores several inter-related themes. The first is the character of strife in Peru, the degree to which this conflict is communal, and to what extent it is rooted in other causes. The second theme is the absence of international spillover. Strife in Peru, McClintock argues, has communal factors, but "communities" are not neatly demarcated in Peru's case, and communal cleavages are fused with other divisions, in particular class and race. Ethnic discrimination lies at the roots of the rage of young Peruvians from the highlands who aspired to professional jobs and a middle-class existence. There is a broad consensus among journalists and scholars that ethnic cleavage is a vital factor in the rebellion. Yet nothing in Sendero's ideology or practice indicates an appeal to ethnicity, nor is there a word about communal issues in Shining Path's doctrine, nor any overt ethnic appeal. In practice Sendero does not respect traditional indigenous culture; "there is not a word of reverence for nature, earth, or sun in Shining Path publications, and the guerrillas frequently prohibit religious festivals of all kinds." Sendero does not appeal to nationalism, or laud Peru in any way. Still, communal conflict is the basis of the

movement's appeal. It is not a conflict between Indians and white elites, but rather the channeling of the resentment of mestizos and *cholos* who are trying to move up into the white world.

Strife has not spread beyond Peru, largely because Sendero has presumably calculated that expansion of the war into neighboring Andean nations is not in its interest at this time. More surprising is the non-involvement of the U.S. in Peru's conflict, which McClintock believes is due to a number of reasons: any lack of territorial contiguity between the U.S. and Peru; the lack of any perceptible Soviet-American rivalry (largely due to the nature of Shining Path itself); and a post-Cold War American preoccupation with domestic political concerns. The Bush administration's "war on drugs" has driven its policy towards Latin America. McClintock concludes with some observations on the relative absence of internationalization of communal strife in Latin America, as compared with the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, where spillover is a problem. Although Sendero frightens the Ecuadorian and Bolivian governments, Peru's neighbors are unlikely to intervene, generally looking to Washington for this kind of help. Guzmán has probably also calculated that the prospects for revolution are greater in Peru than in Ecuador (which is in economically better shape than Peru), and Bolivia (which underwent its own revolution in 1952). He is also following Mao's policy of making the revolution in one's own country first. But if Sendero were to take power in Peru, its internationalist orientation would probably impel it to expand into neighboring Andean nations.

1125. *The Myth of Saint Moyano: Exposure of the Role of a Counter-Revolutionary "Martyr."* [Cambridge: Revolution Books], n.d. [1993?]

Virulent attack on María Elena Moyano, reprinted from the RCP's *Revolutionary Worker.* Moyano, declares the *RW,* was accused of serious crimes against the people, charged with being a police informant, helping the military organize armed urban patrols, and stealing from the people. She ignored warnings from the PCP, and on February 15, 1992, a woman fighter from a Shining Path guerrilla unit delivered the ultimate punishment. Since then, the enemies of the revolution have made Moyano into their symbol, portraying her as a model activist: "They airbrushed a halo around her sordid career. The Myth of Saint Moyano was born!" The glass of milk program and People's Cafeterias are characterized by the *RW* as corrupt, financed by foreign governments, NGO's, and other institutions of imperialism. "María Moyano was no 'grassroots organizer.' She was a big-time bureaucratic hack who controlled this big Cafeteria system, including warehouses, factories, and an extensive patronage system, *all on the basis of her political connections and political line."* According to *RW,* she consciously and openly saw her role as suppressing explosions among the people; she worked to transform charity and self-help organizations among the people *into* networks of informants and armed death squads. "Saint Moyano," states *RW,* was not killed because she was undermining mass support for the people's revolution. "No. This confrontation broke out because Moyano's corrupt machine was *losing* mass support *to the revolutionaries!* It was *Moyano* who called for terror against the people and was responsible for the death of honest revolutionaries. This police snitch had blood-soaked hands." In the year since her death, reports *RW,* the revolution has moved forward.

1126. Rodríguez Vargas, Marisol, Pompeyo Coronado, and María Heise. *Desplazados de la selva central: el caso de los asháninka.* Lima: Centro Amazónico de Antropología y Aplicación Práctica (CAAAP), 1993.

Detailed report on the Asháninka Indians. Between 19,000 and 50,000 natives have been affected by the war between the government, Sendero, and narcotics traffickers. The report begins by examining the impact of government decrees such as the *Comunidades nativas* act, which recognized native rights, as well as various government projects to colonize the jungle areas of Peru, such as road construction and cooperatives. The report describes Asháninka society, its patterns of subsistence, locations, language, cosmovision, and history. The recent history of native-guerrilla violence (which began with a native leader's assassination by MRTA) is also summarized. Sendero, after gaining control of some Asháninka villages, was able to demand the expulsion of two NGO's: CAAAP and "Save the Children." During the "displacement" caused by the war, peasants tended to drift to urban areas, and Indians to other native villages. Characteristics of the *desplazamiento* and several examples of displacement are described. The report also covers native self-defense, the establishment of *rondas,* state intervention (new garrisons designed to help the Indians did not eliminate native-government friction), international attention focused on the plight of the Indians, and the role of the socially-active church (in which the Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social, Cártias, and CAAAP cooperated). The report concludes by describing the "Emergency Project" of February 1992, aimed at guaranteeing the "physical and socio-cultural survival of displaced native communities," and the health, agricultural, educational, and aid components of that project. Appendices charts native demography, Indian communities, languages, diseases, schools, and native testimonies.

1127. Simpson, John. *In the Forests of the Night: Encounters in Peru With Terrorism, Drug-Running and Military Oppression.* New York: Random House, 1993.

This is the story of an expedition, writes Simpson, "not in the sense of a journey to a dark area on a map, but an exploration of the dark areas of a country where things have gone terribly wrong, and where serious and frightening crimes have been and are still being committed." Because a film sympathetic to Shining Path was shown on Channel 4 in England, Simpson was sent by the BBC to make a more balanced documentary; his ultimate objective was to land an interview with Abimael Guzmán himself! In a series of terse, gripping chapters, Simpson describes his adventures in Lima and in the jungle. Before his *senderista* contacts could arrange the interview, Guzmán was captured by Dincote (Simpson dramatically reconstructs the arrest in the best journalistic fashion). The crew, accompanied by the brave and resourceful Peruvian journalist Cecilia Valenzuela, heads for the Huallaga. A meeting with a corrupt army officer in Tarapoto clearly on the take from *narcos* is fraught with menace; Simpson is amazed at the courage of people willing to speak with him of their "disappeared" relatives. Between adventures Simpson recounts the history of Peru, of Guamán Poma de Ayala, of Sendero Luminoso, and of the Asháninka. An excellent, if highly impressionistic portrait of a society plunged into darkness.

1128. Starn, Orin. *Hablan los ronderos: la búsqueda por la paz en los Andes.* Lima: IEP, April 1993.

In December, 1991 the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos organized a meeting on the topic of "Rondas campesinas: ¿El nuevo rostro de los Andes?" (Peasant patrols: The new face of the Andes?) *Ronderos* speak for themselves in this collection of short presentations edited by Orin Starn, who introduces the volume with an overview of the phenomenon of civil defense patrols. Starn once again distinguishes between the northern *rondas,* which originated among the peasants themselves in 1976 to combat rising crime (especially cattle rustling), and the southern patrols; the latter were forced upon peasants by the military as an anti-Sendero tactic, beginning in 1983. Starn reviews both the successes of the *rondas,* in terms of deterring crime and fighting terrorists, and their problems, which include political divisiveness and *caudillismo.* The self-congratulatory words of praise for the *rondas* by the Fujimori government ring hollow, Starn points out, since the image of the *ronderos* as patriots obscures the fact that the thousands of peasants who decided to organize themselves did so from multiple and heterogeneous motives. The work is divided into two sections. The first deals with the northern *rondas,* and includes testimony from *ronderos:* "The *rondas campesinas* were born in my land"; "Taking justice into our own hands"; "Alternative organisms of civic participation." At its end is a debate on Sendero and the northern *rondas,* and a summary by Carlos Iván Degregori. The second section is on the southern patrols; its titles of testimony speak eloquently of peasant concerns: "Already we no longer suffer massacres"; "Dialogue with Sendero is impossible"; "We need the help of the State"; "Our communities make their own decision to organize themselves"; "We have pushed Sendero back." The volume concludes with a parallel discussion on the central and southern patrols, and another *resumen final* from Degregori.

1129. Stern, Peter. "Origins and Trajectory of the Shining Path." In *Latin American Studies in the Twenty-First Century: New Focus, New Formats, New Challenges.* Edited by Deborah L. Jakubs. Albuquerque: SALALM Secretariat, 1993, pp.49-74.

As part of a 1991 SALALM panel on the contemporary Peruvian crisis, Stern analyzes Sendero's rise and evolution through its own works and those of prominent Senderologists. Quoting from Degregori, Granados, Chang-Rodríguez, Favre, Palmer, and McClintock, as well as from "Presidente Gonzalo" himself, Stern shows how a small and determined movement exploited preexisting conditions in the most potentially revolutionary region of Peru in order to launch its people's war; how it carefully prepared the ground for such a course of action with nearly a decade of careful political work; and how the Peruvian government has consistently underestimated its enemy at every turn. The advice of some American "experts," (many of whom appear to be woefully ignorant of Latin America, Peru, or even the Shining Path itself) seems to be predicated more on analyses of Vietnam and Central America than on Peru. Stern concludes with an arresting and relevant quotation that, when it was made, had nothing to do with Latin America: in 1961 a foreign policy expert predicted that regimes that are reluctant to diminish their own privileges will be unable to undertake the fundamental reforms necessary to prevent or disarm revolution, a prediction as tragically prescient for Peru as for Vietnam.

1130. *Straight Talk on the Shining Path and the Catholic Church in Peru.* [Cambridge, MA.]: Revolution Books, 1993.

Washington's sinister legions are again directing a "dirty war" against the people, this time in Peru. In an effort to prevent the kind of involvement of religious groups that mobilized against U.S. policy in El Salvador, efforts are underway to convince American Catholics that Shining Path is killing nuns and priests in Peru. This pamphlet seeks to set the record straight. It uses published commentary by senderologists and reporters to establish that until recently, no religious workers at all were killed in Peru, that there are Catholic supporters of the revolution, and that some nuns and priests are living alongside Sendero: "These accounts--from sources openly *hostile* to the Communist Party of Peru--reveal three things: that the Communist Party of Peru has genuine and growing mass support 'at the grassroots'; that Church clerics have been able to 'coexist' with the emerging new revolutionary state; and that some clerics have been won to supporting the revolution." Since one-third of Peru is now controlled by Revolutionary People's Committees, the fact that 6,000 priests and nuns continue to live and preach throughout Peru is proof that Sendero has not targeted Catholic clerics and believers. The publication asserts that those clerics who have been killed were engaged in counter-revolutionary activities, and were executed after warnings and popular proceedings: "Their deaths were not the indiscriminate targeting of religious people." Clerics are actively encouraging peasants to join the *rondas*. especially in areas where "liberation theology" forces are strong. Those who think of liberation theology as a progressive Church movement involved in "community organizing" may be surprised to find that not all community organizing is progressive! In Peru the forces connected with liberation theology have, "in the main, been closely allied with sections of Peru's ruling classes-including various parliamentary parties and sections of the military. Food, medicine and money is shipped in from imperialist countries and used to attract networks of believers. These networks form the base of various parliamentary party and religious organizations who try to channel the masses into 'self-help' activities that do not challenge the power relations of society." Liberation theology, according to *El Diario*, tries to suffocate the social explosion of the poor. The pamphlet charges charity and reform networks with recruiting "cannon fodder" for the counterrevolution. Liberation theology blesses efforts by peasants and urban poor to organize themselves and develop their communities, and many in the *rondas* are catechists. The pamphlet concludes: "There is a life and death struggle underway in Peru. Which side are you on? Peru's revolutionaries should be supported by progressive people everywhere--and especially by those in the U.S. who have a special obligation to oppose U.S. imperialism's intervention and disinformation."

1131. Strong, Simon. *Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism.* (Conflict Studies, 258) London: Research Institute for the Study of Terrorism, 1993.

Strong continues his work on Shining Path with an incisive and well-written summary of its past and probable future. Strong covers the origins of the revolution, Sendero's ideology, organization, and strategy for armed struggle, and the cost of the war: Agricultural production, tourism, mining, and manufacturing have all suffered severe losses because of the widening violence; the unions have been weakened, caught between guerrillas and the government; the universities are deeply infiltrated and suspect; the judiciary is totally inadequate to deal with terrorism; the police have sunk to their lowest level ever in terms of morale, pay, and corruption (with the exception of Dincote); and the armed forces have been eroded by absenteeism, inadequate supplies and ammunition, poor intelligence, low professional commitment, and lack of organization.

Strong continues to offer highly controversial opinions. He summarizes the revolution in this way: "Guzmán, who like Mariátegui is the illegitimate son of a prosperous white *criollo* father, has carefully manipulated the legacy of four centuries of ethnic and cultural repression of Peruvian Indians by Europeans and their descendants. Indian nationalism is merely a tool, a 'decisive' agent to stir the masses from their slumber." Guzmán has assumed the Incaic mantle, and has been sometimes identified with the Inkarri. Even more controversial is Strong's conclusions about the narcotics trade: "Shining Path's connections with the drug trade appear to be a myth generated by Peruvian governments, a myth that in turn has been massaged by US governments. Asked if any proof had been discovered linking drug trafficking with the Maoists, a senior policeman in the anti-terrorist unit, Dincote, told me in October 1992: 'We have found no evidence at all.'" Strong's final sections are his best: he illuminates the links between Shining Path in Peru and the worldwide Maoist movement of the RIM, and Sendero's external organizations. The U.S.-based Revolutionary Communist Party was allegedly "in the thick of the protests outside the police station in south central Los Angeles [after the Rodney King beating acquittals], where the U.S. flag was burned and windows smashed prior to the looting...described as the 'masses going shopping.'" Strong concludes that "The capture of Guzmán probably means that Shining Path will never seize power in Peru. It is doubtful that there is anybody in the party with the same capacity as a political-military analyst, strategist, and tactician. However, the violence has continued and

will continue." Strong, who always emphasizes the government's weaknesses and Sendero's strengths, declares that the movement remains structurally intact, its military organization outside Lima as strong as ever, its metropolitan committee apparently recovered, and its political penetration in the capital's shanty-towns unaffected. He ends by heaping scorn on Fujimori's boast that terrorism will be vanquished by July, 1995.

1132. *Violencia en la región andina. Síntesis.* Edited by Felipe E. MacGregor. (Serie "Violencia en la región andina," 1). Lima: Asociación Peruana de Estudios e Investigación Para la Paz (APEP), 1993.

Seven social scientists from Peru, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia examine the phenomenon of violence in the Andean region. Among the themes explored in the volume's seven chapters are cultural and historical aspects of violence, the relationship between the state, politics, and violence, daily and structural violence, means of communication and conflict, and a strategy for peace. In a section on *narcotráfico* and violence, a link is established between the flow of coca and the rise of Shining Path. In 1983 Sendero became embroiled in drug trafficking; from collecting fees on the traffic and protecting peasants against drug barons and the state, Sendero moved into active participation in, and eventually control of, the trade by 1990. By this date Sendero's strategy was clear: "...alliance with the producers, *convivencia* with the traffickers, and open war on the forces of order." Sendero, ironically, has eliminated drug sellers in its zone of operations, but favors and promotes an exterior traffic of drugs in order to finance its war.

1133. *Violencia en la región andina: Caso Perú.* Edited by José Luis Carrillo Mendoza. (Serie "Violencia en la región andina," 5). Lima: Asociación Peruana de Estudios e Investigación Para la Paz (APEP), 1993.

Seven chapters by Peruvian social scientists on the violence wracking their country. Jesuit Felipe MacGregor and Marcial Rubio Correa describe a "general vision" of the Andean region; Enrique Bernales Ballesteros examines culture, identity, and violence in contemporary Peru (in which he explicitly roots Sendero); Marcial Rubio Correa looks at the state and violence; Margarita Giesecke analyzes daily violence, APEP examines *narcotráfico*, and José María Salcedo studies violence and the means of communication. MacGregor and Rubio Correa summarize and advance strategies for pacification in their conclusion. Among their proposals is the replacement of a dominant Western cultural model with a heterogeneous culture that respects diversity, the transformation of the present "centralized, elitist, and clientalist political oligarchy" with a more democratic society, the reorganization of the present political system, the moralization of public life, the fulfillment by the state of certain obligations to the people (justice, public services, and security), a battle against poverty, and educational reform. Especially violent elements in Peruvian society that must be fought are machismo, authoritarianism, racism and "education in silence."

1134. Whalin, Terry and Chris Woehr. *One Bright Shining Path: Faith in the Midst of Terrorism.* Wheaton, IL.: Crossway Books, 1993.

Simply-written narrative of the life of Rómulo Sauñe, Quechua-speaking shepherd from a mountain village who was sent by his family to Ayacucho for education. In Ayacucho he attended the University of Huamanga, met a family of Wycliffe Protestant missionaries, and joined their Bible translation center. After studying at the Latin American Bible Institute in Los Angeles, and traveling to Israel, Sauñe returned to Peru for missionary work, where he and his fellow evangelists were targets for Sendero. He and members of his family were murdered in September, 1992, just weeks before Guzmán's capture. Although intended as a testament to the strength of faith, Whalin and Woehr capture the flavor of *ayllu* life in the mountains, and present the factual outlines of Sendero's revolution from 1980 to 1992.

1135. Nangle, Joe. "Shining Path: Exposing Ideological Blinders." *Sojourners*, v.22, no.1 (January 1993): 23-24.

Several nationally-known secular and church-based social activists signed an ad that ran in *The Nation* on October 12, 1992, condemning the killing of political prisoners in Peru and opposing U.S. military intervention. The ad, cleverly written to appeal to human rights advocates, originated with the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru (CSRP). The ad's designers substituted the word "revolutionaries" for "terrorists." Nangle is disturbed by the endorsement of proven practitioners of nonviolence and pacifists of an ad written by a front for one of the most brutal and violent movements in the world. He cites CSRP attacks on Amnesty International, its rationalization of María Elena Moyano's murder, and Sendero's recently burnished image in Europe

(thanks to a sympathetic BBC *[sic]* documentary). Faith-based activists, he writes, must exercise extreme care in what they endorse. Lending one's name to a terrorist front like the CSRP is a grave mistake.

1136. Alber, Erdmute and Ulrich Goedeking. "¿Solidaridad con Sendero? Un debate alemán." *Quehacer,* no.81 (January-February 1993): 90-92.

Translation of an article published in November, 1992 in *Lateinamerika Nachrichten.* The authors discuss the morality of European support for Sendero in the face of Fujimori's dictatorship and a grim body count (more than 25,000), that is largely the responsibility of the military. They do agree that the judicial proceedings against Abimael Guzmán were a scandal. The trial's clandestine nature, the hooded judges, and the obstacles placed in the way of Guzmán's defense lawyer all undermine the credibility of the Peruvian state, which has lost an opportunity to show capacity and initiative in its policy against Sendero. The scandalous proceedings invite the formation of a new myth of Guzmán as martyr. Why not a public recounting of Sendero's massacres and murders? Why not a public examination of Sendero's organization, and Guzmán's role as "President Gonzalo"? A meeting on October 7, 1992 in Berlin "For the Defense of the Life of Abimael Guzmán" was not well attended. Does this infer indifference? Or is the left showing its capacity for moral and political judgment?

1137. Pérez Mundaca, José. "La caída de Abimael Guzmán y el destino de Sendero Luminoso." *Quehacer,* no.81 (January-February 1993): 80-89.

Thoughtful, speculative essay on the significance of Guzmán's "fall." If the October Revolution of 1917 was the obsession of Western nations for more than 70 years (now eliminated by the collapse of the Marxist east), then Shining Path has been the focus of Peruvian society for twelve years. Sendero has been both the product of, and a large cause of, the present crisis in Peru. Pérez Mundaca finds it ironic that as a result of the last twelve years, the dominant classes in Peru are more powerful, and the poor, the very people for whom Sendero is supposedly fighting, are more impoverished than ever before. He examines a number of hypotheses: that the fall of Guzmán does not mean the end of Sendero; or that his capture spells the beginning of the end for the movement. He outlines out the case for each proposition. Social and economic disintegration tend to work in Sendero's favor; its authoritarianism appeals to many Peruvians who are weary of chaos and corruption. In addition, the movement's military apparatus remains intact. Against this, Pérez Mundaca argues that momentum has passed to the government, that Sendero's "invincible" image has suffered, and that Fujimori can (and has) played the "authoritarian card" as well as Guzmán. Ultimately, the movement's "Achilles heel" is that Sendero has murderously attacked the very people who should be its allies: peasants, workers, popular leaders and organizations, shanty-town dwellers, etc. Sendero's determination to annihilate anyone who does not submit to its authority is the biggest contradiction of all.

1138. Gorriti, Gustavo. "The Unshining Path." *The New Republic,* v.208, no.6 (February 8 1993): 19-20, 22-23.

Stinging critique of Alberto Fujimori's presidency. *El chinito* ("the little Chinese") was mocked by wealthy supporters of Vargas Llosa, who wept the night their candidate lost the election. When Fujimori launched his coup on April 5, nobody called him *El chino* anymore. "Those who had once hurled racist insults now spoke highly of Fujimori (comparing him to de Gaulle, for instance), whose metamorphosis into a conservative authoritarian impressed them." *El chino,* says Gorriti, never existed; it was a mask worn to lure the votes of the left, the scared, and the center-left APRA. Gorriti reviews the impact of economic shock therapy, which has impressed the business community and international financial organizations. He also recounts briefly the history of the Japanese in Peru; brought in as rural laborers at the end of the 19th century, they have suffered from prejudice and discrimination. Anti-Japanese riots in 1940 killed ten people and destroyed many properties owned by Peruvian *nisei;* about 10% of this population (almost 1,800 people) was deported to the U.S. for internment during the war. In the post-war years, Japan's quiet industriousness changed opinions about the immigrants; Japan is now the foreign nation most admired by Peruvians. Still, caution, suspicion, and a "finely-developed sense of the low profile" prevails in the Japanese Peruvian community. Gorriti summarizes Fujimori's career, from professor to TV talk show host to politician, as well as that of Vladimiro Montesinos, cashiered army officer, strategist for Peruvian and Colombian drug traffickers, and now national security advisor to Fujimori. Massacres linked to army intelligence, shady dealings, and widespread phone-tapping shadow Fujimori's government. His authoritarianism appeared to pay off with the capture of Abimael Guzmán, but that coup was the work of a police unit established in the 1980's; the

police general who led the raid chose to inform the press rather than the President about the capture, on the hunch that Fujimori would claim the credit, which he did. Gorriti concludes that Fujimori's Mafia-style dictatorship, which is attempting to root itself in power through intimidation, is a recipe for instability in Peru and South America.

1139. Guillermoprieto, Alma. "Letter from Lima: Down the Shining Path." *The New Yorker,* v. 68, no. 51 (February 8 1993): 64-75.

Extremely readable, richly-detailed, perceptive look at Sendero in the aftermath of Guzmán's capture. Guillermoprieto recreates the drama of Guzmán's arrest, and describes the intelligent and patient man who achieved that stunning coup: police general Antonio Ketín Vidal, who would have preferred to be a psychiatrist and who was fascinated by Sendero. It was Vidal who rebuilt a threadbare Dincote into the efficient organization that tracked Guzmán down. Guillermoprieto writes quite disparagingly of "President Gonzalo": "The image of the man who has inspired thousands to suicidal struggle hardly meshes with the performer in the cage..." He is, says the author, neither an inspired nor a perceptive theoretician: "Guzmán's writings do not reveal any instinctive feeling for or empathy with Peru: the country's ethnic diversity, its racism, its heart-stopping mountain vistas, its maddening bureaucracy are nowhere mentioned. Nor is the word 'Quechua,' or the unflinching industriousness of its people." Sendero's art looks like copies of old Chinese propaganda, and President Gonzalo's texts read like bad Mao. Still, Guillermoprieto concedes that many were fascinated by Guzmán's personality: "The weirdly positive response of so many Peruvians," she writes, "to a man who traffics in brutality, whose writings are so few and unimpressive, and who in the flesh turns out to be flabby, splayfooted, and solemn, says something about the desperate state of Peruvian politics....That Presidente Gonzalo was able to combine in his single person the attributes of Guzmán the Avenger and Guzmán the Kindly Uncle is without a doubt the luckiest thing that ever happened to Sendero." Guillermoprieto traces the path of the *provinciano* bastard to Ayacucho, discusses his relationship with his wife Augusta La Torre, and later with Elena Iparraguirre, and speculates on his probable fate. After talking to a sympathizer in one of Lima's shantytowns, she feels that Sendero is still a force to be reckoned with. Despite his capture, many still believe, as Presidente Gonzalo said, "We are condemned to win." One can understand how powerful is the dream of perfect order that fuels the Senderistas, how great their need to create a utopia as much unlike the dismal real Peru as possible.

1140. "Fight the Real Enemy." *The New Republic,* v.208 (February 22 1993):10.

What, asks the *New Republic,* do people like Sinéad O'Connor (the Irish singer), Stanley Aronowitz (left-wing academic), and John Edgar Wiseman (distinguished writer) have in common? "The answer is a surprising fondness for the unrivaled brutality of Peru's Shining Path guerrillas and their imprisoned commander, Dr. Abimael Guzmán." They are among the signatories of a petition that appeared in the January 12 *Village Voice,* calling on readers to "Defend the Life of Abimael Guzmán!" The statement, distributed by the Berkeley-based Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru, is not merely a plea for human rights; it declares that "no knowledgeable or truthful observer of Peru...can deny that Dr. Abimael Guzmán is the recognized leader of millions of peasants, workers, students, intellectuals, and others of various walks of life in Peru. In no way can the twelve-year-long war he has been leading be dismissed as 'acts of terrorism.'" The *New Republic* adds, "Maybe the cultural elite is a menace after all."

1141. Jackson, Sara. "A Traveller in Peru." *Contemporary Review,* v.262, no.1525 (February 1993): 76-79.

Descriptive story of a trip to Cuzco in defiance of rumors about Sendero, which is said to be blowing up tourist trains. Jackson provides a colorful account of a rail journey to the highlands in the company of native passengers, chickens, produce, and the fear of the unknown. Scornful of danger in the safety of her home, she experiences real fear when the locomotive breaks down and the threat of a guerrilla attack looms. The threat turns out to be nonexistent: "In leaving Quillabamba we ran away from the prospect of adventure. Instead we sat amid a train of bustling locals and for all the terror we felt we did not even hear so much as the distant shot of a Sendero's gun...There was nothing but our own fears. Nothing happened to us at all. But then again I too had read some faces, and that whisper was real. *Senderos.* " A strange and subjective piece, in which the very real dangers of Shining Path are taken altogether too lightly.

1142. Vásquez, G.L. "Peruvian Radicalism and the Sendero Luminoso." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology,* v.21, no.2 (Winter 1993): 197.

Study of Sendero's ideology, which Vásquez believes is firmly rooted in Peruvian radicalism. The author asks three questions: What constitutes the radical tradition in Peru; what is radical in Sendero's ideology?; and, how widespread is Sendero's appeal? Vásquez shows how violent revolution by Peru's indigenous population was first advocated by Manuel González Prada in the 1930's, and echoed by José Luis Mariátegui in the 1920's and Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre in the same decade. Even rural guerrilla movements are nothing new in Peru: after the Cuban revolution Luis de Puente Uceda's MIR and Hugo Blanco went to the hills in the tradition of Che Guevara. The latter got 20 years in prison; the former was shot. What elements, asks Vásquez, of *pensamiento Gonzalo* cannot be found in Peruvian radicalism? None, he answers. Guzmán's analysis of Peruvian socioeconomic and political conditions is both unoriginal and mistaken; Guzmán ignores the tremendous changes that have altered Peru since Mariátegui's day: widespread rural-urban migration, modest industrialization and a decline in the supremacy of agriculture, a rise in literacy (to 75%), and the land reform of the military government. Vásquez concludes that Sendero's view of Peru is highly impressionistic, and tells us more about its vision for the future than present-day reality.

1143. Ranly, Ernest W. "Letter from Peru: Shaky Reforms." *Christian Century,* v.110, no.7 (March 3 1993): 229-231.

Fujimori, observes Ranly, is the Ross Perot of Peru: without any ties to any political party, he was nevertheless elected president in 1990. Despite his antidemocratic measures, he enjoys wide support because of his success in dealing with the Shining Path. The capture of Guzmán, followed by the arrest of hundreds of presumed *senderista* leaders, has dealt the movement a major blow. Fujimori has had to reassure the international community (the OAS, the U.S., and international lending agencies), that Peru would soon return to democracy. The Church, which throughout the 1980's consistently blocked the advancement of any cleric espousing liberation theology, has paradoxically supported the poor through basic Christian communities, Mothers Clubs, soup kitchens, and health clinics in the shanty-towns. Church groups have led in defending human rights and denouncing security force abuses. Two nuns and three priests have been murdered by Shining Path. Ranly reviews the dismal economic outlook for the poor: reprivatization under Fujimori has brought about massive unemployment and new migrations to the cities, with dire social consequences.

1144. Goldenberg, Sonia. "Shining Path's American 'Friends'." *The Nation,* v.256, no.10 (March 15 1993): 334-336.

The advertisement calling on progressives to "Defend the Life of Abimael Guzmán" that appeared in the *Village Voice* and Spanish-language newspaper *La Opinión* has touched off a debate with the human rights community. Signed by prominent intellectuals like Noam Chomsky, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, and Phillip Berrigan, the ads were placed by the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru, which supports Sendero. Editorials in the *New Republic* and *Sojourners* attacked the signatories and asked whether those who signed were ignorant of Sendero's record as one of the most brutal and violent movements in the world today. The Peru Peace Network, which has denounced human rights abuses by both the government and Sendero, has launched a campaign to warn the progressive community of the "true nature" of Shining Path. Some of the declaration's signers claim they were duped into signing; others plead ignorance, and still others claim they signed in protest of human rights abuses, not to defend Sendero: "I signed out of concern for Guzmán, to defend his life, not giving him a blank check. Given what happened in the prisons in Peru, one can expect the worst," says a professor of political science at New York University. "I don't believe in guilt by association," declared Ramsey Clark. "If we want to have some peace in Peru we have to recognize the humanity of all sides." Clark refused to criticize Sendero; hatred and demonization create the excesses, he said. Asked if he was familiar with their record, he replied, "There is no record. The media control what world opinion knows." Chomsky had a more nuanced point of view: "You have to weigh the importance of the human rights issue against the political connotations. You are often protecting the rights of horrible people." The ads skillfully mix fact and propaganda, eschewing the word "terrorist" for the less repulsive "revolutionaries" in connection with Sendero. A representative of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, an ecumenical peace group active in Central America and Peru, warned that Shining Path is trying to shape in the minds of progressive sectors the idea that the war in Peru is similar to conflicts in Central America. "But the more people know about the Shining Path, the less they sympathize with them."

1145. Leupp, Gary P. "Peru on the Threshold: A Reply to Hobart A. Spalding." *Monthly Review,* v.44, no.10 (March 1993): 25-30.

Leupp, a professor of East Asian history at Tufts with "no specific expertise in Latin America," challenges Spalding's outlook on what strikes him as "the most exciting and promising revolutionary movement anywhere in the world today." Sendero, writes Leupp, is succeeding because it empowers and conveys a sense of hope to the most desperately poor and most harshly oppressed: landless peasants, shantytown residents, and women. It organizes them to confront all the institutions and infrastructure of the state, the legitimacy of which it wholly rejects. In Peru, villages led by Party-organized People's Committees openly fly the red flag over land newly liberated from exploitative landlords and distributed among the people. "This should occasion celebration among all those who stand with the oppressed and welcome genuine blows against imperialism--especially in this season of widespread demoralization among progressive forces." He goes on to challenge Spalding over the question of Sendero's violence, its alleged lack of a long-term vision of the socialist future, and whether the PCP has a real base of support in Peru. "Even the harshest critics of Sendero Luminoso" he concludes, "express respect for its members' painstaking investigation of social conditions, their flexibility in addressing these conditions while building mass support, and their selective, highly-effective application of violence in targeting the Peruvian state." Is their success a fluke, he asks, a mere reflection of the rottenness of the social fabric? "I submit, rather, that it reflects the fundamental soundness of their understanding of the world--the validity of that political line Spalding dismisses as 'fanatic' and 'ultra-orthodox.' Sendero Luminoso is, in a word, communist. It deserves the sympathy of those of us who continue to take the Marxist-Leninist legacy seriously."

Following is an update on Peru and a reply by Spalding. Sendero does not empower people in a truly democratic manner, he writes; is teaching as teenager how to make a satchel bomb or giving her a gun really empower? In liberated zones, Sendero controls all, commands all, and judges all. I am not, writes Spalding, a partisan of the blind philosophy of proletarian violence in the face of bourgeois violence. Spalding distrusts a doctrine or line that rests totally on armed struggle as the only means to achieve justice. "The great tragedy for Peru today, beyond the continued unforgivable cost in human lives and misery, is that several decades of left organizing and building grassroots organizations may have gone for naught by the time this war ends. Peru still teeters on the brink, but of exactly what, remains clouded."

1146. McClintock, Cynthia. "Peru's Fujimori: A Caudillo Derails Democracy." *Current History,* v.92, no.572 (March 1993): 112-119.

Fujimori's *autogolpe* of April 1992 has proven not only popular with military and business leaders, but also with a majority of the citizenry: the President's approval rating stood at 60% or higher throughout 1992-93. In the first months after the coup, the "Fujishock" of new economic policies had failed to yield significant results and a series of bloody attacks by Sendero in Lima shook the capital. But the capture of Guzmán and other key leaders "transformed Peru's political equations overnight." Fujimori reaped enormous benefits from DINCOTE's action, even though he had not been informed in advance. At a minimum, the capture of Guzmán gives the government valuable breathing space, as the guerrillas will have to regroup and chose new leaders. At best, it is possible that the threat to the state from Sendero is over. Valuable information uncovered in the raid led to the arrest of about 200 suspected *senderistas.* Some 80 computers and 200 diskettes were seized, facilitating even more raids in other communities. By the end of 1992, twelve of nineteen central committee members were detained.

McClintock reviews in detail the trial of Guzmán, the attempted countercoup by certain segments of the military, and the constituent assembly elections in November, all of which have only strengthened Fujimori's position. He has been "riding roughshod over his political enemies." However, he lacks an institutional or even a political base (his "Cambio '90" party is not sufficiently organized to give him one). McClintock concludes that "the more arrogant his government acts towards its political enemies, the more likely that a strong domestic and international political opposition will be forged." There is a widespread perception that democracy as represented by the 1979 constitution has failed, and that Fujimori has polarized Peruvian politics: "Given this, it will be harder than ever to build democracy in Peru."

1147. Adrianzén M., Alberto. "¿Quién viola los derechos humanos?" *Quehacer,* no.82 (March-April 1993): 51-67.

Whenever objections are raised in Peru about government violations of human rights, the response of the government and its defenders (particularly militant members of Opus Dei) is to ask, "What about Sendero Luminoso? Why aren't they being denouncing? And why is the U.S. meddling? They have no right to an opinion, because they practice abortion in their country." No one disputes that the security forces have violated human rights in the fight against subversion,

nor that Sendero has committed crimes. But there is a difference between murders, abuses, and atrocities committed by an organization like Sendero, and those perpetuated by the state or agents which act in its name. It is the comprehension of that essential difference that has been absent in this national debate, whether by ignorance, animus, or a simple, if powerful, political interest. Adrianzén examines this crucial difference, especially the state's central role in the protection of human and civil rights. He reviews Peru's adherence to international treaties concerning human rights, the modern political and philosophical foundations of human rights laws, and the ongoing debate in Peru over this question. The parameters of this debate include the defense of social, as well as human rights as part of a democratic strategy of pacification. Adrianzén declares that the war, social fragmentation, and economic crisis have created a context for the establishment of neoliberal economic policies, a demand for order, and a reduction in social expectations. Neoliberalism, he concludes, is more interested in the concentration of power than in the expansion of rights.

1148. Reyna, Carlos. "En el Huallaga Central: 'Sabemos quién está peridendo esta guerra; pero ¿Quién la está ganando?'" *Quehacer,* no.82 (March-April 1993): 68-79.

Reyna a DESCO investigator, traveled at the end of March to Tarapoto to report from the central Huallaga valley. The most visible sign of guerrilla retreat has been the *arrepentidos,* or guerrillas from MRTA seeking amnesty. These deserters are real, not a fiction invented by the government for propaganda. With the help of humanitarian organizations, they have given themselves up and are serving at a *cuartel* (garrison) while awaiting a clarification of their legal standing. But they are not the only MRTA deserters; others have not surrendered to authorities, but instead are living in their villages, without any links to the movement, confident that as long as the military patrols know they are no longer associated with the guerrillas, they will be left alone. Still others are in hiding. The desertion of so many *miristas* (most of whom were not fighters, but supporters and militia), has weakened the movement, which for its part does not punish these deserters beyond a ritual "expulsion" from the movement. There is a consensus that the movement has lost the magnetism that it had in the region. Reyna describes how the reduced MRTA is operating in the Huallaga, over which it once held sway in many areas, and summarizes the complicated situation between farmers, the army, and guerrillas. Unfortunately, the army still regards any form of rural organization as potentially subversive; leaders of FASMA (Federación Agraria Selva Maestra) and the Frente de Defensa are imprisoned or in hiding. Virtually all of the area's inhabitants either raise coca or derive their living from some aspect of the trade; at the same time, the coca cultivators have formed *rondas* to protect themselves from exploitation by traffickers and from the military. By January, Reyna reports, some 30 *rondas* have been formed; in spite of the fact that the law requires the patrols to be "controlled" by the military authorities, the situation between the patrols and the army remains at best a tense standoff. As a local lawyer put it, "We know who is losing the war, but who is winning it?"

Accompanying the article are several sidebars: one, entitled "Deserter, But Unrepentant," interviews several former guerrillas now living in a state of suspension between revolution and legality. "How Green is My Valley" describes how only coca cultivation is economically feasible on the small plots of land in a majority of rural villages. The last, "The *ronda* of Shapaja," tells of a small village that has existed since 1816, where 384 *ronderos* man a road block and control a stretch of jungle highway independent of state authority. They decided to defend themselves after MRTA murdered several villagers; all men between 17 and 60 belong to the patrol, divided into 32 groups of a dozen men apiece. Each group serves for 24 hours; few carry firearms. The first result of the *rondas* has been a reduction in juvenile delinquency. Although the law (DS 077-DE) requires that they be under state control, a *rondero* solemnly told *Quehacer,* "We are peaceful, autonomous, and democratic patrols. We want to continue that way."

1149. Stinson, Douglass. "4 Peruvian Professors Accused of Aiding 'Shining Path.'" *Chronicle of Higher Education,* v.39, no.33 (April 21 1993): A45.

Four professors have been arrested by Dincote, accused of "advising the Shining Path's central committee on matters of ideology, intelligence, logistics, politics, propaganda, and strategy"; the four supposedly had direct ties to Sendero's political and military leadership. Three of the four are faculty members at the National Technical University in Callao; the fourth teaches at the Enrique Guzmán y Valle National Educational University, known as La Cantuta. Eight other people who were arrested are current or former students at La Cantuta. All will be charged with treason and tried before a military tribunal. Information which led to their arrests was uncovered after a police raid on a Lima safe house in June, 1990. Police charge that Sendero had directed the advisory group to infiltrate and gain control of social, intellectual, and professional organizations and institutions, including student groups.

1150. Gorriti, Gustavo. "Los dilemas de Sendero." *Caretas,* no.1262 (May 20 1993): 28-29.

Gorriti discusses the significance of Guzmán's capture for Shining Path. From Sendero's perspective, to "inflame" the war hurts Guzmán, and to serve Guzmán hurts the war. What was its major source of strength has been converted to its principal weakness; synergy has been exchanged for entropy. Sendero was not prepared for this eventuality, and it has forced it into a tacit dialogue with the state. In last December's Central Committee resolution, one can read the implicit offer beneath the bellicose dialogue: "If anything happens to our chief's life, you will pay with yours, whatever the cost." In this precarious equilibrium, Sendero has little to gain. If a substantive part of the organization has not been damaged, the intangible damage can be reckoned. The greater part of the regional committee, and an important part of the central committee, may be basically intact. But the force of this organization did not reside in its "muscle," but in its capacity to project a superior image of power, initiative, advance, and lack of strategic vulnerability. This was the movement's principle cohesive force, says Gorriti, and it has been shattered.

1151. Cotler, Julio. "Descomposición política y autoritarianismo en el Perú." *Sociedad* (Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires), no.2 (May 1993): 35-56.

Cotler attempts to place recent political events in Peru into a broader, macro-political context: the incapacity of parties and governments to simultaneously satisfy segmented social demands, and a crisis of paradigms, including the decline of socialism and the rise of neoliberalism. Cotler traces Peruvian politics from the collapse of the oligarchy and the failure of military reformism to the authoritarianism of Fujimori. In the early 1980's, the Peruvian left explained (if it did not justify) subversion as a consequence of historical social exploitation. But Sendero's and MRTA's crimes eventually brought about their rejection. Armed conflict and narcotics trafficking has exposed state weaknesses. Peru in the 1990's has been left a narrow choice of options, between a "Pinochet" authoritarian solution to modernization, and the neopatrimonial, technocratic style of Fujimori.

1152. "Caso Cantuta: ¡No había que ser adivino!" *Quehacer,* no.83 (May-June 1993): 4-6.

Indignant editorial on the government's obstruction of an investigation into the disappearance of a professor and nine students from the University of La Cantuta on July 18, 1992. The President of the Republic has declared that a state of war exists within Peru, in which one is either on one side or the other, exactly the same position as that of Sendero Luminoso. *Quehacer* briefly reviews the salient facts of the case: the zone was completely under military authority, and thanks to a Sendero ambush two nights before, under a curfew from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. The responsibility for the disappearances rests completely with the security forces. But the military has stonewalled Congress at every turn in its efforts to investigate the matter.

Following the editorial is a short profile, "Fuerza Michel; fuerza Villa El Salvador." On June 16, at 8 a.m., Michel Azcueta Gorostiza, a teacher known to everyone simply as Michel, was cowardly ambushed by a Sendero commando as he entered the Colegio Fe y Alegría in Villa El Salvador. Four children and two security guards were wounded along with Michel, and hundreds of children were traumatized by the terrorist attack. Michel, an ex-mayor of the Villa, was warned by Sendero some time ago. He, along with people like María Elena Moyano, are seen as serious obstacles to Sendero's advance in the district. The murder of Moyano was a turning point, after which Sendero's visibility in the district diminished; the attack on Michel can be seen as an attempt to recover lost ground. *Quehacer* salutes Michel and the hundreds of other popular leaders and workers who have heroically persisted in their search for democratic development and peace in the face of terror.

1153. Vargas Llosa, Mario. "Prisoner 1509." *Index on Censorship,* v.22, no.5&6 (May-June 1993): 37-39.

Abimael Guzmán's capture has meant a serious setback, and perhaps the beginning of the end, for Shining Path. Vargas Llosa predicts that with the originator and supreme chief behind bars, demoralization will spread among the movement's members, the surviving organizations will become semi-paralyzed, and be much more vulnerable. If the authorities act quickly, they could give the gang the *coup de grace.* But the *de facto* government of Fujimori seems determined to waste this chance with opportunistic advertising campaigns that show dubious judgments. Exhibiting Guzmán in a cage and other humiliating charades "will merely confer on him an aura of martyrdom and galvanize his fanatical followers." Guzmán deserves exemplary punishment, but this must be the result of a legal proceeding. Vargas Llosa goes on to dissect his country: its natural beauty, its untapped wealth, its gulf between rich and poor, and its recent experiment with military socialism

(1968-1980), which he describes and condemns as aggravating what it was trying to solve. He notes that the president has justified his self-serving coup as necessary to defeat terrorism; ironically, the capture was the patient professional police work of DINCOTE, not of Fujimori's military cronies. But Fujimori is garnering the credit for the arrest in the form of adoration from the polls and media. This, says Vargas Llosa, does not signify a true defeat but rather a victory for Abimael Guzmán, whose contempt for bourgeois democracy seems equaled by Fujimori's.

1154. Dennett, Nolan A. "Peruvian Dancer Is Arrested For Housing Terrorist." *Dance Magazine,* v.67, no.6 (June 1993): 26, 28.

Report on the arrest of Maritza Garrido Lecca, a dancer with Danza Lima, along with her uncle, composer Celso Garrido Lecca and choreographer Patricia Awapara, in the house where Abimael Guzmán and several lieutenants were hidden. The *senderistas* were arrested in a hideout above the studio where Maritza rehearsed and gave classes. In her arrest photo, Maritza raises her fist as she shouted, "Communism will take over the world." The artistic community of Lima is reeling with horror and disbelief. A half-dozen other dancers were arrested; all were released. Awapara, who has visited the U.S. and studied dance in New York City, has a strongly-developed social conscience, and is determined to use her art to bring about reform. She recently created a solo work, *Antígona,* in which she cries out for social justice. Awapara was freed by the government. But Maritza Garrido has danced her last dance. Her sentence was life imprisonment at the age of 27. "She will spend her remaining days in a cell six-feet square, seeing the sun for a half hour each day."

1155. "'Exclusive' Comments by Abimael Guzmán." *World Affairs* [Washington, D.C.] (Summer 1993): 52-57.

Transcribed excerpts from a tape recording made by Dincote in Guzmán's cell in Lima in September, 1992, and reprinted from Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin America, on February 25, 1993. The original source was Lima SI. Guzmán describes his formative period as a student, during which he observed the struggles against the unpopular Odría regime, and how his reading of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin (whom he admires) greatly affected his life. He sought to become a member of the Communist Party, but was refused because at the time only the children of workers could join. His encounter with the poor peasants of Ayacucho shocked him, and talking with them, he came to understand their plight. Guzmán describes "defeating" the Peace Corps at the University, and laughs at a report that David Scott Palmer (who was expelled) holds him in high esteem. Guzmán describes how his "red" faction separated from the old Communist Party, how he built his own sect, broke with Saturnino Paredes, and finally formed his own party in February, 1968. Summarized in the article, but not quoted, are further talks with the police, in which Guzmán was asked about the Miraflores car-bomb and the death of Nora [Augusta La Torre]. Guzmán also seems to think that Sendero has become a major issue in and national security concern of the U.S. He downplayed his arrest ("the party must be reorganized"), rejected rumors of splits within Sendero, and denied the existence of Gonzaloism or that a personality cult existed inside Shining Path.

1156. Fitz-Simmons, Daniel W. "Sendero Luminoso: A Case Study in Insurgency." *Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College,* v.23, no.2 (Summer 1993): 64-73.

Fitz-Simmons, professor of Strategic Studies at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, examines Sendero from a strategic-military viewpoint. His political judgments are somewhat dated: "[Sendero's] ideology is a hybrid of Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, and nihilism, emphasizing Indian values while rejecting both Hispanic culture and democratic ideals. Sendero's utopia is premised on the spiritual rejuvenation of its chosen people, the Quechua-speaking 'cosmic race.'" Fitz-Simmons is on stronger ground in his analysis of the war itself; for example, he attributes Sendero successes largely "to a lack of government infrastructure in areas where guerrillas frequently fill politico-military vacuums left by government default." He also asserts that ideological support for Sendero in some regions is tentative, with some support based solely on terror. The government's counter-terror, furthermore, has been a strategic failure; peasants were alienated and the guerrillas simply moved elsewhere. Fitz-Simmon's analysis of the Peruvian army's performance, and the corresponding strengths and weaknesses of the guerrillas, is sound, despite his limitation to English-language sources. He concludes that despite Guzmán's capture, Sendero's guerrilla infrastructure is still largely in place, and the arrest of its leader could precipitate the movement into even more terrorist vengeance against the government. "One thing is certain, however: if President Fujimori and the newly elected Peruvian legislature fail to alleviate the country's massive socioeconomic problems, stability in Peru will remain extremely tenuous."

1157. Rospigliosi, Fernando and Jimmy Torres. "Huallaga: la guerra oculta." *Caretas,* no.1268 (July 1 1993): 26-31, 88.

While Lima is triumphant, each day sees ferocious combat in the Huallaga. *Narcotráfico* is in retreat in the Huallaga, because the armed forces are occupying the airstrips and fields, and a blight is destroying coca fields. The *narcotraficantes* have been displaced to the south. But the peasants of the Huallaga, who cannot so easily abandon their fields, are in a critical situation. Terrorism continues; while the towns are under military control, *senderista* columns still roam the countryside and ambush military patrols. A map shows towns controlled by the army, clandestine airstrips which have been destroyed, and the new air routes to Colombia. The people of the valley are poorer than ever; the ephemeral wealth of the narcotics traffic has left little behind, and the promises of alternative development remain on paper. Subversion may have been expelled from the towns, but it is far from extinguished in the countryside.

1158. Phillips, Julie. "Crossfire's Targets: Women in Peru Fight Violence From Both Sides." *The Village Voice* (July 13 1993): 28-29.

An examination of the impact of the war in Peru on women. Drawing largely on a report from the Women's Rights Project of Human Rights Watch, Phillips establishes that rape and abuse of women is routinely practiced by both government security forces and Shining Path. Since women are prominent in Sendero's leadership, and often lead guerrilla assassination squads, they provoke special fear and anger among soldiers and police. Rape in this context is not only used to extract information, but to punish as well. It also reflects race and class divisions: "*mestizas* are only raped by white or *mestizo* officers, while Indian women are assaulted by dark-skinned foot soldiers as well." Sexual assault is not the only sign of misogyny in the war. Sendero targets the women who run "survival groups"--mothers' groups, soup kitchens, and the "Glass of Milk" child-welfare programs in Peru's shantytowns. Such women are viewed as government "collaborators," and police protection merely increases their vulnerability. Isabel Coral, who works with internal refugees, says that if she asks for protection, "Shining Path...will accuse me of having ties to the government and want to kill me even more." Sendero, while it forbids its fighters to rape women, regards all independent feminist organizations as instruments of oppression and retardation, diverting women from the true path of people's war. They are mocked as "madam feminists...sleep-inducing mattresses." Sendero also views birth control and family planning as anti-nationalist plots designed to deprive the revolution of fighters. Rape victims get little pity; they are expected to understand that sexual assault is a political act, and that the solution is political (i.e., Maoist revolution). Since women's groups form a crucial part of a viable political and social alternative to Sendero and the government, they are in a sense "contested territory" between the guerrillas and the state, "their bodies battlegrounds in a literal sense."

1159. Burt, Jo-Marie. "The Dispossessed Look Homeward: Peru's Internal Refugees Organize for Return." *NACLA Report on the Americas,* v.27, no.1 (July-August 1993): 8-11.

Report on the plight of internal refugees both in building new lives in new homes, and in returning to reclaim their old communities. Many face discrimination in the cities, where the stigma of being a *cholo* (dark-skinned Indian) prevents them from finding stable jobs. Many who fled do not have their identity cards, needed for even the simplest transaction. Most are forced to eke out a bleak life as street vendors or day workers. They face cultural barriers in the cities, which can be insecure places of refuge: the security forces tend to regard all peasant refugees as potential terrorists, and Sendero preys on the refugee settlements, demanding food and shelter. These factors explain why so many displaced possess a strong desire to return to their mountain homes. But "reconstruction aid and security guarantees--neither of which is present in Peru--are the two basic conditions for a successful resettlement process." Burt reports on the attempt of a group of peasants from Ñuñunhuayco-Patahuasi, (who fled after a Sendero massacre in 1991 that killed 22 people), to reclaim their abandoned village. She also discusses the work of CEPRODEP (Center for Promotion and Development of the Population), headed by Isabel Coral, which promotes projects that will encourage the option of resettlement. Another refugee organization is SUYASUN ("we have hope" in Quechua), that provides social services to internal refugees in Lima. Its director believes that the government still takes too lightly the dangers of Sendero: "People may feel that Shining Path is no longer all-powerful, but they have not evaluated the true situation. Shining Path has not been defeated...The country is not yet pacified." An accompanying sidebar is entitled "The *Rondas:* Community-based resistance or an arm of the military?" It discusses the history of the self-defense patrols, and the debate over whether they are truly empowering organizations, or simply put ill-equipped peasants on the front lines of the government's counterinsurgency war.

1160. Reyna, Carlos. "Las batallas del decapitado." *Quehacer,* no.84 (July-August 1993): 8-11.

What does the future hold for the Shining Path, now fighting the "battles of the decapitated"? A year after Guzmán's arrest, two big changes are visible in Sendero. Although Lima as a battleground has not been abandoned, the Andes and the jungle zones have re-emerged as priority areas for the movement. Reyna lists the important military actions that have taken place in these rural zones, places where Sendero has been repulsed by military or the civil defense patrols. The other important change has been the abandonment of the idea of strategic equilibrium. Sendero's strategic offensive against the state has been replaced by the call to defend the life of President Gonzalo, along with an implicit call to defend the life of the Party--in other words, to survive as an organization. Reyna reviews the options open to Sendero: to reconstitute its leadership, to define a new "line" or strategy, or perhaps to become less a militant armed guerrilla movement, and more a permanent political organization. The movement can continue killing, but it will never win the war.

1161. Starn, Orin. "La resistencia en Huanta." *Quehacer,* no.84 (July-August 1993): 34-41.

Extended report from Huanta, one hour north of Ayacucho. Violence has decreased in Huanta, from 935 deaths in 1984, to 171 in 1990, to 86 in 1992. Attacks by Sendero have also fallen in number. Key elements in this transformation are peasant disgust with the bloody tactics of *senderistas;* the "explosive" growth of civil defense committees; and the reorientation of the army from brutality to "populist authoritarianism." The war is not over, say the peasants, but there is cautious optimism that the worst is over. Starn describes the destruction of towns and the transformation of villagers into displaced people. Sendero's presence in the area, once powerful, is now weak. The state of emergency has been lifted in the city of Huanta. Now people in the towns are asking, will the armed *rondas* be transformed into dangerous bands of robbers? This fear reflects the old racism between *campesinos* and townspeople; no one wonders whether the revolvers and rifles bought by whites might not be equally dangerous. But there has been no evidence of any wrongful use of arms or communal disputes, even though some of the peasants have used their own money to buy better weapons than the army handed out. In general, the stereotype of the *rondas* as authoritarian or proto-fascist bodies persists, but in many there is a surprising degree of democracy. Starn reports on the widening of *ronda* authority; the southern patrols are beginning to resemble the original self-defense patrols of the north in their assumption of civil and judicial functions. Nevertheless, he also describes the internal tensions and political squabbling that have afflicted some of the patrols. The history of the *rondas* reproduces, to a certain degree, the old patterns of exploitation of Andean peasants by the wealthy of the city. Perhaps, says Starn, one of the lessons to be drawn from the experience of Huanta is the necessity of abandoning old ideas about social transformation in the sierra. Once the agrarian leagues and peasant confederations were thought to be agents of change, galvanizing the poor to defend their right to land. Now these organizations, many linked to leftist parties and affected by their decline, are weakened in some parts of the country. In areas like Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Junín, the two social movements that have expanded in influence have been the evangelical churches and the Committees of Civil Defense. We are, writes Starn, very far from the old hopes of a spontaneous Andean movement dreamed of by Mariátegui and Valcárcel. Ten years of violence have turned the peasants cynical and pragmatic; they despise both Sendero and the government for the misery each has brought. But they are not resigned; indeed, displaced *iquichanos* are fighting for power and water in their newly-built settlement of New Jerusalem, while their neighbors in Azángaro have just finished a granary and a communal house. The embers of hope, writes Starn, are still alive. Accompanying the article are "Images of Huanta," documenting teachers who continued to teach in the face of Sendero's threats, memorials to slain townspeople, peasants from Iquicha (who live at over 4,000 meters elevation), and the tunnels, similar to those dug by peasants in Vietnam, excavated by peasants in order to hide from Sendero.

1162. Camino, Gustavo. "Capture of the Leader of Shining Path: A Dermatologic Disease Changes the Course of History." *American Journal of Dermatopathology,* v.15, no.4 (August 1993): 385-387.

Interesting piece focusing on how Guzmán's psoriasis led to his downfall. Camino gives a good thumbnail sketch of Sendero and Abimael Guzmán's life, stressing the stigma of his illegitimacy, his smoldering resentment of his father's refusal to acknowledge him, and his subsequent hatred: "The adversarial relationship with his father caused Abimael Guzmán to extend his resentment to society as a whole, yet, at the same time, to thirst for its respect and acceptance of him." Guzmán's psoriasis was diagnosed in 1974 at the Tropical Disease Institute of San Marcos. There is no documentation on the specific treatment he received or on the course of his disease.

Perhaps because of the cold dry climate of the Peruvian highlands and emotional stress, his condition worsened. Although the Andes is an excellent place for a guerrilla to hide, its remoteness prevented Guzmán from obtaining adequate treatment, and so he was forced to seek care secretly in Lima many times. It was during such a trip, writes Camino, that he was captured by the police.

1163. Torres, Jimmy. "Abimael al año." *Caretas,* no.1277 (September 9 1993): 26-30.

One year after Guzmán's capture, important gains have been made against terrorism. Organizing and arming the *rondas* is one; changes in prison policy to restrict prisoners is another. The severity of sentences, an end to freeing subversives on technical grounds, and the law of repentance are still others. Nevertheless, authentic intelligence work is still being sidelined in favor of military methods. Military intelligence heads decided to prohibit decorating the heroes of the counterinsurgency war (an move made purely out of jealously of Dincote's former head, Antonio Ketín Vidal). The GEIN, Dincote's special intelligence section, has been weakened, and its personnel reassigned. *Pensamiento Benedicto,* Dincote's counterpart to *pensamiento Gonzalo,* had its own slogans: Know your enemy; collect and analyze captured enemy documents; offer captured terrorists incentives to yield information; revalue the detective's work in counterintelligence. Now the objective of creating a unified intelligence effort at the national level has been archived, along with *pensamiento Benedicto.*

A sidebar ("La soledad de Guzmán," p.76) analyzes the psychological effects of solitary confinement on a man like Guzmán. A personality like his, that holds convictions with absolute faith and certainty, will probably be less affected by isolation. In addition, Guzmán must carry the extra burden of being a figurehead to his movement, whose followers expect certain behavior from their deity.

1164. "Statement by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Peru." *A World to Win,* no.19 (September 1993): 10-11.

The Party's Central Committee takes up the courageous and resolute call of September 24 [1992] of its beloved leader: "Right now we have to bring all favourable factors into play in order to face these difficulties and continue carrying out our tasks, to achieve our goals, score successes, and win victories! This is what we must do!" And this is what the Party has been doing, leading the unstoppable People's War to country-wide political power, further developing strategic equilibrium, building up the new political power, organizing the People's Liberation Front, whose main organization is the People's Liberation Army, and resolutely carrying out the glorious, historic, and far-reaching Third Plenum of the Central Committee. The PCP is now in the midst of carrying out the Fourth Plan for the Strategic Development of People's War, and the Sixth Military Plan, *"Organize the Seizure of Power!"* with its First Campaign, *"In Defense of Our Leadership, Against the Genocidal Dictatorship!"* in the form of armed actions that are provoking fear and trembling among the imperialist, the big bourgeoisie and the landowners, as well as their revisionist and opportunist flunkies. The Central Committee warns that U.S. imperialism is going all out to unleash so-called "low intensity warfare" against Peru, and alerts the Peruvian people to the hateful schemes being hatched by the genocidal Fujimori dictatorship. It condemns the so-called "repentance" law, part of a ridiculous farce in which hundreds of subversives have allegedly turned themselves in. Finally, it reaffirms its faith in the invincibility of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Gonzalo Thought and People's War, and "our unshakable determination to give our lives for Chairman Gonzalo, for the Party and the Revolution."

1165. "Victory to the Armed Strike May 17, 18 and 19." *A World to Win,* no.19 (September 1993): 11-12.

Statement by the Classist Movement of the Shantytowns, dated May, 1993. The Movimiento Clasista Barrial salutes the heroic and revolutionary proletariat and people of Peru on the occasion of the thirteenth anniversary of the armed struggle. The call to support the armed strike analyzes the political situation in the country, in which the rotten and senile state led by Yankee imperialism, the genocidal armed forces and police, and reactionary parties of all stripes, including the revisionists, are trying vainly to prop up the old State, restructure it, and annihilate People's War and reinforce Bureaucratic Capitalism with new forms of genocide and repression of the people. Thus, the People's Liberation Movement has issued a timely and correct call to the proletariat and the people for an Armed Strike on May 17-19. On these days the people will reaffirm their revolutionary combativity, and deal a powerful and earth-shaking blow to the senile reactionary state. Among the Classist Movement's *lemas* (slogans) are "Down with Oppressive Taxes!"; "No to the Payment of the Foreign Debt!"; "For Water, Sewage Services and Electricity, Combat and Resist!"; "For Health, Housing and Education, Combat and Resist!"; "Through

Struggle We Win and Defend Our Rights!"; and "Long Live the People's Revolutionary Movement!"

1166. "Crush the Genocidal Plan Against the Prisoners of War!" *A World to Win,* no.19 (September 1993): 13.

The Prisoners of War, Canto Grande, Shining Trench of Combat, salute with deep communist joy the vigorous, rising, and overwhelming development of their unbeatable People's War, under the grand direction of Chairman Gonzalo. The hundreds of actions carried out all over the country, and the conclusive Armed Strike that shook Lima November 18-19, demonstrate the power of the strategic offensive to seize power nationwide. "The openly genocidal dictatorship led by the sly and reptile-like Fujimori, as a wounded beast under orders from his master, Yankee imperialism, and with cruel hate for the people, unleashes his counter subversive war...within this is the arrest of our beloved and respected Chairman Gonzalo, whom he tries to kill, dreaming about finishing the revolution." The prisoners of Canto Grande call upon the proletariat and people of Peru to defend the life and health of the greatest living Marxist-Leninist-Maoist. They reaffirm to continue heroic resistance, to give their lives for Chairman Gonzalo, the Party, the Revolution, and Communism, following the shining example of Comrade Norah (Guzmán's wife, Augusta La Torre). Completely convinced that they will seize power nationwide, establish the People's Republic of Peru, a future base area and trench of combat for the World Proletarian Revolution, they will continue developing as many Proletarian Cultural Revolutions as necessary to come to their final goal: golden and forever shining Communism.

1167. Chairman Gonzalo [Abimael Guzmán]. "On the Rectification Campaign Based on the Study of the Document Elections, No! People's War, Yes!" *A World to Win,* no.19 (September 1993): 13-16, 81-88.

Text of a speech given by Abimael Guzmán at an August ,1991 meeting held in conjunction with the Party's rectification campaign. Guzmán first discusses the contradiction between synthesis and analysis (which if understood improperly, may lead to problems in the overall handling of ideology). Analysis, says Guzmán, can lead to metaphysics, but synthesis leads us to materialist dialectics, which inevitably leads us to Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism, and ultimately to Gonzalo Thought. In the second part of his talk, Guzmán reviews the history of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao's greatest achievement, and its application to the Peruvian revolution. Peru's revolution, he declares, must pass through a democratic, a socialist, and not one, but several, cultural revolutions. Guzmán then analyzes the world political situation, particularly *vis-`a-vis* China and the Soviet Union, and concludes that we are witnessing a counter-revolutionary general offensive, led by the forces of imperialism and revisionism. He examines the impact of this counter-revolution on Peru, and the growing delegitimization of the Fujimori government and the "rotten" Peruvian state. He concludes that only Marxism-Leninism-Maoism can produce world proletarian revolution and smash revisionism, and that the Party's task is to "create public opinion and unleash deep-going ideological work among the masses." Guzmán explains the rectification campaign and reiterates his conclusions, adding that the watchword should be: "Serve the people and follow the Party's leadership."

1168. "El mito de 'Sendero ganador.'" *Ideéle,* año 5, no.55-56 (September 1993): 20-23.

Ideéle interviews Raúl González, who has just returned to Peru from Europe. A year after Abimael Guzmán's capture, Sendero is in crisis, lacking a political and military strategy for taking power. Individual actions are apparently being taken by regional committees, independent of any central control. In Europe there is a fight between supporters of Maximiliano Durand and Luis Arce Borja, with one side accusing the other of being police spies, and the other countercharging mindless terror without political direction. Inside Peru, says González, the only economically independent branch of Sendero, the Huallaga group, has always been relatively autonomous, and is now more so. There may actually be three Senderos now: the *huallagistas,* the followers of Morote (the Ayacuchan traditionalists), and Guzmán's supporters. González expands on the divisions inside Sendero, pointing out that the party went through a great debate in 1987-88 over the movement's future strategy, a fight in which Guzmán won out over Morote. The victor then essentially abandoned the rural war and announced strategic equilibrium. González also criticizes Sendero's urban strategy; no guerrilla group has ever taken power through car bombs and killings. Apart from precipitating the collapse of the state, one must demonstrate an ability to create a new state. Sendero's activities around Lima created a picture of a powerful and purposeful movement, but González believes that the portrait of a victorious Sendero was exaggerated. But, he says, neither should any movement that has lasted thirteen years be underestimated. González also discusses the militarization of Peruvian society, the choice between "French" and "English" models

of counterinsurgency, and his views on the government's role in Sendero's defeat. He warns that by no means is the movement finished.

1169. Burgos, Hernando." El mensaje escondido." *Quehacer,* no.85 (September-October 1993): 24-29.

Most of the explanations for Guzmán's extraordinary letters either deny their authenticity or attempt to explain them as the product of brainwashing or drugs. Burgos interviews a "disciplined adherent of the PCP's ideology" to uncover another, completely different interpretation. Guzmán, an able tactician, is in this person's opinion concentrating the attention of the Party in another direction. Guzmán is concerned with maintaining the unity of the Party, through the two-line struggle; thus when he raises the flag of peace, he closes the road to "rightism" *(derechismo)* that has emerged in the new Central Committee. To this Party loyalist, the positive image of Guzmán has given way to a negative one, one that must be rejected. Fujimori acts as if Guzmán is the Party, but from an "organic" point of view Guzmán doesn't decide anything now: there is also the Central Committee. Guzmán's hidden message, in this person's opinion, is that he cannot effectively direct the struggle from prison; his message to the Party's leadership is "Replace me." From that moment he became merely Doctor Guzmán. The December, 1992 resolution of the Central Committee, reaffirming the primacy of his leadership, must now be rethought. The interviewee rejects the idea that Guzmán has capitulated politically or that Sendero has been defeated. Ultimately, the letters are a tactical act, not a rejection of *pensamiento Gonzalo.* Asked at the end of the interview, "Isn't your faith almost religious?", the person replies that adherence to the PCP is a type of lay religiousness; as with any type of religion, there is both conviction and faith.

1170. Reyna, Carlos. "Abimael contra Gonzalo." *Quehacer,* no.85 (September-October 1993): 8-14.

Pacts with one's adversary or concessions to established doctrine are not necessarily rare among rebel chiefs or revolutionary leaders. But Abimael Guzmán's letters to President Fujimori are the strangest contortion yet produced by Sendero's leader. In such situations, someone wins and someone loses, writes Reyna, who believes that Guzmán has lost moral capital as the center of his revolution. Reyna analyzes the offer to negotiate from the vantage point of both Sendero and the government. He concludes that Guzmán is trying to reestablish contact with the outside world and reaffirm his role in the Peruvian political equation. It seems inconceivable that the government could discuss negotiations with a group such as Sendero, but if such talks would mean an end to internal war they are necessary for the Peruvian people: every month at least one hundred people, most of them poor, die as a result of political violence.

A sidebar ("En qué andaba Sendero") reviews the movement's latest actions; even as Guzmán sent his letters, Sendero is showing signs of reorganizing itself. The party's central committee is reported to have met in December, 1992, to discuss its response to Guzmán's arrest and the prosecution of the Sixth General Plan. In February of 1993 more meetings produced a strategy: to defend the continuity of the Party and people's war; to return to the original rural roots of that struggle ("the countryside is the primary focus of struggle and the city complementary"); and to reinforce work with the masses. The concept of prolonged struggle has replaced the idea of a short campaign. The piece goes on to detail the latest wave of attacks, including bombings on the anniversary of Guzmán's capture.

1171. "El silencio y las bombas." *Quehacer,* no.85 (September-October 1993): 30-31.

In the first days of October militant *senderistas* saw, read, and heard something almost unimaginable: Abimael Guzmán asking the government to discuss peace. After an initial period of confusion among his followers, one can begin to discern several diverse interpretations. Some believe that the videotape was faked with clever technology. Others speak of a Guzmán drugged into submission. Still others believe he has been brainwashed. But all deny that Sendero's chief has capitulated. All interpretations lead to one conclusion: the war will continue. *Quehacer* 's sources indicate that the Central Committee has decided not to adopt any resolution with respect to the letters, but to continue people's war. One reason for this decision is the need to cut off the flow of members seeking amnesty under the "law of repentance." Once again, Sendero has shown that it is little or not affected at all by what is said outside of the Party itself. *Quehacer* speculates on what the PCP may do now. It may declare Guzmán a traitor, although this implicates such a fundamental rejection that it would demoralize the base of militants. Or they may accept the letters as genuine, but declare that they are the fruit of extreme isolation and the influence of the SIN. The leadership of the Party does not rest with Guzmán, nor with his captured comrades, but with the newly- reconstituted Central Committee. Without condemning Guzmán, they may make it

clear that the present conduct of the Party is in other hands. Despite what the government believes, the work of "Gonzalo" will not be finished with his epistles.

1172. "Temas del pos-senderismo." *Quehacer*, no.85 (September-October 1993): 20-23.

Quehacer asks Enrique Obando and Carlos Tapia two questions: Were critics and senderologists wrong to predict the failure of the government's counterinsurgency strategy because it concentrated on military means, to the exclusion of political and social considerations? And, what should the national agenda be in the "post-*senderismo* " era, particularly with regard to the new roles of the armed forces and the rural *rondas?* Obando, declaring that "pacification is not ended with the defeat of Sendero," answers the journal's first question in the negative, pointing out that self-defense committees were formed not because the government convinced peasants to do so, but as a reaction against Sendero's terrorism. Ultimately, he writes, Sendero failed because it relied too much on terror than on convincing the masses to join its cause. Obando also writes of the immense labor of reconstruction that lies ahead for Peru; here, the *rondas* can be the germ of a new state, the basis of a new local police, and the basis of a new and democratic system of local justice. Reconciliation, he also observes, is necessary not between the citizenry and the guerrillas, but with ourselves. As in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, a balance will have to be sought between justice and reconciliation; some crimes will have to be punished, and others pardoned.

Tapia writes of a society and a politics that have been "senderized"; he advocates a strategy that will advance the cause of national renewal. The government will have to end its policy of indiscriminate repression of the civil population, improve relations between citizens and the security forces, and recognize the structural causes of the revolution (misery, marginality, and injustice). Merely declaring military victory will not resolve the contradictions brought into focus by thirteen years of internal war. With regard to the country's 3,000 self-defense committees, Tapia recommends that the *rondas* be disarmed in the *narcotráfico* zones, but that their collective identity be retained for local development. In the sierras they should be subordinated to communal authority, and possibly be converted into a local rural police force. Tapia believes that the political-military function of the armed forces should be redirected toward national defense and development, and that the armed forces should be reduced in size, modernized, retrained, and reoriented toward new missions and goals.

1173. "Viabilidad de un acuerdo de paz." *Quehacer*, no.85 (September-October 1993): 16-19.

Is a peace accord possible with Shining Path? *Quehacer* asks two individuals for their opinion: retired Army colonel José Bailetti, member of the Instituto de Investigaciones de la Defensa Nacional (INIDEN), and Dr. Carlos Chipoco, Executive Director of the Centro de Estudios y Acción para la Paz (CEAPAZ). The ex-Army officer calls for nothing less than unconditional surrender, reminding readers of the Maoist precept to attack from strength where the enemy is weakest. He implies that Guzmán's offer to negotiate is nothing more than a tactical retreat, to give the movement time to regroup. He also predicts a fracturing of Sendero into opposing factions: some will seek amnesty; others, more fanatical, will continue the war; still others, less "ideologized," who have access to money from the narcotics trade, may become the armed right hand of *narcopoder.* The academic urges that the government "negotiate or not, but with good reason." In spite of the natural repulsion that many feel at the thought of negotiating with terrorists, we must consider the possible advantages of such a course. There is an amnesty law (literally a "law of repentance") that exchanges liberty for information. Many countries, Chipoco writes, that have faced crises as grave as Peru's or worse have negotiated with their adversaries; the ultimate cost is usually less than that of total victory over an insurgency. Chipoco compares Peru's situation with similar insurgencies in El Salvador, Colombia, Cambodia, and Israel, where bloody wars have not prevented bitter enemies from negotiating. But he warns against negotiations without preparation, forethought, and caution.

1174. "Guzmán se quebró." *Caretas*, no.1281 (October 7 1993): 10-16.

Report on the "breaking" of Guzmán. *Caretas* reproduces his original letter, with commentary, pointing out that Guzmán addresses Fujimori as "President of the Republic," solicits conversations with the government, and proposes ending the war, but does not renounce his ideology. The article also reports on the interaction between Guzmán and Montesinos, who acted as an emissary of the government. Why did he "break"? *Caretas* discusses the effects of thirteen months of isolation on Guzmán, and the possible ramifications of the letter for Sendero and the country.

1175. Valenzuela, Cecilia. "Terremoto en SL." *Caretas*, no.1281 (October 7 1993): 18-20.

Interview with Gustavo Gorriti. What does the letter of September 15 mean? Is it surrender? Gorriti believes that Guzmán is trying to improve his situation, but entering into negotiations does not necessarily mean an end to the war. Nevertheless, the letter is an earthquake for Sendero. Gorriti reminds readers that Guzmán, in his "Interview of the Century," said that the only thing the PCP would negotiate with the state was its surrender. Now that he is in prison, the softening of his position is probably due more to his personal situation than any change in ideology. The government clearly sought this situation, but has no intention of responding to it. As to the future, Sendero has had some success in reconstituting its leadership; the struggle between factions within the PCP will probably now intensify.

1176. Lange, Karen. "Death Threats, Arrests, Imprisonment, Torture." *Editor & Publisher,* v.126, no.41 (October 9 1993): 11.

Journalism is a dangerous profession in Huanta, where 14 journalists have been killed since 1983. Lange, a reporter, talks with Alejandro Coronado, a radio broadcaster, Reuters correspondent, and free-lancer, who has suffered death threats, arrests, imprisonment, and torture, as well as the loss of five of six journalist-friends with whom he grew up. Coronado, a visiting fellow at Duke University, describes being "disappeared" and tortured by the Navy for reporting on human rights violations; he was released when his family appealed to a military commander. Coronado was later caught between conflicting demands from Sendero and threats from the Army; he left Huanta for a "vacation" in Lima. Robin Kirk, who met Coronado while free-lancing herself in Peru, praises him and others like him: "If there weren't journalists like him, the news simply wouldn't get out."

1177. "Vídeos hechos en casa." *Caretas,* no.1282 (October 14 1993): 10-18, 80.

Report on Guzmán's second letter. *Caretas* again reproduces and analyzes the message for significant phrases. Although Guzmán calls unequivocally this time for an end to the war and a peace accord, he nevertheless continues to place himself at the center of the universe; i.e., the needs of history, the people, the nation, and society are identical to those of Abimael Guzmán. Sendero, reports the magazine, may have been paralyzed by the first letter, but a recent wave of attacks shows that it has recovered. The release of the letters and video showing Guzmán discussing his offer to negotiate are part of a government propaganda campaign to drum up support for Fujimori. Following is an "op-ed" piece by Fernando Rospligiosi, "El fin del mito" (The end of the myth), in which he declares that Guzmán himself has liquidated the myth of "President Gonzalo." Guzmán is clearly showing that he cares only about himself at this point. If he had resisted arrest, or committed suicide in prison (as did Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof), he would be a hero to his followers. His letters have produced only demoralization and confusion within Sendero's ranks. The possibility that Guzmán could obtain his liberty by renouncing armed struggle appears remote, as does the idea that he could be reincarnated in the future as a political figure. Movements that have made that transition--the FMLN in El Salvador and M-19 in Colombia--were not so bloody as Shining Path. Nor does it appear that Guzmán can transform himself into a Nelson Mandela.

1178. Kent, Robert B. "Geographical Dimensions of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru." *Geographical Review,* v.83, no.4 (October 1993): 441-454.

Article identifying the territorial dimensions of the Shining Path insurgency and analyzing its progress towards the establishment of an insurgent state. Kent retraces the trajectory of Sendero's spread, giving special attention to geographical and ecological factors paid little heed by most Senderologists. Driven out of its original area of operations by Peruvian security forces, Sendero widened its insurgency beyond Ayacucho and Apurímac, extending along the Andes as well as into Lima: "The dispersal of the Shining Path northward along the Andean axis was due in part to its understanding of the Andean ecosystem and its ability to exploit it tactically." Sendero's preferred Andean field of operations has been the ecological zone known as the *puna,* land generally above 4,000 meters. This zone extends nearly uninterrupted along most of Peru's Andean axis; this terrain is sparsely populated, remote, and inaccessible to government forces. Besides offering a remote refuge and an axis of transportation, the *puna* provides commanding access to populated regions below. Sendero also moved north into Junín, specifically the Mantaro Valley east of Lima. Junín provides food and hydroelectric power for the capital, and is a cross-roads for north-south and east-west highways. However, Sendero did not fare as well in the more sophisticated peasant communities of the Mantaro, which are better integrated into the national economy and have a strong tradition of independence. After analyzing Sendero's campaign in the valley, Kent challenges Simon Strong's assertion that Sendero's flag now flies over hundreds of

villages in the Junín, terming it an exaggeration. Kent examines each of Sendero's fronts in turn: the Huallaga Valley, Lima, and the southern front (Puno). He concludes that Sendero's territorial evolution conforms to the traditional three-stage pattern of other modern insurgencies. Sendero has shifted from a mobile presence to areas where it had established administrative structures, but effective government response has prevented it from designating such areas a permanent territorial core. Sendero then opened new theaters of operation, where the first two stages were repeated. The movement has been most successful in the Huallaga, where it both controls and administers territory. Nevertheless, Sendero still falls short of the third stage of a successful revolutionary movement (a full-fledged, territorial-based insurgent state), even in the Huallaga: "Control of the valley area may offer Shining Path its best prospects for an insurgent state, but that scenario is not imminent."

1179. Gardels, Nathan and Abraham F. Lowenthal. "Saving the State in Peru." *New Perspectives Quarterly,* v.10 (Fall 1993): 10-12.

Gardels and Lowenthal interview President Alberto Fujimori. While he denies that he has any Singapore-style "soft authoritarianism" in mind for Peru, he has tried to apply some pragmatic strategies and measures to gain control of the country by confronting its three main social ills: corruption, the inefficiency of the state, and Shining Path violence. He attributes Sendero's success in large measure to the very weaknesses that he is attempting to correct: "The banner the Shining Path projected for people to rally around was that the Peruvian state was corrupt and inefficient and that it marginalized the dispossessed of Peru, especially in the countryside. In the eyes of the people, these charges were true. The claim of democracy was a cover for these evils." Fujimori discusses his plans to revitalize the country's infrastructure, the massive and endemic problem of corruption (including allegations of *narcotraficante* influence among the military), and human rights violations committed by the security forces and death squads (linked to his own advisor, Vladimir Montesinos). Since April 5, 1992, he declares, the Peruvian state and Sendero have exchanged postures, with the government adopting for the first time an aggressive, integrated, strategic approach to stopping terrorism, and the Shining Path left defensive and passive.

1180. MacAskill, Ewan. "Return to Sendero." *New Statesman and Society,* v.6, no.279 (November 19 1993): 10.

Report on a post-Guzmán Sendero that is split into three competing factions. The old brigade from Ayacucho, which opposed Guzmán's switch from rural to urban war, is in temporary control. The second faction, closest to Guzmán, is mostly in jail. The third, and most likely to emerge on top, is the Huallaga regional command, which has access to coca money. Who will stop Sendero? Probably not the government, whose popularity is waning. "If Sendero had attempted to win popular support, instead of alienating the public by its ruthlessness, it would probably be in power by now." Everyone outside of Fujimori's inner circle reckons that unless Peru's social problems are addressed, there will be Sendero for decades to come--or something worse.

1181. "¡Gonzalo ha muerto! ¡Viva Feliciano!" *Ideéle,* año 5, no.58 (November 1993): 10-15.

Analysis of Guzmán's letters to President Fujimori and the consequences for Peru. There is no doubt that the letters are a triumph for the government in its fight against Sendero. But *Ideéle* asks whether it was really necessary for the president of Peru to pay so much attention to the worst killer in the country's history, to send cakes from the palace to Guzmán's companion Iparraguirre, to be so obsessed with Guzmán's life in prison? *Ideéle* rebukes Fujimori for his "preoccupation" with Guzmán. What does Guzmán's letter mean? It reinforces his role as central to Sendero: founder, ideologue, political and military chief, and the sole possessor of truth. *Ideéle* 's conclusion is that Guzmán, having rationalized his inability to stand prison, is trying to obtain a temporary advantage by asking for negotiations. Guzmán, who had no scruples about ordering others to be killed, "broke" because he couldn't resist even the small amount of suffering meted out to him. The maestro has invented a new reality, in which he rationalizes "accommodation" to the new reality. The article concludes that Sendero will probably continue to fight, although it may be split by Guzmán's actions. The lack of political direction will probably result in a greater emphasis on military action; Peruvians will continue to confront violence for the foreseeable future.

1182. Hinojosa, Iván. "Sendero y el espejo camboyano." *Quehacer,* no.86 (November-December 1993): 35-39.

Of all the adjectives used to describe Sendero Luminoso from 1980 on, the most common was "Pol-Pot like" *(polpotiano),* alluding to the experience of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

This term, much encouraged by the government, was meant to conjure images of the infamous killing fields, and of dogmatic Maoism, fanaticism, antimodernism, antiurbanism, genocide, and savagery. Another commonly made comparison was to present Peru as a South American Guatemala, with an Indian peasant majority exploited by a small mestizo-white minority descended from the Spanish *conquistadores*. This caricature is very common outside Peru. But Hinojosa rejects the identification of Sendero with the Khmer Rouge, while conceding that both movements have certain aspects in common. He summarizes the Cambodian experience from the rise of the Khmer Rouge to their expulsion from Cambodia's coalition government. Hinojosa believes that Sendero actually does resemble the Khmer Rouge now, since with its leader in jail it is an organization reduced to lightly-armed columns capable of terrorist attacks, operating in areas of the country where the state is absent, and surviving on illegal activities (smuggling in Cambodia; narcotics trafficking in Peru). Shining Path may reconstitute itself and survive, in hope of better times. Hinojosa even speculates that in *extremis*, the party might take the ultimate step: accept "bourgeois legality" and forego armed struggle. After all, during the 1970's, the party always spoke of "reconstitution," the act of making itself over.

1183. "¿De tierra adentro? Informes regionales." *Ideéle*, año 5, no.59-60 (December 1993): 87-136.

Ideéle offers a series of analyses of five crucial regions of the country. Jaime Urrutia looks at Ayacucho ("Already a post-Gonzalo scenario?"); Salvador Peña Guerra examines the Mantaro Valley ("Open retreat?"); Oscar Espinosa de Rivero reviews the situation in the *selva central* ("Inconclusive departure"); Róger Rumrrill analyzes the Huallaga Valley ("The beginning of the end of the war"); and Ronald Llerena describes the situation in Puno ("Between war and politics.").

1184. "¿Hacía el fin de la violencia sin fin?" *Ideéle*, año 5, no.59-60 (December 1993): 19-48.

Is the war now truly over with the arrest of Abimael Guzmán? *Ideéle* assembles the views of four experts. Carlos Basombrío Iglesias ("The strategy of *Chino*"), examines Fujimori's counterinsurgency strategy. Isaías Rojas Pérez ("The final blow to Sendero") asks, "Will this be the end of Gonzalo?" Raúl González ("A tired organization") concludes from Guzmán's letters that he is saying that Fujimori has altered objective and subjective conditions in Peru, and therefore the Party must change its course as well. Carlos Tapia García lays out "The tasks for '94" (aid for Ayacucho, increased support for the self-defense committees, demilitarization of the police and transferring greater responsibility for fighting Sendero from the military to the police). Finally, Gustavo Gorriti writes, "Between *jus in bellum* and 9mm. parabellum," in which he reviews the performance of government and armed forces throughout the course of the war. He criticizes Fujimori, who he says had a chance to fight Sendero by strengthening democracy and popular organizations, but instead employed a dictatorial strategy and was the beneficiary of a stroke of good fortune. Are these qualities sufficient to anoint him the Sun Tzu of Kumamoto? Frankly, says Gorriti, the answer is no.

1185. "Nuevos escenarios rurales." *Ideéle*, año 5, no.59-60 (December 1993): 109-136.

Fourteen long years of violence have profoundly changed the country, particularly the rural countryside. Nine observers deliver a final commentary on the impact of Shining Path on Peru. Carlos Monge Salgado looks at "Power and violence in the countryside"; José Coronel examines the "Committees of civil defense"; Margarita Benavides looks at the Asháninka, victims of violence and war. Ricardo Soberón analyzes *narcotráfico*, and Isabel Coral Cordero describes the plight of the *desplazados*. Huberto Lanssiers asks, "[Is it necessary] to destroy the city in order to save it?" reflecting on the erosion of freedom in Peru over the course of fourteen years of counterinsurgency war. Carlos Iván Degregori looks at a "Difficult transition to the post-war [era]." The end of Sendero is not in the hands of one man, he writes, nor of a team of psychological warfare experts. The defeat of Shining Path must come from a democracy erected upon an ethical base that favors justice, solidarity, and economic development. Michel Azcueta writes of "Democracy, terror, and individualism," and César Hildebrant reflects on "Thirteen years, thirty thousand deaths."

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Keeping Up With the Shining Path

Although Abimael Guzmán and many of his followers have been effectively neutralized, some factions of Sendero Luminoso continue their war to take power in Peru. There are a number of sources which interested Sendero-watchers can read to follow the ongoing struggle. The best is undoubtedly DESCO's *Resumen semanal,* a weekly publication from Lima which covered every facet of the war throughout the decade. In English, the monthly bulletin *Latin American Regional Reports,* published by the Latin American Bureau in London, provides good, fairly topical coverage of Latin America. Besides the *Weekly Report,* the Bureau also publishes the regionally-focused *Andean Report. The Sendero File*, published by the Federation of American Scientists Fund's Project on Peru, is "a monthly bulletin chronicling and assessing the ongoing struggle between the government of Peru and Sendero Luminoso."

Luis Arce Borja, who fled Peru after his pro-Sendero newspaper *El Diario* was closed by the government, publishes *El Diario Internacional,* in several languages, including English, from Brussels. The Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), a coalition of Maoist parties, publishes *A World to Win,* a glossy magazine which printed most of Sendero's important ideological documents during the 1980's. Both *El Diario* and *AWTW* represent the more-or-less "official" *senderista* line; both appear on an irregular basis. They are available in Revolutionary Communist Party, USA bookstores ("Revolution Books") throughout the United States. Also available from the same source is the *Emergency Bulletin,* published in London by the International Emergency Committee to Defend the Life of Dr. Abimael Guzmán. In the spring of 1994, *La nueva bandera,* a new publication supporting "President Gonzalo," mysteriously appeared, but gave no clue as to its origins other than its return address of a post office box in Queens, New York.

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